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The problem of establishing and safeguarding through institutional arrangements a 
consensus about some common values, elementary rights and fair procedures has 
become more urgent as our societies have become more pluralistic. Setting this kind of 
problem on the agenda, I found it appropriate to consider the political philosophy of 
John Rawls more closely. He has in a unique way handled the political and moral 
problems actualised by the fact of pluralism and the need for a common institutional 
framework for social co-operation.  
When turning to Rawls‟ philosophy, the intention is to consider vital parts of it in a 
theological perspektive. And it is indeed interesting to consider certain aspects of 
Rawls‟ political liberalism, and especially his idea of an overlapping consensus, in the 
perspective of theological social ethics, since the Rawlsian “overlap”, the core of which 
is a conception of justice, requires from the citizens a kind of moral backing, in accord-
ance with their deeper (religious) commitment. Thereby theological (social) ethics is 
challenged. 
In the present theological thesis Rawls‟ liberal conception is related to a theological con-
ception of social ethics, as conceived by Martin Honecker. There are good reasons for 
paying special attention to Honecker‟s conception in this connection. For even if Hon-
ecker does not very thoroughly and explicitly discuss Rawls‟ theory,  neither his con-
ception of political liberalism nor his idea of an overlapping consensus, there is never-
theless some kind of correspondence in thought between the theologian Honecker and 
the philosopher Rawls, which makes it interesting to bring them together,  at least in a 
dissertation. Honecker is, as well as Rawls, concerned about basic rights, the central 
issues of justice and the ground-values to be fairly shared and publicly justified in 
modern pluralistic societies. The issues handled in this dissertation should also be of 
great relevance in a Norwegian context, not just in an American or a German one.  
The Ethics Program of the Norwegian Research Council seemed to be the right place 
for projects of the kind I aimed for,  with an interest both in theology and philosophy. 
When the Ethics Program decided to give me a scholarship on terms that were also 
acceptable to my employer, Diakonhjemmet College, I could for nearly four years 
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devote myself to a problem, which I had for a long time already been concerned with: 
How may it be possible to establish and maintain a shared basis of social co-operation 
and public reasoning, when facing the deep diversity of modern societies?  
I very much want to thank the Norwegian Research Council, especially the Ethics Pro-
gram, and not least the leader of this program, prof. Dagfinn Föllesdal, as well as its 
coordinator, Tom Eide, for the interest they have taken in each one of us who were 
participants in the program. I am also very grateful to Diakonhjemmet College for en-
abling me to concentrate on the task of elaborating this thesis (with just some “disturb-
ances” following from the fact that I could after all not so easily drop out of all the tasks 
I was already involved in at the Research Department of Diakonhjemmet). But nonethe-
less I felt that I never lacked the necessary institutional backing from Diakonhjemmet, 
and I am especially grateful to Kjell Nordstokke and Einar Vetvik for their generosity. 
The dual structure of my project, however, meant that I had to join two doctoral pro-
grams, both the Ethics Program, which had a more philosophical aim and the official 
doctoral program of the Theological Faculty, required for all those aiming at a theologi-
cal degree of this kind. Even if the participation in two programs was quite demanding 
sometimes, I really profited from both. And not least I profited from cooperating with 
many fellow-candidates in these doctoral programs. The genuine interest that the many 
participants  with their highly different projects  took in one another‟s efforts, has in 
itself been a lesson in applied ethics and in co-operation based on mutual confidence. 
At a very early stage I asked, professor Svein Aage Christoffersen at the Theological 
Faculty of Oslo to be my main adviser. I very much appreciate that he so kindly and 
positively met my wish to have him as supervisor. Systematically, constructively and 
with insight he has responded to all the pages I produced. I also profited very much from 
the feed-back I got, by e-mail and face to face, from Thomas W. Pogge, professor of 
philosophy at Columbia University,. His insight in Rawls‟ philosophy is well known. He 
was certainly also very much concerned about the theological arguments! 
Considerable thanks also goes to Ingebjørg, mye wife, who for more than three years 
had to share the efforts both of a husband and a son, simultaneously working on their 
respective doctoral dissertations within highly different subject areas; engineering and 
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theology. Beside the demanding tasks she had in her own job, she took a genuine inter-
est in problems arising within the field of engineering as well as within the political 
philosophy of Rawls. 
Since Rawls is a philosopher whose ideas have for a long time been frequently exam-
ined, analysed and commented upon by many skilled persons within special fields of 
highly different nature, it may be nearly impossible to have a full overview over the 
literature published about his philosophy. In addition, the works and articles produced 
by Honecker are also numerous. I therefore had to limit myself quite strictly to the 
works which I considered particularly interesting for my purpose. The works and articles 
referred to in the texts and footnotes throughout the dissertation are included in my list 
of literature. However I have also included some works in my list of literature, which 
are not directly referred to in the text, but which have nevertheless been of importance 
for me when working out my thesis. Some of the works used in the doctoral courses of 
the Ethics Program were for instance relevant in this respect. Let it also be remarked 
that references to literature are explicitly and in a rather complete way given in each 
footnote throughout the thesis. This seemed convenient, however, since the thesis was 
continually revised, passages were moved, removed, inserted and omitted, until the 
entire “product” was completed at the end of January 1998. Of course this also means 
that the thesis does not reflect literature published after this time. 
Working simultaneously within philosophy and theological social ethics is a demanding 
task. But this kind of dialogue is also fascinating, challenging and, I believe, also highly 
required. 
Lörenskog, June 1999, 
Kai Ingolf Johannessen 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. The problem 
Modern societies possess a great diversity of people with different cultural backgrounds, 
life styles, moral convictions and religious and philosophical beliefs. These societies are 
very unlike the societies of earlier times where people that lived in close geographical 
proximity, appeared to be much more homogenous in their values and beliefs. Whereas 
this modern diversity should be considered an asset and whereas human differences are 
by no means always a source of problems
1, widespread rivalry over people‟s preferences 
and their diverse understanding of the good may be a political problem since open 
conflict may ensue. Weaker groups may be oppressed by stronger groups and people 
may feel that their perceived right to hold and further certain doctrines, is violated. 
Furthermore, vital decisions may be made by state authorities in favour of certain parties 
justified by ‟the due process of law‟.2 It is necessary to consider the extent to which 
basic equality and individual freedom can be safeguarded within the legal system, how 
rivalry and differences within a society may be restrained by coercive means and how 
far patterns of social co-operation and co-existence can be maintained in societies which 
‟work through differences‟.3 
                                                          
1
 The unproblematic and even positive aspects of diversity, and the possibilities opened up by pluralism, 
are clearly underlined in the book Moral Conflict. When Social Worlds Collide, eds. W. Barnett Pearce 
and Stephen W. Littlejohn (1997): “Sometimes, we are willing, even eager, to put our stories at risk by 
interacting with individuals who are different from us.… we deliberately seek out difference and change in 
a type of exploratory form of communication. Although one could spend a year travelling around the 
world without seeking difference, most sojourners enjoy travel precisely because it is an opportunity to 
explore other ways of being human, to learn new stories. Being exploratory requires seeing connections 
among stories, relating one system of thought to another, and importing ideas from one community into 
those of another. This pattern leads one to strive for improvement, to search for the ultimate good by 
seeing the various ways in which peoples at different times and in different places have come to 
understand their experience.” p.112. 
2
 It seems quite obvious that the existence of pluralism in itself actualises questions of political justice and 
fairness between the differing parties. After having first introduced three kinds of justice, Wolfgang Huber 
continues: “Diesen drei Elementen der iustitia commutiva, der iustitia contributiva und der iustitia 
distributiva tritt jedoch noch ein viertes, formales Element zur Seite. Ich bezeichne es gemäß der auf 
Aristoteles zurückgeführten Tradition als iustitia legalis oder Verfahrensgerechtigkeit. Während die drei 
ersten Elemente Prüfkriterien der Rechtssetzung darstellen, bildet die Verfahrensgerechtigkeit ein ent-
scheidendes Prüfkriterium der Rechtsanwendung. … Sie wird vor allem in den Regeln des angemessenen 
Prozeßverfahrens, des „due process of law‟ entwickelt und zur Geltung gebracht.” W.Huber, Gerechtigkeit 
und Recht. Grundlinien christlicher Rechtsethik (1996), p.196. 
3
 “Repression and violence signify the ultimate failure of traditional administrative, judicial, and 
democratic forms of decision making. They reflect society‟s inability to work through differences.” Moral 
Conflict. When Social Worlds Collide, eds. W. Barnett Pearce and Stephen W. Littlejohn (1997), p.119. 
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Understandably, there is considerable scepticism towards all attempts of establishing a 
shared moral basis in modern societies by political means. The differences in opinion 
with regard to values and moral standards are so deep as to appear to render all attempts 
of establishing a unified value-basis for society, entirely utopian. In addition, the impact 
of using the coercive powers of the state to combat pluralism
4
 by enforcing a ‟unifying‟ 
comprehensive
5
 moral doctrine, may appear to be destructive. 
In modern Western societies there has been a breakdown of confidence in an ‟absolute‟ 
authority. This entails a corresponding decline in the authority of the Church. The 
collapse of the former ‟corpus christianum‟ in our societies has to a considerable extent 
paved the way for the present situation of diversity (and increased tolerance?) with 
regard to beliefs, values and moral doctrines. The loss of confidence with respect to 
many explicit and implicit norms and values which have traditionally been promoted by 
the church and supported by the state, has contributed to a development towards an 
increased pluralism and prompted conflicts which, by their deep-rooted nature, cannot 
always be settled peacefully. Thus, a breakdown of confidence in a previously „absolute‟ 
authority may, without doubt, make society vulnerable to inner rivalries and dis-
integration. The increasing confidence in an autonomous ratio, accelerated in the age of 
Enligthenment, as a common basis for moral and political organisation of society after 
the collapse of the ‟corpus christianum‟, has hardly proved as successful as one may 
have hoped. Radical pluralism, as it may be observed in for example post-modernistic 
thought, raises doubt as to whether an autonomous ratio per se can provide a definite 
basis for overcoming serious conflicts and the disintegration of society. 
Nevertheless, in order to make social co-operation and coexistence possible and in order 
to have conflicts peacefully settled, it seems required that there is an instance in modern 
democratic societies with the legitimate authority and the political power both to 
guarantee a reasonable amount of liberty and plurality, and simultaneously to restrain 
                                                          
4
 Pluralism is in this connection used about a certain kind of heterogeneity within democratic societies; it 
means that there is a diversity among individuals (and groups) concerning religious faith, moral beliefs 
and (private) conceptions of the good. 
5
  Using the term comprehensive about moral or religious views one usually wants to stress that these 
religious and philosophical views cover a wide range of issues. This understanding correspond to 
Webster‟s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language (cf. the 1994-edition, p.302) 
where the term comprehensive is taken to mean “of large scope; covering or involving much; inclusive 
…” But in our connection the term comprehensive also characterises a view as “complete” in the sense 
that the deeper reasons for holding a view are also included. 
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socially unacceptable forms of pluralism. A reasonable diversity should somehow be 
settled, regulated and safeguarded by a common framework that most members of 
society consider to be fair.
6
 
John Rawls, one of the most prominent representatives of today‟s philosophy, has 
devoted himself to the question how a shared and fair framework for coexistence in 
pluralist democratic societies can be established and maintained. Rawls is the author of 
A Theory of Justice, published in 1971. Rawls book has had an enormous influence on 
the political and social sciences, as well as upon discussions and debates in ethics, 
economics and jurisprudence.  
In Rawls‟ latest book, Political Liberalism , published more than twenty years later 
(1993), the primary focus is still upon the possibility of establishing an organisation of 
society that can be accepted as „fairly just‟ by (nearly) all of its members. But as he, in 
his recent writings
7
, is so deeply engaged in the problem of diversity within modern 
societies, he now raises very clearly the urgent question: “how is it possible that there 
may exist over time a stable and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly 
divided by reasonable religious, philosophical and moral doctrines ?” 8 
Rawlsian political liberalism is concerned with establishing the most “fair background 
                                                          
6
 Alexander Schwan clearly sees that the state-authorities of democratic societies should give room for a 
reasonable pluralism. But simultaneously he also emphasises that a growing pluralism makes a common 
framework or a basic consensus even more urgent: “'Pluralismus' besagt also spezifisch, daß die vielen in 
der modernen Lebenswelt vorhandenen und wirkenden Kräfte ... ausdrücklich im Staat anerkannt und 
gutgeheißen werden und daß ihnen ein gesicherter Raum freier Entfaltung eröffnet wird, und zwar sofern 
sie ihrerseits die staatliche, im Grundkonsens des ganzen Volkes oder der gewählten politischen 
Repräsentanten festgelegte Verfassungsmäßige Ordnung bejahen oder zumindest respektieren. Diese 
Ordnung ist als Rahmen- und Strukturbedingung unerläßlich, damit allen pluralen Kräften Recht, Schutz 
and Wirkmöglichkeit in der Konkurrenz, beim Austrag von Konflikten, bei deren Lösung, im wechsel-
seitigen Austausch und in gegenseitiger Achtung zuteil werden können. Der Staat besteht also um der 
Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit für die vielen Individuen, Gruppen, Organisationen, Institutionen und Ideen 
willen. Er ist dann dafür verantwortlich, über den gesellschaftlichen Frieden zu wachen, der das freie und 
zugleich gerechte Spiel der pluralen Kräfte erlaubt; zu dessen Gewährleistung und zur Sicherung ihres 
eigenen Wohles wird den pluralen Kräften politische und weltanschauliche Toleranz im Verhältnis 
zueinander sowie die Anerkennung der staatlichen Ordnung abverlangt.” A. Scwan: “Pluralismus und 
Wahrheit”, Christlicher Glaube in moderner Gesellschaft, Vol. 19 (1981, second edition), p.147f. 
7
 The term “recent” is here used to cover mainly the period after 1985, starting with the article Justice as 
Fairness: political not Metaphysical, Philosophy and Public Affairs (1985, Vol.14, No.3). Here one finds 
the crucial concern very clearly and sharply expressed, that “a workable conception of political justice 
…must allow for a diversity of doctrines and the plurality of conflicting, and indeed incommensurable, 
conceptions of the good affirmed by the members of existing, democratic societies.” (p.225).  
8
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.195. 
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conditions for different and even antagonistic conceptions of the good”.9 The concern 
for the institutional organisation of society is therefore crucial. The most essential poli-
tical task is to develop “a just basic structure within which permissible life styles have a 
fair opportunity to maintain themselves and to gain adherents over generations.”10 This 
implies that “the state, at least as concerns some constitutional essentials, is not to do 
anything intended to favour any particular comprehensive view.”11 Fundamental fairness 
obviously depends on a government‟s ability to achieve a proper balance between two 
vital concerns:  
 The concern for impartiality, which implies that state authorities should, as far as 
possible, be neutral about matters of religion, faith and comprehensive morality.  
 The task of providing individuals, groups and associations with differing conceptions 
of the good life, a fairly equal opportunity to prosper. 
Rawls could not solve his task satisfactorily merely by developing a new comprehensive 
political doctrine to be imposed upon citizens by an external authority. Instead it appears 
that he intends to establish a platform beyond the existing (reasonable) comprehensive 
doctrines without obstructing or opposing them. In this connection he introduces an 
appropriate test-question, which political liberalism, grounded on a conception of justice 
as fairness, should pass; namely: “Is Justice as Fairness Fair to [different] Conceptions 
of the Good?”12 Rawls hopes that political liberalism can pass this test, and he gives 
good reasons for believing that it can. If he succeeds in his project, this would be a 
decisive step towards establishing a consensual basis for social co-operation in pluralist 
societies. The Rawlsian project is indeed ambitious: Rawls hopes to pave the way for an 
overlapping consensus about vital terms of coexistence, which can be accepted as fair 
from highly different perspectives. Therefore the question, “Is Justice as Fairness Fair to 
[different] Conceptions of the Good?”, is particularly crucial.  
It might be appropriate, however, to shift the perspective and to try to answer the test-
question raised by Rawls from within a «comprehensive» view. Could Rawls‟ concep-
                                                          
9
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), 199. 
10
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.198. 
11
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.196. And Rawls simultaneously adds that “At this point the 
contrast between political and comprehensive liberals becomes clear and fundamental.” 
12
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.195 
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tion of political liberalism, with its built-in idea of an overlapping consensus, really be 
considered fair and morally acceptable from a Christian perspective,  i.e. from moral 
principles given within theology itself?  
The main question of the present thesis can now be properly formulated: How may it be 
possible from within theological social ethics to endorse an overlapping consensus as 
conceived of by premises given in Rawls‟ political liberalism? In The idea of an Over-
lapping consensus Rawls defines an overlapping consensus about a moral-political 
conception as: 
“…. a consensus in which it [a political conception] is affirmed by the opposing 
religious, philosophical and moral doctrines likely to thrive over generations in a 
more or less just constitutional democracy, where the criterion of justice is that 
political conception itself.”13 
The main question raised in the present dissertation should be of considerable interest 
from the point of view of theological social ethics, and should simultaneously count as a 
fundamental „litmus-test‟ to the Rawlsian project as such. 14 
1.2. John Rawls, biography and main works 
In the following I shall give a brief sketch of John Rawls‟ biography and a short review 
of his works. This is judged sufficient for my present purpose. 
John Bordley Rawls was born in 1921 in Maryland (Baltimore) 
15
. His family was 
fairly wealthy. John Rawls, however, clearly realised that there were grave inequalities 
in the American society and that a lot of poor people did not have fair or equal access to 
educational or economic opportunities. The injustice could not be overlooked. 
John Rawls went to a private school (Calwert School) from 1927 till 1933 and then to 
the Kent School, a private school for boys. The Kent School was an Episcopalian 
                                                          
13
 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies  (Vol.7; No.1, 1987), p.1. 
14
 Rawls accepts this test-question: “Thus, a conception of justice may fail because it cannot gain the 
support of reasonable citizens who affirm reasonable comprehensive doctrines; or as I shall often say, it 
cannot gain the support of a reasonable overlapping consensus. Being able to do this is necessary for an 
adequate political conception of justice…” J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.36. 
15
 There are written several books about John Rawls. I can for instance refer to: C. Kukathas & P. Pettit: 
John Rawls. En introduktion (Swedish translation 1992),  Wolfgang Kersting: John Rawls zur Einführung 
(1993),  Thomas W. Pogge: John Rawls (1994). The latter book gives both an informative biographical 
overview as well as a clear introduction to Rawls‟ political conception as such. In my short biography I 
am especially drawing on Pogge‟s book.  
 6 
institution which allowed very little latitude in terms of behaviour and religious duties. 
(The pupils had for instance to attend one church service every day, except on Sundays 
when they had to attend two). John Rawls did not find the intellectual standard of the 
school especially high. 
When the second world war broke out, John Rawls started at Princeton. He studied 
mathematics, chemical subjects and history of arts, but at last he turned to philosophy. 
He was especially influenced by Norman Malcolm who had studied under Wittgenstein 
and had written his thesis for C.S.Lewis. In 1942 Rawls participated in a seminar held 
by Malcolm about the evil of man, an issue actualised by the war. The students read 
texts written by Plato, Augustine, Bishop Butler, the theologian Reinhold Niebuhr and 
others. 
Upon finishing his undergraduate degree at Princeton, Rawls enlisted in the army and 
served in the Pacific, New-Guinea, the Philippines and Japan. He remained in the army 
until 1946. 
Rawls returned to Princeton as a Graduate Student in philosophy where he remained 
(with one year‟s break) until he had finished his dissertation about the human 
character.
16
 During this period he also attended courses within economics, political 
theory and constitutional law. 
In 1949 he married Margareth.
17
 They had four children. 
During 1952 and 1953 Rawls lived in Oxford where he became acquainted with 
H.L.A.Hart, a lecturer in jurisprudence. Here, Rawls also participated in seminaries on 
Kant‟s Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten and Mill‟s On Liberty, held among 
others by I. Berlin.   
In 1953, Rawls was appointed an assistant professor at Cornell University, and three 
years later was appointed Associate Professor. 
In 1959 he went to Harvard to give lectures for one year. The next year he was ap-
                                                          
16
 The exact title of his thesis was. A study in the Grounds of Ethical Knowledge: Considered with 
Reference to Judgements on the Moral Worth of Character. (1950) 
17
 She was especially concerned with Art and History of Art. And she was also engaged in work for equal 
rights for women. 
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pointed as a professor at Massachusetts institute of Technology (where he was a col-
league of Noam Chomsky). In 1962 Rawls returned to Harvard where he has remained. 
The years at Harvard were obviously very stimulating. But there were difficulties too, 
especially during the Vietnam war era, which was characterised by widespread student 
activism in protest of the war. Rawls himself was very critical of the war. Some of 
Rawls' colleagues, however, had very different views. In his position as chairman of the 
Philosophical Seminary in 1970, Rawls had to handle many internal conflicts. 
Rawls' A Theory of Justice (Theory) was published in 1971, and quickly met with inter-
national acclaim. 
While this is not the place for a bibliography of Rawls' writings
18
, some comments 
addressing the relation between his two main works, “A Theory of Justice,” published in 
1971, and Political Liberalism, published over twenty years later in 1993, are in order. 
Even if A Theory of Justice decisively influenced the philosophical, moral and political 
debate from the day it was published, the ideas it expressed had already been presented 
by Rawls as subjects of public discussion. Thus Rawls himself says: 
“In presenting a theory of justice I have tried to bring together into one coherent 
view the ideas expressed in the papers I have written over the past dozen years or so. 
All of the central topics of these essays are taken up again, usually in considerably 
more detail.… Although the main ideas are much the same, I have tried to eliminate 
inconsistencies and to fill out and strengthen the argument at many points.”19 
And he mentions explicitly several essays, which are now integrated in his main work in 
a more or less revised version.
20
 
                                                          
18
 Andreas Föllesdal has elaborated such a bibliography, to which I am very much indebted. Cf. Norsk 
Statsvitenskapelig Tidsskrift, 1994, 2:261-263. 
19
 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), p.vii. 
20
 He refers himself explicitly to: “Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics” (1951, The Philosophical 
Review, vol. 60, 177-197, where he takes up ideas from his thesis, which he had the foregoing year 
defended for a Ph.D);  “Justice as Fairness” (1958, The Philosophical Review, 67, 164-194. A thinner 
essay about Justice as Fairness had been published in Journal of Philosophy, 54, 653-662, 1957);  “The 
sense of Justice” (1963, The philosophical Review, 72, 281-305);  “Constitutional Liberty” (1963, In 
C.J.Friedrich & J.W.Chapman, Nomos: Justice, 98-125, New York: Atherton Press);  “Distributive 
Justice” (1967, In P.Laslett & W.G.Runciman, Philosophy, Politics and Society, Third Series, 58-82, 
London: Blackwell);  “Distributive Justice: Some Addenda” (1968, Natural Law Forum, 13,15-71);  “The 
Justification of Civil Disobedience” (1969, In Hugo A. Bedau, Civil disobedience: Theory and Practice, 
240-255, New York: Pegasus). 
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Similarly, Political Liberalism, reflects the integration and refinement of ideas that 
Rawls had expressed in previously published essays/lectures and which were, therefore, 
already part of the public discussion.
21
 
Rawls has produced other noteworthy essays relating to the above
22
 and my thesis draws 
heavily on some of Rawls most recent articles. 
A Theory of Justice remains Rawls‟ most famous and influential book and in that 
respect is considered his principal work. Rawls is inseparably associated with the 
conception of justice as fairness, and the two principles of justice that he so thoroughly 
elaborated in A Theory of Justice have been the subject of intense public discussion for 
almost 30 years: 
“First Principle 
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic 
liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.”23 
Second Principle 
“Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both 
a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and 
                                                          
21
 He mentions explicitly: “The Basic Structure as Subject” (1978, In A.I Goldman & J.Kim, Values and 
Morals: Essays in Honor of William Frankena, Charles Stevenson, and Richard B. Brandt, 47-71, 
Dordrecht: D.Reidel Publishing Company);  “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory. The Dewey 
Lectures” (1980, Journal of Philosophy, 77, 515-572);  “The Basic Liberties and Their Priority” (1982, In 
The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Vol. 3, 3-87, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, Editor: 
Sterling M. McMurrin);  “Justice as Fairness. Political not Metaphysical” (1985, Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, 14, 223-251);  “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus” (1987, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 
7, 1-25);  “The Domain of the political and Overlapping Consensus” (1989, New York University Law 
Review, 64, 233-255. (The last three essays are considerably revised and also combined when integrated 
in Political Liberalism together with Public Reason, which appeared now for the first time.) 
22
 Cf. for instance: “Two Concepts of Rule” (1955, Philosophical Review, 64, 3-32);  “The Sense of 
Justice” (1963, The Philosophical Review, 72, 281-305);  “Justice as Reciprocity” (1971, In S.Gorovitz, 
Utilitarianism: John Stuart Mill, with Critical Essays, 242-268, New York: Bobs Merill);  “Distributive 
Justice” (1973, In Edmund S. Phelps, Economic Justice, 319-362, London: Penguin. This essay combines 
ideas that were presented by Rawls in two earlier essays about the same issue in 1967 and 1968);  
“Fairness to Goodness” (1975, The Philosophical Review, 84, 536-554); A Kantian Conception of 
Equality (1975, Cambridge Review, 94-99);  “Social Unity and primary Goods” (1982, Amartya Sen & 
Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism and beyond, 159-185);  “The Priority of Right and ideas of the Good” 
(1988, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 17, 251-276);  “The Law of Peoples” (1994, in Stephen Shute and 
Susan Hurley, On Human Rights, The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993, 41-82);  “Reply to Habermas” 
(1995, Journal of Philosophy, 132-180);  “Introduction to the Paperback Edition” (in Political 
Liberalism, 1996), “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” (1997, The University of Chicago Law Review, 
vol. 64, 765-806).  
23
 The first principle is taken from J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), p.250. 
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b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity.”24 
The main aim of the present research-project is not to discuss Rawls‟ theory of justice 
rigorously. It is, however, necessary for me to be well acquainted with the most essential 
aspects of his conception of justice and with the main lines of the debate, since Rawls‟ 
consensual efforts cannot be analysed independently of the idea of justice as fairness. 
However, I will also emphasise that Rawls himself, in his more recent writings allows 
for different conceptions of justice, when seeking a shared basis for fair social coope-
ration and public reasoning. As Rawls states, “Political liberalism, then, does not try to 
fix public reason once and for all in the form of one favoured conception of justice. That 
would not be a sensible approach.”25  
Rawls ends his most recent article, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited (1997), by 
comparing his two main works, A Theory of Justice (1971) and Political Liberalism 
(1993), in a way well worth noticing: 
“I end by pointing out the fundamental difference between A Theory of Justice and 
Political Liberalism. The first explicitly attempts to develop from the idea of the 
social contract, represented by Locke, Rousseau, and Kant, a theory of justice that is 
no longer open to objections often thought fatal to it, and that proves superior to the 
long dominant tradition of utilitarianism. A Theory of Justice hopes to present the 
structural features of such a theory so as to make it the best approximation to our 
considered judgments of justice and hence to give the most appropriate moral basis 
for a democratic society. Furthermore, justice as fairness is presented there as a 
comprehensive liberal doctrine (although the term “comprehensive doctrine” is not 
used until later) in which all the members of its well ordered society affirm that 
same doctrine. This kind of well ordered society contradicts the fact of reasonable 
pluralism and hence Political Liberalism regards that society as impossible.  
Thus, Political Liberalism considers a different question, namely: How is it possible 
for those affirming a comprehensive doctrine, religious or nonreligious, and in 
particular doctrines based on religious authority, such as the Church or the Bible, 
                                                          
24
 The second principle is taken from J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), p.83. Let me now add that 
Rawls also introduces two priority rules: the first priority rule securing “The Priority of Liberty” and the 
second priority rule securing “The Priority of Justice over Efficiency and Welfare”. Cf. J. Rawls, A 
Theory of Justice (1971), p.302, where the priority rules are elaborated in detail. Let it also be added that 
the so-called “opportunity-principle” and the “difference-principle” may sometimes be referred to in 
reverse order. Usually “the difference principle” is the second part of Rawls‟  second principle of justice. 
This is the case in Andreas Föllesdal‟s article on “Human Worth and Human Rights Based on John Rawls 
Contractualism” in Menneskverd. Humanistiske perspektiver (1982), ed. Jon Wetlesen, p.116, just as it is 
normally the case in Political Liberalism (cf. p.291). 
25
 J. Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, The University of Chicago Law Review (1997;3), 
p.774. 
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also to hold a reasonable political conception of justice that supports a constitutional 
democratic society? The political conceptions are seen as both liberal and self-
standing and not as comprehensive, whereas the religious doctrines may be compre-
hensive but not liberal. The two books are asymmetrical, though both have an idea 
of public reason. In the first, public reason is given by a comprehensive liberal 
doctrine, while in the second, public reason is a way of reasoning about political 
values shared by free and equal citizens that does not trespass on citizens‟ compre-
hensive doctrines so long as those doctrines are consistent with a democratic polity. 
Thus, the well ordered constitutional democratic society of Political Liberalism is 
one in which the dominant and controlling citizens affirm and act from irreconcil-
able yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines. These doctrines in turn support 
reasonable political conceptions  although not necessarily the most reasonable  
which specify the basic rights and liberties and opportunities of citizens in society‟s 
basic structure.”26 
It is not difficult to see that the ideas originally set out in a Theory of Justice have 
evolved, incorporating modifications and innovations, even as Political Liberalism 
demonstrates the continuity in the Rawlsian concern for a society that reflects a shared 
and fair scheme of social co-operation. A decisive influence in the evolution of Rawls‟ 
ideas since A Theory of Justice was published, is an increased insight in the pheno-
menon of pluralism, which inevitably characterises modern liberal democracies. Indeed, 
addressing the problem of pluralism and especially that of a reasonable pluralism, is a 
major part of Rawls‟ project in Political Liberalism. Moreover, the very phenomenon of 
pluralism actualises the demand for an overlapping consensus, as Rawls clearly recog-
nises in The idea of an overlapping consensus (1987), and in Political Liberalism 
(1993).  
Since I am mainly concerned with Rawls‟ consensual efforts, as actualised through the 
fact of pluralism, it is most natural to concentrate on his more recent writings, with 
special weight on Political Liberalism
27
, where the idea of an overlapping consensus is 
thoroughly elaborated, as is also Rawls‟ idea of public reason with the accompanying 
ideal of a duty of civility. However, Rawls still draws also on the idea of a social con-
tract, based on consent, and this idea cannot be omitted in a thesis concerned with an 
agreed basis for social coexistence. It is still of importance when addressing the problem 
of establishing a voluntary consensual basis for social co-operation. And in fact Rawls‟ 
                                                          
26
 J. Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, The University of Chicago Law Review (1997;3), 
p.806f. 
27
 Let it here also be mentioned that Rawls sets some new accents in his introduction to the paperback 
edition of Political Liberalism (1996), as will be shown. 
 11 
idea of a social contract plays a role not just in A Theory of Justice but also in Political 
Liberalism as well as in other writings.  
Rawlsian thought is often employed, quoted and referred to in political and moral 
debates when issues of basic justice are set on the agenda, and is also taken into account 
when people are concerned with matters of pluralism, political values, the terms of 
public reason and the shared premises for an overlapping consensus. The way in which 
Rawls unfolds his ideas on these topics presents an interesting challenge from the per-
spective of theological (social) ethics. Although Rawlsian liberalism is presented as a 
strictly political conception, this does not mean that political liberalism should eo ipso 
be excluded from the interest-sphere of comprehensive moral, religious and philo-
sophical doctrines. On the contrary, it is precisely because it is a political liberalism that 
Rawls can hope for support for his consensual project from within very different 
doctrines. 
And thus the question arises again: How might it be possible for theological social 
ethics to endorse Rawls‟ liberal conception as a shared basis for social co-operation and 
coexistence in pluralist societies? 
1.3. Some remarks on the research situation 
As mentioned, Rawls is first and foremost associated with the conception of “justice as 
fairness”. A concern for justice is also central within Christian social-ethics. This con-
vergence of concerns alone should guarantee a theological interest in Rawls‟ political 
philosophy. Considering, however, that Rawls‟ main work was published in 1971, the 
lack of systematic theological contributions to the Rawls-debate is quite remarkable. 
Within the fields of politics and philosophy “A Theory of Justice” has been a topic of 
discussion and debate since its publication. It may be possible to identify several main 
positions in the philosophical debate. Identifying these positions  very roughly  will 
help determine the boundaries of the debate. The following three main-positions should 
be mentioned: 
1. The neo-liberals (the view they hold can also be classified as “libertarianism”) argue 
that Rawls‟ liberal conception of justice does not really guarantee the rights of indi-
 12 
viduals, but might instead undermine personal freedom. If state-authorities are given 
a justified right to interfere in matters concerning property, economy and redistri-
bution, individual liberty might very soon be strictly limited. Libertarians instead 
wish to limit the mandate of the state to a considerable extent. “Libertarians maintain 
that … only a minimal or night-watchman state that protects against force, theft, and 
fraud can be justified.”28 Robert Nozick has been considered one of the most influ-
ential spokesmen for the neo-liberal view.
29
 
2. The communitarians criticise Rawls from the opposite point of view, for giving the 
individual perspective too much importance. For communitarians, the community, 
the social moral and cultural centre of human beings, is not given its proper and 
constitutive place in Rawls‟ theory. In spite of his interest for the very basic structure 
and for society as a fair system of co-operation, it is the individual perspective which 
is dominating in a Rawlsian liberalism according to most communitarians. For 
instance, Rawls' original position does not allow individuals to define themselves by 
their personal attachments and social bonds. Michael J. Sandel has a reputation as a 
representative of a communitarian perspective and as a critic of Rawls.
30
 
3. From a Marxist point of view Rawlsian liberalism appears to be viewed as a kind of 
reformism. In Rawls‟ conception the perspective of class-struggle is not constitutive. 
The liberal society is instead taken as a fair co-operative system. In accordance with a 
Marxian approach some theologians might criticise Rawls‟ lack of class-analysis, his 
liberal individualism and his confidence in human rationality.
31
 
The theological contribution to the debate on Rawls‟ ideas, his theory of justice and 
political liberalism, is not very significant. Although Rawls may frequently be referred 
to in theological articles and books, not least in the English-speaking part of the world, 
Rawls' philosophy does not appear to have been subjected yet to a thorough and 
                                                          
28
 J. P. Sterba in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (1995). Libertarianism is here contrasted to so 
called welfare liberalism. “Welfare liberals maintain that …coercive institutions of a welfare state 
requiring a guaranteed social minimum and equal opportunity are justified.” Ibid., p.628 
29
 Cf. for instance Anarchy, State and Utopia, which was first published by Basic Books, Inc. 1974. (I 
have used a Swedish translation. Anarki, Stat och Utopi, Stockholm 1986). 
30
 Cf. M.J.Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (first published 1982). 
31
 But as far as I can see it is possible to find in Rawls‟ concern for justice also essential aspects that could 
for instance be utilised within a perspective of “liberation theology”. In this respect is the dissertation 
written by H. Bedford-Strohm, Vorrang für die Armen (1992), very interesting. 
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systematically analysis from a theological point of view.
 32
   
In as much as I am discussing Rawls work in a European context, I will refer to some 
literature in the German and Norwegian debate, where Rawls theory is examined or 
mentioned. Here, in the European context, I feel even more justified in claiming that 
Rawls‟ ideas have not really been examined from the perspective of theological social 
ethics. The work of the following writers merit, however, further mentioning here: 
Arthur Rich considers Rawls' theory at some length in the first volume of his ethics of 
economy. Christian faith and Christian love might provide society with an increasing 
sense of justice. In a similar way  but based upon the rationality and reasonableness of 
man and his natural sense of justice  Rawls work can contribute to increased justice 
and a strengthening of fair co-operation in society. Rich is fundamentally appreciative of 
Rawls‟ ideas.33 
Martin Honecker recognises that Rawls clearly intends to develop a moral conception 
of justice which, from the point of view of theological social ethics, is the strength of 
Rawls' theory.
34
 According to Honecker, however, Rawls‟ conception of justice is 
                                                          
32
 The overview “Zur Rawls-Rezeption in der theologischen Ethik” given by Bedford-Strohm (Vorrang 
für die Armen, 1992, pp.21-24), supports the view that more thorough systematic-theological approaches 
to Rawls‟ conception are difficult to find in the English/American-speaking part of the world too. 
Nevertheless Bedford-Strohm refers to K. Lebacqs: Justice in an unjust World. Foundations for a 
Christian Approach to Justice, Minneapolis 1987. (Cf. also Six Theories of Justice. Perspectives from 
Philosophical and Theological Ethics, Minneapolis 1986). And H. Beckley: “A Christian Affirmation of 
Rawls's Idea of Justice as Fairness” (in Journal of Religious Ethics, part 1;1985, part 2;1986) is also 
worth mentioning. Harlan Beckley sees in Rawls‟ ideas a proper basis for an overlapping consensus 
among Christian and non-Christian citizens. The anthropology of John Rawls  with emphasis upon 
morality, equality, liberty and rationality  is to a certain extent considered compatible with central ideas 
in Christian ethics.  Bedford-Strohm also refers to W. Werpehowski: Social Justice Selves: John Rawls's 
'Theory of Justice' and Christian Ethics (1981). William Werpehowski finds an essential compatibility 
between Rawls‟ conception of a just (“human”) society and central ideas of Christian ethics. His criteria 
for judging Rawls‟ conception are taken from the theology of Karl Barth, as expressed in “the humanity of 
God” (die Mitmenschlichkeit Gottes).  And let me also add that David Tracy refers to Rawls as a 
philosopher with a mixed theory for ethical reflection [which] allows any intelligent and rational person to 
enter the argument on genuinely common grounds without prior commitments to Rawls‟ own “personal 
preferences”. Cf. D.Tracy, The Analogical Imagination. Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism 
(1991). But of course it will be impossible for me now to refer to (nearly) all the theological books an 
articles where Rawls is mentioned or used for some particular purpose. 
33
 Cf. A. Rich: Wirtschaftsethik. Bd.1: Grundlagen in theologischer Perspektive (1984). 
34
 Cf. M. Honecker Einführung in die Theologische Ethik (1990), p. 190f.: “John Rawls will erneut 
Gerechtigkeit und Moral - wie vor ihm Platon, Aristoteles, Kant - aneinander binden. Er beabsichtigt eine 
Herleitung von Gerechtigkeitsprinzipien aus Moral. … So stellt sich die Frage: Ist Gerechtigkeit 
überhaupt rational zu definieren? Ist jede Berufung auf Gerechtigkeit nur „Leerformel‟ zu Zwecke 
ideologsicher Legitimation bestehender Machtverhältnisse? Es stellt sich also die Aufgabe der 
Ideologiekritik: Kann man Gerechtigkeit überhaupt theoretisch  wie Platon und Rawls es versuchen  
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simultaneously too abstract, even if it provides us with „Klugheitsregeln‟ which are 
useful in a more pragmatic perspective.
35
 I shall more thoroughly consider Honecker‟s 
theological conception in the main body of the thesis. 
Heinrich Bedford-Strohm has completed a research-project in social ethics in which 
he analysed the pronouncements given by U.S. Catholic bishops concerning justice and 
social responsibility. Bedford-Strohm's dissertation pays considerable attention to John 
Rawls' theory of justice. He has no difficulty in recognising, and to a great extent inte-
grating, Rawlsian moral principles of justice with comparable theological doctrines of 
social ethics. 
36
 According to Bedford-Strohm, there is good reason to believe that the 
social implications of Rawls' conception of justice should render it creditable from the 
side of the church. 
Helmut Kaiser considers Rawls‟ theory of justice in some detail in Zeitschrift für 
Evangelische Ethik 1991(4).
37
 Although concerned with the role of justice within the 
domain of business and economy, Kaiser also focuses more generally on the issue of 
„fairness‟ which is so essential of Rawls‟ theory of justice.38   
                                                                                                                                                                          
losgelöst von den empirsichen Verhältnissen bestimmen? … An Rawls‟ Versuch einer vernünftigen 
Definition von Gerechtigkeit wird nochmals die Aporie erkennbar; vor welche die Idee der Gerechtigkeit 
führt. Gerechtigkeit entspricht einer ebenso ursprünglichen Sehnsucht des Menschen, wie sie zugleich ein 
schillerndes und vieldeutiges Phänomen ist. Eine wissenschaftlich annähernd vertretbare Bestimmung von 
Moral muß stets formal bleiben.” Cf. also M. Honecker,“Rechtfertigung und Gerechtigkeit in der 
Perspektive Evangelischer Theologie”, Jahrbuch des evangelischen Bundes 23 (1990). Honecker 
considers Rawls‟ conception of justice to be “abstract”, but nevertheless practically valuable. Since 
Honecker‟s theological conception of social ethics will be considered more thoroughly later in my 
dissertation, I shall then seek for a much broader and deeper theological basis within the social ethics of 
Honecker for approaching the philosophy of Rawls. 
35
 And thus Honecker can also say: “Rawls‟ Regeln zur Bestimmung von Gerechtigkeit sind zweifellos 
pragmatisch wichtig als „Klugheitsregeln‟, auch wenn sie für die theoretische Verbindung von 
Gerechtigkeit und Moral nicht zureichen.” M. Honecker, Einführung in die Theologische Ethik, 
Grundlagen und Grundbegriffe (1990), p.191. 
36
 Cf. H. Bedford-Strohm: Vorrang für die Armen. Auf dem Wege zu einer theologischen Theorie der 
Gerechtigkeit, 1993. I refer to the original version of the dissertation, defended at the University of 
Heidelberg in 1993. The dissertation is later published by Christian Kaiser. 
37
 H. Kaiser, “Von der „Brüderlichkeit‟ zur Gerechtigkeitstheorie von John Rawls: Eine Vermittlung von 
Ethik und Wirtschaft”, Zeitschrift für Evangelische Ethik (1991;4), pp.248-267. 
38
 Helmut Kaiser‟s considerations to the idea of “fairness” as used by Rawls, are very much to the point 
and might appropriately be presented in this introductionary chapter to my own thesis. Kaiser starts by 
contrasting the principle of fairness with a utilitarian approach: “J.Rawls Kritik am Nutzenprinzip besteht 
darin, daß das Ziel dieses Utilitätsprinzips  das größte Glück der größten Zahl  dem Fairneßgrundsatz 
widersprechen kann. Denn es ist utilitaristisch durchaus denkbar und legitimierbar, daß ein einzelner, 
einzelne Gruppen mit dem Glück der Mehrheit aufgerechnet werden. Dies ist jedoch nach J.Rawls ethisch 
nicht zulässig, weil für ihn das Fairneßprinzip „Zu jedermanns Vorteil‟ gilt. Er stellt sich die Gesellschaft 
als ein System von fairer Zusammenarbeit vor, welche als Kooperation zu wechselseitigem Vorteil durch 
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Joachim von Soosten considers in his article on the communitarian critique of deon-
tological moral approaches, among others John Rawls‟ conception of justice.39 He is 
especially concerned with the question whether “the right” should be given some kind of 
priority over “the good”, as Rawls seems to suggest.40  
                                                                                                                                                                          
eine Identität von Interessen bestimmt ist: „Die Frage der Fairneß ergibt sich, wenn freie Personen, die 
keine Herrschaft übereinander ausüben, sich an einer gemeinschaftlichen Tätigkeit beteiligen und sich 
untereinander auf die Regeln einigen beziehungsweise die Regeln anerkennen, die diese Tätigkeit 
definieren und die jeweiligen Anteile an Vorteilen und Lasten festlegen. Die Parteien halten eine Praxis 
gewöhnlich dann für fair, wenn keiner das Gefühl hat, er oder einer der anderen werde durch Beteiligung 
daran übervorteilt oder werde dazu genötigt, Ansprüchen nachzugeben, die nicht als legitim empfunden 
werden. Fairneß ist eine soziale Kategorie, gekennzeichnet durch Herrschaftsfreiheit, Gleichheit und 
Konsens. Das Fair play beinhaltet für J.Rawls eine „Einschränkung des Eigennutzens‟, wobei die 
Einschränkung des eigennützigen Strebens eine Verhaltensform ist, „durch die Teilnehmer an einer 
gemeinsamen Praxis ihre wechselseitige Anerkennung als Personen mit gleichen Interessen und 
Fähighkeiten zeigen‟. Mit diesem für J.Rawls zentralen Begriff der Fairneß hat er für seine Theorie der 
Gerechtigkeit zentrale anthropologische Vorentscheidungen getroffen, welche eine Absetzung zum 
klassischen ökonomischen Menschenbild bedeuten, welches seit und  fälschlicherweise  mit Bezug auf 
Adam Smith den Eigennutz und das egoistische Erfolgskalkül als alleinige Triebfeder des gesellschaft-
lichen Wohlstandes bestimmt. Mit der Anerkennung des Anderen im Fair play wird erstens das 
egoistische Verhalten überwunden, bei welchem der einzelne seine Ansprüche und Interessen in den 
Vordergrund stellt, ohne diejenigen des anderen zu berücksichtigen. Fairneß stellt vielmehr eine 
Beziehung der positiven Gegenseitigkeit dar, in welcher eine gegenseitige Verständigung über Ansprüche, 
Bedürfnisse und Interessen geschieht. Damit kann noch nicht von Solidarität oder Brüderlichkeit in dem 
Sinne gesprochen werden, daß man sich vorbehaltslos für den anderen einsetzt, doch basiert Fairneß auf 
der goldenen Regel, welche in ihrer positiven Formulierung im Neuen Testament heißt: „Alles, was ihr 
wollt, das euch die Leute tun, sollt auch ihr ihnen tun.‟ (Mt 7,12) … Zweitens fordert J. Rawls mit dem 
Gedanken der Fairneß, daß der Gedanke des Gemeinwohls im Utilitarismus nicht allein kollektiv, sondern 
distributiv verstanden werden muß. Es darf nicht allein auf das maximale Gesamtwohl ankommen, 
vielmehr muß die Verteilung des Gesamtwohls auf die verschiedenen Mitglieder der Gesellschaft eine 
„selbständige Rolle‟ spielen. … Mit dem Begriff der Fairneß sind damit wichtige ethische 
Voraussetzungen für den Gerechtigkeitsbegriff geschaffen, welche in drei Punkten zusammengefaßt 
werden können, womit gleichzeitig die Leitidee der Brüderlichkeit aufgenommen wird:  
- Fairneß geht davon aus, daß das eigene Handeln vorgängig auf das Handeln des anderen bezogen ist und 
beinhaltet mit der goldenen Regel die positive Forderung, daß das Handeln dem Kriterium „Zu 
jedermanns Vorteil‟ genügen muß. 
- Fairneß enhält damit das Kriterium des distributiven Vorteils, welches besagt, daß das Wohl des 
einzelnen eine besondere Berücksichtigung erfährt und nicht nutzensummentheoretisch aufgerechnet und 
vernachlässigt werden darf. 
- Wird Brüderlichkeit verstanden als „Für-andere-Dasein‟ (D.Bonhoeffer), welches auf der wechsel-
seitigen Angewiesenheit der Gesellschaftsmitglieder aufeinander beruht, dann gibt es zwischen Fairneß 
und Brüderlichkeit dort eine grundsätzliche Übereinstimmung, wo die „positive Gegenseitigkeit‟ (Mt 
7,12) als Grundstruktur einer jeden menschlichen Beziehung angenommen und damit die „Koinzidenz von 
Moral und Selbstinteresse‟ aufgebrochen wird.” H. Kaiser, “Von der „Brüderlichkeit‟ zur Gerechtig-
keitstheorie von John Rawls: Eine Vermittlung von Ethik und Wirtschaft”, Zeitschrift für Evangelische 
Ethik (1991;4), p.256f. 
39
 J. von Soosten, “Gerechtigkeit ohne Solidarität? Deontologische Ethik in der Kritik”, Zeitschrift für 
Evangelische Ethik (1992;1), pp.61-74. 
40
 It seems as if von Soosten to some extent defends Rawls against the criticism of Michael Sandel: “Vor 
allem ermöglicht Sandels Begründung der prioritären Stellung des Guten keine Antwort auf die Frage, wie 
der normative Rahmen moderner Gesellschaften beshaffen sein muß, unter deren Bedingungen eine 
Vielfalt rivalisierender Konzepte des guten Lebens miteinander koexistieren und kooperieren können. 
Weil eine Antwort hierauf ausbleibt, gelangt Rawls folgerichtig zu der Überzeugung, daß nur die von ihm 
ausgearbeiteten Gerechtigkeitsprinzipien die historisch errungene Freiheit zur Verwirklichung 
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Wolfgang Huber pays considerable attention to Rawls‟ philosophy in his book about 
Gerechtigkeit und Recht (1996). Huber touches upon Rawls‟ concern for consensus, but 
it is especially his theory of justice upon which he focuses. Huber obviously assesses 
Rawls‟ theory positively and stresses that Rawls in an appropriate way has combined 




In a German-speaking context, and with the noted exception of Bedford Strohm's dis-
sertation, Rawls‟ theory has not previously been very systematically considered from a 
theological point of view.  
In a Norwegian context of theological social-ethics, Rawls is sometimes mentioned.  
Professor Axel Smith, in his book from 1982 about “just distribution”42, discusses 
Rawls‟ conception of justice. He appears to find the theory interesting, but is never-
theless critical. Smith finds very little in Rawlsian liberalism that might contribute to 
diminishing the unjust gap between rich and poor in the world to-day. Smith further 
views Rawls‟ method for grounding an institutional scheme of social co-operation on a 
fundamental consent from all coexisting parties, as incapable of dealing with the funda-
mental conflicts in a modern world. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
individueller wie gemeinschaftlicher Lebensziele und Lebensformen (erstens) unter Schutz stellen können, 
ohne daß (zweitens) deren Rivalität untereinander sich ruinös auf die Grundlagen des gesellschaftlichen 
Verkehrs auswirken müßte. Das letzte Argument führt auf den Kern der Einwände gegen Sandels 
Interpreation der „Theory of Justice‟. Auch ein kommunitär erweiterter Personbegriff muß nämlich 
keinesfalls die Aufgabe der Vorrangstellung des Rechten und Gerechten nach sich ziehen, weil auch und 
gerade die gemeinsame Suche nach dem guten Leben des gesellschaflichen Schutzes durch ein faires 
Regulativ bedarf, wie es das Konzept der „Gerechtigkeit als Fairneß‟ in Aussicht stellt. Die Abhängigkeit 
der Priorität des Gerechten vor dem Guten von einem atomistischen Personbegriff ist keineswegs 
zwingend….”. J. von Soosten, “Gerechtigkeit ohne Solidarität? Deontologische Ethik in der Kritik”, 
Zeitschrift für Evangelische Ethik (1992;1), p.65. 
41
 “Auf diese Weise verknüpft Rawls die Fragestellungen der beiden Gerechtigkeitstraditionen … und 
nimmt aus beiden entscheidende Momente auf. Der aristotelischen Tradition folgt er, indem er Gerecht-
igkeit konzentriert vom Gleichheitsprinzip aus versteht. Er bestimmt das Gleichheitsprinzip dadurch 
genauer, daß er es im Sinn einer Gleichheit größtmöglicher Freiheiten interpretiert. Diese Gleichheit der 
Freiheiten zielt nicht zuletzt auf die Gleichheit der Beteiligungschancen am gesellschaftlichen Leben und 
an den gesellschaftlichen Gütern. Der biblischen Gerechtigkeitstradition aber folgt Rawls, auch wenn er 
nicht ausdrücklich auf sie Bezug nimmt, der Sache nach darin, daß er als wichtigsten Prüfstein jeder 
Gerechtigkeitstheorie die Position der Unterpriviligierten, der bei der Verteilung knapper Güter Benach-
teiligten anerkennt. Daß sie gegen Übervorteilung geschützt werden und daß ihre benachteiligte Situation 
verändert wird, ist für eine Theorie der Gerechtigkeit entscheidend.” W.Huber, Gerechtigkeit und Recht. 
Grundlinien christlicher Rechtsethik (1996), p.190. 
42
 A. Smith: Rett fordeling (1982). 
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Ivar Asheim, professor in ethics at the Free Faculty of Theology in Oslo, very briefly 
refers to John Rawls in his 1991-book on ethics.
43
 It appears that he in this book shares 
the view that Rawls, as a moral philosopher, has tried to make essential improvements 
in utilitarianism, without escaping its inherent weaknesses.  
In his book, Hva betyr holdninger? Studier i dydsetikk (1997), Asheim analyses the 
Rawlsian conception in more detail. Here he focuses both on Rawls‟ conception of 
justice and on his idea of an overlapping consensus and considers the weight ascribed by 
Rawls to public reason. It is interesting to see that Asheim now  in matters of politics 
and ethics  finds a parallel concern between Rawls‟ ideas and the theological doctrine 
of the two kingdoms.
44
 
It should also be mentioned that The Research Department of the Swedish Church, 
in co-operation with The Department of Studies of the Lutheran world Federation, 
has given a Research Report concerning a just Europe. And here Rawls‟ conception of 
justice is at least taken explicitly into account as a highly relevant theory for under-
standing political and economic processes in Europe to day!
45
 
The theological approach to Rawls‟ philosophy in a Norwegian (and Scandinavian) 
context has been occasional and rather unsystematic. 
This very short outline is, however, sufficient to demonstrate that there are different 
opinions in a theological context about Rawls‟ theory. Some theologians have been 
fundamentally critical  for different reasons, and some have accepted Rawls‟ con-
ception as a contribution to increased justice, which might be endorsed theologically and 
                                                          
43
 Ivar Asheim: Øyet og horisonten. Grunnproblemer i aktuell etikkdebatt (1991), p. 181( note 157). 
44
 “Slik Rawls reformulerer sin teori, koker den ned til et spørsmål om forholdet mellom politikk og etikk 
i et demokratisk samfunn. At dette spørsmålet reiser ømtålige grenseproblemer, er innlysende. I luthersk 
tradisjon har disse problemene vært søkt løst ved en teori som distingverer mellom to regimenter, et 
verdslig og et åndelig. Poenget med denne teorien er blant annet å unngå religionstvang. I saker som angår 
tro og livssyn, skal det herske full frihet. Tvangsmakt er bare tillatt i det verdslige regiment og for 
verdslige saker og forhold, det vil si til opprettholdelse av ytre samfunnsrettferdighet. Som vi har sett …, 
innebærer denne læren visse differensieringer med hensyn til fellesskapsbegrepet. Lignende differensi-
eringer foretar også Rawls, når han for det demokratiske, politiske samfunn som rettferdighetsteorien 
gjelder, sier at det verken er „a community‟ eller bare en „association‟, men noe midt imellom. Rawls‟ 
teori har i det hele visse fellestrekk med distinksjonen mellom to regimenter, ettersom også den utvilsomt 
innebærer at politiske avgjørelser i bestemte sammenhenger må være religiøst nøytrale.” I.Asheim, Hva 
betyr holdninger. Studier i dydsetikk (1997), p.186f. 
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approved of by churches and Christians. This outline has also demonstrated that 
theologians, when referring to Rawls, mostly focus on his theory of justice,  his strong 
concern for elementary liberties and rights as well as the wider social implications 
which his liberal conception of justice is supposed to have. Of course Rawls‟ basic ideas 
about liberty, equality, distributive justice, fairness and social co-operation apply within 
many sectors of life, not least within the domain of economy, which some theologians 
concerned with social and economic ethics have clearly seen. Rawls‟ ideas of agreement 
and more specifically about an overlapping consensus are not so often taken into 
consideration from a theological point of view. This, in my opinion, is remarkable. 
I will focus on Rawls‟ consensual efforts and especially the vital assumption which is 
most clearly contained within his conception of an overlapping consensus: that the basic 
terms of co-operation should be endorsed from a Christian point of view (as well as 
from other perspectives). In approaching Rawls‟ moral/political conception I will take 
my point of departure from a particular, but representative theological position: the 
theological conception of social-ethics as elaborated in the works of the German 
professor of ethics at the University of Bonn, Martin Honecker. My reasons for this 
approach are as follows: 
1. Differences in historical and cultural development as well as differences in theo-
logical schools and between denominations have contributed to considerable 
variations , in theological ethics. In this situation I found it most appropriate to take 




                                                                                                                                                                          
45
 A just Europe. The Churches Response to the Ethical Implications of the new Europe (1992), Ed. D. 
Hedin & V. Mortensen. 
46
 Let me now remark that I have for my purposes mainly concentrated on the following works and 
articles from Honecker‟s hand: Konzept einer sozialethischen Theorie. Grundfragen evangelischer 
Sozialethik, (J.C.B.Mohr, Tübingen, 1971);  “Zur gegenwärtigen Bedeutung von Barmen V” (Zeitschrift 
für Evangelische Ethik, 1972, pp.207-218);  “Theologische Kriterien und politische Urteilsbildung” 
(Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, 1974, pp.472-490);  “Das Problem der Eigengesetzlichkeit” 
(Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, 1976, pp.92-130);  Sozialethik zwischen Tradition und Vernunft, 
(J.C.B.Mohr, Tübingen, 1977);  “Erfahrung und Entscheidung. Zur Begründung einer theologischen 
Ethik” (Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, 1978, pp.485-502);  Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung 
in die evangelische Sozialethik, (Gütersloher Taschenbücher/Siebenstern 290, Gütersloher Verlagshaus 
Gerd Mohn, Gütersloh 1978);  “Die Denkschriften der EKD als Paradigma ethischer Argumentation” (in 
Kirche im Spannungsfeld der Politik. Festschrift für Bischof D. Hermann Kunst D.D. zum 70. Geburtstag 
am 21. Januar 1977. Ed. Paul Collmer, Hermann Kalinna, Lothar Wiedemann, Göttingen 1978, pp.131-
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2. My approach is not an arbitrary one. Honecker explicitly refers to the theory of John 
Rawls. But that was not the deciding factor in my choice. Instead I have taken into 
account that Honecker is concerned with many of the problems Rawls thought central 
to his theory, and he is addressing them from a theological perspective. For instance 
he is concerned with the issue of pluralism and the need for some kind of consensual 
framework for coexistent parties within modern societies. 
3. Just as Rawls has elaborated a consistent political philosophy with clear moral 
aspects, Honecker has presented us with a systematic account of theological social 
ethics with a strong concern for the importance of sharing some basic political 
values. 
4. Honecker, who was, during his education, strongly influenced by Barthian theology, 
now assumes a (modern) Lutheran point of view in addressing basic questions of 
social and political ethics. He reinterprets and employs theological principles and 
models as for instance “the doctrine of the two kingdoms” and the distinction 
between “law and gospel” (issues which are very often discussed in a Norwegian 
Lutheran context too). I hope to contribute to this debate. 
For these reasons, I believe Honecker‟s theological conception of social ethics provides 
a proper and very interesting theological point of departure for my approach to Rawls‟ 
ideas. This does not mean, however, that I will try to establish a kind of one-way com-
munication between a more or less fixed and unquestionable theological position and 
Rawlsian political philosophy. I am convinced that Rawls will not leave the presup-
                                                                                                                                                                          
142);  “Das Problem des theologischen Konstruktivismus” (Zeitschrift für Evangelische Ethik, 1980, 
pp.97-110);  “Thesen zur Aporie der Zweireichelehre” (Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, 1981, 
pp.128-140);  Perspektiven christlicher Gesellschaftsdeutung, (Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn/-
Gütersloh 1981);  “Sind Denkschriften „kirkchliche Lehre‟?” (Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, 1984, 
pp.241-263);  Einführung in die Theologische Ethik. Grundlagen und Grundbegriffe (Walter de Gruyter, 
Berlin/New York, 1990);  “Vernunft, Gewissen, Glaube. Das spezifisch Christliche im Horizont der 
Ethik” (in Evangelische Ethik. Diskussionsbeiträge zu ihrer Grundlegung und ihren Aufgaben, München 
1990, Ed. Hans G.Ulrich, pp.124-123);  “Rechtfertigung und Gerechtigkeit in der Perspektive Evangel-
ischer Theologie” (in Rechtfertigung und Gerechtigkeit, Jahrbuch des Evangelischen Bundes 23, 
Göttingen, 1990, pp. 41-66);  “Der Auftrag der Kirche und die Aufgabe des Staates” (In Essener Ge-
spräche zum Thema Staat und Kirche, Vol.25, pp.49-76, Münster 1991, Eds. Heiner Marré, Johannes 
Stüting. The broad discussion that followed that lesson is referred on the pages from 76-102);  “Zur 
ethischen Diskussion der 80er Jahre” (Theologische Rundschau 56, 1991, pp.54-97);  “Europa og den 
evangeliske kirke” (in Forankring og Forandring. Verdier for det nye Europa. Festskrift til Ivar Asheim 
på 65-årsdagen den 5. august 1992, Universitetsforlaget 1992, pp.221-233, eds. Sverre Dag .Mogstad, 
Lars Østnor);  Grundriss der Sozialethik (Walter de Gruyter, Berlin/New York 1995);  “Vernunft, Affekt, 
 20 
positions and principles of a theological social ethics undisturbed.  
1.4. An outline of the dissertation 
Rawls‟ philosophical/political conception of liberalism has, as already suggested, been 
intensively discussed in political and philosophical contexts all over the world for more 
than twenty-five years. His requirement that there be an overlapping consensus about “a 
regulative political conception of justice”47 very clearly challenges moral theology, 
religious individuals, groups and churches, as participating members of a democratic 
regime, with a moral concern for the fair organisation of society. In my opinion, Rawls' 
theories should therefore be subjected to analysis from a theological point of view.
48
 No 
systematic theological attempt to do this has been made. I will, by way of this disser-
tation, take a step in that direction. 
In chapter 2 I will concentrate on some of the main features of the liberal society as a 
fair system of co-operation. In this connection I shall also consider the question how 
church and theology might conceive of the value-formation of society as such. This is an 
issue which Honecker has considered rather thoroughly, and it is helpful to draw upon 
these considerations. At the same time, the question necessarily arises as to whether it 
may be fruitful at all to employ an idea of political unity which includes certain shared 
moral and political values. 
The difficulty in taking for granted some kind of unity with regard to political and moral 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Erfahrung” (In Fundamente der Ethik. Bilanz der Neuzeit, Freiburg 1996, pp. 95-110, ed. Adrian 
Holderegger). 
47
 “What is needed is a regulative political conception of justice that can articulate and order in a 
principled way the political ideals and values of a democratic regime, thereby specifying the aims the 
constitution is to achieve and the limits it must respect. In addition, this political conception needs to be 
such that there is some hope of its gaining the support of an overlapping consensus, that is, a consensus in 
which it is affirmed by the opposing religious, philosophical and moral doctrines likely to thrive over 
generations in a more or less just constitutional democracy, where the criterion of justice is that political 
conception itself.” J. Rawls, “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus”, Oxford journal of Legal Studies 
(1987, Vol.7, No.1), p.1. 
48
 Discussing the so called “Option für de Armen” as an issue of social ethics  immediately after having 
presented Rawls‟ theory of justice  Wolfgang Huber appropriately stresses that this kind of issue “zielt 
gerade auf eine theologische Theorie der Gerechtigkeit, die konsequent an der gleichen Würde aller 
Menschen ausgerichtet ist und eben deshalb in der Diskriminierung von Menschengruppen und in ihrem 
Ausschluß von aktiver gesellschaftlicher Teilhabe einen Verstoß gegen elementare Gerechtigkeits-
forderungen sieht. Aus theologischen Gründen drängt sie auf eine politische Theorie der Gerechtigkeit, 
nach welcher die Freiheitschancen aller einzelnen den entscheidenden Maßstab für die Legitimität 
politischer Herrschaft darstellen.” W.Huber, Gerechtigkeit und Recht. Grundlinien christlicher 
Rechtsethik (1996), p.194. 
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values will be quite obvious when I turn to chapter 3, where a central background 
premise for Rawls‟ approach to the consensus-problem is displayed: The fact of 
pluralism brings Rawls to the “negative” conclusion that no comprehensive moral 
doctrine can (or should) be taken as the appropriate basis for settling the institutional 
architectonic and practice of democratic and pluralist societies. The question before us 
is, however, whether such a conclusion  which might in fact be considered a serious 
challenge and threat to many religious views  should be considered plausible. 
One can hardly deny that the Christian church throughout history has often seen itself as 
having a responsibility for providing society with moral values and standards. The 
influence of such values on western culture until now cannot be disputed. The process 
of secularisation and the increasing diversity, however, has altered the situation radi-
cally. In modern societies there is a true conglomerate of influential moral ideas and 
conceptions of the good life that are conceived of more or less independently of, and 
sometimes even in opposition to, Christian ethics. The very “fact of pluralism” cannot 
be ignored, and in itself, would appear to render the ideal of a Christian society a rather 
utopian affair. The idea of individual freedom  with the accompanying idea of liberty 
of conscience  would appear to decisively render any attempt to restore the idea of 
society qua “corpus christianum” futile. Many citizens would doubtlessly consider it 
unfair if the coercive powers of the state were used to enforce controversial moral 
doctrines and values rooted in a particular (religious) belief-system upon society as a 
whole. And it appears that religious ethics cannot in the long run exclusively set the 
premises for the value-formation of modern democratic societies. It seems as Honecker 
for his part shares this presupposition.  
But Honecker as well as Rawls, nevertheless, hold that there has to be established 
common institutions of government and laws, which can be widely recognised by the 
citizens, and that there has to be some shared basis for public reasoning, making it 
possible for the parties to justify to one another the very standards of fair coexistence 
and to establish agreed ways of solving political conflicts.  
But Rawls very clearly stresses that no comprehensive view or doctrine can be taken as 
a common moral platform for settling the common institutional framework of modern 
democratic societies.  
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The question that the thesis has to answer is whether the Rawlsian assumption (that no 
comprehensive doctrine can fairly be made the very value-basis for ordering society) is 
really plausible. How should Rawls “negative assumption” be judged in a theological 
perspective? Honecker provides us with sufficient material for discussing this issue.  
Rawls‟ “negative” assumption; that no comprehensive moral doctrine should be given 
priority when defining the political values for the very basic structure of society, would 
obviously be more attractive  even from a theological point of view  if he simul-
taneously succeeds in establishing the idea
49
 of an overlapping consensus as a credible 
and fair alternative, likely to gain adherents from (nearly) all groups, in societies 
characterised by the fact of pluralism.
50
 
After having analysed the hard facts of pluralism, I will turn to the “constructive”, and 
demanding task of analysing the crucial premises for a shared institutional framework 
for social co-operation elaborated by Rawls. He is convinced that fair coexistence in 
highly pluralist societies requires a consensus on elementary principles of justice, fair 
procedures, fundamental rights and liberties, and the kind of political and social insti-
tutions necessary to guarantee these goods. In chapter 4, I consider different aspects of 
the consensus-problem, with special weight on Rawls‟ way(s) of developing a con-
sensual framework. 
Since the idea of having essential shared standards in a society, that can be willingly 
entered upon by all citizens, is so central within the liberal tradition to which Rawls 
belongs, it is important to see how he pursues typical liberal concerns by renewing and 
systematically employing an idea found in the Western political culture, namely the idea 
                                                          
49
 In this place it might be appropriate to underline how Rawls himself employs the frequently used terms; 
„idea‟, „conception‟ and „doctrine‟ (and for my own part I shall normally follow Rawls): “I shall use the 
term doctrine for comprehensive views of all kinds and the term conception for a political conception and 
its component parts, such as the conception of the person as citizen. The term idea is used as a general 
term and may refer to either as the context determines.” J. Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, 
The University of Chicago Law Review (1997;3), p.766 (note 3). 
50
 Samuel Scheffler realises that political liberalism is in some respect attractive: “The appeal of 
liberalism derives to a considerable extent from its commitment to tolerating diverse ways of life and 
schemes of value.” But immediately he adds: “Yet this same commitment is also responsible for much of 
what is puzzling about liberalism.” S.Scheffler, “The Appeal of Political Liberalism”, Ethics (1994, 
Vol.1205, No.1), p.4. 
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of a basic social contract.
51
 Contractarianism aims at grounding the very organisation of 
society on consent from those governed. Hence I can more specifically proceed to 
Rawls‟ idea of an overlapping consensus, especially as conceived of in his most recent 
writings, - particularly in Political Liberalism (1993).  
According to Rawls it is necessary that the most fundamental principles of fair coex-
istence “can be argued for as valid, or desirable or appropriate without reliance on any 
particular comprehensive view…”52 Rawls therefore avoids religious doctrines and even 
more comprehensive kinds of liberalism
53
 as well as utilitarian welfare-principles and 
controversial ideological views when seeking an overlapping consensus about the value-
system of the state and the central public institutions of society. Thereby he appears to 
challenge a theologically based perspective on the unity of society. It may therefore be 
of special interest to see how this challenge can be met, on premises given within a 
theologian conception of social ethics, as conceived of by a modern theologian as 
Martin Honecker. 
Let it now be added, however: Since Rawls stresses so strongly that the political values, 
incorporated in the basic structure of society, are to be voluntarily recognised by the 
different parties, these political values can obviously not conflict decisively with the 
comprehensive doctrines to which citizens in pluralist societies feel most committed. 
Therefore an overlapping consensus has to be conceived of as a “consensus that includes 
all the opposing philosophical and religious doctrines likely to persist and to gain 
adherents in a more or less just constitutional society.”54 Although the content of an 
overlapping consensus can obviously not be taken from any particular religion or 
comprehensive value-system, the very idea of establishing an “overlap” could certainly 
not succeed at all if it could not somehow be endorsed
55
 from the perspective of very 
                                                          
51
 In other contexts I think that Rawls might have drawn upon other political ideas, which are considered 
essential in public reasoning. 
52
 K. Greenawalt, Private Consciences and public Reasons (1995), p.106. 
53
 Although Rawls himself is obviously indebted to both John Locke and Immanuel Kant for his liberal 
conception, Locke and Kant are simultaneously taken as standard examples of a kind of comprehensive 
liberalism, that   according to Rawls  could not serve as a common ground for political coexistence in 
pluralist societies. Rawls himself intends to elaborate a political liberalism with a minimum of meta-
physical ambitions. 
54
 J. Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (1987, 
Vol.7, No. 1), p. 225f. 
55
 This is Rawls‟ own terminology. I will later consider more explicitly the proper meaning of endorsing 
an overlapping consensus. 
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diverse comprehensive political, philosophical and religious views. This means that 
even competing doctrines might be supposed to have some perspectives on society and 
the political conditions for coexistence in common.
56
 
Society, as a fair system of co-operation requires an overlapping consensus on vital 
criteria of justice, which political institutions should satisfy. Rawls makes it clear that; 
“Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought.”57 
Some elementary principles of justice should plausibly be taken as the core of an 
overlapping consensus. Achieving this kind of consensus is, however, a difficult project 
in the face of pluralism, even if it should not be substantively or metaphysically very 
demanding. Rawls is aware of the difficulties but holds, nonetheless, that a well-ordered 
society requires at least a minimal consensus in matters of basic justice, fair 
(re)distribution, social co-operation and the procedures for handling of conflicts.  
It is a crucial premise in modern liberalism that the very organisation of society has to 
be grounded on consent from those governed and not on an absolute divine will. Then it 
is also of great importance that a common forum can be established,  making it pos-
sible for citizens to justify to one another the positions they take when basic issues of 
justice, matters of law or constitutional principles are at stake. Rawls stresses very 
clearly the shared premises for public reasoning. 
And so does Honecker. Theological social ethics, as conceived of by Honecker, appears 
to share with political liberalism a basic confidence in public reason /political ratio,  
and thereby in the ability of citizens to handle the problems within the “worldly realm” 
reasonably. This issue is very thoroughly discussed in chapter 5 where I also stress, 
however, that there are limits to the efficacy of political reason. Taking my point of 
departure from Honecker‟s social ethics, I can employ central Lutheran “distinctions” 
when considering reasonable political ideas, conceptions and practices in the perspec-
tive of Christian faith. It should especially be emphasised that there are aspects of the 
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 I should also hold the possibility open that Rawls‟ attempt to establish vital liberal premises for an 
overlapping consensus in pluralist societies, will prove far too optimistic. Maybe should a Rawlsian 
proposal for an overlapping consensus better be rejected. This possibility I will also have in mind. 
57
 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), p.3. 
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doctrine of the two kingdoms that can fruitfully be employed.
58
 
At the end of chapter 5 I introduce and discuss Rawls‟ idea of public reason more 
specifically. According to Rawls “the idea of public reason …is a view about the kind of 
reasons on which citizens are to rest their political cases in making their political justifi-
cations to one another when they support laws and policies that invoke the coercive 
powers of government concerning fundamental political questions.”59 In “their political 
justification to one another” citizens are in need of a referential basis, that is fully 
accessible
60
 to all the parties involved in social co-operation. Persons entering the public 
forum have to draw on a conception of justice, which satisfies the “publicity-condition”, 
it has to be openly argued for and it can be reasonably assessed.
61
 And it may be widely 
endorsable. 
Rawls also stresses that there is an inherent ideal in public reason which drives people 
with an elementary sense of justice to behave in accordance with an idea of “civic 
friendship” when entering the public forum.62 The moral commitment following from 
the idea of public reason itself is “materialised” in the duty of civility. 
“And since the exercise of political power itself must be legitimate, the ideal of 
citizenship imposes a moral, not a legal, duty  the duty of civility  to be able to 
explain to one another on those fundamental questions how the principles and 
                                                          
58
 There are some problems of terminology when presenting (and using) this model in an English-
speaking context. Sometimes I will nonetheless just use the phrase “doctrine of the two kingdoms”. But 
often I will try to make the terminology more suitable for modern times by using instead the notion “two 
realms”, as it is used for instance in the book Two kingdoms and one world. A sourcebook in Christian 
Social Ethics (1976, ed.K.H.Herz). Cf. for instance p.309f. And  sometimes I even use the phrase “two 
regiments”. The notion regiment‟, which according to Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of 
the English Language (1994-edition), can be used about governmental rule, has also clear military 
connotations and is often associated with strong control. Cf. Webster‟s Dictionary, p.1208. When the 
notion is used theologically, however, it should not be forgotten that the term just reflects the meaning of 
„regere‟ (to rule). Having this in mind I can sometimes appropriately use the phrase “two regiments”. 
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 J. Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, The University of Chicago Law Review (1997;3), 
p.795. 
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 This implies that the others can fully understand it and also that it might be possible for them to accept 
it freely on fully reasonable premises. 
61
 This concern is expressed in a more nuanced way by Rawls himself when underlining that “the idea of 
publicity as understood in justice as fairness has tree levels, which may be described as follows: The first 
…is achieved when society is effectively regulated by public principles of justice. …The second level of 
publicity concerns the general beliefs in the light of which first principles of justice themselves can be 
accepted… The third and last level of publicity has to do with the full justification of the public con-
ception of justice as it would be presented in its own terms.” J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.66f. 
62
 J. Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, The University of Chicago Law Review (1997;3), 
p.771. 
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policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the political values of public 
reason. This duty also involves a willingness to listen to others and a fair-minded-
ness in deciding when accommodations to their views should reasonably be made. 
… As reasonable and rational, and knowing that they affirm a diversity of reason-
able religious and philosophical doctrines they should be ready to explain the basis 
of their actions to one another in terms each could reasonably expect that others 
might endorse as consistent with their freedom and equality. Trying to meet this 
condition is one of the tasks that this ideal of democratic politics asks of us. 
Understanding how to conduct oneself as a democratic citizen includes under-
standing an ideal of public reason.”63  
If members of society  both groups and individuals  are to succeed in securing the 
required minimum amount of overlapping consensus about the very “basics” of society 
there has to be both a public forum for arguing, reasoning and justifying political stand-
points in matters of vital shared interest, and there has to be standards and ideals for 
how to behave within this public forum. Thus a well ordered society requires a general 
adherence to the duty of civility, that is, a willingness to comply with elementary 
standards for social co-operation and public reasoning in matters of basic justice and 
essential conditions for social co-operation and coexistence. Reasonable people will 
agree to these terms. In chapter 6 I primarily consider the ideals inherent in the idea of 
public reason and deal with the kind of conflicts that may arise in fulfilling one‟s civic 
duty. For instance, the duty of civility requires that individuals and associations, both 
Christian citizens and Churches within democratic societies, be able and willing to make 
the adjustments required for participating in a public forum. This means that, when 
engaging in matters of shared political interest and basic justice, the arguments used by 
individuals and associations should be such that they can be generally accessible in 
terms of common reason.
64
   
A duty of civility, as elaborated by Rawls, may well be considered a necessity in modern 
pluralist democracies. It is, nonetheless, a question how far individuals and groups can 
avoid drawing on or referring to their deeper (private) moral convictions when engaging 
in public discourse or acting on behalf of some authority of society (as a judge, 
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 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.217f. 
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 That this might be a controversial claim can easily be seen. In the debate within the Norwegian 
Parliament before a new and liberal abortion law passed Stortinget, some of the representatives decided 
for instance to present their ultimate reasons for denying to vote for a liberal abortion-law, arguing 
explicitly from the Bible (Psalm 139). Even if such arguments were understood and perhaps even 




 without ending up with a kind of split morality instead of just a virtuous 
accommodation to terms implicit in public reason. These tensions are reflected in the 
very title of chapter 6: “Citizenship, discipleship and the duty of civility.” 
In chapter 7 I reach a conclusion. In this chapter I pay due attention to the fact that both 
individual Christians and Churches are political agents, playing a role within the 
political arena. The church has often considered it important to exert and maintain a 
Christian influence on law-making and public life. Should churches and individual 
Christians likewise endorse an overlapping consensus and comply with the constraints 
inherent in a duty of civility? It may be well worth noting that churches are not seldom 
trying to find new ways suitable for playing their public role. In matters of social ethics 
one has for instance  in Germany – made use of so called “Denkschriften”. The 
churches will avoid categorical statements about political issues. The very term 
“Denkschriften” indicates that churches may be rather tentative in their approach to 
matters of public interest, taking into account that all parties have to make some 
adjustments to the fact that the public forum is a field of shared interest.
66
 Somehow 
churches themselves, when engaging in matters of social ethics and politics, seem to 
comply with the “consensual virtue”, the duty of civility, as the moral ideal inherent in 
the very idea of public reason. By accepting the terms of political ratio and public reason 
(with its inherent ideal), the “worldly realm” is theologically marked as a shared 
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 Thomas W. Pogge is one of the Rawls-experts, who most clearly has seen the dilemmas that might be 
actualised when trying to further coexistence and consensual virtues in society by practising a duty of 
civility: “Jeder Bürger wird durch eine Grundordnung regiert, die er selbst als gerecht anerkennt und kann 
dann auch die demokratisch getroffenen Entscheidungen akzeptieren, die seiner eigenen religiösen, 
moralischen oder philosophischen Weltanschauung zuwiderlaufen (vgl. PL 217). Diese Möglichkeit wird 
aber nur dann realisiert, wenn jeder seiner Pflicht zur Kulanz unter Bürgern („duty of civilty‟) nachkommt, 
d.h. sein politisches Handeln, d.h. Argumentieren, Entscheiden, Abstimmen, usw. in der Öffentlichkeit  
nicht unbedingt innerhalb von Organisationen wie der Kirchen, Universitäten, Gewerkschaften usw.  
nach bestem Wissen und Gewissen ausschließlich an dem gemeinsamen Kriterium, den gemeinsamen 
Richtlinien und den allen zugänglichen Informationen orientiert, wenigstens wenn es um Merkmale der 
Grundordnung selbst geht. Man soll sich in solchen Fällen also nicht von der eigenen umfassenderen 
Weltanschauung oder Konzeption des Guten beeinflussen lassen, noch von Informationen, die man nur 
aufgrund seiner Weltanschauung als Informationen betrachtet (z:B. daß ein bestimmter 
Religionsunterricht Gott mißfällt oder die Seele verdirbt). Das Achten dieser Pflicht ist Teil des 
Gerechtigkeitssinns, der für eine durch eine politische Gerechtigkeitskonzeption wohlgeordnete 
Gesellschaft erforderlich ist: In einer solchen Gesellschaft erfüllt jeder diese Pflicht, und es ist auch 
allgemein bekannt, daß jeder dies tut.” T. W. Pogge: John Rawls (1994), p.136f. 
66
 It should here be mentioned that “Denkschriften” are not merely a kind of more or less casually state-
ments from the side of the Church with regard to contingent problems arising in particular modern 
societies. In a fundamental “Denkschrift” are “Aufgaben und Grenzen kirchlicher Äußerungen zu gesell-
schaftlichen Fragen” focused in a more principled way. Cf. Die Denkschriften der Evangelischen Kirche 
in Deutschland, Band 1/1 (1981, 2.Aufl.), p. 43ff.  
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concern and as moral “commonwealth”. But even if committed to a duty of civility, as 
inherent in public reason, it cannot be denied that Christian discipleship as such also 
entails a moral duty, and reconciling the two obligations may be a difficult task. 
This overview should make it clear that I am omitting many of the issues often associted 
with the examination of Rawls‟ philosophical conception. I am concentrating on Rawls‟ 
efforts to establish an agreed basis for social co-operation, and this project is considered 
throughout in a theological perspective. For the theological premises I take my point of 
departure clearly from the conception of Martin Honecker, His social ethics is therefore 
thoroughly introduced and analysed throughout the present thesis.  
But primarily this study is concerned with Rawls, or better: with certain aspects of his 
philosophy. Even if one might find changes in Rawls‟ liberal conception, there remains 
a remarkable continuity. The concern for establishing an agreed basis of fair coexistence 
among members of society as free and equal citizens is itself part of that continuum,  
one which has been strengthened, fortified and well expanded upon during the years 
Rawls has been engaged in the political/philosophical debate. I believe it would be a 
mistake to view the stages of Rawls‟ development as jumps from one position to 
another. Rather he has all the way critically assessed and refined his ideas. When Rawls, 
in his most recent writings, stresses the importance of agreeing on shared terms of 
public reason, this does not mean that other aspects, as for instance the contractarian 
approach, is taken as “outmoded”67 or that an overlapping consensus should better be 
based on some quite different ideas of justice. Instead Rawls strengthens and expands 
the idea of an overlapping consensus by refining original ideas, seeking all the way 
support in vital ideas within the political culture. And he emphasises that: 
“When political liberalism speaks of a reasonable overlapping consensus of 
comprehensive doctrines, it means that all of these doctrines, both religious and 
nonreligious, support a political conception of justice underwriting a constitutional 
democratic society whose principles, ideals, and standards satisfy the criterion of 
reciprocity. Thus, all reasonable doctrines affirm such a society with its correspond-
ing political institutions: equal basic rights and liberties for all citizens, including 
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 In his latest article he writes that: “Each of us must have principles and guidelines to which we appeal 
… I have proposed that one way to identify those political principles and guidelines is to show that they 
would be agreed to in the original position. Others will think that different ways to identify these 
principles are more reasonable.” J. Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, The University of 
Chicago Law Review (1997;3), p.773.   
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liberty of conscience and the freedom of religion.”68  
Stressing the principle of rule by consent, requires that related ideas in Rawls‟ con-
ception are closely held together, namely the idea of establishing an overlapping con-
sensus which has to be linked with Rawls‟ contractarian approach and with his concen-
tration on public reason with its inherent ideal of a duty of civility. The very idea of 
maintaining in society a public forum implies in itself that there already is a basic con-
sensus about some shared terms of public reasoning and public justification. Some 
shared principles of justice may serve as a common referential basis for public reasoning 
about the basics and essentials of society. On the other hand the proper exercise of 
public reason may contribute decisively to maintaining a morally based “overlap” and to 
the strengthening of civic friendship.  
Let it also be noted here that the problems raised by Rawls and his concern for estab-
lishing basic shared terms of social co-operation, seem to be a matter of interest for sev-
eral theologians, not just Honecker. The very influential catholic theologian, Hans 
Küng, for instance, is concerned with parallel problems. Hans Küng, referring explicitly 
to Rawls, stresses in his Projekt Weltethos the need for a fundamental consensus about 
moral “basics”, although he has obviously a wider concern than Rawls. 
“Gerade die plurale Gesellschaft, wenn in ihr verschiedene Weltanschauungen 
zusammenleben sollen, braucht einen grundlegenden Konsens, zu dem die ver-
schiedenen Weltanschauungen beitragen, so daß sich zwar kein „strenger‟oder 
totaler, wohl aber ein „Overlapping Consensus‟ (John Rawls) bilden kann.”69 
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 J. Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, The University of Chicago Law Review (1997;3), 
p.801. 
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 It may be of interest also to present the text preceeding the lines I have quoted: “Denn der freiheitlich-
demokratische Staat  im Gegensatz zum mittelalterlich-klerikalen (“schwarzen”) oder zum modern-
totalitären (“braunen” oder “roten”)  muß von seinem Selbstverständnis her nun einmal weltanschaulich 
neutral sein. Das heißt, er muß verschiedene Religionen und Konfessionen, Philosophien und Ideologien 
dulden. Und dies bedeutete zweifellos einen ungeheuren Fortschritt in der Menschheitsgeschichte, so daß 
heute überall in der Welt eine ungeheure Sehnsucht nach Freiheit und Menschenrechten zu spüren ist, die 
kein westlicher Intellektueller, der westliche Freiheit ständig genießt, je als „typisch westlich‟ desavou-
ieren sollte. Der demokratische Staat, muß seiner Verfassung gemäß Gewissens- und Religionsfreiheit, 
muß auch Presse- und Versammlungsfreiheit und alles, was zu den modernen Menschenrechten gezählt 
wird, achten, schützen und fördern. Und trotzdem: dieser Staat darf bei all dem gerade keinen Lebenssinn 
und Lebensstil dekretieren, er darf keine obersten Werte und letzte Noten rechtlich vorschreiben, wenn er 
seine weltanschauliche Neutralität nicht verletzen will. Hierin liegt ganz offensichtlich das Dilemma jedes 
modernen demokratischen Staatswesens (ob in Europa, Amerika, Indien oder Japan) begründet: Was es 
rechtlich nicht vorschreiben darf, darauf ist es zugleich angewiesen. Gerade die plurale Gesellschaft, wenn 
in ihr verschiedene Weltanschauungen zusammenleben sollen, braucht einen grundlegenden Konsens, zu 
dem die verschiedenen Weltanschauungen beitragen, so daß sich zwar kein „strenger‟oder totaler, wohl 
aber ein „Overlapping Consensus‟ (John Rawls) bilden kann.” H. Küng in: Projekt Weltethos (Fourth 
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1.5. Some methodological reflections 
Theology employs different methods. Obviously, the same methodology cannot be 
applied to areas of church history, bible-exegesis, dogma and (social)ethics. And there 
are different approaches to ethical issues within theological ethics,  just as there is 
within moral philosophy. We certainly possess neither an authoritative philosophical 
method nor a “canonical” theological method in ethics. Martin Honecker, correctly I 
believe, observes that there exists a methodological pluralism not just within philo-
sophy, but within theology as well.
70




I. Ethics can be understood as a theorising over (everyday) moral life with special regard 
to the norms, values and virtues that are implied. This theoretical reflection might be 
merely descriptive or it can be normative in its aim. Like Honecker I take a normative 
approach. The term social-ethics gives ethics a particular scope, as is clearly expressed 
by Honecker: 
“Ethik hat die Frage zu bedenken: Was soll ich tun? Sozialethik im besonderen hat 
sich der Frage zu stellen, welche Bedingungen, Voraussetzungen, Strukturen 
gegeben sein müssen, damit Menschen verantwortlich handeln und zusammenleben 
können. Sie hat die Gesellschaft, die Vielfalt sozialer Beziehungen und Bezüge im 
ganzen zu bedenken, weil diese das Bezugsfeld menschlichen Handelns darstellen. 
Eine Einführung in die Sozialethik hat folglich das Verhältnis von Mensch und 
Gesellschaft zum Thema…”72  
The present project belongs within the domain of normative social ethics. And it should 
not be difficult to consider Rawls‟ normative theory of justice and his conception of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
edition,1992), p. 48f. Although Küng explicitly refers to Rawls, there are obviously some differences 
between them too. Küng is aiming at a common “Weltethos”, while Rawls is aiming at a morally grounded 
political consensus about the basic structure and main institutions of society. 
70 
“Daran wird deutlich, daß ich nicht eine bestimmte ethische Methode und Theorie als allein gültig 
übernehmen kann. Der Pluralismus ethischer Ansätze und Methoden ist ein Faktum, dem ein Lehr- und 
Studienbuch Rechnung zu tragen hat.” M. Honecker, Einführung in die Theologische Ethik. Grundlagen 
und Grundbegriffe (1990), p.vi. 
71
 He emphasises that; “Einer Darlegung der Ethik als theologischer Disziplin sind vorab drei 
Klarstellungen vorauszuschicken: (a) Es gibt keine besondere und spezifisch theologische Methode der 
Ethik. Auch theologische Ethik kann in ihren Methoden nur die Arbeitsformen und das Vorgehen jeder 
anderen Ethik übernehmen.  (b) Die Grundbegriffe der Ethik sind in der Regel keine spezifisch christ-
lichen Begriffe (z.B. Norm, Pflicht, Tugend usw.).  (c) Auch die Paraklese als solche ist noch keine 
spezifisch christliche Redeweise. ... Es liegt auf der Hand, daß eine Ethik, die Lebensfragen thematiziert 
und nicht einfach Lehrsätze anwendet, nur vereinbar ist mit einer 'offenen' Auffassung von Dogmatik und 
systematischer Theologie.” M. Honecker: Einführung in die Theologsiche Ethik (1990), p.20f. 
72
 M. Honecker: Das Recht des Menschen (1978), p.17. 
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political liberalism within a perspective of theological social ethics. 
Rawls, however, emphasises, especially in his book about Political Liberalism, that his 
conception is strictly political and, as such, not to be taken as a comprehensive moral 
doctrine. Despite this, Rawls elaborates a political theory of justice that is morally 
grounded and an idea of an overlapping consensus that can be maintained for moral 
reasons. Honecker is right when writing that “John Rawls will erneut Gerechtigkeit und 
Moral  wie vor ihm Platon, Aristoteles, Kant  aneinander binden.”73 Rawls‟ con-
ception of political philosophy clearly presupposes a moral perspective. Even pluralist 
societies require that there be some essential norms, binding for moral reasons, not just 
upheld by the means of coercive state power. Our normative ethical approach to Rawls‟ 
political philosophy therefore genuinely accords with Rawls‟ own conception.74 
II. Modes of social ethics have to accord with life-reality and the complexity of modern 
societies. That is clearly reflected in Honecker‟s balancing of “einen Ansatz 'von oben' 
und einen Ansatz 'von unten'”75 and in the stress he puts upon the requirement of a 
“Konvergenzargumentation”.76 There has to be a simultaneity of theological reflection, 
general arguments drawing on a morally laden idea of “humanity”, as well as general 
insights stemming from the different sciences. All of these are factors to be weighed in 
reaching a proper solution in “worldly” affairs. 
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 M. Honecker Einführung in die Theologische Ethik (1990), p. 190. 
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 Rawls himself is (still) considered one of the main representatives of modern normative theory in 
political science. Daryl Glaser defines normative theory (a bit loosely) as follows: “The remit of the term 
can, however, be defined more broadly, to cover all political theorising of a prescriptive or recom-
mendatory kind: that is to say, all theory-making concerned with what „ought to be‟, as opposed to „what 
is‟, in political life.” D. Glaser, “Normative Theory”, Theory and Methods in political Science (1995, eds. 
D. Marsch and G. Stoker), p.21. And after he has referred some of the critique against normative theory as 
such, Glaser adds: “Despite such criticism, normative theory remains a living and vital branch of political 
studies. Indeed, it has benefited from a considerable revival of interest since the early 1970s, thanks in 
part to the influence of writers such as John Rawls and Robert Nozick.” Ibid., p.21f. 
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 M. Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p. 128  
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 “Für eine gesellschaftsbezogene, das Politische einschließende Ethik läßt sich das Christliche nicht 
mehr autoritativ ermitteln - sei es mit Hilfe historisch-kritischer Exegese, sei es aufgrund einer axiomat-
ischen Dogmatik.… Der theologische Beitrag  gemeint ist der Beitrag der theologischen Fachwissen-
schaft  zu ethischen Urteilsbildung kann nur der Diskussionsbeitrag eines Dialogpartners in einem 
umfassenderen Kommunikationsprozess unter der Christen sein. An die Stelle der theoretischen 
Behauptung einer bestehenden Konvergenz von gegenwärtiger gesellschaftlicher Situation und christo-
logischer Entscheidung hat eine Konvergenzargumentation zu treten, in der die theologische Besinnung 
auf das Christliche nur ein Argument neben anderen, beispielsweise der allgemeinen Humanität oder auch 
verallgemeinerungsfähiger, wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnisse ist.” M. Honecker, “Theologische Kriterien 
und politische Urteilsbildung”, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche (1974) p.489. 
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There appears to be parallels between Honecker‟s ideal of a “Konvergenzargu-
mentation” and Rawls‟ attempt to reach wide reflective equilibrium.77 Aiming at a wide 
reflective equilibrium means that we are seeking support for moral beliefs by alternately 
and systematically narrowing and widening our perspective, thereby taking into account 
both our (intuitive) judgements in particular cases, and our more principled views, 
drawing also on wider theoretical insights of a moral as well as a non-moral kind.
78
 
Thereby the most appropriate moral point of view is achieved in an ongoing process, by 
seeking a proper balance between the moral intuitions we have about concrete (contin-
gent) cases, the principled views we also hold, and the other theoretical considerations 
we are making. Although a definitive equilibrium may never be achieved, the constant 
refinement of our moral judgements and the public testing of our moral beliefs allows 
for an ethical approach in matters of politics that is both elastic and consistent. More 
strongly stated, seeking wide reflective equilibrium aims at increasing  in an ongoing 
process  the coherence among the moral intuitions, considered judgements, general 
norms, reflected principles, firm beliefs and theoretical insights we have.
79
  
                                                          
77
 Rawls' works do not contain very extensive discussions about methodology as such. Methodological 
questions are raised within different contexts and might be taken into consideration in those parts of 
Rawls‟ theory where such problems are more or less clearly implied. In this preliminary methodical 
chapter, however, I have found it necessary to comment briefly on a couple of methodical aspects most 
characteristic of the Rawlsian approach. 
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 Norman Daniels describes very appropriately how wide the horizon of wide reflective equilibrium 
might be: “We not only must work back and forth between principles and judgments about particular 
cases, the process that characterizes narrow equilibrium, but we must bring to bear all theoretical 
considerations that have relevance to the acceptibility of the principles as well as the particular judgments. 
These theoretical considerations may be empirical or they may be moral. … It is important that we see 
how diverse the types of beliefs included in wide equilibrium are, as well as the kinds of arguments that 
may be based on them. They include our beliefs about particular cases; about rules, principles, and virtues 
and how to apply or act on them; about the conflict between consequentialist and deontological views, 
about partiality and impartiality and the moral point of view; about motivation, moral develoment, strains 
of moral commitment, and the limits of ethics; about the nature of persons; about the role or function of 
ethics in our lives; about the implications of game theory, decision theory, and accounts of rationality for 
morality; about human psychology, sociology, and political and economic behavior; about the ways we 
should reply to moral scepticism and moral disagreement, and about moral justification itself. As is 
evident from this broad and encompassing list, the elements of moral theory are diverse. Moral theory is 
not simply a set of principles.” N. Daniels, Justice and Justification. Reflective equilibrium in theory and 
practice (1996), p.6. 
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 Tranöy discerns a stronger and a weaker sense of the notion coherence. Coherence in the strongest 
sense shall not be defined here. But the way Tranöy defines cohrence in a weaker sense to a wide extent 
applies in this context: “Det vi trenger, er et koherens-begrep som ligger midt imellom kravet om 
motsigelsesfrihet, som tydeligvis er et minstekrav for ordnede kunnskapsmengder, og et strengt deduktivt 
koherens- eller systemideal. Vitenskapenes verden byr på høyst forskjellige muligheter til å oppfylle slike 
ønskemål. For mens både konsistens (motsigelsesfrihet) og konsekvens (deduktiv følgeriktighet) er relativt 
greie å definere eller i alle fall å eksemplifisere, er de mellomliggende koherens-begreper på ingen måte 
lette å gjøre rede for selv om behovet for dem er aldri så påtrengende. Det som da ofte synes å skje, er at 
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Inspired both by Honecker‟s way of establishing a “Konvergenzargumentation” and 
Rawls‟ way of seeking a wide reflective equilibrium, I am, throughout my thesis, alter-
nating between political liberalism and theological social ethics, seeking a “Vermit-
tlung”80 between Rawls‟ political approach and Honecker‟s moral concern. This 
indicates that I need not first establish a comprehensive theological platform, with the 
intention of correctly assessing and properly correcting political liberalism from pre-
mises derived from some kind of privileged religious insight. It should be clear that I am 
aiming at a more principled clarification, but will not avoid considering a more practical 
“test-case” (as in chapter 6). 
III. An important aspect of a methodological approach aiming at (wide) reflective equi-
librium is that political arrangements, schemes and values are in principle taken as re-
visable. Political conceptions as well as social institutions can always be improved, as 
can the moral theories which underlie them. Increasing of coherence, which is what one 
aims at when going for a (wide) reflective equilibrium might, at best, be taken as an 
indication of truth, but coherence in itself can never guarantee that a position of truth 
has really been attained. In political liberalism Rawls accordingly makes a crucial dis-
tinction between “truth” and “reasonableness”. Within the domain of the political it is 
sufficient to aim at (the most) reasonable solutions.  
To some extent this corresponds with Honecker‟s concern for avoiding (religious) ab-
solutism in politics, aiming instead at a more reasonable and even pragmatic approach 
in matters belonging within the “worldly realm”. Citizens in highly complex societies, - 
sharing much of the same uncertainty
81
, have to handle common problems on the basis 
                                                                                                                                                                          
kravene om konsistens og koherens går over i eller erstattes av vagere, men ikke desto mindre artikuler-
bare krav om system, orden og sammenheng. Begreper, prinsipper og teorier som stilles sammen, må være 
relevante for hverandre, ha noe med hverandre å gjøre, må kunne inngå i “logiske” forbindelser med 
hverandre, gi opphav til hypoteser og ideer, øke kunnskapsmengdens fruktbarhet og forskernes evne til 
innen systemet å generere nye interessante påstander eller teorier. I dette tror jeg vi kan se noe karakter-
istisk for strukturen i det vi kunne kalle metodologiske normer som ordnet system. Dets ulike normer viser 
seg ofte å være „beslektet‟ fordi, med skiftende omstendigheter, går de over i hverandre, forutsetter de 
hverandre, erstatter de og samarbeider de med hverandre.” Knut Erik Tranöy: Vitenskapen – samfunns-
makt og livsform, Universitetsforlaget 1986 (4th edition 1994), p.137 
80
 For the use of this term cf. M.Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische 
Sozialethik (1978), p.149  
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 “Keine Ethik verfügt nämlich über einen Vorrat an abrufbaren Einsichten für alle Lebenslagen. Sie teilt 
vielmehr die Ratlosigkeit und Verlegenheit der von neuen Herausforderungen, neuen Situationen und 
neuen Aufgabenstellungen Betroffenen.” M Honecker: Einführung in die Theologische Ethik. Grundlagen 
und Grundbegriffe (1990), p x. 
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of shared values, political reason and the practical and theoretical insight they have 
gained. Honecker takes the essential Lutheran distinctions, and in particular the doctrine 
of the two kingdoms, as providing a proper systematic-theological approach for deter-
mining  among other things  our responsibility in matters of politics and social ethics. 
More correctly, one should say that Honecker to a large extent takes his theological 
point of departure in a reinterpretation of the doctrine of the two kingdoms as a herme-
neutic key when approaching the domain of the political.
82
 I think that “the doctrine of 
the two kingdoms” provides an appropriate systematic-theological “gateway” to Rawls‟ 
political conception, as it is expressed both in his theory of justice, in his conception of 
an overlapping consensus and, last but not least, in his idea of public reason. 
This allows me to proceed in accordance with Honecker‟s theological approach without 
violating Rawls‟ aim of establishing a strictly political and widely shared platform for 
coexistence, that may even be morally backed up on genuinely religious (and other) 
grounds. And it further allows me, in accordance with the distinction between “the two 
realms”, to avoid making a theological claim of privileged insight in “worldly” things. 
IV. I will conclude by making some remarks concerning the use of terminology, speci-
fically with regard to expressions referring to Christian or theological thought. By using 
the term Christian ethics, as I often do, I do not refer to any “authorised” theological 
system of ethics
83
. The notion Christian ethics might, however, sometimes be 
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 Honecker fears, however, that theological models like the doctrine of the two kingdoms might end up as 
formulas of little use (“Leerformel”) for complying with the present political/moral problems which 
people in modern societies are really facing: But nonetheless he finds hardly a better theological “device” 
for paving the way most properly into the domain of the political, even if he is very much aware of the 
apories, problems and historical abuses of this doctrine. Tentatively at least, he will nonetheless set out 
from a newinterpretation of the doctrine of the two kingdoms: “Angesichts der geschilderten Aporien und 
offenen Fragen habe ich vorgeschlagen, die Zweireichelehre neu zu interpretieren. Dieser Vorschlag ist, 
wie nachdrücklich betont sei, eine Hypothese, und auch nicht die einzig mögliche.” M. Honecker, 
“Thesen zur Aporie der Zweireichelehre”, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche (1981), p.136f.  
83
 The phrase Christian ethics might of couse also be taken in a rather polemic sense , or it might at least 
signal that the relation between a theological approach to social ethics and philosophical or strictly politi-
cal approaches is taken to be fundamentally conflict-laden. The famous theologian, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 
may without doubt be supported by many theologians when he at the very outset of his Ethics states that: 
“The knowledge of good and evil seems to be the aim of all ethical reflection. The first task of Christian 
ethics is to invalidate this knowledge. In launching this attack on the underlying assumptions of all other 
ethics, Christian ethics stands so completely alone that it becomes questionable whether there is any 
purpose in speaking of Christian ethics at all.” D. Bonhoeffer, Ethics (English translation 1955. First 
published in Germany 1949), p. 17-19. Quite another view, however, can be found in the theological 
ethics, as conceived of by the influential Scandinavian theologian, Knud E. Lögstrup, who even wants to 
avoid the term Christian as a qualification of a particular kind of ethics. Knud E. Lögstrup obviously fears 
a situation in society where “Gud er blevet argument, retsligt, moralsk og politisk. Tavsheden er brudt, 
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considered an appropriate term when comprising a number of more or less different 
approaches to questions of morality which share the premise that they take their point of 
departure from Christian belief or Biblical sources.
 
The term theological ethics, which is 
also used in my thesis, may often be more adequate and also less controversial, espec-
ially if one just wants to underline that moral issues are being considered in the light of 
theological principles.
84
 In addition one might use the expression moral theology
85
, as 
Rawls himself can do. He quite simply uses the phrase „moral theology‟ about kinds of 
ethics that are in a stronger or a weaker sense explicitly religiously grounded.
86
 But even 
if I sometimes find it appropriate to use the expressions moral theology or Christian 
ethics, I will thereby not undermine a clear presupposition of my thesis;  that all parties 
involved in social co-operation can be assumed to share some common moral ground 
when addressing political values, social norms, institutionalised standards of justice, and 
terms of public reasoning.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
ofte på en meget larmende måde i rethaveri og i en utålelig og fraseaktig bedre-viten. Hvad enten det 
derfor drejer sig om at tage stilling til ægteskabslovgivning, børneopdragelse, til spørsmålet om straffens 
motivering skal være gengæld eller prevention, til en politisk-økonomisk oppfattelse af, hvordan 
samfundet skal indrettes etc. må den kristne tage stillling dertil på ganske de samme vilkår som enhver 
anden.”K.Løgstrup, Den etiske Fordring (1969), s.128. 
84 
 It also makes sense to make a distinction between Christian morality and theological ethics in 
accordance with the widely accepted distinction between ethics and morality. Thus Christian morality 
might be understood as a practice motivated by norms, values, ideas inherent in the Christian faith. And 
theological ethics might be understood as the theological (theoretical) reflection over this kind of morality. 
85
 The expression “theologia moralis”, which comes close to the notion “moral theology” can be found 
already by G.Calixt as early as in 1634. Cf. Epitome theologiae moralis (1634). This terminology seems 
to some extent also to come close to the terminology recently used by Trutz Rendtorff: In his “ethical 
theology” he will make it possible “Ethik als eine Grunddimension der Theologie zu begreifen und den 
eigenständigen ethischen Sinn von Theologie zu erkennen.” Cf. Ethik. Grundelemente, Methodologie und 
Konkretionen einer ethischen Theologie, (1990), p.7. 
86
 Cf. for instance Political Liberalism, p.xxiv where Rawls uses the notion moral theology: “These things 
they thought they knew with the certainty of faith, as here their moral theology gave them complete 
guidance.” Ibid. 
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2. THEOLOGY, POLITICAL LIBERALISM AND THE 
VALUE-FORMATION OF SOCIETY 
2.1. The problem 
Although I touch upon some sociological issues, I have no intention of providing any 
detailed sociological analysis. Let me just remark that sociologists have yet to reach any 
agreement about the fundamental basis of society.
87
 By the way,  although some clas-
sical sociologists like Max Weber may be referred to in A Theory of Justice
88
, Rawls 
does not draw upon particular sociological theories.  
The foundation of society is also a matter of fundamental interest in theological social 
ethics. Christians involved in social co-operation within the framework of society are 
usually very much concerned about the kind of values which underlie the social struc-
ture and form the basis for coexistence. Rawls makes it quite clear from the very outset 
of the first chapter of his monumental work, A Theory of Justice, that he has to “begin 
by describing the role of justice in social co-operation and with a brief account of the 
primary subject of justice, the basic structure of society”89. Society, or better  the 
institutional scheme of society  settles in a very decisive way the terms for cooperation, 
distribution and implementation of citizens‟ rights, duties and liberties. 
The major institutions of society have a decisive influence on the welfare of each 
citizen. And thus both the essential social and economic arrangements such as the 
institution of the family, the rules for acquiring property, the organising of the means of 
production on the one hand, and the legal and governmental safeguarding of elementary 
rights and liberties such as freedom of thought, the liberty of conscience, and the right to 
practice one‟s religion on the other hand, have an essential impact on the type of life that 
it is possible for individuals, groups and associations to lead. The major institutions of 
society, viewed as a single scheme, largely determine citizens‟ opportunities, life-plans, 
legal rights and duties. This is why Rawls makes the basic structure of society his 
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 The sociologist, Joachim Israel, for instance emphasises this kind of fundamental disagreement, confes-
sing that “det rår dyp uenighet og meningsulikhet mellom sosiologer om hvordan man skal oppfatte sam-
funnet.” J. Israel, Sosiologi (Norwegian edition Oslo 1973), p.63. 
88
 There can obviously not be a sharp division between political philosophy and sociology. The very 
phenomenon of society makes them overlap. 
89
 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), p.3. 
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primary subject. But the institutional framework of society faces according to Rawls a 
crucial test: How are justice, liberties and elementary rights for individual citizens in 
fact promoted and secured by the basic structure itself? The institutional scheme of 
society
90
 is to be established as a suitable framework for individuals‟ fundamental life-
prospects and conceptions of the good.  
The idea of society, and not least the interdependence between the “architectonic” of 
society and vital ideas of religion and ethics, has been subject to different conceptions 
throughout history and may, in principle, have no fixed definition. Society continuously 
changes. I think that Paul Barry Clark has made that clear in a way very much to the 
point: 
“This does not mean that there is something that we cannot call society. It is, 
however, a strange beast. It is rather like the duality of light, which is both wave and 
particle, uncertain in its appearance; for it appears as simultaneously substantive and 
as reflexive. As substantive it appears definable and fixed, as reflective it appears 
fluid and without boundaries for no sooner are the boundaries imagined then they 
have changed. Those boundaries might be imagined by ethics or by theology but no 
sooner are they imagined than society changes. This implies that the relation 
between ethics, society and theology is one of constant challenge, interpenetration, 
change and fluidity. They gather together briefly in a moment, but no sooner is the 
moment grasped than the grasping changes the relation and destroys the moment. So 
it is with reflexive relations.”91 
To speak of society is normally to speak of individuals placed within a certain social 
order and this gives rise to the question whether society should appropriately be taken as 
prior to the individual. In a sense it certainly is. One is born into a society, some social 
patterns already exist, social, political and economic institutions are already at hand. 
There may even be shared traditions, some widely recognised moral values and settled 
standards of justice as well as distributive mechanisms.  
A more individualistic perspective on society cannot entirely be ignored: It is for 
instance a crucial idea  at least within liberalism  that members of society have 
elementary rights and liberties, and should be allowed to pursue beliefs, talents, interests 
and conceptions of the good,  independently of any commitment merely derived from 
their belonging to a social and political entity. 
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 I mostly prefer the phrase “institutional scheme of society” instead of the more Rawlsian phrase “basic 
structure of society”.  
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 P. B. Clarke in: Dictionary of Ethics, Theology and Society (1996, Article on SOCIETY), p.785. 
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But even for citizens acting on their own, there obviously have to be some common 
rules by virtue of which the freedom of an individual is taken as compatible with a 
similar freedom for others. Members of society (like chess-players for instance) have to 
play by some vital shared rules if their social interplay is to allow any possibility of 
realising goals or ends which are in the interest of all individuals. It seems as if the well-
being of society as such is dependant on whether the coexistent members of society 
really succeed in establishing and defending some kind of common good. But then one 
might ask: How is it possible for citizens to share some substantial norms for “fair inter-
play”, and even have a shared aim or a “common good” as an acceptable point of orient-
ation for them all? It is not easy to see from where to derive the values and the compo-
nents required for establishing an institutional framework of coexistence upholding 
shared standards and thereby preventing social disintegration. 
It cannot be denied that the church  as an association with a considerable influence at 
least within western societies  has always had an idea about what a good society should 
be like, and what might threaten its order. The way the structural framework of society 
is arranged, the way a genuinely shared basis for coexistence is conceived, eventually 
also approved and ultimately realised within such a framework, seems to be of as great 
importance to citizens generally as it is for the Church as an association within society. 
Thus theological social ethics will permanently take into consideration the way society 
is structured, the understanding of the common good, the practising of distributive prin-
ciples, the coercive role of the state, the rights of individual citizens, their liberties, free-
dom of conscience etc. And in fact churches have often issued more or less authoritative 
pronouncements to the question of the common good and about political systems, social 
issues and the actual problems which are typical of modern societies.
92
 
Those concerned with the problems of securing a moral basis for coexistence and social 
co-operation in modern societies  among which churches and church-members may 
safely be assumed  should find Rawls' political liberalism of considerable interest. But 
should the church, or at least individual church-members, really “support” a proposal for 
a broad and morally grounded consensus,  conceived of on Rawlsian premises? Can 
political liberalism provide for an organisation of society that is morally and politically 
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better, more acceptable and fairer than other schemes? Is there any reason to believe that 
Rawlsian liberalism is in a better position than other political ideologies, moral theories 
or Christian belief-systems to produce an adequate “overlap” or a shared conception of 
the “common good”, or that that conception is sufficient  to establish the requisite unity  
given the present deep diversity which characterises modern societies? Is there any theo-
logical reason to expect that a “common good” or an “overlap”, conceived of on liberal 
premises could really be endorsed from genuinely theological premises?
93
 
2.2. Different perspectives on society 
2.2.1 A consensus- versus a conflict-perspective? 
Although the term “overlapping consensus” is mostly used in John Rawls‟ later 
writings, he has always emphasised his concern for a broad agreement on the basic 
structure of society. It therefore seems most appropriate to consider him a typical 
representative of a consensus-perspective on society.
94
  
Sociologists who defend a consensus-theory (as functionalists like Talcott Parsons do) 
usually regard society as “an integrated whole, composed of structures which mesh 
closely with one another”.95 Anthony Giddens, a well-known modern sociologist, takes 
it to be typical of those defending a consensus-model that they think of society as a set 
                                                                                                                                                                          
92
 Cf. for instance the use of Encyclicals in the Catholic Church , and the publishing of so-called 
“Denkschriften” from the side of the Protestant Churches in Germany in recent time. 
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 I take my approach to this question from the perspective of theological social ethics as conceived of by 
Martin Honecker. Of course it might also have been very interesting to consider this question from 
another theological point of view; for instance from a Barthian perspective, from a Catholic perspective 
etc. That will be done, - only as far as it illuminates Honecker‟s way of thinking or if it is appropriate to 
contrast Honecker‟s conception of social-ethics with some other influential position, - for instance the 
Barthian one. 
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 It is worth mentioning that Axel Smith, one of the few Norwegian theologians, who has taken Rawls‟ 
theory of justice into consideration, obviously finds the Rawlsian scheme of society too harmonious and 
therefore introduces a conflict-perspective in addition. After having considered the problem of distributive 
justice in utilitarianism and in Rawlsianism Smith continues: “For å finne fram til rettferdige løsninger på 
den typen konflikter vi har for oss kunne en ved siden av utilitarismens og Rawls‟ løsningsmodeller trenge 
flere andre modeller som kunne ivareta andre hensyn. Det burde for eksempel også være en modell som 
bare aksepterte ordninger som gir de gruppene som fra før av står lavest på den sosiale skala større for-
deler enn andre, slik at sosiale ulikheter i samfunnet systematisk ble bygget ned.” A.Smith: Rett fordeling. 
Om normer for en kristen politisk etikk (1982), p. 166. (I think Rawls through the difference-principle in 
fact meets this claim from Smith.) And so Smith continues: “Men det kan også være bruk for modeller 
som på en mer fundamental måte bryter med grunnleggende forutsetninger hos Rawls. Rawls er det sosio-
logene betegner som en konsensusteoretiker. (Allardt) Han går ut fra at rettferdige løsninger er å finne 
langs en linje som forutsetter avveining mellom forskjellige interesser. Det hender at den rettferdige løs-
ningen ikke er å finne langs en slik linje, men bare ved å ta utgangspunkt i en helt grunnleggende konflikt i 
samfunnet.” Ibid., p.166. 
95
 A. Giddens: Sociology (1995, second edition), p.721. 
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of interdependent parts, which are mutually supporting and constraining upon one an-
other. Giddens‟ characterisation of this interdependence from a sociological perspective 
takes the form of a rather common analogy: 
“the analogy here is not with the walls of a building, but with the physiology of the 
body. A body consists of various specialised parts (such as the brain, heart. lungs, 
liver and so forth), each of which contributes to sustaining the continuing life of the 
organism. These necessarily work in harmony with one another; if they do not, the 
life of the organism is under threat. So it is according to Durkheim (and Parsons), 
with society. For a society to have a continuing existence over time, its specialised 
institutions (such as the political system, religion, the family and the educational 
system) must work in harmony with one another. The continuation of a society thus 
depends on cooperation, which in turn presumes a general consensus, or agreement, 
among its members over the basic values.”96 
And so one might consider it typical of consensus-models that they take it to be essential 
that a society is organised in accordance with an overriding value-system, which exist-
ing authorities are trying to maintain. Ideally spoken this value-system should also be 
taken for granted by most citizens.
97
 In harmonious and “balanced” societies there has to 
be  or so it would seem  a strong concern for common norms and values and accord-
ingly also for the way these norms and values can most appropriately be made widely 
acceptable. The role of basic institutions, such as the family, the school-system, the 
courts and also the churches, in the process of creating and promulgating society's 
“internalised” common norms and values, has to be considered rather crucial. 
Conflict theorists, on the other hand, consider the existence of antagonisms essential to a 
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 Some sociologists, however, obviously mean that a consensus-perspective on society necessarily im-
plies a high degree of social control. This is for instance emphasised by Joachim Israel: “Derfor er det 
nødvendig … at samfunnet skaper og bevarer ett eneste verdisystem og forsvarer seg mot angrep som tar 
sikte på å endre dette systemet. Hvordan oppnår man dette integrerte og eneste verdisystem? Gjennom 
sosialiseringsprosessen og gjennom sosial kontroll som fører til likeartede meninger og vurderinger (kon-
sensus = samsvar i meninger og vurderinger). Ved sosialiseringsprosessen blir barn via oppdragelse og 
utdannelse indoktrinert til å lære seg å akseptere det herskende eller dominerende verdisystemet eller, om 
man så vil, den herskende klasses verdisystem. Sosial kontroll vil si alle de tiltak som hindrer at det opp-
står avvikende atferd, eller som tilbakefører avvikende atferd til den atferd som faller sammen med det 
dominerende verdisystemet. Sosial kontroll blir utøvd av politi og domstoler, av barneverns- og edru-
skapsnemnder, av skoler og utdannelsesanstalter, av kirker og rotary-klubber (i hvert fall forsøker de 
sistnevnte å gjøre det. Om de lykkes i samfunn som våre, er en annen sak).… For å resymere: Hos dem 
som snakker om at samfunnet er et system i balanse, understrekes betydningen av sosiale og moralske 
normer, av et allment godtatt verdisystem, av likeartet atferd. Sosialisering og sosial kontroll blir ansett for 
å være de viktigste samfunnsmessige prosessene. Man finner at avvikende atferd forstyrrer balansen og 
integrasjonen i samfunnet. Konflikter blir betraktet som forstyrrende momenter som truer balansen, like-
vekten og den sosiale integrasjonen.” J. Israel: Sosiologi (Norwegian edition, 1973), p.61.The perspective 




 Conflicts normally exist in a society as a result of the ubiquitous scarcity of 
basic goods; raw materials, economic resources, food and social goods, and the per-
ception of injustice in the distribution of social goods and scarce material resources. Of 
course there might occasionally be sufficient goods, but material and economic abund-
ance among some privileged groups can normally be achieved only through a corre-
sponding suppression of elementary needs of others,  what seems obvious in a world-
wide perspective. And so one should take for granted that there is usually a deep and 
insoluble conflict of interest among diverse groups and classes in society. This kind of 
conflict is not primarily a conflict concerning norms, ethics and moral ideas, but a 
conflict concerning the control over economic resources, raw material and political 
power. Karl Marx‟s account of class conflict might be taken as the paradigmatic 
example of a conflict-theory. Although not all conflict theories assign a dominant role to 
the class-struggle as Marx's did, conflict models all consider the existence of some anta-
gonism essential to the existence of any given society.  Conflicts are simultaneously 
considered the vital driving forces of social change in society. In a conflict-perspective 
one could never consider a situation of prevailing consensus as stable. Consensus is 
always the result of contingent circumstances. And according to sociologists like 
Joachim Israel the two fundamental perspectives on society, the consensus-perspective 
and the conflict-perspective, cannot be reconciled.
99
 
At first blush, it would seem obvious that Rawls‟ could not be a conflict theorist given 
his requirement of an overlapping consensus, while that same requirement makes Rawls' 
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 Collins Dictionary of Sociology considers conflict theories “more particularly, [as] the relatively diffuse 
collection of theories that in the 1960s were ranged against, and contested the dominance of, Parsonian 
STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONALISM and its emphasis on societies as mainly governed by value-
consensus and the internalization of institutionalized shared values.”(p.112). This is a very vague 
description that might however suffice in our context. 
99
 As far as I can see, even a conflict-model, might take a certain framework for granted, within which 
competition, struggle and controversies are to be carried out. What seems right, however, is that for 
genuine and more “dogmatic” conflict-theorists should any kind of synthesis between a perspective of 
consensus and a perspective of conflict beforehand be ruled out. “Mange forfattere fremholder at man 
burde kunne finne en syntese ettersom både konflikter og konsensus forekommer i alle samfunn. Dette er i 
og for seg riktig. Men de mister poenget i vårt resonnement. Problemet er ikke om det forekommer kon-
sensus og konflikter samtidig, problemet er hvilken betydning man tillegger dem: Enten er balansen det 
sentrale og det normale, og konflikter det som forstyrrer balansen, eller også er konflikter det sentrale og 
normale, mens balanse er noe tilfeldig. I konsensusteorier om samfunnet har man følgende mønster: Kon-
sensus fører til ensartethet som fører til likevekt som blir forstyrret av avvikende atferd og konflikter som 
blir kontrollert gjennom sosialisering og sosial kontroll som fører til konsensus. I konfliktteorier om sam-
funnet har man følgende mønster: Knapphet fører til tvang som fører til konflikter som fører til ulike 
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theory an equally obvious candidate for inclusion within the class of consensus theories. 
Moreover, classifying Rawls as a consensus theorist seems much more consistent with 
Rawls embrace of liberalism in as much as liberalism is widely assumed to postulate an 
essential harmony between individual aims and social goals.
100
 But first impressions are 
just that, impressions and Rawls merits a closer look.  
Before enlisting Rawls without reservations in the consensus school it should be noted 
that Rawls, when elaborating the idea of an overlapping consensus, is facing the radical 
diversity of modern societies. Without doubt Rawls recognises the great destructive po-
tential contained within the conflicts inherent in modern society. Unlike Marx, however, 
he does not see the ground-conflicts as stemming only from inequities in the distribution 
of economic resources. Rather, Rawls realises that fundamental differences in beliefs, 
religion, norms, values, moral ideas, aspirations, life-plans and conceptions of the good 
give rise to serious conflicts in modern societies.
101
 It is Rawls‟ clear insight in this deep 
diversity which raises questions about his  inclusion within the consensus camp.  
Simply acknowledging the existence of diversity may be rather trivial. But saying that 
the diversity in modern societies is deep, means that there is in society different interests 
and conceptions of the good which are incompatible, not just in the sense that they do 
not in themselves fit harmoniously together or have competing aims, but even in the 
sense of being mutually exclusive. The not infrequent attempts by one religion during 
the history to eliminate another provide a good example of this exclusiveness. 
The phenomenon of contemporary diversity seems to be most characteristic of societies 
having reached a certain stage of differentiation, complexity, modernity and individual 
autonomy. This is clearly realised by Rawls. Therefore, if Rawls is characterised as a 
                                                                                                                                                                          
verdisystemer som sammen med konfliktene utgjør drivkrefter for sosial forandring som fører til andre 
eller nye former for knapphet.” J. Israel, Sosiologi, p.63. 
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 Some theologians even take this as a decisive reason why classical liberalism should be considered 
essentially in conflict with Christian social ethics. Axel Smith, for instance, writes that “Liberalismens 
pionerer hadde tro på en grunnleggende harmoni mellom egennytten og fellesnytten. Når et menneske 
arbeider for sin egeninteresse, vil dette som regel også gagne det som er fellesskapets interesse. Denne 
harmonitenkningen er kanskje det trekk ved liberalismen som står i den skarpeste motsetning til Bibelens 
menneskesyn og samfunnsforståelse.” A. Smith: Rett fordeling. Om normer for en kristen politisk etikk 
(1982), p. 163. And he adds that “Den grunnleggende motsetningen i samfunnssynet mellom Bibelen og 
klassisk liberalisme på dette punkt har ikke i tilstrekkelig grad vært påaktet av samfunnsinteresserte 
kristne mennesker.” Ibid., p.164. 
101
 In a Weberian perspective one might likewise emphasise the kind of diversity that could be ascribed to 
the decisive differences regarding religious belief, gender and the plurality of interests more generally. 
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“consensus-theorist”, it should simultaneously be added that an understanding of the 
conflict potential within modern societies is also crucial to understanding his political 
philosophy. 
2.2.2. The circumstances of (in)justice 
The perspective one takes on society, should correspond to the real world in a suffi-
ciently close way. An insight into the “circumstances of justice” provides us with back-
ground knowledge that is required when elaborating a conception of justice to go ap-
propriately with real societies. The overview as well as the comments I give in this 
connection refer mainly to section 22 in A Theory of Justice, where Rawls states: 
“The circumstances of justice may be described as the normal conditions under 
which human cooperation is both possible and necessary. Thus, as I noted at the 
outset, although a society is a cooperative venture for mutual advantage, it is 
typically marked by a conflict as well as an identity of interests. There is an identity 
of interests since social cooperation makes possible a better life for all than any 
would have if each were to try to live solely by his own efforts. There is a conflict of 
interests since men are not indifferent as to how the greater benefits produced by 
their collaboration are distributed, for in order to pursue their ends they each prefer a 
larger to a lesser share. Thus principles are needed for choosing among the various 
arrangements which determine the division of advantages and for underwriting an 
agreement on the proper distributive shares. These requirements define the role of 
justice. The background conditions that give rise to these necessities are the 
circumstances of justice” 102  
By referring in this way to the circumstances of justice, or perhaps I should better say 
the circumstances of injustice, Rawls stresses that the societies he has in mind are char-
acterised by conflicting as well as coinciding interests. The “circumstances” must reflect 
the reality of modern societies. A conception of justice built on the insight in the 
circumstances of justice has to provide people with principles for sharing fairly what 
their co-operative efforts can be expected to bring forth
103
, while simultaneously pro-
tecting each citizen from being exploited by the others. It should also be added that 
citizens can normally not be expected to have their interests sacrificed to those of their 
co-citizens. A society where the circumstances of justice apply is not to be conceived of 
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 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), p.126. Rawls says that “my account largely follows that of Hume 
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 I am deliberately vague about this, for if the idea is to establish principles for sharing a surplus, result-
ing from citizens co-operative efforts, it seems obvious that one should also have an idea about what fairly 
belongs to each person independently of social co-operation.  
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as a society of saints: 
“In a society of saints agreeing on a common ideal, if such a community could exist, 
disputes about justice would not occur. Each would work selflessly for one end as 
determined by their common religion, and reference to this end (assuming it to be 
clearly defined) would settle every question of right. But a human society is charac-
terized by the circumstances of justice.”104 
It is the competing interests in society combined with the danger that some people might 
otherwise feel entitled to enforce their own interests against the others, that give rise to 
the need for principles of justice.  
Now Rawls holds that the circumstances of justice in society are mainly of two kinds:  
 First there is what Rawls characterises as the objective circumstances. In this con-
nection he underlines the existence of moderate scarcity.
105
 
 Second, there are the subjective circumstances which arise because people, although 
they might have roughly similar basic needs and interests, also pursue different con-
ceptions of the good and have diverse rational long-time plans.
106
 And people are 
also bound by very different natural ties, allegiances and loyalties. 
The ability to satisfy the objective conditions presuppose two things. On the one hand 
there is the synergetic effect: Co-operation can be expected to result in a “surplus” to be 
distributed fairly. On the other hand moderate scarcity still applies: The co-operative 
“product” can any way be supposed to fall short of the actual demands that most people 
usually have for that product.
107
 
When considering subjective conditions, Rawls stresses that individual life-plans and 
personal convictions of conscience have to be handled and balanced on terms that are 
widely recognisable as fair. Compliance with the terms given by the circumstances of 
justice is only possible if the settled principles are inclusive enough to be widely recog-
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are not so abundant that schemes of cooperation become superfluous, nor are conditions so harsh that 
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nised and simultaneously specific enough to set constraints upon those who might other-
wise feel justified in enforcing their views on others.
108
  
My point is that Rawls' description of the “circumstances of justice” deals directly with 
the circumstances of scarcity, social differences and diversity regarding people‟s life-
prospects. How these circumstances should most appropriately and fairly be handled is, 
however, the difficult question. Rawls even lets the “circumstances” be reflected in the 
“original position”,  when the most fundamental principles of justice as fairness are to 
be settled. 
2.3. Rawls’ perspective on society 
2.3.1. Society as a fair scheme of social co-operation 
Although the diversity within modern societies is without doubt taken by Rawls to be 
radical, the main perspective on society within the Rawlsian political conception is ob-
viously not a perspective of irreconcilable conflict, where situations of consensus are to 
be considered merely contingent and arbitrary. Rawls‟ hope is that it might after all be 
possible to establish an overlapping consensus, which can be made stable by being 
endorsed by all citizens as fair. 
Thus Rawls is mainly concerned about achieving the fairest possible terms of social co-
operation. The very idea of fair social co-operation is indeed central to Rawls‟ concep-
tion of society. Society is considered a joint co-operative venture. According to Rawls 
one should, however, distinguish between socially co-ordinated activity and coope-
ration. While the former might be ordered by some tyrannical sovereign, the latter is 
supposed to rest on rules, principles and procedures that the co-operating parties them-
selves can  in some fundamental way  freely accept.109 
 If social co-operation between free citizens shall succeed  according to Rawls  it 
has to be widely acceptable as fair. 
 Fair terms of co-operation are to be expressed in principles specifying for the citizens 
their fundamental rights and duties, which are effectively to be safeguarded by the 
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main political institutions of society. 
 The very institutional organisation  (the basic structure) of society is, however; deci-
sively dependent on the support from citizens with a sense of justice. 
The basic structure as such should provide for fair terms of co-operation,  terms that all 
citizens and parties might endorse, provided of course that the other parties accept them 
too. Thus there is a natural element of reciprocity inherent in fair co-operation.
110
 Rawls 
explains the application of the principle of fairness to individuals as follows:  
“I shall try to use this principle to account for all requirements that are obligations as 
distinct from natural duties.
111
 This principle holds that a person is required to do his 
part as defined by the rules of an institution when two conditions are met: first, the 
institution is just (or fair), that is, it satisfies the two principles of justice; and 
second, one has voluntarily accepted the benefits of the arrangements or taken 
advantage of the opportunities it offers to further one‟s interests. The main idea is 
that when a number of persons engage in a mutually advantageous cooperative 
venture according to rules, and thus restrict their liberty in ways necessary to yield 
advantages for all, those who have submitted to these restrictions have a right to a 
similar acquiescence on the part of those who have benefited from their submission. 
We are not to gain from the cooperative labors of others without doing our fair 
share. The two principles of justice define what is a fair share in the case of insti-
tutions belonging to the basic structure. So if these arrangements are just, each 
person receives a fair share when all (himself included) do their part. Now by defi-
nition the requirements specified by the principle of fairness are the obligations. All 
obligations arise in this way. It is important, however, to note that the principle of 
fairness has two parts, the first which states that the institutions or practices in 
question must be just, the second which characterizes the requisite voluntary acts. 
The first part formulates the conditions necessary if these voluntary acts are to give 
rise to obligations.”112 
An approximately just institutional scheme will further fairness and give rise to obliga-
tions that are voluntarily accepted by the co-operating parties (as for instance the obli-
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gation to keep promises). 
In its approach to society Rawls‟ political philosophy reflects a “fairness-model”, which 
implies that society is mainly to be taken as a joint venture of co-operation, even if it is 
simultaneously characterised by radical diversity. Rawls‟ idea of society as a fair system 
of co-operation provides for a much more subtle insight into the nature of society than 
either “conflict- or harmony-models”.  
2.3.2 The ideal of a well-ordered society 
Faced with the growing diversity within modern democratic societies, it is difficult to 
see how such societies can be (and remain) well-ordered. Diversity would seem to entail 
the weakening of the attachments and bonds among persons. It also means that the 
diversity of values, norms and life-prospects makes it difficult to establish a platform of 
shared values that all citizens can approve of. And the great emphasis on individual 
freedom hardly seems conducive to strengthening common standards and norms. 
Nevertheless the idea of a well-ordered society, based on widely approved morally 
grounded ordering principles is a leitmotif in Rawls‟ theory. 
Rawls‟ ideal of a well-ordered society makes it possible to think of society as a fair 
system of co-operation and to consider it as a genuine social unity of coexistent citizens.
 
Thus, the conception of a well-ordered society is normative and highly idealised.
113
 
According to Rawls a well-ordered society is; 
 a society where the citizens accept fundamental principles of justice.  
 a society where these principles are publicly known. (Each citizen knows them and 
also knows that the principles are known and recognised by the other citizens). 
 a society where it is publicly acknowledged that the basic structure of society satis-
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fies these principles of justice,  or where one has at least good reason to believe that 
this may be the case. 
 a society where the citizens have a normally effective sense of justice, corresponding 
to the fair institutional scheme of society as such.
114
 
And so Rawls concludes by saying that; “In such a society the publicly recognised con-
ception of justice establishes a shared point of view from which citizens' claims on 
society can be adjudicated. This is a highly idealized concept.”115 Thus the ideal of a 
well-ordered society  although not elaborated in detail by Rawls  provides us with 
standards for assessing the (lack of ) justice of the basic structure of actual societies and 
for improving the institutional scheme of real societies. 
Let me further specify the most important features of a well-ordered society: 
I. The domain of the public plays an essential part in a well-ordered society.  
There is in a well-ordered society a public understanding concerning the kind of claims 
it would be appropriate for citizens to advance towards one another.
116
 The principles 
and rules regulating the coexistence within the institutional scheme of one‟s society are 
supposed to be publicly known and can therefore also be publicly discussed and asses-
sed. Thus Rawls‟ conception of political liberalism can in many respects be seen as a 
contribution to establishing “a reasonable public basis of justification on fundamental 
political questions”.117 The assessment of the scheme of society, the valuation of the 
principles for a fair distribution of the basic goods, should be crystallised and recognised 
within the public forum. As Rawls stresses, “a well-ordered society is a society effect-
                                                                                                                                                                          
emphasises, that the conception of a well-ordered society as conceived of by Rawls, is a „model-
conception‟ with a strong normative character. 
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ively regulated by a public political conception of justice.”118 (Rawls‟ notion of “the 
public” is thoroughly analysed below). 
II. A well-ordered society is stable.  
Rawls admits that his earlier writings paid too little attention to the problem how the 
principles underlying an institutional framework, characteristic of a well-ordered 
society, could be made stable by being willingly endorsed by citizens, or at least by 
most of them. The problem of diversity, i.e. the conflicting (social) interests, the 
heterogeneity of beliefs and the highly different aims that individuals as well as groups 
and associations might pursue, may spoil any chance of maintaining a stable society, 
unified by some common aims and values. 
Rawls  in his latest writings  realises that he has to pay more attention to the problem 
of how a stable basis is possible,  and can be maintained in societies characterised by 
deep and lasting diversity in many respects. In truly liberal societies one should not 
choose the “easy” way; - to enforce social and political unity, stability and “well-
orderedness”119 by the means of the coercive powers of the state, as was sometimes the 
case also in “liberal” societies.120  
Instead Rawls emphasises that the basis of an enduring social unity must be a 
conception of justice which is;  
“in some way supported by, all reasonable (or the reasonable) comprehensive 
doctrines in society. A second comment is that this basis of social unity is the 
deepest because the fundamental ideas of the political conception are endorsed by 
the reasonable comprehensive doctrines, and these doctrines represent what citizens 
regard as their deepest convictions, religious, philosophical, and moral. From this 
follows stability for the right reasons.”121 
The path to stability in a society which is well-ordered on Rawlsian premises, is obvi-
ously not a short one. A social unity, which is sufficiently stable, has to be secured by 
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principles of justice that can somehow be endorsed by citizens themselves, even if they 
are differently situated and hold incompatible religious beliefs and pursue different 
conceptions of the good. This issue of stability was not  according to Rawls himself  
sufficiently considered in his first conception of A Theory of Justice. That is where 
Rawls' recent writings are most  self-critical, and where the most significant incongru-
ence between his two main works; A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism can be 
found.
122
 The “later” Rawls considered his former ideas about how a well-ordered 
society could be upheld to be  at least to some extent  “unrealistic”. As mentioned, 
this does not mean that he has rejected his former conception, only that he considers it 
insufficient to address the question of how a just society can be maintained over time. 
Here, I would underline that Rawls‟ idea of a well-ordered society is based upon the 
assumption that such a society's institutional scheme can be approved of and supported 
by its members for moral reasons. This will also secure “stability for the right reasons”. 
III. The most characteristic feature of a well-ordered society is that it is just.  
The primary focus of the Rawlsian theory is first of all the institutional scheme, the very 
basic structure of society, defining decisively the framework for citizens coexistence and 
social co-operation. And Rawls begins the first chapter of A Theory of Justice by stres-
sing that: 
“Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought. A 
theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; 
likewise laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be 
reformed or abolished if they are unjust. Each person possesses an inviolability 
founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override…”123 
Elementary principles of justice, that can be widely approved of, should indeed be 
considered an appropriate bulwark both against the instability inherent in “private 
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society”124 and towards the kind of stability inherent in the homogeneous societies, 
where the so-called “common good” is enforced, even by the extensive use of the co-
ercive powers of society. Rawls realises clearly that trying to enforce “well-orderedness” 
by use of the coercive powers of society  at the cost of individual liberty  might in the 
long run render society not well-ordered and fair, but rather unjust and therefore un-
stable. There is therefore a need for a shared conception of justice and for principles of 
co-operation which provide the coexisting members of a society with reasonable means 
of fairly settling disagreements and conflicts. Rawls on his part emphasises in this 
connection that: 
“Justice as fairness begins, as I have said, with one of the most general of all choices 
which persons might make together, namely with the choice of the first principle of 
a conception of justice which is to regulate all subsequent criticism and reform of 
institutions. Then, having chosen a conception of justice, we can suppose that they 
are to choose a constitution and a legislature to enact laws, and so on, all in accord-
ance with the principles of justice initially agreed upon.”125 
A well-ordered society is to be characterised by an institutional scheme that can be 
recognised as fair. The institutional framework of a well-ordered society is arranged 
according to principles that its members can freely, willingly and reasonably be assumed 
to recognise as “fair”. This means that there is also good reason to believe that a well-
ordered society might be self-supportive: It is likely that coexistent citizens, living 
within an institutional framework that can be recognised as fair, will thereby strengthen 
their sense of justice. And moral persons with a sufficient sense of justice, can be 
expected to have an interest in upholding a just institutional framework. 
I think Rawls very plausibly stresses the urgent need for at least some shared principles 
of coexistence. But it seems far from obvious why citizens, living together in a society 
which Rawls himself takes to be a society characterised by deep diversity, should agree 
on one conception of justice as fairness as specified by Rawls. However, Rawls would 
not deny that there might be different conceptions of justice providing for well-ordered 
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societies. The conception of “justice” people hold is of essential significance for the way 
they conceive of a well-ordered society. 
2.3.3. Use of coercive powers in a well-ordered society 
Although liberal societies cannot enforce an authorised religious view or a highest 
unifying value for all citizens by use of coercive means, no society, real or ideal, can 
ignore the question of how the coercive powers of society are legitimately to be used. 
Power is an inherent part of politics, and power is in its very nature coercive.  
There is a very long debate within politics, philosophy, law and theology about both the 
nature of power and the legitimate use of (coercive) power. It is neither necessary nor 
possible to do more than focus upon a few narrow aspects of this debate which directly 
concern us. The complexity of the phenomenon of power is readily reflected in the many 
terms one finds in Greek and Latin to express it, e.g., du/namij, e)cousi/a, a)rxh/ and, 
potentia, potestas, dominium, respectively. 
Most people agree that the state normally has a monopoly to use the coercive power of 
society. But if the coercive powers of society were used to maintain social unity by 
enforcing a controversial “common good”, for instance a system of religious and moral 
doctrines as a common law for the whole society, the result should most likely be some 
kind of tyranny. 
It can easily be observed how the Christian church  throughout its history  recognised 
different kinds of state-authorities, provided they were able to use the coercive power to 
maintain at least an elementary protection of the inhabitants as can for instance  clearly 
be seen in St.Paul‟s Letter to the Romans (Rom.13,1-5). In this case  so many years 
before the Constantinian turning point  it is astonishing that St. Paul could somehow 
recognise the legitimacy of the Roman government. A precondition for this is obviously 
that the pagan authority can be taken as an “instrument” preventing the escalation of 
evil, and in doing so it is even to be considered God‟s servant. This perspective, how-
ever, also implies that the coercive power of state-authorities is clearly seen as mandated 
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and limited by God‟s own power.126  
Turning to liberal democracies, the question of power has to be reconsidered: What is 
the source of legitimacy assigned to the government's use of coercive power and how far 
does that legitimacy extend in the use of that coercive power in such societies? 
According to Rawls‟ conception of political liberalism it is very clear that the political 
power of liberal democracies can only be “the power of free and equal citizens as a 
collective body”.127 And the coercive power is therefore exercised legitimately only 
when it is exercised in accordance with constitutive principles that are justifiable to all 
citizens as rational and reasonable moral persons. And so Rawls formulates the liberal 
principle for legitimating the power of society in the following way: 
“…our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accord-
ance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may 
reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to 
their common human reason.”128 
                                                          
126
 It might appropriately be remarked that when the power of God was discussed in medieval theology, 
one sometimes made a distinction between God‟s “potentia absoluta” and his “potentia ordinata” (Duns 
Scotus). Under a perspective of absolute power, God‟s power might be considered entirely unbound. 
Under a perspective of “ordained” power God is, however, seen as a king who has bound himself to 
laws and principles, which can be widely known. Making analogies to the political domain this would 
mean that an absolute power, i.e. a power that is not restricted by any law, should be contrasted to a 
power limited by constitutive principles. In political life, as we find it within constitutional democracies 
today, the power can only be an “ordained” power. In late medieval theology other aspects of actual 
interest were emphasised too: A distinction was sometimes made between the form of power that could 
legitimately be exercised by the church and the form of power that was legitimately to be exercised by 
the state. The state had an exclusive right to use the “sword”. And the “sword” here symbolises the “co-
ercive” power (potentia coactiva), which includes the legitimate right to enforce directives in society 
and to use legal “sanctions” (penalties, imprisonment and sometimes even capital punishment) to up-
hold the scheme of society.  
127
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.136 
128
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.137. In the light of this it might be astonishing to see how 
Rawls  as a liberal  can assess different “hierarchical” schemes of society quite positively. The notion 
“hierarchical” is adopted from one of Rawls most recent essays, “The Law of peoples”. This essay is in 
my opinion in many ways interesting (and controversial), since Rawls here extends some principles of 
his political conception to the relation between states. “A further aim is to set out the bearing of political 
liberalism once a liberal political conception of justice is extended to the law of peoples. In particular, 
we ask: What form does the toleration of non-liberal societies take in this case? Surely tyrannical and 
dictatorial regimes cannot be accepted as members in good standing of a reasonable society of peoples. 
But equally not all regimes can reasonably be required to be liberal, otherwise the law of peoples itself 
would not express liberalism‟s own principle of toleration for other reasonable ways of ordering society 
nor further its attempt to find a shared basis of agreement among reasonable peoples. Just as citizens in 
a liberal society must respect other person‟s comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doc-
trines provided they are pursued in accordance with a reasonable political conception of justice, so a 
liberal society must respect other societies organized by comprehensive doctrines, provided their 
political and social institutions meet certain conditions that lead the society to adhere to a reasonable 
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Not surprisingly, Rawls‟ conception of a liberal principle of legitimacy lacks any refer-
ence to a mandate from God or to a divine law-book. The principle is instead grounded 
in the power of the citizens,  not just as individuals, but as a corporate body. According 
to Rawls to say that an exercise of government power is legitimate means that the citiz-
ens are exercising power over themselves. And this should most plausibly imply that the 
principles for exercising that kind of power should in themselves be part of an over-
lapping consensus,  a mutually binding agreement made in advance. Since the consti-
tutive principles for use of society‟s coercive powers express the idea of citizens exer-
cising power over themselves, increased weight has to be ascribed to the field of the 
public as the forum where practices involving use of the coercive powers of society can 
be continually discussed and justified in a shared forum. 
One should not assume a conflict between this strictly political way of legitimating 
(coercive) power in society and the deeper theological idea that the use of the (coercive) 
powers of society belongs ultimately to the state according to a divine mandate.
129
 
2.3.4. Society - a voluntary or a non-voluntary scheme? 
The idea of society as a system of fair co-operation between free and equal persons who 
are viewed as fully co-operating members of society over a complete life-time might be 
taken as an organising idea and an appropriate starting point for a political theory.
 130
 
“… if we are to succeed in finding a basis for public agreement, we must find a way 
of organizing familiar ideas and principles into a conception of political justice that 
expresses those ideas and principles in a somewhat different way than before. Justice 
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as fairness tries to do this by using a fundamental organizing idea within which all 
ideas and principles can be systematically connected and related. This organizing 
idea is that of society as a fair system of social cooperation between free and equal 
persons viewed as fully cooperating members of society over a complete life.”131 
I have emphasised that Rawls considers society a fair scheme of co-operation. But there 
is another aspect to the idea of society as a joint venture of fair co-operation. According 
to the philosopher Thomas Nagel “A society satisfying the principles of justice as 
fairness comes as close as a society can to being a voluntary scheme, for it meets the 
principles which free and equal persons would assent to under circumstances that are 
fair.”132 This accords with Rawls‟ view as expressed for instance in A Theory of Justice: 
“Yet a society satisfying the principles of justice comes as close as society can to 
being a voluntary scheme, for it meets the principles which free and equal citizens 
would assent to under circumstances that are fair.”133 
But Rawls makes it clear that: 
“No society can, of course, be a scheme of cooperation which men enter voluntarily 
in a literal sense; each person finds himself placed at the birth in some particular 
position in some particular society, and the nature of this position materially affects 
his life prospects. Yet a society satisfying the principles of justice comes as close as 
a society can to being a voluntary scheme….”134 
Considering society as a joint co-operative venture for free and equal citizens can obvi-
ously not mean that it should in all respects be viewed as a voluntary enterprise. From 
one perspective society should most appropriately rather be viewed as a non-voluntary 
scheme. 
Society is viewed by Rawls as a “closed” system, (a view that involves a considerable 
abstraction). The many complex relations to other societies are not focused upon. And 
then follows the nearly trivial supplement: “Its members enter it only by birth and leave 
it only by death.”135 Rawls speaks of citizens as born into a society where they are to 
lead a complete life. They are neither entering society at the age of reason, nor when 
they might find it advantageous nor when it complies completely with their own inter-
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 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.9 
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 Thomas Nagel: “Rawls on Justice”, in Reading Rawls, Ed. Norman Daniels, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 
1975, p.5 
133
 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), p.13. By using the phrase “under circumsances that are fair” 
Rawls alludes to the “circumstances” of an original position, which shall be thoroughly presented and 
discussed later. 
134
 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), p.13. 
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ests, desires or beliefs. Instead citizens are normally to be considered fully co-operating 
members of society over a complete life. 
This perspective on society as not just a voluntary, but also a non-voluntary scheme, has 
some very decisive implications,  not least of all, for theological social ethics: One 
should be aware of the decisive difference between a society at the one hand and the 
kind of communities or associations on the other hand, which one  according to Rawls 
 should be free to join or leave at any time. Churches should in this perspective most 
appropriately be regarded as communities or associations, since no man is considered 
bound to any particular church-membership and he may leave his church freely. Church-
membership is obviously voluntary in a way that citizenship is not. Neither heresy nor 
excommunication from a religious community should therefore affect one‟s civil status 
as a citizen. 
In Rawls‟ opinion, a more or less explicit fundament of values and common traditions 
can obviously be taken as constitutive of most communities.
136
 There is within a com-
munity usually some shared aims and particular ideas about a common good, from 
which certain duties and obligations can be derived. But I think that Rawls in a plausible 
way has made it obvious that the wider political society  understood as a non-voluntary 
scheme that one enters by birth and leaves by death  cannot be unified and fairly 
ordered if communal values that are typical of churches, local societies and more homo-
geneous communities, are to be taken as a common basis for coexistence. In the wider 
society  consisting of diverse associations, competing interest groups and citizens with 
different conceptions of the good  a less substantial alternative is required. I think there 
are both principled reasons (one should not impose on citizens as free and equal persons 
a particular conception of the good) and factual reasons (cf. the fact of pluralism) for 
seeking a less substantial alternative. These reasons are crucial considerations when 
turning to the problem of elaborating an overlapping consensus that can be the basis of 
social unity. 
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 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.12 
136
 Sometimes I have used the notion “community” and sometimes the notion “association”. In this 
respect my intention is to follow Rawls‟ terminology: “By definition, let‟s think of a community as a 
special kind of association, one united by a comprehensive doctrine, for example, a church. The 
members of other associations often have shared ends but these do not make up a comprehensive 
doctrine and may even be purely formal.” J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.40. 
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2.3.5 A well-ordered society conceived of as a liberal society 
Although Rawls might use the notion well-ordered about non-liberal societies
137
, there 
can be little doubt that he himself aims for schemes of society regulated by broadly 
liberal conceptions of justice, with justice as fairness as the paradigmatic standard 
example. And thus it should be correct to say that a Rawlsian well-ordered society is 
conceived of as a liberal society. 
The term liberal has been applied to highly different issues, views and conceptions. And 
thus any definition of liberalism might be controversial and disputed.
138
 My concern, 
however, is not so much with “classical” liberal views as with “modern” liberalism, as 
elaborated in an eminent way by John Rawls.
 139
 
First: The priority of certain political liberties is quite obvious within liberalism in 
general as it is within the Rawlsian version. (Rawls does not distinguish between basic 
liberties and basic rights). Rawls emphasises the traditional political liberties such as; 
freedom of political speech and press, freedom of assembly, liberty of conscience and 
freedom of association, the liberty and integrity of the person (violated, for example, by 
slavery), and he also mentions more generally the rights and liberties covered by the rule 
of law.  
In a well-ordered society as conceived of by Rawls it is required that society takes steps 
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 “ Here I understand a well-ordered society as being peaceful and not expansionist; its legal system 
satisfies certain requisite conditions of legitimacy in the eyes of its own people; and, as a consequence 
of this, it honors basic human rights. One kind of nonliberal society satisfying these conditions is illu-
strated by what I call, for lack of a better term, a well-ordered hierarchical society. This example makes 
the point, central for this argument, that although any society must honor basic human rights, it need not 
be liberal. It also indicates the role of human rights as part of a reasonable law of peoples.” J. Rawls, 
“The Law of Peoples”, On Human rights. The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993, (Eds. S. Shute and S. 
Hurley, 1993), p.43. 
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 In a book, recently published in Norway, Ånund Haga emphasises clearly the difficulties in defining 
precisely the terms “liberal” or “liberalism”: “Det er sjølvsagt vanskeleg å snakke allment om liberal-
ismens utematiserte føresetnader, ettersom „liberalisme‟ slett ikkje har nokon entydig bruk. Uttrykket 
blir nytta om eit mangfald av delvis heterogene synsmåter, og for at det skal skiljast mellom dei, blir dei 
stundom inndelte i ymse slags bindestreksliberalismer. Desse strekkjer seg frå det som på den eine ut-
enden er ein radikal sosialliberalisme, som innanfor bestemte grenser stør ein god mon offentleg styring, 
til det som på den andre utenden er ein sterk profilert marknadsliberalisme, som vil redusere offentlege 
inngrep til det som måtte vere eit lite, men uomgjengeleg minimum (nemlig for å sikre at alle individu-
elle interesser får utfalde seg under frie og like vilkår).” Å.Haga: “Liberalismens utematiserte føreset-
nader, Den politiske orden (Ed. E. O. Eriksen 1994), p.25. Let it just be added that the tradition of 
liberalism should at least be traced back to John Locke (1632-1704), but also to Immanuel Kant (1724-
1804) and maybe even to Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). 
139
 This means that I will not here go deep into different liberal conceptions. 
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to make liberty effective.
140
 The notion “effective” in this connection implies that a 
merely formal codification of basic liberties (and rights) is not sufficient. What Rawls 
intends is that,  
“including in the first principle of justice the guarantee that the political liberties, 
and only these liberties, are secured by what I have called their „fair value‟. To 
explain: this guarantee means that the worth of the political liberties to all citizens, 
whatever their social and economic position, must be approximately equal…”141 
Therefore a scheme of society has to be seen not just in relation to the rights and liber-
ties it proclaims, the test comes in determining how certain it is that these liberties will 
be implemented and to what extent these rights are really realised.
142
 In a Rawlsian con-
ception of political liberalism, liberty and basic rights can never be pro forma. Avoiding 
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 In this respect Rawls remains much of a consequentialist! The emphasis on the real liberty does not 
mean that all kinds of “liberties” are to be given priority over other (moral) principles and values. But it 
means that the basic political liberties, as for instance the freedom of thought and speech, free voting 
and the right to participation in political life, and the rights for citizens to join associations voluntarily, 
must obviously be guaranteed before people can make effective use of other rights. And thus Rawls can 
even propose quite radical steps to secure these basic liberties: “We may take for granted that a demo-
cratic regime presupposes freedom of speech and assembly, and liberty of thought and conscience. … If 
the public forum is to be free and open to all, and in continuous session, everyone should be able to 
make use of it. All citizens should have the means to be informed about political issues. They should be 
in a position to assess how proposals affect their well-being and which policies advance their concep-
tion of the public good. Moreover, they should have a fair chance to add alternative proposals to the 
agenda for political discussion. The liberties protected by the principle of participation lose much of 
their value whenever those who have greater private means are permitted to use their advantages to 
control the course of public debate. For eventually these inequalities will enable those better situated to 
exercise a larger influence over the development of legislation. In due time they are likely to acquire a 
preponderant weight in settling social questions, at least in regard to those matters upon which they 
normally agree, which is to say in regard to those things that support their favored circumstances. Com-
pensating steps must, then, be taken to preserve the fair value for all of the equal political liberties. A 
variety of devices can be used. For example, in a society allowing private ownership of the means of 
production, property and wealth must be kept widely distributed and government moneys provided on a 
regular basis to encourage free public discussion. In addition, political parties are to be made independ-
ent from private economic interests by allotting them sufficient tax revenues to play their part in the 
constitutional scheme.”, A Theory of Justice (1971), p.225f. 
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 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.327. (Italicisation is made by me). 
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 “Wie soll beurteilt werden, ob und inwieweit eine unter einer bestimmten Grundordnung lebende 
Person die von Rawls geforderten Grundrechte hat? Zum Verständnis seiner Antwort auf diese Frage 
sind bezüglich eines jeden Grundrechts drei konzentrische Themen zu unterscheiden. Das engste, 
formal-rechtliche Thema betrifft die Frage, inwieweit jeder Person in den Verfassungs- oder Gesetzes-
texten ihrer Gesellschaft das betreffende Stück Freiheit explizit zugesprochen wird. Das weitere, 
effektiv-rechtliche Thema betrifft die Frage, inwieweit sie tatsächlich sicheren Zugang zu diesem Stück 
Freiheit hat … Innerhalb des zweiten Themas unterscheidet Rawls dann zwischen Umfang und Sicher-
heit von Grundrechten. Der Umfang betrifft die Frage, wieviel die gesetzlich garantierten Grundrechte 
nach der gängigen Rechtssprechung abdecken  welche Handlungsweisen z.B. als vom Grundrecht auf 
Redefreiheit geschützt verstanden werden. Für die Bewertung einer Grundordnung relevant ist hier 
natürlich nur, inwieweit gesetzlich garantierte Grundrechte das abdecken, was sie abdecken müssen, um 
ein „adequates Paket‟ zu bilden. Die Sicherheit eines Grundrechts betrifft die Frage, wie solide es, bzw. 
sein Gegenstand geschützt sind. Es gibt genügend Staaten, in denen z.B. das Recht auf freie Religions-
ausübung offiziell garantiert, aber doch nicht sicher ist….” T. W. Pogge, John Rawls (1994), p.108f. 
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this outcome is one of the goals of his theory. 
However, where some liberal theories treat liberty rights as inviolate, Rawlsian liberal-
ism holds that citizens should be ready to accept certain constraints on their individual 
liberty in some cases. Liberty practised in a way that is compatible with a similar 
scheme of liberty for others opens necessarily up for certain trade-offs. Rawls empha-
sises, however, that “liberty can be restricted only for the sake of liberty itself.”143 
Nevertheless the question arises whether basic liberties might sometimes be restrained 
for the sake of satisfying basic needs. This is a question I cannot discuss thoroughly 
here, but a few brief comments are in order: 
Rawls avoids the most difficult discussions about the proper balancing of individual 
liberty rights against the satisfaction of basic needs by focusing on societies character-
ised by only moderate scarcity. But sometimes he seems to suggest that a trade-off 
between basic liberties and basic needs might be required,  in spite of the clear lexical 
ordering of the two principles of justice.
144
 There are, however, according to Rawls, 
certain liberties and fundamental rights that human beings should never abandon. I think 
that the right to practice one‟s religion may be such a fundamental right.  
The emphasis on the political value of liberty is a first characteristic of political liber-
alism. By stressing basic liberty liberalism without doubt limits the absolute power of 
state-authorities. And the way one emphasises the respect of the liberty and the rights of 




It should be noted here that the value of liberty, and also the problem of occasionally 
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 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), p.244. 
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 Concerning this question Thomas Pogge appropriately adds: “Am vernünftigsten wäre es vielleicht, 
Grundrechte und Grundbedürfnisse auf eine Stufe zu stellen, und dann Rawls‟ ersten Grundsatz so zu 
verstehen, daß er für jedes Gesellschaftsmitglied ein Grundrecht auf Befriedigung seiner Grundbedürf-
nisse fordert. Diese Gleichstellung wird an zwei Stellen angedeutet, an denen Rawls die politischen 
Fragen, die entweder die Grundbedürfnisse oder die Grundrechte tangieren, kollektiv als solche be-
zeichnet, bei denen es um wesentliche Verfassungsinhalte geht (PL 166, 228f. [refers to the German 
edition of Political Liberalism]). Die Gleichstellung hätte den weiteren Vorteil, daß Rawls‟ Abrücken 
von der amerikanischen Verfassungstradition durch ein Näherrücken an die Menschenrechtsdokumente 
der Vereinten Nationen ausgeglichen wäre.” T. W. Pogge, John Rawls (1994), p.124. 
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This is for instance clearly underlined by Kymlicka: “… any liberal philosophers have argued for 
tolerance because it provides the best conditions under which people can make informed and rational 
judgements about the value of different pursuits. Respect for the liberty of others is predicated not on 
our inability to criticize preferences, but precisely on the role of freedom in securing the conditions 
under which we can best make such judgements.” W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture 
(1989), p.10. 
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limiting individual freedom in a legitimate way, may similarly be strongly emphasised 
within Christian social ethics.
146
 
Second: Most kinds of liberal views would also “require a formal equality of oppor-
tunity in that all have at least the same legal rights of access to all advantaged social 
positions.”147 But there might in society be a lot of inequalities and contingencies con-
cerning people‟s talents, natural endowments, family backgrounds, social limits and 
start-positions. And Rawls is seeking ways “to mitigate the influence of social contin-
gencies and natural fortune on distributive shares.”148 He is aiming at securing the most 
“fair equality of opportunity”149. This should mean not just that positions in society are 
open in a formal sense, but also that one should have a fair chance of attaining these 
positions.
150
 And it should also mean that society‟s political and legal institutions really 
have to pave the way for a fair distribution of primary goods
151
 among the citizens. The 
impact of a society‟s institutional organisation on the distributive mechanisms, and on 
the opportunities of each citizen is to be assessed from a clearly egalitarian perspective. 
Hence it follows that it might be necessary that some structural constraints are built into 
the social system, thereby restricting for instance those mechanisms of an “autonomous” 
free market which might hamper fair equality of opportunity.
152
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 Tor Aukrust is the author of a well-known and very influential theological book about Social Ethics in 
Norway. Even if he is very much aware of the differences, he is trying to draw social-ethical and politi-
cal consequences from the biblical idea of freedom: “Denne projisering av frihetsbegrepet over på det 
samfunnsmessige plan må i prinsippet anerkjennes som en legitim tolkning og realisering av den kristne 
frihetstanke. For friheten i Kristus kan ikke begrenses til en indre holdning; den omfatter det hele men-
neske, også mennesket som samfunnsborger.” T. Aukrust: Mennesket i samfunnet. En sosialetikk. Bind 
I (1965), p. 142. But he also realises that individual freedom must be limited, and sees the social con-
tract as a means to bring about the required limitation: “Denne erkjennelse av grensene for den sosiale 
frihet kommer til uttrykk i „kontrakt-teorien‟.” Ibid., p.143. 
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 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), p.72. 
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 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), p.73. 
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 Cf. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), p.73: “The liberal interpretation, as I shall refer to it, tries to 
correct for this [contingency] by adding to the requirement of careers open to talents the further con-
dition of the principle of fair equality of opportunity.” 
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 Cf. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), p.73. Rawls obviously intends to establish a fair position 
beyond the mere “notion of careers open to talents” Ibid., p.83. 
151
 A list of such primary goods need not be “specified” here. Let it now more generally be stated that 
primary goods are basic goods that every rational man is presumed to want,  whatever else he is 
aiming at. 
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 To mitigate the influence of social contingencies Rawls obviously finds it necessary to take steps “…to 
impose further basic structural conditions on the social system. Free market arrangements must be set 
within a framework of political and legal institutions which regulates the overall trends of economic 
events and preserves the social conditions necessary for fair equality of opportunity.” J. Rawls, A 
Theory of Justice (1971), p.73. 
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However, the liberal conception of equality, as conceived of by Rawls, is not incom-
patible with a certain amount of inequality, but it is incompatible with a basic structure 
of society, which is excluding some from political and social participation.
153
 In Rawls 
conception a fundamental equality, that can by no means be just formal, is taken as a 
vital premise if one shall arrive at principles of coexistence that all parties can en-
dorse.
154
 It is only as free and equal partners that they can be expected to agree to and to 
comply with fair terms of coexistence. 
Thus political liberalism doubtlessly embraces a strictly egalitarian conception of 
society.
155. And let me quickly add that one should distinguish between an “egalitarian 
liberalism” and “libertarianism”.156 
There is doubtlessly a strong concern for recognising the equal worth of all human 
beings in egalitarian liberalism. This concern is similarly focused from the point of view 
of theological social ethics, although it may be a rather complex affair both to properly 
evaluate either the historical role the church has played in furthering the value of politi-
cal equality in society, or the social impact of central Bible texts like the following:
157
  
“So there is no difference between Jews and Gentiles, between slaves and free men, 
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 In one of his latest essays, “The Law of Peoples”, published in the book On Human Rights. The 
Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993, (Ed. S. Shute and S. Hurley, 1993), Rawls tries to comply with the 
problem of justice in and between so-called hierarchical societies. 
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 I shall later more thoroughly discuss the way Rawls has structured the initial choice-situation, the 
original position, to secure a basic equality between the consenting parties. 
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 According to Rawls himself is political liberalism (as expressed in the two principles of justice) to be 
characterised as “an egalitarian form of liberalism in virtue of three elements. These are  a) the guaran-
tee of the fair value of the political liberties, so that these are not purely formal;  b) fair (and again not 
purely formal) equality of opportunity;  and finally c) the so-called difference principle …” J. Rawls, 
Political Liberalism (1993), p.6. Thomas Pogge emphasises that; “Dieser egalitären Elemente wegen ist 
Rawls‟ Konzeption besonders auf moralische Loyalität angewiesen. Denn das Eigeninteresse der polit-
isch einflußreicheren, d.h. der begabteren und sozial besser gestellten Bürger würde diese eher dazu 
motivieren, den demokratischen politischen Prozess zur Untergrabung der egalitären Elemente zu 
mißbrauchen.” T. W. Pogge, John Rawls (1994), p.150. 
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 This distinction is for instance made in an essay written by Ånund Haga: “Ettersom liberalistiske posi-
sjonar nærmar seg den eine eller den andre av dei nemnde utendane, har det no vorte vanleg å kalle dei 
respektivt egalitær liberalisme og libertariansk liberalisme… [Footnote 1:] Dei mest representative 
formuleringane av desse posisjonane gir respektivt Rawls (1971) og Nozick (1974).” Å.Haga, 
“Liberalismens utematiserte føresetnader”, Den politiske orden, (ed. E. O. Eriksen, 1994), p.25. 
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 Even if it might be considered a rather complex affair to evaluate fairly the role that the churches have 
played and might still play in furthering political equality, Tor Aukrust stresses that especially modern 
democracy has made the idea of equality politically relevant in a way that should be considered highly 
legitimate from the point of view of Christian social ethics: “Alle mennesker er skapt like. Demokratiets 
sosiale anvendelse av likhetsidéen er kristelig legitim. Det vil i det lange løp innebære en uholdbar selv-
motsigelse om kirken forkynte alle menneskers likhet i Guds rike og samtidig tolererte et kynisk ulik-
hetsprinsipp i det samfunnsmessige liv.” T. Aukrust: Mennesket i samfunnet. En sosialetikk. Bind I 
(1965), p. 145. 
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between men and women; you are all one in union with Christ Jesus.” (Gal. 3,28) 
Third: An ideal of fraternity may also be taken as a vital aspect of liberalism. In a 
society where all citizens are considered free and equal, it should not be possible for 
those better off to use their favourable position to take advantage of the weaker citizens 
when distributive principles are settled and practised. Under Rawlsian liberalism, the so-
called “difference-principle” protects and benefits the worst off. The “difference-prin-
ciple” is a fundamental part of the Rawlsean liberal conception and says that permissible 
“social and economic inequalities … are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advant-
aged members of society.”158 Rawls explicitly relates the difference-principle to the idea 
of fraternity as follows: 
“The difference principle, however, does seem to correspond to a natural meaning of 
fraternity: namely to the idea of not wanting to have greater advantages unless this is 
to the benefit of others who are less well off.”159 
Rawls thinks that one reason why the motive of fraternity has played a less important 
role than the ideals of “liberty” and “equality” in modern theories about democratic 
society, is that fraternity is taken to express affection, sentiment and feelings that might 
be most typical of family-life. And, simultaneously, it is often assumed that one cannot 
realistically expect citizens within the wider political society to have that kind of affect-
ion towards one another. Fraternity, nevertheless, expresses a kind of solidarity that no 
modern well-ordered society can do without. Linked to the difference-principle, the idea 
of fraternity can also be made a workable idea within the wider society. Of course it 
should be admitted that the difference principle in itself explicitly recognises and allows 
for some kind of social and economic inequality in society. Nevertheless, the difference 
principle, when linked to the idea of fraternity, should pave the way for assessing the 
organisational structure of a society from the perspective of the worst-off within it.
160
 
From the point of view of moral theology it is quite crucial, when evaluating a political 
conception, that there be not just a concern for individuals as free and equal, but also a 
genuine concern for the less advantaged. The theologian Heinrich Bedford Strohm thus 
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of Rawlsian liberalism. 
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 For the present, however, I leave out the problem how the principles of liberty, equality and fraternity 
are more exactly to be balanced if conflicting. 
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defends Rawls‟ difference principle, because he believes that it might contribute to an 
institutional scheme of society which reduces social inequalities by specifically taking 
into account the improvement of the situation of the least advantaged.
161
 
Summing up, one might say that the most characteristic features of a well-ordered 
liberal society is that it is a fair society in the sense that the very institutional scheme of 
society guarantees and effectively safeguards each citizen‟s fundamental liberties (and 
rights), secures for each member fairly equal opportunities and also provides for the 
general means by which people may make use of their liberties and rights. And there is 
in Rawlsian liberalism a strong inherent idea of social fraternity, as expressed in the 
difference principle. Let me now just show how Rawls very briefly expresses;  
“…the content of a liberal conception of justice. The content of such a conception is 
given by three main features: first, a specification of certain basic rights, liberties 
and opportunities (of a kind familiar from constitutional democratic regimes); 
second, an assignment of special priority to those rights, liberties and opportunities, 
especially with respect to claims of the general good and of perfectionist values; and 
third, measures assuring to all citizens adequate all-purpose means to make effective 
use of their liberties and opportunities. These elements can be understood in 
different ways, so that there are many variant liberalisms.
162
 
A liberal society is accordingly a society which allows for individual liberty, con-
siderable variety and the pursuit of different conceptions of the good. 
2.3.5.1. EXCURSUS: Liberalism  advancing an “atomist” 
conception of society? 
The notion “atomism”, as used in this excursus, is taken from the philosophy of Charles 
Taylor.
163
 In Taylor‟s writings the term “atomism”, which is rather vague, is used to 
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 “Im übrigen spricht viel für die Annahme, daß in einer Gesellschaft, in der die Rawlsschen Grundsätze 
eine immer größere Geltung erlangen, die gesellschaftlichen Unterschiede nicht größer werden, sondern 
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 I have used a Swedish translation of “Atomism”, (first published 1979), made by T.Lindén in Charles 
Taylor. Identitet, frihet och gemenskap, Politisk-filosofiske texter i urval av H. Grimen (1995). The 
version of liberalism that Taylor is referring to and criticising, is mainly the libertarian version as repre-
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characterise certain doctrines, mostly of a contractarian type, that have played a 
considerable role in the western political culture since about 1600.
164
 From the 
perspective of “atomism” society is the product of co-operation between coexisting 
individuals for their mutual advantage. Society is an arrangement established to defend, 
support and coordinate basic individual interests. This means that society is considered 
an aggregate of mere individuals,  co-operating, however, in a joint synergetic venture. 
Thus, for example, one may find among citizens a readiness to pay for a common 
insurance-system or a public health-service-system in case one gets ill, or to maintain a 
police-system in order to protect citizens from criminals, and members of society might 
also be expected to pay for other services that cannot appropriately be solved on the 
level of individuals. Despite these joint enterprises, this view of society is mainly 
“instrumental” and individualistic, - not genuinely social. One needs and uses society for 
one‟s own purposes. The atomist perspective is in sharp contrast to the “holism” 
described by Taylor. 
Taylor locates “atomism” within the liberal tradition as expressed by philosophers like 
Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. Liberalism is taken to be a standard example of indi-
vidualism, however, it should, as already suggested, in many respects also be taken as a 
typical manifestation of modern political ideas about individual rights, personal freedom 
and emancipation from absolutism and despotism. Thus liberalism has directly contri-
buted to the limitation of state-absolutism. 
Modern liberalism is also concerned about the relation between man and society (culture 
and community), a relation which seems, however, to be even more fundamentally stres-
sed from a communitarian point of view. This concern is reflected in the works of philo-






 and also 
                                                                                                                                                                          
sented by Robert Nozick in his book from 1974: Anarchy, State and Utopia. Rawls is not directly refer-
red to in this essay. But the term “atomism” is also used by Taylor in other works, for instance in 
Sources of the Self. The Making of the Modern Identity, Cambridge University Press 1989 and in Philo-
sophical Arguments, Harvard University Press, Cambridge/Massachusetts 1995. In the last book I will 
especially refer to chapter 10, “Cross-Purposes: The liberal-Communitarian Debate”, where a Rawlsian 
version of liberalism is directly taken into consideration. Taylor is aware of the problem connected with 
using a term like “atomism” to characterise very different kinds of liberalism. However, taking this into 
account, the term seems to focus on a problem that is recognised as important also by Rawls.  
164
 A contractarian approach shall be more thoroughly considered later. 
165
 Cf. for instance After virtue, a study in moral theory (1992, first edition 1981). 
166
 Cf. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1990, first edition 1982). 
167
 Cf. Spheres of Justice. A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (1983). 
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Charles Taylor, all of whom have mounted serious challenges to liberalism.
168
 The 
controversy between communitarians and liberals concerns both vital anthropological 
questions and not least the question how a society or a community is most properly to be 
unified by some kind of common good and shared values.  
Communitarians emphasise that we find ourselves embedded in various social relation-
ships to which we are inevitably “bound.”  We play predefined roles in public life, with-
in religious associations or in the smaller communities we belong to. We are in a way 
“pre-formed” by the particular values of our community, and by the shared traditions we 
are acquainted with; we are dependent on particular achievements of our culture, and we 
are to a large extent brought up to respect the norms and values that are internalised 
through the institutions of our society. Thus, we cannot escape our culture, society, com-
munity or social attachments. Communitarianism views individuals from a genuinely 
social perspective, - “as part of a system of social attachments in families, neighbour-
hoods, and communities”169 That man is a social being, does not mean that he could not 
survive if he was excluded from all kinds of communal life. But it means that human 
beings can only fulfil their “telos,” their human potentiality, their moral, rational and 
human capacity when socially embedded. 
Thus Charles Taylor strongly defends the social thesis that persons are “situated” beings 
sharing in a common and inescapable authoritative horizon.
170
 
Our common traditions and communal values are essential from a communitarian point 
of view and largely determinative in the development of  a shared value-platform in so-
ciety. Communitarians stress that citizens at the very outset already participate in an au-
                                                          
168
 Thomas Pogge suggests that the significance of the communitarian attack might be a bit overesti-
mated: “There is a widespread sense that Rawls‟s work is in shambles because his critics have shown its 
foundations to be essentially and irremediably flawed. Since Rawls‟s mistake is thought to be a deep 
one, the collapse of his theory is said to indicate something larger, to remark the end of an era, perhaps 
the death of liberalism, the demise of the Enlightenment tradition, or even the bankruptcy of systematic 
moral philosophy. What we need is a radical reorientation in our ethical thinking, or so the story goes. 
Several authors have already volunteered to set the agenda for the dawning post-Rawlsian era, an 
agenda based on the renunciation not merely of Rawls‟s conclusions but of his goals and entire project. 
[Footnote 2:] Here I have in mind, for example, Alasdair MacIntyre, Bernhard Williams, Michael 
Sandel, and Michael Walzer, who want ethics to be centrally concerned with human virtues, with 
ground projects and deep commitments, or with a notion of community.” T.W. Pogge: Realizing Rawls 
(1989), p.2. 
169
 Cf. Communitarianism. A New Public Ethics (1994, Ed. M. Daly), p.55.  
170
 I have, however, shown that society is in a fundamental way considered “inescapable” from Rawls‟ 
point of view too. Cf. my  discussion about society as a voluntary and a non-voluntary scheme earlier in 
this chapter. 
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thoritative value-horizon, a phenomenon which is of the greatest significance for social 
unity. They will reject a liberal view that takes a consensus about basics in society to be 
the result of an agreement among “free-standing” individuals,  who as free and rational 
parties, find it prudent to come to some kind of agreement or a kind of modus vivendi 
with other individuals on some required terms of coexistence. According to Taylor, lib-
eralism, being essentially atomistic, lacks an ontological basis for establishing a genuine 
social perspective, even when considering the relation between man and society. 
The relevance of this disagreement applies to the problem of defining a “common 
good”:  
 According to a liberal view  as the communitarians see it  society is just an 
aggregate of individuals and accordingly “the common good is constituted out of 
individual goods, without remainder.”171 This means that the common good of 
society can in reality be no more than a “convergent good”.  
 It seems as if liberalism treats the existence of very different conceptions of the good 
in modern pluralist societies as given, rather than supporting a shared quest for a 
genuinely unifying common good. 
 This might even be a reason why modern liberalism so often develops into a so-
called “procedural liberalism”, with an ideal of being impartial towards the many 
substantial conceptions of the good, that in fact exist.  
To have a society, however, citizens need according to Taylor a genuinely “common 
good” instead of just an aggregate of “convergent goods”. And one should try to proceed 
from merely convergent “I-identities” to a genuine “we-identity”.172   
                                                          
171
 C. Taylor: Philosophical Arguments (second printing 1995), p.188. 
172
 In Taylor‟s opinion such liberalist views cannot really take the decisive step from a “for-me-and-you-
perspective” to a “for-us-perspective”. The move from the” for-me-and-you” to the “for-us”, is for 
instance one of the most important things we bring about in language,  and any theory of language has 
to take account of that. Charles Taylor illustrates with a little story the transition from a convergent 
“for-me-and you-perspective” to a genuinely social “for-us-perspective”: “Jacques lived in Saint 
Jérôme, and his greatest desire was to hear the Montreal Symphony Orchestra under Charles Dutoît 
playing in a live concert. He had heard them on records and radio, but he was convinced that these 
media could never give total fidelity, and he wanted to hear the real thing. The obvious solution was to 
travel to Montreal, but his aged mother would fall into a state of acute anxiety whenever she went 
farther than the next town. So Jacques got the idea of recruiting other music lovers in the town to raise 
the required fee to bring the orchestra to Saint Jérôme. Finally the great moment came. As Jacques 
walked into the concert hall that night, he looked on the Montreal symphony visit as a convergent good 
between him and his fellow subscribers. But then, when he actually experienced his first live concert, he 
was enraptured not only by the quality of the sound, which was as he had expected quite different from 
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But is it really accurate to hold that liberals (like Rawls) have a “pre-social” and “atom-
istic” perspective on society which denies the significance of our “situatedness”? Does a 
liberal perspective necessarily or practically mean that society is taken to consist of 
citizens who  as individuals with certain rights  are to be considered prior to all the 
social relations, traditions, roles, institutional arrangements and communal practices, in 
which they are involved?  
There is considerable varieties within liberalism,  something that Charles Taylor is ob-
viously well aware of. I am concerned with Rawlsian liberalism. And John Rawls, as a 
representative of modern political liberalism, clearly realises that an accusation against 
liberalism for being basically “individualistic” is indeed a kind of objection that also; 
“underlies much of the criticism of Theory. This criticism holds that the kind of 
liberalism it represents is intrinsically faulty because it relies on an abstract con-
ception of the person and uses an individualist, nonsocial, idea of human nature, or 
else that it employs an unworkable distinction between the public and the private 
that renders it unable to deal with the problems of gender and the family.”173 
However, it does not appear to me that Rawlsian liberalism can be easily accused of 
treating society as nothing more than a mutually advantageous association of indi-
viduals. Citizens‟ situatedness within the political culture of their own society is in no 
way neglected. On my reading, Rawls does not set out from an abstract hypothetical 
position of atomic individualism but takes the first and decisive step towards establish-
ing an overlapping consensus in society by identifying “the fundamental ideas we seem 
to share through the public political culture we belong to. From these ideas we try to 
work out a political conception of justice congruent with our considered convictions on 
due reflection.”174 
Rawlsian liberalism does not deny the significance of traditions and communal values. 
Rawls takes it as given that people belong essentially to families, local communities, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
what you get on records, but also by the dialogue between orchestra and audience. His own love of 
music fused with that of the crowd in the darkened hall, resonated with theirs, and found expression in 
an enthusiastic common act of applause at the end. Jacques also enjoyed the concert in a way he had not 
expected, as a mediately common good.” C. Taylor: Philosophical Arguments, (second printing 1995), 
p.191. Let me also add that Taylor distinguishes between “„mediately‟ common goods” and 
“„immediately‟ common goods”. Listening to music alone might be quite another experience than 
listening to music when it is mediated in a common forum. And now he adds that there are also certain 
things, as for instance friendship, which essentially have to be shared. These are in an eminent way the 
“„immediately‟ common goods”.  
173
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p. xxix 
174
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.150f. 
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different ethnic groups and are members of churches, and that they normally have a deep 
attachment to these relationships and the communal values they represent. But it is 
nevertheless difficult to see why it should necessarily follow from this that the wider 
political society which includes different ethnic, religious and cultural  groups, associa-
tions and  minorities should, without considerable reservation, be conceived of in a way 
completely analogous to the way one thinks that communities are most properly and 
naturally structured.  
But it cannot be denied that one of the fundamental objections against liberalism is that 
man is made a socially unsituated “detached self”. In some respects such an objection 
might be understandable, especially if the parties in the so-called original situation are 
allowed to provide us with the premises we need for elaborating an ontology of the 
person. But it would be a misunderstanding to proceed like this.
175
 In fact, Rawls em-
phasises that the talents, moral powers and abilities of human beings “  as individuals 
 cannot come to fruition apart from social conditions”.176 However, it must be re-
marked that Rawlsian political liberalism in itself has neither a deep ontology of the 
person, nor is it a requirement inherent in political liberalism that one ignores the social 
embeddedness of the “self”.  
Not withstanding the above, it should also be underlined that it is a central concern in 
liberalism to prevent citizens from being considered a mere “product” of society, tradi-
tion, culture and community. Rather, citizens are to be taken as individual persons able 
of judging morally the practices, the institutions and the arrangements of their own 
society (and of the communities to which they belong) from a more detached point of 
view. Within a liberal perspective it is therefore easier than within a communitarian 
perspective to assess one‟s society (and community) from a more impartial position, 
thus transcending one‟s own cultural and communal “embeddedness”.177 This might be 
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 I shall later discuss Rawls‟ use of the idea of an original position in connection with his use of the idea 
of a social contract. 
176
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.270. 
177
 “Without conflating all persons into one but recognizing them as distinct and separate, it enables us to 
be impartial, even between persons who are not contemporaries but who belong to many generations. 
Thus to see our place in society from the perspective of this position is to see it sub specie aeternitatis: 
it is to regard the human situation not only from all social but also from all temporal points of view. 
This perspective of eternity is not a perspective from a certain place beyond the world, nor the point of 
view of a transcendent being; rather it is a certain form of thought and feeling that rational people can 
adopt within the world.” J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), p.587. Let it be added that Rawls is more 
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crucial when setting out for a morally grounded overlapping consensus, which can 
provide us with a basis for criticising even the social scheme one belongs to. And it 
might also be crucial for establishing the kind of standards which are expressed in 
universal individual rights. 
From the perspective of theological social ethics one might expect to find a certain af-
finity towards communitarian ideas/ideals about social unity and communal practices, as 
well as a clear rejection of social “atomism”. First I should reiterate that the objection 
that liberalism furthers “atomistic individualism” does not apply very well to Rawlsian 
liberalism. And let it now be added that moral theology should also be expected to trans-
cend the kind of particularism which may follow from a communal perspective. Believ-
ing in God the Creator opens up for a more universal perspective!
178
 
2.4. Theology contributing to  the unity of society? 
2.4.1. Theology and the ordering of society 
The concern of egalitarian liberalism is not primarily a concern for any one particular set 
of values or religious truths that might be taken as an essential value-basis for society. 
The positive attitude of political liberalism to people‟s religious commitment seems to 
rest on a fundamental respect for persons‟ elementary rights, the basic liberties of each 
citizen, and a strong concern for the freedom of conscience. Stressing the value of 
personal rights, freedom of conscience and individual liberty, egalitarian liberalism 
should most likely further a diversity of beliefs. This would simultaneously require a 
rather fundamental impartiality from governmental authorities, social institutions and 
public laws in matters concerning religious belief. 
The consequence of adopting such a liberal scheme clearly appears to undermine any 
goal of realising a Christian society.
179
 A liberal conception of society, conceived to be 
maximally impartial towards the different coexisting groups, might be considered fair 
only if it succeeded in providing a fair framework for those practising a Christian belief 
as well as for the adherents of other religious and moral conceptions, without favouring 
                                                                                                                                                                          
careful in recent writings, where he seems to require not just a perspective “sub specie aeternitatis”, but 
also stresses people‟s particular situatedness. 
178
 The universal perspective has made it easier for churches/Christians to engage in matters concerning 
human rights.  
179
 Of course one might ask whether there has ever been something like the “Christian” society and 
whether there might be the slightest possibility of ever realising a “Christian” conception of society. 
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any particular moral or religious view.  
In 1971, the same year Rawls‟ monumental 607 page work A Theory of Justice was 
published, the theologian Martin Honecker published his Konzept einer sozialethischen 
Theorie, which at 203 pages was a less monumental work. Honecker makes it quite 
clear that this work should be considered a tentative contribution to the theological 
debate about social ethics.
180
 Issues concerning social justice and the relatively best 
scheme of society, as well as questions concerning the social and political responsibility 
of Christian citizens and of the church as an association within modern and complex 
democracies, had in many respects become increasingly problematic. 
One can hardly expect to find a thoroughly elaborated conception of society and state or 
a complete theory of s justice within a tentative theological conception of social ethics. 
Nevertheless Honecker provides us with at least some decisive perspectives on society. 
In Konzept einer sozialethischen Theorie, however, he starts by contrasting his own 
view to two others. 
Honecker rejects a modern-eschatological approach to social ethics
181
 that is, an ap-
proach to society taking its point of departure from the kerygma about the kingdom of 
God. While there are strong motivations for assuming the primacy of the Christian ker-
ygma in many respects, and doing so might even have some decisive impact on people‟s 
overall political perspective, Honecker held that the kerygma of the kingdom of God 
cannot be directly transformed into a political program, theory or symbol.  Rather, an 
eschatological social ethics would most likely render all established societies merely 
provisional arrangements. Let it, however, be remarked that there are also strongly 
eschatological versions of social ethics with a less “revolutionary” approach.182  
                                                          
180
 He considers his own concept to be “Ein Diskussionsbeitrag, unzulänglich und unfertig, wie Diskus-
sionsbeiträge zu sein pflegen, aber immerhin eine Konkretion, die veranschaulichen soll, wie der Ansatz 
ausgezogen werden kann. In der gegenwärtigen Lage der theologischen Sozialethik werden alle system-
atisch abgewogenen und unangreifbar gemachten Entwürfe immer zu spät kommen. Daher muß man 
den Mut haben, noch nicht nach allen Seiten hin abgesicherte Überlegungen öffentlich zur Diskussion 
zu stellen, in der Hoffnung, daß die öffentliche Erörterung die Probleme einer Präzisierung und Lösung 
näherbringen wird.” M. Honecker, Konzept einer sozialethischen Theorie. Grundfragen evangelischer 
Sozialethik (1971), p.10. 
181
 It is especially a “theology of hope” as conceived of by Jürgen Moltmann, mainly in Theologie der 
Hoffnung (1964), that Honecker has in mind. 
182
 In an essay, Guds rike som politisk mål. Gisle Johnson og det sosiale spørsmål i dag”, Svein Aage 
Christoffersen has shown how the most influential Norwegian theologian of the 1900th century, claims 
that the state should be a Christian state, contributing to a moral education in accordance with vital prin-
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Honecker also rejects a “theology of order” (“Theologie der Ordnungen”) as insuf-
ficient. According to a “theology of order”, as understood by Honecker, the basic orga-
nisation of society has its ultimate legitimacy in divine will and authority. And the well-
orderedness of society depends on the maintenance of a pre-ordained hierarchical struc-
ture.
183
 In a “theology of order” the state-institution plays the most central role, since 
this institution has the required divine legitimacy and power to enforce social unity and 
to cope with disorder.
184
 There are many reasons why Honecker criticises a “Theologie 
der Ordnungen”185, but let me focus here on just one aspect of his critique: A “theology 
of order” is too often and too easily used to give legitimacy to existing state authorities 
and social organisations which can not plausibly be morally defended.
186
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
ciples inherent in the kerygma of the kingdom of God: “…læren om staten blir en lære om den kristelige 
stat. På samme måte som bare det kristelige ekteskap er et sant ekteskap, er det bare den kristelige stat 
som kan tilsvare statens ide, som er å skape det fullkomne samfunn som forutsetning for den enkeltes 
fullkommenhet. Statens oppgave er 'som et Organ for Guds i Kristus aapenbarede Vilje paa den kriste-
lige Families og det kristelige Selskabs Grundvold ved sin kristelige Lov og Retsorden at fremme de 
enkelte Statsborgeres sædelige opdragelse og saaledes bidrage Sit til Guds Riges komme'. Johnson 
tenker seg ikke at kirken skal styre staten. Men han tenker seg at kirken skal utstyre staten med den 
sedelighet som staten har til oppgave å tilføre samfunnet, fordi det i realiteten bare er kirken som kan 
utstyre staten med denne sedelighet” S. Aa. Christoffersen in Arv og utfordring, Menneske og samfunn i 
den kristne moraltradisjon (Eds. S. Aa.Christoffersen and T.Wyller, 1995), p.238. 
183
 “Die Obrigkeit und nur sie allein, ist von Gott eingesetzt. Macht entfaltet sich nach diesem patriarchal-
ischen und personalen Verständnis von Staatsautorität nur von oben nach unten. Machtausübung von 
unten her ist undenkbar.” M. Honecker, Konzept einer sozialethischen Theorie. Grundfragen 
evangelischer Sozialethik (1971), p.147 
184
 There might be considerable variations within a “theology of order”. It is for instance obvious that 
there are great differences between theologians like Paul Althaus, Walther Künneth and Helmut 
Thielicke, three theologians that figure in the dissertation of T. Bakkevig: Ordnungstheologie und 
Atomwaffen. Eine Studie zur Sozialethik von Paul Althaus, Walter Künneth und Helmut Thielicke 
(1989). But a common feature is obviously that the main institutions of society, in particular state and 
family, are viewed as ordered by God to prevent egoism, sin and escalation of disorder. The family 
institution is usually taken to be instituted by God through the creation act, while the state-institution 
might be seen as required because of the fall of man. Both kinds of institutions, however, have their 
ultimate legitimacy from God. And as an institution, enforced because of the fall and the egoism of 
man, the state has a legitimate mandate to use coercive powers to prevent disorder, anarchy and evil, 
and protect the weaker against the stronger. Thus it is also recognised that the state has to use the means 
that should be considered adequate when dealing with evil and egoism. 
185
 There are at least three more reasons why Honecker rejects a “theology of order”. First it has not 
taken sufficiently into account that (western) society has changed fundamentally. Models “ursprünglich 
entworfen für ein einheitliches „Corpus christianum‟, in welchem es noch keinen staats- und kirchen-
freien Raum gab” (Konzept einer sozialethischen Theorie, p.8f.) should not automatically be considered 
applicable to modern democratic societies. Secondly: Taking the nature of sin and egoism into conside-
ration, there should be no reason to believe that an absolute ruler should be less subject to sin, evil and 
greediness than most ordinary citizens. Experiences with the third “Reich” should be sufficient for 
demonstrating this. Procedures should instead be institutionalised, - guaranteeing that political authori-
ties are effectively, publicly and continually controlled. Thirdly: Honecker is very critical of state-
metaphysics mainly concerned with the essence (das Wesen) of the state rather than its actual functions. 
Most kinds of state-metaphysics tend toward state-positivism. 
186
 “Die Theologie der Ordnungen versteht menschliche Verhältnisse als Stiftungen Gottes. Daß in ihnen 
Gottes erhaltende Gnade wirksam ist, kann man wohl glauben. Aber man kann diesen Glauben nicht zur 
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Thus, Martin Honecker is very much aware  and critical  of the ideological and le-
gitimating function that a “theology of order” might have in society. If basic political 
institutions are ultimately held to be “sacrosanct”, then the institutional scheme of 
society can hardly be appropriately assessed and criticised from a moral, political and 
rational point of view. There are many reasons why Honecker stresses this point.  




 According to Honecker no particular conception of the state can be derived from 
premises given in the Bible or in theological dogmatics.
188
 
 The role of the state may easily be overestimated through a “theology of order”. 
According to Honecker it is an urgent task to make the state accept its limitations.
189
 
 The state might, nevertheless, be taken as an “ordinatio divina”190, but one has to be 
very careful about drawing political consequences from the religious view that the 
state may theologically be taken as an “ordinatio divina”. 
 In modern societies an appropriate political “Willensbildung kann nur gelingen im 
Konsens der betroffenen Bürger.”191  
Thus Honecker concludes that the obligation of churches and Christians to supply the 
state with the moral basis and the substantial values required for maintaining the order 
and unity of society no longer exists or, at the least, is radically altered in modern so-
cieties.
192
 And he rejects theological legitimation of any particular political scheme of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
gesellschaftlichen Legitimation vorhandener Institutionen verwenden.” M. Honecker, Konzept einer 
sozialethischen Theorie. Grundfragen evangelischer Sozialethik (1971), p.2. 
187
 But Honecker admits that there are versions of a “theology of order” that are not subject to his kind of 
critique. He takes theological social ethics, as elaborated by Emil Brunner, as an example. 
188
 “Aus Glaubenssätzen und biblischem Zeugnis ist keine Staatsform herzuleiten. Der gegenwärtige Staat 
is in seiner konkreten Erscheinung ein Gebilde der Geschichte.” M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik 
(1995), p.337. Let me here insert that someone might accept the latter assertion, while still finding the 
former (“Aus Glaubenssätzen und biblischem Zeugnis ist keine Staatsform herzuleiten.”) unjustified. 
189
 It is for instance necessary to stress that; “Der christliche Glaube sieht den Zweck des Staates dadurch 
begrenzt, daß er nicht Heilsveranstaltung sein darf.” M.Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.337. 
190
 “Christlicher Glaube anerkennt jedoch die Notwendigkeit von Staatsgewalt und politischer Macht, um 
dem Bösen willen. Deshalb bejaht er das Prinzip der 'Staatlichkeit', als Gottes Setzung, als ordinatio 
divina.” M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.337. 
191
 M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.337. 
192
 And therefore Honecker can now clearly state that: “Die christliche Gemeinde und die einzelnen 
Christen sind nicht vordringlich nach einem eigenen materialen theologischen ('theoretischen') Beitrag 
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society. Ironically, this undermining of a theological legitimacy for the modern state and 
political scheme may be symptomatic of the modern legitimacy crisis itself. Modern 
societies are left with the task of finding new ways to ground the legitimacy of state 
authority in the aftermath of the collapse of widely recognised religious authority. In 
denying the church's legitimising power Honecker simultaneously prevents the Christian 
gospel from being politically and morally “exploited” and misused to support any par-
ticular political schemes or conceptions of society. One might, therefore, assume that 
Honecker  being so critical of the political legitimation-history of the church in western 
societies  should also be critical of theologically supporting an “overlap” as conceived 
of within the framework of political liberalism.
193
 
From this Honecker‟s sceptical attitude towards a “theology of society” (“Theologie der 
Gesellschaft”) can be easily understood. Admittedly Heinz-Dietrich Wendland, who 
uses this term explicitly, takes a “realistic” approach.194 He fully recognises the herme-
neutic problem of applying Bible-texts in matters of actual politics, and he avoids the 
risk of letting the modern world define the agenda of theology and church. But never-
theless he tends to establish a privileged theological position
195
 for interfering in matters 
                                                                                                                                                                          
zur politischen Theorie gefragt, der in der Regel doch nur legitimatorischen Zwecken dienen würde 
oder dienstbar gemacht würde.” M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.337 
193
 However, Honecker admits that from the theological side there may be a greater “affinity” towards 
certain political schemes and conceptions than towards others. The shades of grey are not insignificant. 
194
 “Es ist nicht die Intention der evangelischen Theologie der Gesellschaft, dieser Gesellschaft und ihren 
Strukturen mit utopischen Forderungen gegenüberzutreten. Eine gegensatzlose, spannungslose soziale 
Einheit gibt es nicht - am wenigsten auf dem Boden einer „pluralistischen‟ Gesellschaft. Aber die 
Kirche ist auf diesem Boden durch ihre Sendung zum Wächter bestellt, zum Anwalt der menschlichen 
Einheit der Gesellschaft, damit deren Zerspaltung und „Desintegration‟ nicht verhindere, daß die 
Gemeinschaft der Menschen über die sozialen Gegensätze hinweg und durch die Verbandsmauern 
hindurch erhalten oder neugewonnen werde; der Gefahr neuer Klassenbildung muß sie in den Weg 
treten; in dem Wirwarr von Verbands- und Gruppensprachen, der dazu führt, daß man sich gegenseitig 
nicht mehr versteht, muß sie für die echte Gesprächsmöglichkeit Sorge tragen, Türen in die Mauern 
brechen und dem personalen Kontakt zwischen getrennten Sozialparteien und Verbänden dienen. Auch 
heute noch steht eine Fülle von Möglichkeiten offen.” H.-D. Wendland, Die Kirche in der modernen 
Gesellschaft (2.verbesserte und ergänzte Ausgabe 1973), p.147. God himself sets obviously the pre-
mises not just for the church as such, but for the concrete political aims as well: “Wie Gott alle Grenzen 
zum Menschen hin überschritten hat und die Feindschaft des Sünders gegen sich selbst aufhebt, ist die 
Nächstenliebe niemals festgesetzt in Gesetz und Recht. Sie bleibt darum nicht in den Grenzen der Ver-
nunft und Humanität … Deshalb sind alle Träger der sozialen Arbeit im Staat, in der Gemeinde, in den 
Verbänden der Wohlfahrtspflege, darum sind ökonomisch-politische Verbänden wie der Neosozial-
ismus und der Neoliberalismus zu befragen, ob es für sie nicht endlich an der Zeit sei, ihre letzten 
Voraussetzungen und Traditionen radikal zu überprüfen, zu revidieren und eine neue Entscheidung zu 
treffen, die über die privaten Beziehungen zu dieser oder jener Philosophie, dieser oder jener Gestalt 
der Humanitätsreligion hinaus endlich zu Wirklichkeit Gottes und damit des Menschen vorstößt.” Ibid., 
p.175f.  
195
 Honecker on his side underlines: “Bei der Diagnose der Gesellschaft ist die theologische Sozialethik 
auf sozialwissenschaftliche Information angewiesen. Sie kann sich dabei nur auf profane Vernunft-
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of politics equally concerning all citizens. Such an attempt to establish a “theology of 
society” from which to evaluate and revise the scheme of society, might end up with an 
“overtaxation” of dogmatic motifs and biblical texts in matters which are in reality of a 
genuinely political nature. That would be both theologically illegitimate and politically 
inappropriate. 
Indeed, Honecker has no intention of undermining the belief that “civitas terrena” be-
longs within the non-transparent providentia dei. To deny this should have rendered him 
a Manichaean. But using God('s will) as a decisive and ultimate argument when political 
issues are at stake, would bring a kind of absolutism into the political domain, that 
would render reasonable political discourse more or less impossible. One has to take 
into account that the role of God‟s will in the political arena is itself a controversial 
matter among the members of society,  just as it is among the Christians. 
Taking politics (and morality) as a joint venture, simultaneously facing the radical 
diversity of modern societies, Honecker seems largely forced to avoid “Eine kerygma-
tische Einschärfung ethischer Grundsätze und jede Form von autoritärer Moralver-
mittlung…”196 when addressing the question of moral values for society as such and the 
impact of Christian norms in this context. As a result, Honecker seems to be left with a 
rather “thin” version of Christian social ethics. “Thin” in so far as it seems impossible 
for him to argue for the kind of substantial religious ethics, which would be required if 
he should effectively provide society with “Christian” guidelines in political matters. 
Like Rawls, Honecker is obviously concerned about shared basic values, norms and 
agreements that might render fair coexistence among diverse parties possible. Taking 
the characteristic features of modern democratic societies into account when considering 
social ethics in a theological perspective, Honecker reaches conclusions that are to a 
large extent similar to vital aspects of Rawls' theory. Thus Honecker aims at furthering 
an attitude of reasonable co-operation (not least on the part of Christians) in resolving 
the common problems facing citizens of modern societies. But there is another goal 
which is similarly stressed in Honecker‟s conception,  i.e. to prevent Christian ethics 
                                                                                                                                                                          
erkenntnis berufen. Gegen eine „Theologie der Gesellschaft‟ ist Skepsis geboten. Denn daß die 
theologische Erkenntnis Einblick in eine besondere Tiefendimension der Gesellschaft gewähren kann, 
ist nicht nachzuweisen.” M. Honecker, Konzept einer sozialethischen Theorie. Grundfragen evangel-
ischer Sozialethik (1971), p.10. 
196
 M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.ix. 
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(or religion) from being ideologically and politically misused. 
2.4.2. The value-formation of society 
When focusing on the value-formation of society, it might be instructive to turn to the 
intense German debate in the seventies about the role of legislation in questions of 
family-politics generally, and the right to seek and have an abortion specifically. This 
debate provides examples of the kind of questions and problems raised in this chapter. 
From the specific issue of abortion there arose a much wider debate about the kind of 
fundamental values (“Grund-werte”) which could most appropriately serve as a shared 
value-basis for society, and a discussion about the causes of the present “value-crisis”. 
The following questions are typical of those raised in the public debate:  
 How far should state-authorities themselves be responsible for the furthering of basic 
moral values and for the safeguarding of fundamental ethical norms for society as a 
whole?  
 What role could and/or should the churches  and other associations within civil 
society  play in promoting central ethical values for society as a whole? 
From the perspective of the churches, especially from the side of representative Catholic 
church-leaders, it was taken as a regrettable fact that political authorities did not main-
tain vital and fundamental values as they ought to.
197
 It was argued that, even in a plur-
alist society, there are specific substantial norms and values, such as the protection of 
the life of the unborn, that should be taken as a unanimous achievement of civilised 
societies, and which political authorities should abide by. 
Bundeskanzler Helmut Schmidt responded to the critique against the state-authorities. In 
Schmidt‟s opinion, state-authorities should have a very limited task in settling contro-
versial questions of morality. Of course he did not deny that the law and the coercive 
powers of the state should be used for safeguarding the most essential rights and politi-
cal liberties, provided these are basic rights founded on moral values that are widely 
                                                          
197
 Honecker writes: “Kritisiert wird, daß das Sittengesetz und die Grundwerte angefochten werden: Die 
Mißachtung der Familie, die Infragestellung der Institutionen Ehe und Familie, ideologische Interpreta-
tionen der Bildungsziele und -inhalte wie des Demokratieverständnisses, die Einschränkungen des 
Rechts des ungeborenen Lebens durch die Ermöglichung des Schwangerschaftsabbruchs werden aus-
drücklich genannt.” M. Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik 
(1978), p. 189. 
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approved of in society as such. Schmidt‟s point, and purpose, was to underline the 
position that there is no democratic legitimation for making moral standards, especially 
controversial ones, part of the law of a modern society,  and even less for furthering 
such standards by use of coercive power or the criminal law.
198
  
Schmidt does, however, not draw the conclusion that churches should stay entirely out 
of politics. On the contrary, given the Church's considerable moral influence within 
western societies, Helmut Schmidt considered the church itself co-responsible for the 
moral crisis of modern western societies: 
“Wenn daher die Mißachtung der Grundwerte seitens der Kirche und der Verlust 
eines Grundwertekonsensus beklagt wird, dann ist dies zuerst und vor allem eine 
Anfrage an die Verkündigung der Kirche.”199  
Within the framework of civil society the church has both a task and an opportunity 
(like anybody else) to contribute to the value-formation of society, thus influencing the 
norms and values to be held by most citizens. The state-authorities, however, cannot in 
the same way “preach” morality or advance particular (Christian) values and moral doc-
trines, especially if they are not widely shared. Rather, the state-authorities' primary 
responsibility is the protection of the fundamental legal rights (“Grundrechte”), guar-
anteed by a society‟s constitution.  
In many ways Honecker found this debate about the elementary, unifying groundvalues 
of society important but also confusing.
200
 Some distinctions were in his opinion to be 
                                                          
198
 “Der Staat des Grundgesetzes kann als Staat nicht Träger eines eigenen Ethos sein … Nur das, was in 
der Gesellschaft an ethischen Grundhaltungen tatsächlich vorhanden ist, kann in den Rechtsetzungs-
prozess eingehen, kann als Recht ausgeformt werden.” (Gorschenek, p. 22), Quoted from M. Honecker, 
Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p. 190 
199
 This is Martin Honecker‟s way of formulating Bundeskanzler Schmidt‟s standpoint. Cf. Das Recht des 
Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p. 190. 
200
 It has to be admitted that many different concerns are without doubt brought into the German debate 
about ground-values, what might seem a bit confusing. Honecker proposes to use the term “Grundwert” 
in a way that is less confusing: “Der Begriff der „Grundwerte‟ wird in den meisten Dokumenten und 
Stellungnahmen weniger erklärt als einfach vorausgesetzt. Eine Folge davon ist, daß es sehr ver-
schiedene Sachverhalte als Grundwerte bezeichnet werden. Die Erklärung der katholischen deutschen 
Bischöfe „Gesellschaftliche Grundwerte und menschliches Glück‟ vom 7. Mai 1976 ordnet diesem 
Begriff sowohl sittliche Werte wie Freiheit, Gerechtigkeit, Frieden, Wahrheit, Liebe zu, als auch Grund-
prinzipien der katholischen Soziallehre  Gemeinwohl, Subsidiaritäts- und Solidaritätsprinzip , als 
auch elementare Rechtsgüter, wie den Schutz des Lebens oder der Würde der Person, und schließlich 
Institutionen wie Ehe und Familie, dann die Rechtsordnung, den Staat und sogar die Demokratie. 
Ethische Grundüberzeugungen, Rechtsgüter, Institutionen und Sozialprinzipien werden damit freilich 
nicht mehr unterscheidbar.… Nun ist nicht zu bestreiten, daß alle genannten Sachverhalte bezogen sind 
auf den einen Wert der Personwürde. Aber dennoch sind Institutionen oder Sozialprinzipien lediglich 
auf diesen Wert bezogen. Sie sind nicht selbst Grundwerte. Die Unschuld des vulgären Wert-Begriffs 
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made: 
 First one has to distinguish clearly between state-authorities, church-authorities and 
civil society when placing questions of moral value-formation and the honouring of 
substantial social norms on the agenda. 
 And a corresponding distinction between “Grundrechte” , “Grundwerte” and “letzte 
Werte” is to be made.201  
All of the participants in the debate agreed that state-authorities have the task of safe-
guarding (even by use of coercive power) the constitutional and most fundamental rights 
of the citizens.
202
 There also seems to be a wide agreement that constitutional basic 
rights are rooted in vital ground-values recognised in society,  even if it may be charac-
terised by widespread diversity. 
Let me, however, interject a remark that might seem obvious, but that should neverthe-
less be considered very much to the point: Schmidt distinguishes two political perspec-
tives, a state-perspective and a civil-society-perspective. But even if the distinction 
might be of importance, it was the opinion of many representatives of the church that he 
distinguished too sharply. A “dualism” between state and civil society cannot 
successfully be maintained. Honecker for his part wishes to underline that: 
“Der Staat, der Daseinsvorsorge im umfassenden Sinne leistet und dabei auch Für-
sorge für die Kultur faktisch wahrnimmt, ist nicht der klassisiche Nichtinterven-
tionsstaat, der sich mit Polizeifunktionen begnügt. Vielmehr ist es auch Sache des 
Staates, gemeinsame Überzeugungen seiner Bürger zu schützen. Er schafft diese 
Werte und Grundhaltungen nicht; aber er lebt von ihnen und kann sich deshalb nicht 
indifferent und gleichgültig ihnen gegenüber verhalten. Zudem sind die Staatsbürger 
doch nichts anderes als die Gesellschaft. Eine Abstinenz des Staates gegenüber den 
                                                                                                                                                                          
täuscht jedenfalls über seine Probleme hinweg. Daher soll der Begriff „Grundwerte‟ hier nur sittliche 
Grundeinstellungen bezeichnen und deswegen auch von Menschenrechten unterschieden werden. Über-
dies würde ich es vorziehen, statt von Grundwerten von ethischen Maßstäben oder Grundnormen 
ethischen Verhaltens zu reden. Da sich aber der Begriff „Grundwerte‟ in der Diskussion eingebürgert 
und durchgesetzt hat, behalte ich ihn trotz Bedenken bei.” M. Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. 
Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p. 167f. In this way Honecker can distinghuish 
between “Grundwerte” and “Grundrechte”, what means that he takes the former to provide us with 
specific moral guidelines, while he holds that “Grundrechte sind in der Verfassung eines Staates 
positivierte Menschenrechte”. Ibid, p.188. 
201
 For the term “letzte Werte” I refer to Martin Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die 
evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p. 189. 
202
 A remark might be to the point here: “Grundrechte sind in der Verfassung eines Staates positivierte 
Menschenrechte”, according to Honecker. Cf. Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische 
Sozialethik (1978), p. p.188 
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Grundwerten ist faktisch undurchführbar.”203 
After all it appears to me that this brings Honecker rather close to Helmut Schmidt‟s 
point of view. The active role of the state-authorities in the moral value-formation 
should be very limited. In and of themselves, state-authorities might be expected to be 
as far as possible morally neutral in controversial questions involving faith and compre-
hensive religious doctrines. But the state nevertheless needs a moral backing from the 
citizens,  it is dependent on the “gemeinsame Überzeugungen seiner Bürger”. And as 
far as the Church is concerned, it can be expected that it, as an influential value-pro-
ducing association within society, will somehow contribute to the value-formation of 
democratic societies,. 
As remarked, many participants in the debate contested that the distinctions between 
state and civil society, and between “Grundrechte” and “Grundwerte” could be drawn so 
clearly and sharply as the “Bundeskanzler” in fact did.204 But it was obviously not easy 
for church-leaders to say how far state-authorities should go in furthering certain moral 
values by the means of coercive power and the legislative institutions. Even if the state 
is dependent on fundamental moral values found in political society, it might be pro-
blematic for the state as such to be an advocate of particular moral doctrines.  
As far as I can see, Honecker can in no way be said to be unappreciative of the position 
taken by Bundeskanzler Schmidt. This is clearly evident from Honecker‟s rejection of 
those who criticise state-authorities for being concerned just with “ethischen Mini-
malia”.205 Helmut Schmidt is, according to Honecker, correct in claiming that a modern 
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 M. Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p. p.191. 
204
 Honecker takes Cardinal Höffner, the leader of the Catholic Bishops conference, as an example of a 
theologian, who is contesting that such a sharp distinction between (comprehensive moral) ground-
values and (legal) ground-rights can be clearly drawn: “Im Widerspruch dazu erklärte der damalige 
kommissarische Vorsitzende der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz, eine solche Unterscheidung von Grund-
rechten und Grundwerten, für abwegig: „Grundwerte sind das Rechtsgut, der Inhalt der Grundrechte und 
darum deren unaufgebbarer Bestandteil … Der Staat hat … die Grundrechtsgüter, also die Grundwerte 
mit seiner Autorität und seinen legitimen Möglichkeiten nicht nur zu respektieren, sondern auch zu 
schützen, zu gewährleisten und zu fördern, z.B.in der Gesetzgebung über Ehe und Familie, in der Ge-
staltung der Gesellschaft, im Erziehungs- und Bildungswesen, im Ausbau des Systems der sozialen 
Sicherheit, in der Mitgestaltung der öffentlichen Meinung. Hier ist auch der Schutz der Grundwerte 
durch das Strafrecht zu nennen. Der Staat kann sich seiner Verantwortung für die Inhalte der Grund-
werte, wenn er sich nicht aufgeben will, nicht entziehen. Er ist weltanschauungsneutral, aber grundwert-
gebunden.‟ (Gorschenek, S.156).” The quotation is taken from M. Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. 
Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p. 190f. 
205
 Here Honecker obviously has in mind an article about “Aspekte der Freiheitsproblematik im Recht”, 
written by A.Hollerbach in: Philosophische Perspektiven 5, 1973, S.29-41. Honecker stresses that 
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state cannot have the task of promoting more than an essential minimum
206
 of basic 
moral values. How could the government of a modern pluralist and constitutional demo-
cracy maintain more than an ethical minimum-program without using methods that are 
not worthy of modern constitutional democracies?
207
  
But, according to Honecker, this certainly does not mean that a modern state should be 
entirely neutral in all questions of significant moral value. There are obviously some 
doctrines concerning the integrity and inviolability of the person which cannot be the 
subject of political bargaining or compromising and which state-authorities should 
themselves advance, protect and act upon. Honecker makes this quite clear: 
“Auch theoretisch sind Grundrechte und Grundwerte nicht völlig voneinander zu 
trennen. Die Anerkennung der Würde der Person ist eine Wertentscheidung; zu-
gleich ist der Schutz der Menschenwürde ein Grundrecht. Die Grundrechte beruhen 
zumindest auf der Geltung eines Grundwerts, auf dem Grundwert des Person-Seins. 
Diesen Grundwert können Mehrheitsentscheidungen nicht aufheben. Er ist weder 
Staat noch Gesellschaft verfügbar. Dieser Grundwert der Würde der Person ist 
sowohl Grundlagenordnung politischer Ethik wie Grundlage des staatlichen 
Rechts.”208 
And state-authorities have no reason to fear that upholding certain moral doctrines of 
this kind, might be considered “eine staatliche Sanktion kirchlicher Wertvorstel-
lungen”.209 In matters touching upon the value and integrity of the person, political 
                                                                                                                                                                          
“einmal ist gegen den Satz „Mit ethischen Minimalia ist kein Staat zu machen‟ einzuwenden: Der Staat 
kann als Maximum an Grundwerten rechtlich nur ein Minimum dessen schützen, was gesellschaftlichen 
Gruppen fordern. Positive Wertoffenheit des Staates gebietet ihm aber, gesellschaftlichen Gruppen ein 
Mehr an Verwirklichung ihrer Wertvorstellungen zu ermöglichen als er von der Gesamtgesellschaft 
rechtlich erzwingen kann. Zum anderen sind Grundwerte Voraussetzungen und Interpretationshilfen 
von Grundrechten. Aber es wäre gefählich, eine vollständige Ethisierung des Rechts anzustreben, da 
dies zu einer Überbeanspruchung der Autorität des Staates wie zu einer Juridifizierung des Ethos führen 
müßte. Insoweit hat der Einspruch von Helmut Schmidt recht. Die Differenzierung von Grundwerten 
und Menschenrechten ist notwendig; eine auf den Dualismus von Recht und Ethos gegründete Tren-
nung, Separierung der Menschenrechte von den Grundwerten aber macht das Recht zu einem wert-
freien, damit beliebig manipulierbaren Instrument der Ordnung sozialer Beziehungen und Verhält-
nisse.” M. Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p. 
192.  
206
 Maybe is the term “minimum” not the most appropriate in this connection. Neither Schmidt nor 
Honecker will defend the idea that a modern state should just be a “minimum-state” in the sense that it 
should merely be a kind of police-state with the negative task of punishing evil-doers. A modern state is 
far more than that, according to Schmidt and Honecker. But I think both of them want to underline that 
a modern state should be a minimum-state in the sense that it should just promote those ethical stand-
ards that are most fundamental and widely acceptable. A modern state cannot in itself use criminal law 
or governmental power to enforce a “thick” moral conception.  
207
 I think this is also the main point of Bundeskanzler Schmidt: The coercive powers of the state should 
normally not be used to settle controversies in matters of morality and religion. 
208
 M. Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p. 191. 
209
 M. Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p. 191. 
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authorities simply cannot be allowed to be “neutral”. 
Thus Honecker takes it for granted that there are or should be in society at least a mini-
mum of shared groundvalues (“Grundwerte”) - especially in areas affecting the integrity 
and inviolability of the person. Such values have to be guaranteed by the state-authori-
ties, codified in form of legal rights, and effectively maintained. Beyond this, however, 
state-authorities should not attempt to impose a value based homogeneity on society as a 
whole. 
How churches can most appropriately participate in the moral discussion and in the 
value-formation within civil society is  of course  not fully clarified by Bundeskanzler 
Schmidt. The theologian Martin Honecker has more to say in this respect, as shall be 
more thoroughly explored in chapter 5.  
2.5. Society  to be sufficiently ordered and unified by a 
conception of justice? 
In the last and concluding section of this main-chapter it should clearly be emphasised 
how Rawls very consequently conceives of the unity of society. Note first please, that 
both Rawls and Honecker clearly agree that the well-orderedness and unity of society 
cannot just be achieved through a successful approximation to a pre-defined “ewige 
Ordnung” 210 Neither does social unity require that people have the same historical tra-
ditions, that they agree on religious values, believe in similar comprehensive doctrines 
and are bound by shared communal bonds and attachments.  
Rawls instead makes it clear that “political liberalism conceives of social unity in a 
different way: namely, as deriving from an overlapping consensus on a political con-
ception of justice suitable for a constitutional regime.”211 In a well-ordered society 
citizens should be supposed to have one final end
212
 in common, the aim of justice 
itself. Thus they are assumed to have a political and reasonable conception of justice, or 
at least some essentially similar principles of justice, in common,  by which fair co-
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 M. Honecker, Konzept einer sozialethischen Theorie. Grundfragen evangelischer Sozialethik (1971), 
160f. 
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 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.201 
212
 According to Rawls “a final end is understood as an end valued or wanted for its own sake and not 
solely as a means to something else”, J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.201 
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existence and co-operation can be established and regulated. Vital principles of justice 
are to be “materialised” in the very institutional scheme of society, in the procedures for 
solving conflicts and in the framework for public reasoning. This is considered suf-
ficient for social unity and social co-operation. It is within such a shared framework that 
communities, associations, groups and individuals can be supposed to be most fairly 
situated. Vital principles of justice, when made the core of an overlapping consensus, 
are themselves assumed to fill the role of a “common good” in society. 
Let me close this chapter with some words from Honecker, which may clearly support 
Rawls‟ view:  
“Während eine metaphysisiche ontokratische Staatslehre Gerechtigkeit als ewige 
Ordnung begreift, wird sie im gesellschaftlichen Prozess zu suchen und zu 
verwirklichen. Die Gerechtigkeit liegt nicht vor, sie kann nur das Ergebnis eines 
demokratischen Consensus sein.”213 
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 M. Honecker, Konzept einer sozialethischen Theorie. Grundfragen evangelischer Sozialethik (1971), 
p.160f. 
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3. PLURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF COMPRE-
HENSIVE DOCTRINES 
3.1. The problem 
In the previous chapter I argued that a society can be well ordered and sufficiently uni-
fied even if it lacks a professed religious basis from which moral doctrines and ethical 
values can be derived.
214
 Admittedly it seems unlikely that there could be within modern 
societies any religiously grounded moral doctrine capable of providing us with a widely 
acceptable moral platform and serving as a common value basis for coexistence and co-
operation. In Rawls‟ own words:  
“The religious doctrines that in previous centuries were the professed basis of 
society have gradually given way to principles of constitutional government that all 
citizens, whatever their religious view, can endorse. Comprehensive philosophical 
and moral doctrines likewise cannot be endorsed by citizens generally, and they also 
no longer can, if they ever could, serve as the professed basis of society.”215  
It is certainly the case that the widespread “pluralism” in questions of values and moral 
standards in modern society instils a sense of urgency to reconsiderations of funda-
mental issues concerning coexistence and the required minimum of consensus. 
Although pluralism
216
 can be peaceful, it may equally well lead to sharp conflicts.  
If a situation of “bellum omnium in omnes” is to be avoided, society needs to develop 
regulative political principles that can serve as a basis for a fair coexistence among the 
various parties of a highly pluralistic society. But the problem is that there seems to be 
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 This does not mean that religious doctrines should not play a role in the value-formation of society, as 
I hope to show clearly,  when discussing Honecker‟s model of “Vermittlung” and Rawls‟ idea of a 
consensus endorsed “from within” the different comprehensive (religious) doctrines themselves. 
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 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.10 
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 Many have adopted a rather negative attitude to the phenomenon of “pluralism”,  for different 
reasons. Gregor McLennan writes that: “More loosely still, pluralism indicated a certain type of 
temperament, a particular psycho-personal frame of mind. In this sense, 'pluralism' is not significantly 
different from the general gist of „liberalism‟, an equally unpopular state of intellectual being for radi-
cals of the 70s stamp. Taken that way, pluralism as an outlook on life and politics could be expected to 
appeal to the overly-tolerant, pseudo-tolerant, ostensibly humanistic, and intellectually eclectic sort of 
person; the sort of person who does not really have clear opinions on anything; the well-meaning type 
who, deep down, does not fundamentally want to question or change society; the faint-hearted ones, 
hesitant even about pushing academic sociology or political science to their full critical potential; the 
sort of people who fiddle while Rome burns.” G.McLennan, Pluralism (1995), p.1f. But McLennan also 
adds: “Nevertheless, pluralism is nowadays part of the „structure of feeling‟ of the critical wing of 
western intellectual culture to a degree that would have been unthinkable even 10 or 15 years ago.” 
Ibid., p.2. 
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no substantial value-system, religious or secular, that can serve as an acceptable and 
shared moral basis for coexistence and social co-operation in modern societies. 
According to Rawls it is a typical and permanent feature of liberal democracies that 
citizens and associations may legitimately subscribe to different and even “incompa-
tible”217 comprehensive moral and religious doctrines. And since these doctrines have 
widely competing conceptions of what is good and valuable, it seems unfair for one of 
the parties to impose on society as a whole a value-system that could not in the long run 
be willingly endorsed, honoured and maintained by (nearly) all citizens. One simply 
cannot ignore the problem of diversity (value-pluralism), when attempting to establish a 
shared basis for coexistence and social co-operation for society as a whole. 
The fact of pluralism was a constant underlying problem in the previous chapter. This 
“fact”, as understood by Rawls, is well described by Thomas Pogge as follows: 
“Das 'Faktum des Pluralismus' ist die von Rawls behauptete Tatsache, daß eine 
Einigung auf eine umfassende religiöse, philosophische oder moralische Welt-
anschauung oder Konzeption des Guten in einer freiheitlichen Gesellschaft keinen 
Bestand haben kann, daß solche Werte immer umstritten sein werden.” [And Pogge 
adds] “… daß das Faktum des Pluralismus auch ohne Unvernunft und Böswilligkeit 
Bestand haben würde.”218 
In this chapter I analyse the role that the phenomenon of pluralism plays within the 
respective thought of John Rawls and Martin Honecker.
219
 Pluralism should neither be 
ignored as a “positive premise” (since it is connected with freedom) nor as a “negative” 
premise (since it is a threat to social unity) when conceiving of a political philosophy, or 
working out an appropriate theological conception of social ethics for modern societies. 
Let me sum up: The apparent paradox before us is that a shared professed value-basis 
cannot be established in modern pluralist societies, and yet modern pluralist societies 
stand in urgent need of morally grounded principles that can serve as a basis for fair 
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 The notion of “incompatibility” is used by Rawls himself. By using this term I think he wants to stress 
two important things: First that different comprehensive doctrines, existing in modern societies, might 
have so different focus-points that they should better be considered incomparable. And secondly I think 
incompatibility also means that different comprehensive doctrines might provide people with competing 
“truths” about the same issues, what makes it unlikely that people should come to any kind of agreement 
about these issues in foreseeable time.(The possibility that people can change their minds  even in 
matters of the strongest “truths” they hold, should, however, not be excluded). 
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 T. Pogge, John Rawls (1994), p. 135f. 
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 The amount of literature concerning the issue of pluralism is enormous. I therefore have to limit 
myself, and of course I shall especially concentrate on the main works of Rawls and Honecker. 
 84 
coexistence among the various parties in spite of the competing religious and moral 
doctrines they might hold. 
3.2. Pluralism 
3.2.1. Explaining the terminology 
Collins Dictionary of Sociology offers the following explanation of pluralism: 
“The original use of the term was in association with opposition to the Hegelian 
conception of the unitary state. …the most important use of the term in modern 
sociology and political science is the suggestion that modern Western liberal demo-
cracies are pluralistic polities, in which a plurality of groups and/or elites either 
share power or continuously compete for power.”220 
There are three things worth noticing here:  
 It is particularly focused on “Western liberal democracies” as societies with a pro-
nounced pluralism.  
 These modern democracies can be supposed to be divided into different (interest-) 
groups.  
 The different parties continuously compete for power,  or/and have to share power 
(in a way that is acceptable from the perspective of each group). 
Pluralism and liberalism are often taken to be very closely related. Pluralism can hardly 
thrive without a liberal attitude. There is within liberalism a built-in respect of plural-
ism.  
In his book Political Liberalism (1993) John Rawls makes it quite clear at the very 
outset what characterises modern democracies as pluralist societies,  
“a modern democratic society is characterized by a pluralism of incompatible yet 
reasonable comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines. No one of 
these doctrines is affirmed by citizens generally. Nor should one expect that in the 
foreseeable future one of them, or some other reasonable doctrine, will ever be 
affirmed by all, or nearly all, citizens.”221 
In this quotation the aspect of “power” is not directly addressed. But there are three 
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 Collins Dictionary of Sociology (Eds. D. Jary and J. Jary, 1991), p. 473. 
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 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.xvi. 
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other aspects that are focused here, namely that, 
 people in modern societies hold doctrines (religious, moral or philosophical) that are 
incompatible, 
 the different doctrines that exist side by side, might nevertheless be considered 
reasonable, 
 there is no reason to believe that any one of the many (religious, moral of philo-
sophical) doctrines shall be universally approved of in the foreseeable future. 
Thus, pluralism, as used by Rawls, normally means nothing else than that there is in 
society a diversity of moral, religious and philosophical doctrines. But this kind of 
pluralism provides us with a political problem, for the views and values held by dif-
ferent groups and individuals are to a wide extent competing doctrines. And then the 
problem that was suggested in Collins Dictionary of Sociology, gets urgent for Rawls as 
well: From a political point of view should the competing groups  even when holding 
conflicting doctrines  simultaneously be coexistent parties, sharing the power belong-
ing to society as a whole. 
When I use the notions “value-pluralism” or “moral pluralism” in my thesis I want to 
stress one essential aspect of pluralism, - an aspect that is very much focused by Rawls 
as well as by Honecker.
222
  
Nicholas Rescher has, even as strongly as Rawls (and Honecker) made it clear that there 
is no reason to believe that value-pluralism should in the foreseeable future be over-
come. He stresses instead that “value disagreement is not only fundamental but also 
ineliminable”223: 
“As long as people think themselves to have good reason for prizing things dif-
ferently  for making different assessments in point of value, significance, im-
portance, and the like  that is, so long as people are people, beings with a value-
structure of their own, consensus, however attractive in the abstract, is not in the 
concrete a practicable or even desirable state of affairs. A fundamental variability of 
reflective evaluations in point of values, ideals, aims, and aspirations prevails among 
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 Very often, when I just use the term “pluralism” I mean “value-pluralism” more specifically. This 
should be obvious from the context. 
223
 N. Rescher: Pluralism. Against the Demand for Consensus (1993), p. 131. By this I think that Rescher 
wants to stress that pluralism is ineliminable in the sense that it cannot be expected to be eliminated by the 
means of reasonable and morally acceptable means.  
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people, engendering a pluralism in cognitive, practical, doctrinal, and even political 
regards. In sum, value dissensus inheres in human condition.”224  
A distinction may appropriately be made between pluralism in terms of cognitive 
matters (knowledge and beliefs) and pluralism in axiological matters (values and ends). 
Rawls‟ suggests that it might be much easier to agree on matters of science and “hard” 
knowledge than on matters of politics and ethics.
225
 It might, however, be very difficult 
to introduce a sharp fact-value divide, thus making ethics a non-cognitive matter while 
knowledge produced in other fields should be unproblematically certain, and I don‟t 
think that Rawls is making this sharp separation either. I believe that Rescher might be 
right, that:  
“Evaluative disagreement is basic to disagreement in general. Even factual dis-
agreement generally roots in evaluative conflicts, arising when different parties 
apply different norms and standards to the evaluation of evidence, and thus bring 
different cognitive values to bear. Cognitive valuation calls for according sig-
nificance to certain considerations, seeing certain matters as important, and taking 
certain cases to be archetypical  or at least highly relevant. Such cognitive values 
involve taking a particular approach to determining the bearing of „the objective 
facts‟, and indicate an evaluative response to an objective situation.” 226 
By emphasising the phenomenon of value-pluralism in society, I want to underline that 
there is a wide range of moral doctrines, norms and evaluative standards that might be 
considered substantially incompatible or conflicting in some essential respect. Such 
value-pluralism may be considered a permanent feature of modern democratic societies. 
This is taken for granted by Honecker as well as by Rawls who do not appear to think it 
necessary to confirm or document the existence of this kind of pluralism by producing 
empirical investigations and statistical surveys.
227
  But it is nevertheless emphasised that 
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 N. Rescher: Pluralism. Against the Demand for Consensus (1993), p. 132. 
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 This seems to be implied in the question set forth by Rawls: “Why does not our conscientious attempt 
to reason with one another lead to reasonable agreement? It seems to do so in natural science, at least in 
the long run.” John Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.54. 
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 Nicholas Rescher: Pluralism. Against the Demand for Consensus (1993), p. 135. 
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 In western societies, for instance in the Norwegian society, many scientific surveys concerning these 
issues have been made during the last years. And there can be no doubt that statistical surveys to a very 
wide extent support Rawls‟ way of describing “the fact of pluralism”, although the degree of diversity 
concerning moral, religious and metaphysical issues can obviously differ. Cf. to these questions for 
instance O. Listhaug and B. Huseby, Values in Norway 1990: Study, Description and Codebook (ISS-
rapport nr. 29, 1990). Institutt for sosiologi og samfunnsvitenskap, Universitetet i Trondheim 1991. This 
report is part of the Norwegian investigation following from an international value-survey carried out in 
more than 20 countries all over the world. Cf. also O. Listhaug, Norske verdier 1982 - 1990: Stabilitet og 
endring (Rapport nr. 30). And in 1991 a similar survey about religious belief and religious values was 
carried out by the International Social Survey Programme in 14 countries. Cf. P. K. Botvar‟s comments on 
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such pluralism is a “fact” in modern societies, so much so that Rawls finds it 
appropriate to use the phrase “fact of pluralism”. 
So far I have shown that the notion of pluralism should be specified by the use of predi-
cates like “moral”, “religious”, “political” etc. For my own part I am especially con-
cerned about the problems provided by value-pluralism, which makes it so problematic 
to go for a basic moral consensus in modern pluralist democracies.  
Liberals like Rawls emphasise that the widespread and radical diversity makes coexis-
tence and co-operation difficult, but they nevertheless also stress that some kind of con-
sensus is both required and attainable. 
3.2.2. Pluralism and liberalism as twins? 
As suggested in the initial explanation of “pluralism” taken from Collins Dictionary of 
Sociology, pluralism and liberalism seem to be very closely related. The philosopher 
Charles Larmore, however, contests that there is such an “intimate” connection between 
liberalism and pluralism:  
“A prevalent view about the moral sources of liberalism is that it arose out of the 
acceptance of value pluralism. Liberalism and pluralism are indeed often thought to 
be intimately connected ideas. Pluralism is often considered an essential part of the 
basis of liberal principles of political association. And a liberal political order is in 
turn often perceived as one that guarantees and fosters a pluralistic society. I believe 
that this view is importantly mistaken. Liberalism does not draw its rationale from 
an acceptance of pluralism, nor must it seek to promote its virtues.”228 
The reason for this somewhat surprising statement from Larmore, however, is that he 
holds that “pluralism” should most properly be distinguished from the idea that “reason-
able people tend naturally to disagree about the comprehensive nature of the good 
life.”229  
According to Larmore pluralism should be understood as a philosophical doctrine about 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the Norwegian part of this survey in: Religion uten kirke. Ikke institusjonell religiøsitet i Norge, Stor-
britannia og Tyskland (Rapport 10,1993). Cf also Kai Ingolf Johannessen: “Pluralisering av den kristne 
moral?”, Tidsskrift for Kirke, Religion og Samfunn (No 11992), p.41-48. Cf. also P. Repstad: “Tro uten 
kirke”, Ibid, p.3-14. All the survey-material demonstrates, I think, that a considerable amount of value-
pluralism in modern western societies can easily be documented. But as already emphasised, Rawls just 
takes “the fact of pluralism” as a given fact. 
228
 C. Larmore, The Morals of Modernity (1996, The quotation is taken from a preliminary edition, given 
me by the author), p.263. 
229
 C. Larmore, The Morals of Modernity (1996, preliminary edition), p.263 
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the nature of value, and as such it is to be contrasted with alternative philosophical value 
-theories like monism (and dualism). The pluralist (as well as the dualist) would certain-
ly deny that there is just one such ultimate source of value.  Instead, the pluralist claims 
that there are multiple independent sources of value.
230
 
But this means that the question whether a doctrine of pluralism is philosophically true 
should not be confused with the political question of how a society can most appropri-
ately uphold a legitimate diversity of doctrines (some of which might be pluralist doc-
trines and some of which might be monist or dualist doctrines). The pluralist doctrine is 
in itself a very controversial doctrine.
231
 And if political liberalism was dependent upon 
the truth value of pluralism as opposed to monism, it would be similarly controversial. 
Such a philosophically comprehensive and controversial liberalism would be at odds 
with the ideal of impartiality that has been an essential feature of liberalism when facing 
existing disagreement concerning diverse philosophical doctrines and conceptions held 
to be true by different citizens. But according to Larmore there is nothing within the 
conception of liberalism that requires us to hold a philosophical doctrine of pluralism to 
be true. 
The intuitive tendency to treat pluralism and liberalism as twins may be attributable to 
the fact that both doctrines are relatively modern phenomena,  and therefore have some 
vital background-premises in common. Both developed in a world confronted with an 
emerging metaphysical-religious disenchantment
232
,  a world where many people no 
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 The question which of the doctrines  either pluralism or monism  should be given the upper hand, 
is, however, not without relevance for the problem of handling value conflicts, what Larmore admits: “The 
purportedly single source of value should be able to provide a common basis for determining, in given 
situations, the respective weights of the conflicting commitments. Pluralism harbors no such guarantee of 
solvability. In its lights, conflicting values can stem from different ultimate sources, and when this is so, 
there can be no assurance of a resolution. …[But] sometimes we can find a solution to a conflict, not by 
appealing to a common denominator of value, but simply by recognizing that one consideration carries 
more weight than the other. Value commitments may be, in other words, comparable without being com-
mensurable, the directives they offer in a given situation being rankable without appeal to a common 
standard.” C. Larmore, The Morals of Modernity (1996; preliminary edition), p.269. 
231
 “Whether true or false, pluralism is an eminently controversial doctrine. It has been, as Berlin has 
emphasized, a peripheral view in the history of Western thought. It is incompatible with the religious 
orthodoxies which have sought in God the single, ultimately harmonious source of good. If political 
liberalism rested essentially on the acceptance of pluralism, it would itself amount to a very controversial 
doctrine. Yet liberalism‟s primary ambition, I believe, has been to find principles of political association, 
expressing certain fundamental moral values, which, to as great extent as possible, reasonable people may 
accept, despite the different views about the good and about religious truth which divide them.” C. Lar-
more, The Morals of Modernity (1996, preliminary edition), p.265 
232
 In Norway Knut Lundby has clearly considered pluralism an inherent aspect of secularisation: “Seku-
lariseringen fremtrer i ulike former i det sen-industrielle samfunn. Vi skiller mellom privatisering av 
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longer recognised a divine highest good,  or at least not the same highest good. In 
pluralist societies there was no recognisable highest good or an overarching value,  
there was no intelligible divine and hierarchical order or an ultimate aim, that could be 
recognised by all inhabitants. Instead it seemed most reasonable to accept that there are 
really multiple sources of value. Genuine pluralism can in a way be considered a result 
both of recent metaphysical “disenchantment” and of the loss of the unifying force 
inherent in religion. 
Political liberalism, however, facing the same features of modern societies as the more 
dogmatic pluralists, has not drawn decisive doctrinaire conclusions from the modern 
metaphysical disenchantment. Liberals can instead accept and respect that there are 
many reasonable citizens in modern societies, for instance many citizens with a 
Christian perspective on society, who take the course of history to be in some deeper 
way in accordance with the plan of God, i.e. with a divine order and will. Political 
liberalism, with its respect of actual diversity, should for instance respect that some 
people might reasonably trust in the providentia dei and try to lead their moral life in 
accordance with a particular value-order as defined by the one God in the Holy 
Scripture. Political liberalism should better not make a philosophical doctrine of 
pluralism an axiom of its own. 
I think that Larmore argues quite convincingly for the view that pluralism, as he under-
stands it, should be held apart from political liberalism as such. We should notice the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
religionen, religiøs og ideologisk pluralisme, foruten kirkelig og anti-kirkelig interessearbeid.” K. Lundby: 
Sekularisering i Norden - studert gjennom programmer om kirke og religion i radio og tv (Stensil nr. 35, 
1974) p.(2). And Lundby also emphasises that “Sekulariseringen fører til at kirkereligionen mister sitt 
monopol som ramme rundt samfunnet, og dermed til en religiøs og ideologisk pluralisme (Berger 1967, 
s.135). Heretter betegner vi denne kort og godt som „pluralisme‟. Også pluralismen må forstås på bak-
grunn av de strukturelle endringer frem mot industrisamfunnet…” (Ibid., p.36). Pluralism has according to 
Lundby certain consequences within many fields,   for instance concerning the role of the state: “Plural-
isme er altså differensiering. … I en pluralistisk  situasjon opptrer staten som en oppmann mellom religi-
øse konkurrenter. Også i land med statskirke, hvor én kirke formelt favoriseres, er staten i realiteten til-
nærmet nøytral i forhold til ulike kirkesamfunn og livssyn-retninger. Statens oppmannrolle vis-a-vis 
konkurrerende religiøse grupper er slående lik den rolle staten spiller i en liberalistisk laissez-faire-
økonomi. I en slik økonomi begrenses statens rolle til å sørge for orden mellom konkurrenter som forut-
settes å være uavhengige. Denne likhet mellom økonomisk og religiøs fri-konkurranse er langt fra til-
feldig. … De har røtter i den samme kapitalistisk-industrielle utvikling, og i de samme liberalistiske og 
individualistiske idéretninger.” (Ibid. p. 37). And the consequence of such pluralism is accordingly that 
religions have to compete with other religions (and denomination) as well as with ideologies and popular 
philosophies, offering their “products” within the marketplace of free societies, under the protection of an 
impartial state. As a historical sketch the thesis of Lundbye might to a considerable degree be considered 
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distinction. Larmore has pointed to an important distinction.
233
 If we are not at least 
aware of this distinction between a doctrine of philosophical pluralism on the one side 
and the idea of reasonable disagreement on the other, it might sometimes lead to con-
fusing and unpleasant results. What liberalism should really take into account is not as 
much philosophical pluralism, as the different phenomenon of reasonable disagreement. 
Liberalism and pluralism should therefore not be considered twins according to 
Larmore. 
But if I now turn to the conception of John Rawls, it is not concerned with Larmore's 
sharply drawn distinction between pluralism on the one hand and reasonable disagree-
ment on the other hand. Although Larmore criticises Rawls for this, he simultaneously 
admits that: 
“At one point, indeed, he [Rawls] seems close to acknowledging the difference 
between the two notions. See his The Domain of the Political and Overlapping 
Consensus, New York University Law Review, vol. 64, no.2 (May 1989), p.237 
(footnote 7).”234 
In my opinion there can be no doubt that when Rawls normally points to “the fact of 
pluralism”, he just wants to stress the phenomenon that there is in society a diversity of 
moral, religious and philosophical doctrines. And according to Rawls it has to be con-
sidered unlikely that people within modern democracies should ever agree upon the 
same overarching comprehensive conception of the good. And the persisting situation of 
“pluralism” also means that it would be unfair to attempt to draw political conclusions, 
affecting all citizens, from controversial doctrines that are recognised just by some of 
the citizens.
 235
 (Larmore would obviously agree with Rawls in this respect.) Political 
                                                                                                                                                                          
appropriate, but the relation between “pluralism” and the conception of liberalism should in my opinion 
be taken as far more complex.  
233
 Let it be inserted here that in the article on “pluralism” in Encyclopedia Americana, Vol. 22, 1979, 
written by D. C. Williams, it may likewise be underlined that pluralism “… is generally contrasted with 
monism, in which all things manifest just one substance or principle, and with dualism, in which they 
manifest just two.” But it is more in accordance with Rawls‟ view when he continues: “Pluralism as a 
political theory holds that sovereignty does not, or should not, reside in a single group, order or organi-
zation of men, but in a cooperation and consensus of many groups.” (p. 258). 
234
 C. Larmore, The Morals of Modernity (1996, preliminary edition), p.297 (Footnote 6). 
235
 One might say that to a wide extent it is the very “fact of pluralism”, as Rawls understands it, that 
makes it so urgent for him to advance a conception of justice as fairness. This is clearly seen by Thomas 
Pogge: “Damit soll eine Gesellschaft möglich werden, in der eine größere Vielfalt miteinander konkur-
rierender Lehren gleichberechtigt koexistieren kann durch ihre gmeinsame Anerkennung einer Gerechtig-
keitskonzeption, deren Voraussetzungen mit jeder von ihnen vereinbar sind. Rawls betrachtet es als einen 
wichtigen Vorteil einer Gerechtigkeitskonzeption, daß sie eine gleichberechtigte Koexistenz möglichst 
vieler vernünftigen Lehren ermöglicht.” T W. Pogge, John Rawls (1994), p. 144.  
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liberalism is without doubt very much concerned with the issue of reasonable disagree-
ment in modern political societies, while the issue of philosophical pluralism as opposed 
to monism and dualism is systematically avoided.  
Taking pluralism in the Rawlsian sense, one might say that liberalism is closely related 
to the fact (and the problems) of “pluralism” as a political phenomenon most typical of 
modern societies. Of course one should not deny that the term “pluralism” might plau-
sibly be understood in very different ways, but I think that the way Rawls uses the term 
is sufficiently precise and also very much in accordance with an ordinary understanding. 
There should therefore be no confusion regarding Rawls' use of the term.  
Quite apart from the fact that Rawls and Larmore differ in terminology
236
, both of them 
are very much concerned with the phenomenon of diversity and reasonable disagree-
ment as essential features of modern democratic societies. And this kind of diversity 
without doubt gives important premises for political liberalism. While liberalism and 
pluralism in the Rawlsian sense are not twins, they are nevertheless closely related.  
3.2.3. Pluralism in Honecker’s “Grundriß der Sozialethik” 
I think that the theologian, Martin Honecker's understanding of pluralism closely 
parallels that of Rawls: 
“Pluralismus, Vielfalt kennzeichnet die moderne Lebenswelt. … Pluralismus ist in 
einem ein normativer und deskriptiver Begriff. Zunächst ist Pluralismus ein Faktum, 
nämlich die Vielfalt der Meinungen, Gruppeninteressen in einer Gesellschaft. Die 
Anerkennung des Rechts auf Glaubens-, Gewissens- und Meinungsfreiheit und die 
Zulassung einer Mehrzahl von Verbänden und Gruppierungen (z.B. Parteien, Tarif-
partner) führt notwendig zu einer pluralistischen Struktur der Gesellschaft.”237 
Note that Honecker takes pluralism to be both an empirical and a normative phenome-
non. Just as Rawls he takes for granted “the fact of pluralism”. And not unlike Rawls, 
Honecker also holds that there are certain essential moral values implicit in pluralism, 
such as for instance a virtue of toleration, a recognition of an elementary liberty of 
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 This difference in terminology is, however, not so systematic and clear. Larmore can sometimes use 
the term “pluralism” in much the same way as Rawls uses the term, for instance when he refers to “those 
two characteristically modern phenomena  the pluralism of ideals of the good life and the existence of 
reasonable disagreement about which ideals are preferable  that stand at the centre of liberal thought.” C. 
E. Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (1987), p.73. 
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 M. Honecker: Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.642. 
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conscience, and the freedom for different groups and associations to practice their 
religion, hold different kinds of morality and promote their beliefs publicly.  
Honecker is very much aware of the distinction that Larmore makes (as discussed 
above), but he tries at the very outset to make it clear how he wishes to use the notion of 
“pluralism” within the context of social ethics, and thereby avoids the kind of confusion 
that Larmore has pointed to. Honecker explicitly distinguishes between a philosophical 
doctrine of pluralism and pluralism as the kind of diversity that is characteristic of 
modern societies.
238
 The latter refers to the “plurality” of associations, interests, life-
projects and moral and religious conceptions that (legitimately) exists in society.
239
 
Honecker is concerned both with the political and with the religious aspects of plural-
ism, as well as with the plurality of moral views, doctrines and values within the wider 
domain of society and within the more limited domain of the church(es). And in fact he 
pays scant attention to the doctrine of “philosophical pluralism” as opposed to monism 
and dualism in his further writing. 
It is hardly surprising that Martin Honecker, a theologian, is directly concerned about 
the Church's social role in the context of widespread pluralism. The chapter of Grundriß 
der Sozialethik, where he explicitly concentrates on pluralism, is accordingly called 
“Kirche im Plualismus”.240 In this chapter Honecker considers both the problem of 
pluralism in a wider political field (“Gesellschaftlicher Pluralismus”)241 as well as the 
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 “Neben einem Pluralismus gesellschaftlicher Kräfte und dem innerkirchlichen Pluralismus ist das 
Phänomen eines Pluralismus in derPhilosophie zu erwähnen. Der Pluralismus in der Philosophie richtet 
sich gegen eine einlinige Wirklichkeitssicht (z.B. Monismus oder Dualismus). … Im folgenden geht es 
allein um den gesellschaftlichen Pluralismus, um Demokratie, Konflikt und Kompromiß, Toleranz etc.” 
M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.643. 
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 One might try to avoid the term “pluralism” in these connections, as does for instance Ian Markam in 
his book Plurality and Christian Ethics. He consequently uses the term “plurality” instead , but his 
reasons for doing so are very special ones: “Ian Markham wishes to avoid the term „pluralism‟ as he be-
lieves it to be too identified with John Hick and with the specific problem of Christianity‟s relationship to 
other religions.” (Cf. the editor, R. Gill‟s, preface to I. Markham‟s book “Plurality and Christian Ethics”, 
New Studies in Christian Ethics, 1994, p.xi.) In my opinion there might be some good reasons for disting-
uishing between “pluralism” and “plurality”. But it makes little sense to do so consequently in my thesis, 
since it is difficult to apply a distinction that Honecker (as well as Rawls) would not use in the same 
meaning or should obviously not find appropriate: “Als Sprachregelung hat es sich nicht als sinnvoll 
erwiesen, zwischen Pluralität und Pluralismus zu unterscheiden. Pluralität wäre danach legitime Vielfalt, 
Pluralismus die Ideologie der Unverbindlichkeit, Relativismus. Pluralität wäre legitim, Pluralismus hin-
gegen illegitim.” M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p. 646. 
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241
 M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), pp.642-645. 
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problem of pluralism within the universal church (the interdenominational problem) and 




Let me now add: In a way Christian Churches are trained in handling both intra-de-
nominational and inter-denominational disagreement. Different churches have for a long 
time participated in the ecumenical dialogue, each of them bringing with them their 
particular tradition and denominational characteristics. In ecumenical negotiation and 
discourse, however, the question can usually not be avoided: Which “truths” have to be 
accepted as an absolute minimum on different levels of co-operation? Some “truths” 
concerning worship, eucharistic community and baptism are often given the status of an 
“articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiae”, i.e. they are often reckoned as a sort of “consti-
tutional essentials” within the church. Disagreement on such crucial issues may make 
mutual recognition and reconciliation nearly impossible. But there remain many issues 
which do not invoke the question of “Truth” with a capital-“T”. There are, for example, 
questions concerning the most appropriate way of organising the church, and there are 
vital and extremely complex issues of how to assess issues of social ethics and politics 
form a Christian point of view. One could say that overcoming disagreement between 
the different denominations of the Christian Church, might to some extent be considered 
easier than establishing a consensus in society as such, since church-consensus always 
sets out from some common premises given in the Bible as a shared normative source. 
(Although the hermeneutical approach might differ radically). On the other hand, attem-
pting to reach beyond a merely situational and practical co-operation, to overcome deep 
diversities between the churches seems extremely difficult, just because there is no way 
the ecumenical debate could entirely suspend the question of truth.  
The problem of pluralism, which John Rawls considers, is in many respects different 
from that of the ecumenical debate of the churches. There is for Rawls no kind of reve-
lationary truth nor any kind of holy documents to be taken as a recognised point of de-
parture. Rawls has to take another point of departure for his consensual efforts. More-
over, he  has to set the question of truth itself aside (or at least in brackets) when seeking 
for a shared political solution. And so the normative premises, the practices and the 
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 What concerns “Kirchlicher und theologischer Pluralismus”, cf. M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozial-
ethik, (1995), pp.645-648. 
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methods of the ecumenical consensual work cannot directly be taken as a model for 
establishing an overlapping consensus about the institutional scheme of society.  
My thesis focuses mainly upon the pluralism in society (and the related issue of a 
morally grounded consensus for the basic organisation of society) although this issue 
and the problem of pluralism within churches, cannot be kept sharply apart. But plural-
ism within the church, as well as the conflicts between Christian churches and the many 
religions, shall only be considered in so as far as it might contribute to illuminating 
pluralism as an issue within social ethics and as a phenomenon of public interest.
243
 It is 
well worth noticing that Honecker in fact discusses general aspects of pluralism, that 
concern all citizens, even in the chapter about inner-ecclesiological pluralism. 
In addition, it should not be ignored that Honecker‟s perspective is primarily theo-
logical,  even when he considers pluralism as a phenomenon of the political society. 
(“Gesellschaftlicher Pluralismus”). And from a theological perspective it might appro-
priately be asked: Why should people holding conceptions of social and political ethics 
that are based on theological premises, judge pluralism in much the same positive way 
as is the case within a Rawlsian version of liberalism? From an ideal
244
 theological point 
of view it seems as plausible to say that if pluralism is closely connected with modern 
secularism, and with an abandoning of a particular Christian perspective on society, one 
should rather not expect Christians to approve whole-heartedly of the existing pluralism. 
Instead, one should expect that Christians would try to overcome it (with all morally 
acceptable means open to them). And why should it be taken for granted that free and 
rational, reasonable and honest citizens will disagree permanently and radically in mat-
ters of religion, morality and values of social-ethics?  There is no logical reason why it 
should necessarily be considered utopian to hope that most people might some day re-
cognise and embrace essential Christian values as the most appropriate basis for coexist-
ence and social co-operation, even within democratic societies. 
However, there is little doubt that Honecker takes pluralism as an irreversible fact, that 
is closely connected with moral ideas of toleration and freedom of conscience. And 
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 Rawls is always working first within the field of “ideal theory”. Why shouldn‟t theological social 
ethics do just the same,  before behaving “realistically”, making necessary compromises and choosing 
the second best? 
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from Honecker‟s theological perspective pluralism is not considered a regrettable fact. It 
seems as if he takes for granted both that pluralism is the natural outcome of people‟s 
free reasoning in matters of morality, politics and religion, and that existing pluralism in 
modern societies could only be overcome at the cost of elementary human rights. The 
first assumption might perhaps be disputed, the latter seems to be beyond reasonable 
doubt. 
In my opinion Honecker‟s approach to pluralism is not very unlike the attitude that 
Rawls expresses in Political Liberalism. Although both Honecker and Rawls assess 
pluralism in a positive way, both of them are simultaneously aware of the problems that 
pluralism obviously provides for maintaining a required minimum of social unity. Thus 
Rawls, especially in his more recent writings, elaborates in some detail his idea of an 
overlapping consensus within which a reasonable pluralism is still supposed to thrive. 
And Honecker foresees that an escalation of pluralism might undermine social commit-
ment to essential human rights and values, and therefore he stresses that there has to be 
drawn a “Grenze zwischen legitimen und illegitimen Pluralismus…”245. Even if plural-
ism is in no way a regrettable fact, it should not be without structure and limits. A moral 
minimum-basis that cannot so easily be relativised, has to be maintained,  beyond all 
existing discord. 
3.2.4. Reasonable and not reasonable pluralism 
It seems as if Rawls  like Honecker finds it appropriate to distinguish between two 
kinds of pluralism. Adopting a distinction from Joshua Cohen
246
 he writes that,  
“a democratic society is marked by the fact of reasonable pluralism. … the diversity 
of reasonable comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines found in 
modern democratic societies is not a mere historical condition that may soon pass 
away; it is a permanent feature of the public culture of democracy. Under the politi-
cal and social conditions secured by the basic rights and liberties of free institutions, 
a diversity of conflicting and irreconcilable  and what‟s more, reasonable  com-
prehensive doctrines will come about and persist if such diversity does not already 
obtain. This fact of reasonable pluralism must be distinguished from the fact of 
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 “I am grateful to Joshua Cohen for instructive discussion on this point; and also for insisting on the 
importance of the distinction between reasonable pluralism and pluralism as such …These matters he 
discusses in illuminating detail in “Moral Pluralism and political Consensus”, The idea of democracy, 
edited by David Copp and Jean Hampton, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.” J. Rawls, 
Political Liberalism (1993), p.36. 
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pluralism as such.”247 
Rawls distinguishes “pluralism as such” from a “reasonable pluralism”. The latter is 
more specific and should be positively assessed. And thus one might say that the way 
Rawls conceives of pluralism is not without normative aspects.  
By distinguishing between reasonable pluralism and pluralism that is not qualified as 
reasonable, Rawls in my opinion tries to solve the problem resulting from the ambiguity 
inherent in pluralism itself. “Pluralism as such” or “simple pluralism” as he also calls 
it
248
, might be rather critically assessed, while pluralism, as far as it can be qualified as 
reasonable, is definitely to be considered a “good”, closely connected with liberty of 
conscience, freedom of thought and toleration. 
But even if one can accept that it is very important to make a distinction like this, it is 
not an easy distinction to defend and to employ. One is confronted with the problem of 
how to decide what should count as reasonable and as a legitimate kind of pluralism in 
modern societies, and how to decide which doctrines, conceptions and practices are for 
instance to be ruled out as not reasonable. 
In Political Liberalism Rawls frequently uses the notion “reasonable” to qualify 
different phenomena: 
“Rawls refers to reasonable principles of justice, reasonable judgements, reasonable 
conditions on a process of construction, reasonable decisions, a reasonable political 
conception of justice, reasonable expectations, a reasonable overlapping consensus, 
reasonable justification, reasonable norms, a reasonable society, reasonable disagree-
ment, reasonable assurance, reasonable faith, reasonably favorable conditions, the 
virtue of reasonableness, a reasonable idea, reasonable measures, reasonable require-
ments, reasonable actions, reasonable doubt, a reasonable basis of public justifi-
cation, reasonable answers, a reasonable variant of the public conception of justice, a 
reasonable understanding, reasonable belief, a reasonable combination and balance 
of values, reasonable extensions of justice as fairness, a reasonable expression of 
political values, unreasonable force, reasonable pluralism, reasonable comprehens-
ive doctrines and reasonable ways of affirming them, and reasonable agents or 
persons, who have a reasonable moral psychology.”249 
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(1993), p.xvii. He considers “the distinction between simple pluralism and reasonable pluralism” to be a 
very central one in Political Liberalism. Cf. Political Liberalism, p. xxx; xxxi.   
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 L. Wenar: “Political Liberalism: An Internal Critique” in Ethics (Volume 106, No 1, October 1995), p. 
34. 
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The term “reasonable” is obviously central to Rawls‟ conception of political liberalism. 
It should be underlined that the very idea of “reasonable pluralism” in Rawls‟ concep-
tion is based upon the assumption that most citizens in society are reasonable persons. 
For now it is sufficient to emphasise that reasonable persons can be expected to have the 
required self-insight when making political judgements, they can honour fair terms of 
co-operation and comply with shared terms of public reasoning. And according to Rawls 
they have also the required moral capacities that make them ready to seek fair solutions 
and abide by agreed standards,  provided that others are willing to do the same. 
However, even if all the citizens of a well-ordered society were moral persons of high 
standard and were also reasonable human beings with the most honest intention of re-
specting fair terms of communication, co-operation and coexistence, pluralism cannot 
be supposed to vanish. One has to realise that a democratic society, even if inhabited by 
moral citizens, will still generate pluralism,  but expectedly a reasonable kind of 
pluralism. So far Rawls‟ argument appears plausible. 
From a theological point of view one might say that Lutheran theology has a somewhat 
more complex or “pessimistic” perspective on the moral capacity of natural man. This 
might be right.
250
 A thorough examination of this issue is, however, beyond the scope of 
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 It is widely assumed that a Lutheran perspective on the moral capacity of man is more “pessimistic” 
than a liberal approach. But nevertheless I think that one should be rather nuanced when focusing theo-
logically on the “good” that man (as a moral person) can be expected to bring about within the framework 
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seiner Entscheidung, und damit auch in der Macht seiner Gestaltungskraft. Sodann: In dieser rationalen 
Bestimmungs- und Gestaltungsmacht sieht auch Luther an sich ein bonum der menschlichen Natur. Ja, er 
sieht in ihr nicht einmal etwas nur Beiläufiges und für das Wesen des Menschen Unwichtiges, sondern ein 
in ihn als Menschen den übrigen Kreaturen gegenüber auszeichnendes bonum seiner Natur, das er  wie 
wir in den Thesen De homine sahen  gelegentlich in beinahe enthusiastischen Worten preisen kann.  
Er stellt endlich nicht in Abrede, daß der Mensch auch als Sünder mit dieser rationalen Erkenntnis- und 
Willenskraft  die ihm erhalten bleibt  in ganz bestimmten Sinne „Gutes‟ wirken kann. Gutes nämlich im 
Sinne dessen, was der Erhaltung des Leiblichen Lebens „zugute kommt‟: nicht nur seines eigenen, sondern 
auch des der societas civilis. Dabei denkt Luther nicht nur an die unmittelbaren leiblichen Bedürfnisse 
(Nahrung, Kleidung, Wohnung, ärztliche Versorgung etc.), sondern etwa auch an die Kunst der Staats-
führung und Rechtsprechung, die ja ebenso wesentlich der Erhaltung des irdischen Lebens dient. Gewiß, 
das Gute, das der Mensch so auch als Sünder durch die ratio wirken kann, liegt für Luther auf der Ebene 
des individuellen und sozialen utile, sein Gegensatz ist das Schädliche; beides, Nutzen und Schaden, be-
zogen auf Erhaltung und Förderung des leiblichen Lebens auf Erden. Aber da Gott dieses Leben schafft 
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this dissertation. My point now is just this: Even if people were moral persons, ready to 
honour fair terms of co-operation, and even if they had also a capacity of assessing 
evidence and setting priorities in complex matters, and even if they were capable of 
weighing competing considerations and correctly drawing logical inferences, pluralism 
will persist. Radical disagreement seems to be an inevitable phenomenon that cannot be 
removed from modern societies
251
 unless one is ready to use very illiberal methods. And 
that is out of the question from the point of view of political liberalism. 
The age of Enlightenment engendered a surging confidence in the power of reason and 
widespread optimism about what might be achieved through public debate and co-
operation between reasonable human beings within the fields of ethics and politics. 
However, in most pluralist democracies today there is little such confidence in the 
capacity of human reason to resolve issues in the field of (social) ethics. It might, with-
out great difficulty, be argued that reason itself, if freely practised, tends not towards 
consensus, but towards a plurality of moral ideas, ethical values, conceptions of the 
good and beliefs about religious phenomena.  
If it were only misunderstandings and irrational aspects of daily life that led to differ-
ences, and disagreement, one might realistically hope to resolve them,  clearing the 
way for a rationally grounded value-concord. And there can be no doubt that people in 
fact often behave irrationally. They clearly make the kind of logical errors that quite 
quickly lead to conflicting opinions and disagreement. Self- and group-interests, pre-
judice and bias, blindness and short-sightedness, can all also play an immense role in 
social and public life, generating diversity and deep conflicts. But what makes things 
                                                                                                                                                                          
und aufrechterhalten will, ist diese Funktion menschlicher ratio für Luther keineswegs etwas theologisch 
Belangloses oder gar Verächtliches.”W. Joest: Ontologie der Person bei Luther (1967), p.204f. 
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 However, I should be a bit more precise about this: It should be considered “unreasonable” (although 
someone might consider it “rational”) if those in power tried to make it illegitimate for different people to 
hold and express competing views. But it can hardly be considered “unreasonable” if a political govern-
ment settles a political controversy that cannot remain unsettled, by taking a decision that outrules some 
other options. In many cases must a law-giver deliberately take a decision in favour of some interests, 
thereby outweighing others. For instance should a law of abortion either leave the decision with the 
woman herself, or draw the required consequences from the view that an “unborn child”  just as grown 
up people  has elementary human rights that are to be guaranteed by the state. When making law in this 
connection, one can obviously not have both. This is the kind of cases, which really render pluralism a 
very difficult problem. Safeguarding the right for different parties to hold and to express even incompa-
tible views publicly, might be considered very important, but this is nevertheless another kind of problem. 
For in this case is it not required that one of the incompatible views are to be outruled. One can normally 
have both. 
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even more complicated, however, is that all our differences, conflicts and disagreement 
can in no way be considered just the mere result of ignorance, wickedness, rivalry, ego-
ism, logical errors and such kinds of unreasonableness. Self-interestedness and prejudice 
might to a wide extent explain why there is often a widespread unreasonable pluralism 
in society, but according to Rawls one should in no way ignore that reasonable people, 
even when behaving as rational and moral agents, will also come to highly different 
conclusions in matters of morality, philosophy, religion, ethical values and the overall 
perspective on society and human life. 
It remains a crucial insight that there is no acceptable way value-pluralism as such could 
ever be removed from modern liberal societies by morally acceptable means. Reason-
able citizens, holding reasonable doctrines, are to coexist within a society where reason-
able pluralism prevails. As far as I can see, Rawls provides us with some characteristics 
typical of reasonable pluralism, reasonable citizens and reasonable doctrines. However, 
he does not provide us with criteria for easily distinguishing between those doctrines 
that are to be outruled as unreasonable and those that are to be included as reasonable  
Since I will later consider the issue of the reasonableness of doctrines, let it now just be 
remarked that doctrines qualified as reasonable are supposed to draw upon a certain 
tradition of thought, they are assumed to express an intelligible view of the world and 
are pointing out the most significant values, which can also be properly balanced. But 
Rawls admits that: “This account of reasonable comprehensive doctrines is deliberately 
loose.”252  
From a theological point of view Rawls‟ “looseness” in defining criteria for outruling 
comprehensive doctrines as unreasonable is of great importance, since it makes it diffi-
cult for political authorities to dismiss religious doctrines on premises, which are genu-
inely defined as political. I think this is also Rawls‟ intention. 
3.2.5. Why do reasonable people disagree? 
As made quite clear so far, reasonable pluralism might be considered a “good” accord-
ing to Rawls as well as according to Honecker. But the question remains: Why should 
we not expect that fair and co-operative citizens will be able to overcome even reason-
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able pluralism some day. Should it for instance be considered entirely unrealistic to 
hope that people could agree on a (Christian) value-basis that might effectively unify 
nearly all the inhabitants of a well-ordered society? Does not the very fact of pluralism 
itself indicate that something has gone fatally “wrong”? 
Rawls recognises that there are various explanations for the radical and persisting dis-
agreement among a society's citizens in matters of belief, morality, values and life-per-
spective. And he discusses different aspects of this problem in Lecture II of Political 
Liberalism (especially in the §§ 1;2;3), where he raises the following question:  
“Why does not our conscientious attempt to reason with one another lead to 
reasonable agreement?”253 
The answer is given by reference to fundamental limitations on human judgement in 
matters concerning moral norms, political values and the ultimate meaning of life. These 
kinds of limitation are summed up by Rawls in a list characterised as “the burdens of 
judgments”.  
In this chapter I will just give a brief overview of Rawls' “burdens of judgment” and its 
significance for understanding the nature of pluralism.
254
 For these limitations on our 
judgement explain why pluralism  and even reasonable pluralism  persists. And 
Rawls without doubt considers “the willingness to recognize the „burdens of judgment‟ 
and to accept their consequences”255 to be one of the most characteristic features of 
reasonable persons. Such a willingness to accept the “burdens of judgment” is of the 
greatest importance for converting pluralism as such into a reasonable kind of pluralism 
in modern societies. What does this really mean? 
A lot of uncertainty, hazards and epistemological difficulties are involved in even our 
most correct and conscientious exercise of the powers of reason and judgement in ordi-
nary social life. Some of the most fundamental and inescapable difficulties we face 
when trying to make our best judgements in questions concerning moral and political 
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 That Rawls‟ ideas about “the burdens of judgment” are not so uncontroversial  from a religious point 
of view  as it might seem in the first place, shall here just be mentioned. In this place it is sufficient to 
show that there is so much about the insight in the “burdens” that they can at least to some extent serve to 
make it obvious why pluralism occurs and cannot be expected to disappear. In a later chapter I will dis-
cuss some special problems connected with the idea of “the burdens of judgment”,  and I will thoroughly 
consider some of these problems in a theological perspective. 
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issues,  are the following (this list of “burdens” is not intended by Rawls to be a 
complete list):  
1. Reality is complex, and the conflicting data might therefore be hard to assess. Lack 
of empirical evidence is in no way an extraordinary phenomenon. 
2. Even if we come to an agreement about the kinds of considerations that are relevant 
in a complex case, we may still disagree about their weight. 
3. Our moral and political concepts are often vague. This indeterminacy cannot be 
removed. Therefore we have to rely on interpretation and judgement. 
4. When assessing evidence and weighing moral and political values, people are 
influenced by their total experience, that will to some extent always differ. 
5. In a dispute there are often different kinds of normative considerations of varying 
force, what makes it difficult to agree on any standard assessment. 
6. All systems of social institutions have a limited social space. All that is valuable can 
in no way be realised simultaneously. In such a situation it is often difficult to set 
priorities and to make appropriate adjustments. 
Thus Rawls points to epistemological (our knowledge is in many ways “precon-
ditioned”) as well as semantic (concepts and terms are vague) and situational (our 
limited social space and particular experience) aspects, that limit our possibility of an 
“objective” and “absolutely true” and “infallible” judgement in matters of politics and 
social ethics. These “burdens”, as sketched by Rawls, might be weighed and assessed 
differently, but I think that such an insight into the limitations of our judgement as a 
source of pluralism, is of essential importance both in political life and within the field 
of Christian social ethics.  
All human beings have to carry these “burdens of judgments”. Even the most co-opera-
tive citizens, the most reasonable persons, as well as the most rational, honest and pru-
dent human beings, have to carry these “burdens”. Taking into account that we can 
never reach a perspective beyond such fundamental limitations on our judgement, we 
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can better understand why even reasonable persons might land at very different opin-
ions, beliefs and standpoints in matters concerning political values, moral norms and 
right conduct. The epistemological limitations inherent in human judgement, the herme-
neutical and contextual preconditions that one cannot escape, the vagueness of our con-
cepts, the complexity of situations and the many hard cases of modern societies,  all 
these things make it very likely that even reasonable and rational and honest agents 
have to accept that there is often no clear and absolutely indisputable single answer in 
matters of great complexity. And even if somebody believes very firmly that he has 
discovered the indisputable “truth” in matters of politics, social ethics and even religious 
faith, he simultaneously has to realise that there might be no compelling reasons for 
others to accept just the same “truth”. Other people might reasonably come to another 
conclusion and might weigh evidence differently. The “burdens of judgments” foster 
pluralism concerning political opinions, moral beliefs and conceptions of the good.  
This also means that the very fact of pluralism does not necessarily signals that some-
thing has gone fatally “wrong” in modern societies but rather indicates that things are 
going on as one should normally expect. Recognising “the burdens of judgment” makes 
it obvious why pluralism  i.e. a reasonable pluralism  should not be considered a re-
grettable flaw of modern democratic societies. 
Now one can better understand why a Rawlsian liberal society  even in the perspective 
of ideal theory  has to be conceived of as a reasonable pluralist society. Given the pre-
mises of social complexity and the epistemic and semantic limitations on human judge-
ment, one should see diversity as the normal outcome of people‟s reasoning,  even 
when it is at its best, and even if the parties are both honest and reasonable. I think that 
Rawls has made this obvious
256
 in a way that also has to be considered plausible in a 
theological perspective. 
3.2.6. Pluralism as closely connected with human freedom 
The recognition of the “burdens of judgment” is of the greatest significance for accept-
ing the very idea of a reasonable pluralism, that is so closely connected with the ideas of 
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liberty of conscience and freedom of faith. The price for removing a reasonable plural-
ism and for trying to re-establish homogeneity in respect of moral values within modern 
societies, might be far too high.
257
 
For pluralism is closely and positively connected to human freedom. I think that Alex-
ander Schwan has emphasised this perspective in a very appropriate way in the volumi-
nous Catholic work on Christlicher Glaube in moderner Gesellschaft: 
“Der Pluralismus ist darum eine Bekundung des universellen Reichtums, aber auch 
der konkreten Begrenztheit menschlicher Selbstverwirklichungen, Gestaltungs-
formen, Bestrebungen und Kräfte. Keinesfalls ist er jedoch von sich her ein Aus-
druck der Konfusion oder Schwäche. Vielmehr bedeutet er eine unverzichtbare Be-
dingung und zugleich einen wesentlichen Inhalt für menschliche Freiheit; Freiheit 
als Freisein von nicht rational reflektierten, nicht vernunftgemäß eingesehenen, nicht 
freiwillig anerkannten, nicht bewußt übernommenen, nicht verantwortlich einzulös-
enden Bindungen und Verpflichtungen; Freiheit zugleich als Sichbestimmen zu ver-
nunftgemäßem, verantwortlichem Denken und Handeln, was die bewußte Über-
nahme von Bindungen und Verpflichtungen nicht aus-, sondern einschließt.”258 
Thus Schwan links pluralism very closely to human freedom and thereby also to the 
reasonableness and the moral capacity (and responsibility) of human beings, even if he 
is very well aware that there is no guarantee that freedom in itself will in fact heighten 
moral responsibility. Schwan is nevertheless very much convinced that any attempt to 
remove pluralism will lead to a “loss of human substance”. And Rawls very clearly 
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 A. Schwan, “Pluralismus und Wahrheit” in: Christlicher Glaube in moderner Gesellschaft (Vol. 19, 
1981), p. 149. It might indeed be surprising to see how positively the phenomenon of pluralism can be 
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and responsibility of human beings, although it is at the end also emphasised that pluralism in itself cannot 
be unlimited: “Es gibt im Pluralismus nicht die eine, absolute, autoritativ über alles gebietende Norm-
instanz. Nicht zuletzt dieser entscheidende Wesenszug bringt erhebliche Schwierigkeiten für die Orientier-
ung, Identitätsbildung und Sinnfindung der Individuen und Gruppen in der modernen Lebenswelt mit sich. 
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gleich wiederum dafür noch keine Garantie. Die Pluralität auch der Norminstanzen ist für das Leben in 
Gegenwart und Zukunft eine irreversible, unabdingbare und wünschenswerte Grundbedingung. Es kann 
sinnvollerweise kein Zurück zu weltanschaulich, normativ und sozial geschlossenen Gesellschaften geben. 
Die sittliche Selbstverwirklichung des Menschen in Selbstbestimmung und Eigenverantwortung wäre dann 
unmöglich. Insofern ist der Pluralismus eine geschichtliche Errungenschaft, die  einmal erworben  nicht 
ohne Verlust an humaner Substanz preisgegeben werden kann. Doch bedarf auch die pluralistische Gesell-
schaft zugleich eines Fundamentalbestandes an einheitlichem Ethos…”, Ibid, p.152f. It is also well worth 
noticing that Schwan is of the opinion that “Für die katholische Kirche haben papst Johannes XXVIII. und 
das II. Vatikanische Konzil den endgütligen Durchbruch in der Bejahung von Pluralismus und Demokratie 
bewirkt.” Ibid. p.201. 
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emphasises that it is the free use of reason and the exercise of the normal human moral 
capacities within a framework of free institutions that foster pluralism.  
“It is the fact that free institutions tend to generate not simply a variety of doctrines 
and views, as one might expect from peoples‟ various interests and their tendency to 
focus on narrow points of view. Rather, it is the fact that among the views that 
develop are the doctrines that reasonable citizens affirm and that political liberalism 
must address. They are not simply the upshot of self- and class interests, or of 
peoples‟ understandable tendency to view the political world from a limited 
standpoint. Instead, they are in part the work of free practical reason within the 
framework of free institutions. Thus, although historical doctrines are not, of course, 
the work of free reason alone, the fact of reasonable pluralism is not an unfortunate 
condition of human life.”259 
Since pluralism is seen as the natural outcome of human reason itself, when unfolded 
within a framework of free institutions, it becomes obvious why Rawls cannot see plur-
alism, i.e. reasonable pluralism, as a disaster. “To see reasonable pluralism as a disaster 
is to see the exercise of reason under the conditions of freedom itself as a disaster.”260  
One might from a theological point of view discuss the role of reason itself in matters of 
social ethics and politics and what can really be expected from the exercise of reason 
“under the conditions of freedom”. Here, however, I want only to stress one point in 
Rawls‟ argument that seems to be of vital significance: Modern pluralism can only be 
removed by those having the ideological hegemony in society if they are ready to use 
their power to discriminate against others to the extent of using the coercive power of 
the state to uproot views that are considered “false” or “untrue” or “dangerous”. This 
way of removing pluralism is only possible at the cost of elementary human freedom
261
 
and “nicht ohne Verlust an humaner Substanz”,  to say it in Schwan‟s words once 
more.
262
 Let me now add that I think that Rawls should consider the question of whether 
the modern development towards a plurality of comprehensive doctrines could be re-
versed voluntarily and by argumentative means alone, a rather farfetched theoretical 
question. In fact, Rawls takes the plurality of reasonable doctrines to be “always a 
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feature of the culture of a free democratic regime”.263 His view seems realistic.  
But introducing a distinction between “ pluralism as such” and “reasonable pluralism” 
Rawls simultaneously suggests that pluralism cannot be absolute. If there were no 
reasonable constraints on pluralism, it would end up with threatening freedom itself. 
And a fundamental limitation is even built into the first principle of justice as conceived 
of by Rawls, where he makes it clear that; 
“each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties 
which is compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all.”264 
If pluralism, which might be considered a manifestation of human liberty, shall not to a 
wide extent place freedom itself in danger, it has to be compatible with the liberty of 
others, what means that all citizens have to accept some basic constraints on their own 
“free” activities. I think that Stephen Holmes has made this main concern of liberalism 
very clear in his aptly titled book, Passions and Constraints which stresses  the dialectic 
between liberty and constraints. There are certain constraints that quite simply have to 
be taken as “possibility-creating rules”.265  
Rawls similarly proceeds along this line when he first takes pluralism, i.e. reasonable 
pluralism, to be a manifestation of human freedom, and thereafter aims at letting the 
parties bind themselves through a consensus on some morally relevant, although not 
very substantial, rules, principles and procedures for handling moral conflicts, safe-
guarding political justice, upholding appropriate electoral and legislative routines, 
establishing acceptable ways of settling constitutional issues,  thereby securing for all 
citizens the highest possible amount of elementary liberties and rights which are compa-
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 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.xviii. Pluralism what concerns comprehensive doctrines has in 
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characterized not simply by a pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines. No one 
of these doctrines is affirmed by citizens generally. Nor should one expect that in the foreseeable future 
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creating rules and therefore cannot be accurately described as manacles clamped upon a pre-existent 
freedom.” S. Holmes, Passions and Constraint. On the Theory of Liberal Democracy (1995), p.109.  
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tible with similar liberties for others. 
Accepting reasonable pluralism as a manifestation of liberty might help raise a bulwark 
against the power of totalitarian political doctrines and the attempts to enforce ideologi-
cal conformity. And Honecker on his part can therefore, much like Rawls, consider 
(moral) pluralism a “Kennzeichen einer freiheitlichen Gesellschaft…”266 There are five 
aspects of Honecker‟s conception of pluralism that in my opinion should be emphasised 
when relating pluralism, as a phenomenon of modern societies, to human freedom: 
1. Pluralism should not be considered an inevitable “evil”, to be taken reluctantly for 
granted, only because there is actually no realistic hope of re-establishing society as a 
corpus christianum. As a “Kennzeichen einer freiheitlichen Gesellschaft…” should 
pluralism be rather positively assessed,  even from a theological perspective. Plur-
alism is seen by Honecker as a manifestation of individual liberty, freedom of con-
science and freedom of faith. 
2. Pluralism and toleration are closely connected. Accepting diversity is to recognise the 
right of other people to take different standpoints, for instance in questions of 
morality and faith, and to join a church or to leave the church freely. Honecker, 
however, simultaneously wishes very much to guard himself against relativism.
267
 
3. As previously suggested, In expressing a variety of interests and conceptions of the 
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spektiven der Gesellschaftsdeutung (1981), Honecker can accentuate that especially the Lutheran church 
has the required theological “instruments” that should have made it possible to distinguish appropriately 
between “Society” and “Christianity”, thereby making it possible to accept the pluralism of our society 
and fully support freedom of conscience. But Honecker is also of the opinion that all the (great) denomi-
nations are now advancing towards a modern approach to society, what implies that society is taken as a 
secular enterprise, with institutions guaranteeing human rights, basic liberties, religious freedom and ele-
mentary toleration. And so he writes: “Erst die Aufklärung hat mit der Forderung nach Religionsfreiheit 
und Toleranz den Gedanken und binnen kurzem auch die Wirklichkeit der konfessionell geschlossenen res 
publica christiana erschüttert. Eine der wesentlichen geistigen Wurzeln des gegenwärtigen Pluralismus ist 
die Anerkennung und Förderung der Menschenrechte, insbesondere des Rechtes der Religionsfreiheit, der 
Glaubens-, Gewissens- und Bekenntnisfreiheit. Die Anerkennung eines Pluralismus hat zur Voraussetzung 
die Religionsfreiheit, wie die Forderung nach Religionsfreiheit ihrerseits wiederum bereits Zeichen eines 
bestehenden Pluralismus ist. Überdies zeigt der Hinweis auf die Religionsfreiheit, daß auch im Katholi-
zismus, wie die Deklaration über die Religionsfreiheit des 2. Vatikanischen Konzils und die darüber ge-
führten Debatten auf dem Konzil erweisen, die Konzeption des Konfessionsstaates fragwürdig geworden 
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schaft in der Pastoralkonstitution „Über die Kirche in der Welt von heute‟. Zwischen den Theologen ist 
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 “Toleranz und Pluralismus sind daher nicht mit Relativismus zu verwechseln, sondern sind 
Verhaltensweisen innerhalb eines Grundkonsens über dasjenige, was unter einer „menschenwürdigen‟ 
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good, pluralism can in itself be considered a barrier against totalitarian attempts to 
enforce political and ideological homogeneity by the use of coercive state-power. 
4. Pluralism, however, is not just considered a barrier against totalitarian views, but is 
also seen by Honecker as an alternative to an individualistic and atomistic perspec-
tive on society. This is so because Honecker largely views pluralism from a “group-
perspective”. Only when joining organisations and associations can individuals in the 
most proper way make use of their “freedom” and effectively pursue their interests. 
Thus pluralism is a characteristic of modern societies, being organised in a diversity 
of interest-groups and voluntary associations. 
268
 
5. Even in a pluralist society, however, there has to be within all groups an orientation 
towards a common good.
269
 The common good of society gets manifest in the ap-
proval of human dignity, the recognition of elementary individual rights, and a funda-
mental respect of the integrity of each person.
.270
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Gesellschaft verstanden wird.” M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.644. 
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 It seems quite easy to follow Honecker in so far as he considers pluralism a manifestation of human 
freedom and a barrier against totalitarian doctrines. But it might be more difficult to understand why he 
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 What Honecker calls “die Norm der Gemeinwohlorientierung” is not very thorouhgly explicated by 
him. But he obviously sees that the fundamental and optimal conditions for coexistence and cooperation in 
a society will not automatically be the result if the different interest-groups are pursuing only their own 
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 “Der Pluralismus bedarf also durchaus eines Korrektivs durch eine Wertorientierung. Dem Plural-
ismus sind folglich Voraussetzungen vorgegeben, nämlich die Menschenwürde, die Grundrechte der 
Person. Diese Wertorientierung zieht auch einer Toleranz Grenzen…”, M. Honecker, Grundriß der 
Sozialethik (1995), p.644. 
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I think these remarks are sufficient to demonstrate that Honecker and Rawls do no 
assess the phenomenon of pluralism very differently. Like Rawls, Honecker takes the 
phenomenon of (reasonable/legitimate) pluralism to be closely connected with human 
freedom and with the idea of toleration.  
Honecker is also very much in step with Rawls in so far as he underlines that pluralism 
should not and cannot be total and entirely unlimited. Social co-operation would in fact 
be impossible if the parties did not honour certain shared duties. Coexistence, as such, 
depends on the recognition of vital mutual obligations. And the acceptance of political 
institutions, with a right and an authority to impose on the citizens certain constraints on 
their liberty, is required to make society work as a joint co-operative enterprise. Ac-
cording to Honecker pluralism and the corresponding virtue of toleration as well as the 
liberty of individuals and associations can only survive within a common institutional 
framework. And this framework has to be settled and maintained through a ground-
consensus, which is morally safeguarded. And so one also finds in Honecker‟s concep-
tion of pluralism a dialectic between freedom and constraint. Some kind of shared moral 
framework has to be settled and upheld even in modern pluralist societies. “Der Plural-
ismus bedarf also durchaus eines Korrektivs durch eine Wertorientierung.”271 Thus I 
think that Honecker as well as Rawls plausibly shows that pluralism has to be “framed”. 
Even in pluralist societies with competing conceptions of the good, there has to be an 
underlying moral ground-consensus 
272
 And a moral ground-consensus can hardly be 
entirely unspecified as regards content. From where should then the elements of the 
common framework most appropriately and fairly be taken? From one of the existing 
and old-established comprehensive moral doctrines, or maybe from a new kind of 
world-view or political philosophy?  
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 In many ways Honecker stresses that pluralism, which certainly has to be positively assessed, cannot 
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3.3. No comprehensive moral doctrine can provide a 
common framework 
3.4.1. Competing conceptions of the good 
As I have tried to make clear – “the burdens of judgment” and the fact that reason itself 
tends to foster pluralism render it most unlikely that the pluralism of modern societies 
can ever be removed by democratic means even if citizens should be both reasonable, 
honest and co-operative. These are important reasons why both Rawls and Honecker 
recognise the fact of pluralism.  
Honecker, however, clearly argues that there has to be a “ground-consensus” in society. 
Without such a “ground-consensus” pluralism itself and also elementary liberties would 
not survive. And in a similar way Rawls argues that there has to be an “overlapping 
consensus” even in radical pluralist societies.  
But there seems to be an insurmountable obstacle here: A consensus cannot be supposed 
 at least not in the long run  to be acceptable and stable if it is based more or less ex-
plicitly on any of the comprehensive moral or religious doctrines that are already hon-
oured by some particular group within society. It is unlikely that a particular substantial 
“conception of the good” should have any chance of gaining broad and persisting sup-
port as a shared basis for coexistence in pluralist democratic societies. It seems as if no 
group can provide us with moral doctrines and principles that can be recognised by the 
others. The search for a superior norm-system with a viable authority, quickly reveals 
itself to be futile; there is no obvious candidate acceptable by nearly all parties. 
3.4.2. Learning from history 
Rawls begins his attempt to show that no comprehensive religious or moral doctrine can 
be taken as an appropriate basis for establishing a common framework in democratic 
societies with a very short historical overview. He is mainly focusing on the western 
history after the Reformation. 
It is often taken for granted  at least in western societies  that the influence of the 
Christian religion throughout history has been decisive and that this religion has pro-
vided us with basic moral values and paradigmatic ground-stories, which have become 
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an integrated part of our background-culture.
273
 But religious wars are also an integral 
part of western history and culture. The fragmentation of Christianity and the denomi-
national pluralism, which especially flourished in the time immediately after the Refor-
mation, had irreversible religious as well as political consequences,  and conflicts were 
“settled” even by use of the most brutal means. It seemed impossible to re-establish 
social unity on the basis of an agreement about a general and comprehensive religious 
and moral doctrine. Exhausted after many years of struggle and warfare, the opposing 
religious/political parties at last turned to a search for agreement on some minimum-
principles for peaceful coexistence.
274
 And so Rawls in fact considers the Reformation  
at least indirectly  as the historical origin both of political liberalism and of ideas of 
toleration and freedom of conscience. 
“Thus the historical origin of political liberalism (and of liberalism more generally) 
is the Reformation and its aftermath, with the long controversies over religious 
toleration in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Something like the modern 
understanding of liberty of conscience and freedom of thought began then. As Hegel 
saw, pluralism made religious liberty possible, certainly not Luther‟s and Calvin‟s 
intention.  ..... Indeed, the success of liberal constitutionalism came as a discovery of 
a new social possibility: the possibility of a reasonably harmonious and stable plural-
ist society. Before the successful and peaceful practice of toleration in societies with 
liberal institutions there was no way of knowing of that possibility. It is more natural 
to believe, as the centuries-long practice of intolerance appeared to confirm, that 
social unity and concord requires agreement on a general and comprehensive 
religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine.”275 
Without doubt, Rawls recognises the strong obligation usually inherent in a religious 
conviction. One reason why religious convictions might lead to conflicts that cannot be 
solved, is  according to Rawls  that there is in religiously grounded conceptions of the 
good a transcendent dimension making compromises in questions that are considered 
essential, virtually impossible. The striving for religious truth might therefore very 
easily end in “mortal conflict”276 if the parties are unable to establish a framework for 
coexistence based on an acceptance of elementary freedom of thought and conscience. 
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Political liberalism aims for such a framework, but can never neglect the irreconcilable 
latent conflict in matters of ultimate truth, that may always accompany discussions on 
matters rooted in religious convictions. 
Rawls‟ overview of the post-Reformation period might indeed be considered a rather 
short and rough outline of modern western history. But his intention is not that of a 
historian. And I think that his outline serves an important purpose: to demonstrate that 
the modern fragmentation of moral and religious beliefs cannot be overcome by argu-
ment or discourse (nor can it be assumed, that it can be entirely removed, even by the 
use of the most oppressive and brutal means). A plurality of reasonable religious and 
moral doctrines is undeniably the result of a long process that was decisively accelerated 
through the Reformation. 
3.4.3. Thick or thin? 
It is not difficult to agree with Rawls; that there is in religion usually a transcendent 
perspective that makes the moral commitment that follows from religious faith, both 
strong and uncompromising. And it is a distinctive mark of radically pluralist societies 
that there is no particular religious doctrine that can be considered rather uncontroversial 
and generally acceptable. Nevertheless citizens have to share at least some moral values, 
required for coexistence and social co-operation.  
Given the fact of pluralism and given also the plausible assumption that there has to be 
some kind of moral “commonwealth” which coexisting citizens have to share, political 
agents are left with a dilemma that they cannot so easily escape: What should be con-
sidered a sufficient minimum of shared values and norms to make fair coexistence and 
social co-operation possible? 
Taking into account the radical diversity within modern societies, the most appropriate 
question seems in fact be how far one can avoid substantial values, norms and standards 
that might be considered controversial. For if defining a “common good” for modern 
societies that is too “thick”, the result will most likely not be a strengthening of social 
unity, but instead an increasing of conflicts that are a danger to the stability of society. If 
citizens really understand the nature of the deep diversity that is characteristic of modern 
democratic societies, it seems obvious that they cannot go for an “overlap” or a concep-
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tion of the common good that draws exclusively upon a particular religion and a specific 
value-system. On the other hand: fair co-existence might be hampered and the stability 
of society threatened also by a radical reductionism concerning the “moral common-
wealth” of society, and through the lack of a morally grounded basic structure, that 
could provide for fair terms of co-operation. An “overlap”, a “moral framework for co-
operation” or a “common good” should obviously not be too “thin” either.  
I have now used the notions “thick” and “thin”. These terms might seem rather impre-
cise, and of course they are not notions with a significant theological or philosophical 
weight. But they are nevertheless often used in a way that I find appropriate for my 
purpose here, namely to demonstrate that it is very problematic in a pluralist society to 
take a particular substantial religious or moral system as a common basis when elabo-
rating a moral framework for society as such.  
The notions “thick” and “thin” as used now, are taken from a book written by Michael 
Walzer: Thick and Thin. Moral Argument at Home and Abroad.
277
 Among other things, 
Walzer is in this book especially concerned with the possibility of understanding and 
sharing a moral engagement across borders, cultures and societies, but I think that his 
considerations also apply to societies characterised by radical diversity and inner 
“borders” between different groups. In the first chapter, called “Moral Minimalism” 
Walzer starts by telling a story: 
“I want to begin my argument by recalling a picture …, which is the actual starting 
point, the conceptual occasion of this chapter. It is a picture of people marching in 
the streets of Prague; they carry signs, some of which say, simply, „Truth‟ and others 
„Justice‟. When I saw the picture, I knew immediately what the signs meant  and so 
did everyone else who saw the same picture. Not only that: I also recognized and 
acknowledged the values that the marchers were defending  and so did (almost) 
everyone else. Is there any recent account, any post-modernist account, of political 
language that can explain this understanding and acknowledgement? How could I 
penetrate so quickly and join so unreservedly in the language game or the power 
play of a distant demonstration? The marchers shared a culture with which I was 
largely unfamiliar; they were responding to an experience I had never had. And yet, I 
could have walked comfortably in their midst. I could carry the same signs. The 
reasons for this easy friendliness and agreement probably have as much to do with 
what the marchers did not mean as with what they did mean. They were not march-
ing in defence of the coherence theory, or the consensus theory, or the correspond-
ence theory of truth. Perhaps they disagreed about such theories among themselves; 
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more likely, they did not care about them. No particular account of truth was at issue 
here. The march had nothing to do with epistemology. Or, better, the epistemologi-
cal commitments of the marchers were so elementary that they could be expressed in 
any of the available theories  except for those that denied the very possibility of 
statements being „true‟. The marchers wanted to hear true statements from their 
political leaders; they wanted to be able to believe what they read in the newspapers; 
they didn‟t want to be lied to anymore. Similarly, these citizens of Prague were not 
marching in defence of utilitarian equality or John Rawls‟s difference principle or 
any philosophical theory of desert or merit for entitlement. Nor were they moved by 
some historical vision of justice with roots, say, in Hussite religious radicalism. 
Undoubtedly, they would have argued, if pressed, for different distributive pro-
grams; they would have described a just society in different ways; they would have 
urged different rationales for reward and punishment; they would have drawn on 
different accounts of history and culture. What they meant by the „justice‟ inscribed 
on their signs, however, was simple enough: an end to arbitrary arrests, equal and 
impartial law enforcement, the abolition of the privileges and prerogatives of the 
party elite  common, garden variety justice.”278 
In a passage as this I think that Walzer has very clearly demonstrated that there is among 
people a kind of “thin” morality, which is characterised by being not very complex and 
substantially elaborated, and which is therefore widely endorsable, perhaps even uni-
versally acceptable. 
It would not be appropriate, however, to consider this kind of  “thin” core-morality a 
kind of moral “Esperanto”,  a new and rather undemanding moral system, conceived 
and designed to be easily learnt by most people. Walzer does not take this kind of “thin” 
morality to be unambitious and emotionally shallow. (According to Walzer one should 
not think of “thinness” in mere procedural terms either). In fact there is not much that is 
more demanding and less relativist than the cry for „justice‟ and „truth‟ set forth by the 
marchers in Prague.  
I have no difficulties in accepting Walzer‟s way of assessing this kind of moral mini-
malism;  which is very appropriately characterised as “morality close to the bone”.279 
And I can also agree with Walzer that one should suppose that there is a close interplay 
between “thin” and “thick”. A “morality close to the bone” must be seen as connected to 
and embedded in some “thicker,” certainly more controversial and contextually elabo-
rated moral conception that people might have. The particular communal values that 
each of the protesters marching in Prague have, might in reality differ to a considerable 
                                                          
278
 M. Walzer, Thick and Thin. Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (1994), p.1f. 
 114 
degree from the values of the co-demonstrators, and they should certainly differ from 
our communal values and norms. Nevertheless, we can (quite easily imagine that we 
could) join their parade in Prague and cry with them for “truth” and “justice”. This is 
possible because inherent in our own value-system or in our religious beliefs there are 
also vital standards of justice and truth, and we also have some experiences about what 
injustice means, and we know something about being lied to, just as they do. Therefore 
we are able to “join” them. Even if a joint moral enterprise might be rather limited, it is 
nevertheless strong enough to make a common and morally motivated parade against 
lies and injustice possible. This is “morality close to the bone”. Let this suffice for now 
as an explanation of  the relation between “thick” and “thin.” 
In this connection Walzer also finds it necessary to correct some obvious intuitions held 
by most people, namely that; 
“Men and women everywhere begin with some common idea or principle or set of 
ideas and principles, which they then work up in many different ways. They start 
thin, as it were, and thicken with age, as if in accordance with our deepest intuition 
about what it means to develop or mature. But our intuition is wrong here. Morality 
is thick from the beginning, culturally integrated, fully resonant, and it reveals itself 
thinly only on special occasions, when moral language is turned to specific pur-
poses.”280 
Now it might be asked: Why should a morality that is “thick”, thus carrying the features 
of the particular culture and community within which it has developed over generations, 
“reveal itself thinly only on special occasions”,  for instance in more dramatic situat-
ions like the Prague revolt? There should also be the need for a “thinner” morality, 
focusing on the most essential values that are to be permanently shared by citizens in 
societies characterised by persisting inner diversity. I think that there are two things 
about the “thinner” morality that should be emphasised: 
 firstly that it has the advantage of being compatible with very different “maximalist” 
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 secondly that it focuses on the most elementary rights and values, which is in no way 
equivalent to lacking the “maximum” obligation, i.e. the strong commitment, that is 
often ascribed to more comprehensive and “maximalist” versions of ethics.  
3.4.4. No comprehensive moral doctrine… 
What I  following Walzer  have called a “maximalist morality” should in Rawls‟ 
language better be characterised as a “comprehensive moral doctrine”. Rawls  like 
Walzer  is aware of the problems that arise when trying to convert a comprehensive 
moral doctrine into a common moral platform that (nearly) all coexistent parties in 
pluralist societies should accept. In the long run such a project will not work  and as 
stressed earlier: it should certainly be impermissible to try to make it work by using the 
coercive powers of the state. Not a particular comprehensive moral doctrine, but a “thin-
ner” morality seems to be required when defining a common value-basis for people 
committed to very different comprehensive doctrines. Rawls  again, not unlike 
Walzer
282
  means that a “thinner” moral basis should be supposed to apply more 
widely than the “thicker” kinds of morality that are closely connected to particular 
religious or philosophical beliefs.  
But Rawls goes further and his claims, for example, that the Christian doctrine should 
not be taken as an exclusive moral source when establishing a common framework for 
society, because the Christian doctrine is considered comprehensive, raise the question, 
what it is that should really be ruled out when seeking a value-platform for an overlap-
ping consensus in pluralist societies?  
I think Rawls would say that it is “comprehensiveness” itself that has to be avoided as 
far as possible. What Rawls means when he characterises a given doctrine as compre-
hensive (and general), is explained as follows: 
“A conception is said to be general when it applies to a wide range of subjects (in 
the limit to all subjects) universally; it is comprehensive when it includes concept-
ions of what is of value in human life, as well as ideals of personal virtue and char-
acter, that are to inform much of our nonpolitical conduct (in the limit of our life as a 
whole). There is a tendency for religious and philosophical conceptions to be general 
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and fully comprehensive; indeed, their being so is sometimes regarded as an ideal to 
be realized. A doctrine is fully comprehensive when it covers all recognized values 
and virtues within one rather precisely articulated scheme of thought; whereas a doc-
trine is only partially comprehensive when it comprises certain (but not all) non-
political values and virtues and is rather loosely articulated. Note that, by definition, 
for a conception to be even partially comprehensive, it must extend beyond the 
political and include nonpolitical values and virtues.”283  
According to Rawls a religious (Christian) moral view can normally be considered both 
general (applying to a wide range of subjects) and comprehensive (including concept-
ions of value and person that transcends the domain of the mere political). The term 
comprehensive should, I believe, appropriately be applied to moral, religious and philo-
sophical doctrines that systematically cover a wide range of issues in a more or less 
complete way.  
When I use the notion of “comprehensive doctrine” I intend  following Rawls  to 
characterise a doctrine as both “broad” and “deep”. And a “thin” morality conceived of 
for the political domain can in no way be “broad” in the sense that it covers a very wide 
range of subjects within politics, family life, church communities etc., and neither can it 
be “deep”, at least not in the sense that it implies any kind of religious or philosophical 
“Letztbegründung”. But it is, however, supposed to be “broad” in the sense that it can be 
expected to be widely approved of.  
One can understand that Rawls will reject “unreasonable” comprehensive doctrines as a 
platform for establishing a common framework, but it seems not as easy to understand 
why he so categorically also rejects all kinds of “reasonable” comprehensive doctrines 
as possible candidates when seeking an appropriate moral platform for society as a 
whole. Rawls, as a matter of principle, effectively disqualifies all comprehensive doc-
trines from serving as a common moral basis for the citizens of a modern pluralist 
society.  
There are several reasons why Rawls disqualifies comprehensive doctrines (most of 
which are “reasonable”) as candidates when seeking for an acceptable common moral 
foundation for co-operation and coexistence in modern democratic societies. According 
to Rawls: 
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1. It is characteristic of comprehensive religious, moral and philosophical doctrines, that 
they cannot be expected to be generally approved of by a considerable majority of 
citizens in pluralist societies, and hence they cannot (any longer) serve as the pro-
fessed basis of modern societies. 
2. Public institutions, as well as a genuinely political conception (of liberalism), should 
as far as possible avoid addressing specific moral issues which are the subject of 
controversies between the comprehensive doctrines. Liberal institutions and liberal 
political conceptions are supposed to treat different parties with a maximum of 




3. A common moral platform based on the hegemony of one‟s particular comprehensive 
religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine can be maintained only by the oppressive 
use of state power.
285
  
4. A critical approach towards any attempt to make a particular (religious) doctrine the 
professed moral basis of society does not mean that comprehensive doctrines should 
themselves be made suspect. On the contrary: religious, philosophical and moral 
doctrines are to be reckoned as integral and essential parts of the “background cul-
ture” of modern societies, and they are indirectly of the greatest importance for se-
curing a morally grounded “overlap”. 
5. An attempt by citizens to integrate a political conception of justice with the compre-
hensive doctrine they hold, into a coherent overall-view is normal. Political concep-
tions and comprehensive doctrines cannot and should not be kept entirely apart.
286
 
6. A conception of justice, explicitly conceived of as the basis of a well-ordered demo-
cratic society, must nevertheless be limited strictly to the domain of the political. 
Such a unifying conception of justice should therefore in itself not be wide and deep, 
                                                          
284
 Impartiality means that “political liberalism does not attack or criticize any reasonable view” and it 
also means that political liberalism does not characterise any comprehensive doctrine as untrue or true. 
Political liberalism is concentrating on a political conception of justice, which is not referred to as “true” 
(in opposition to other conceptions), but as “reasonable”. Cf. J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.xixf.  
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Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.37 
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referring to certain “Letztbegründungen” or ultimate “truths”. Those holding reason-
able comprehensive doctrines should be ready to accept that the ultimate question of 
moral and religious truth cannot and should not be decided politically. Politically 
speaking there may be many reasonable comprehensive doctrines in a pluralist 
society, even if just one of them might really be true.
287
 
It would be both problematic and unfair to introduce a “thick” comprehensive doctrine 
as a professed value-basis for society as a whole. Both the Christian (moral) doctrine as 
well as philosophical views which cover issues of ethics, truth and the meaning of life 
are obviously considered too “comprehensive” by Rawls. In my opinion there is little 
reason to doubt that it would be considered unfair by a lot of citizens if society were 
explicitly grounded on a particular (and controversial) comprehensive doctrine  as for 
instance the Christian one.
288
 
The question can, however, be raised, whether “theological ethics”289  as conceived of 
by Honecker  is appropriately to be considered a comprehensive doctrine in Rawls‟ 
sense of the word. In the introduction to his Einführung in die Theologische Ethik, 
published in 1990, Honecker emphasises that there are good reasons for being “Zurück-
haltend … gegenüber allen emphatischen Postulaten einer (absoluten) theologischen 
Begründung.”290 Nevertheless it can hardly be denied that Honecker himself conceives 
of social and political ethics in a clearly theological perspective. In the mentioned book 
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 “Should we think that any of the reasonable doctrines present in society are true, or approximately so, 
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himself should consider kinds of ethics, conceived of in a systematic theological perspective, to be clearly 
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he openly refers to theological premises for ethics as such (chapter 2)
291
, he considers 
general norms and values in a theological perspective (chapter 4)
292
. And he really does 
not ignore the special sources of Christian ethics (chapter 5)
293
. And he begins his dis-
cussion of social ethics (chapter 6), with a presentation of specific problems that are 
typical of a modern Lutheran approach.
294
 
It cannot surprise that ethics  in a “Christian” perspective  transcend the domain of 
the merely political. In principle, ethics conceived of in a theological perspective cannot 
avoid being both “deep” and “broad”, if measured with Rawlsian criteria for qualifying 
doctrines as “comprehensive”. “Deep” in the sense that such ethics are grounded fun-
damentally and theologically in certain doctrines about God the Creator and Redemptor, 
in certain religious assumptions about human nature, and in a particular (eschatological) 
perspective on the world. And “broad” in the sense that there is no domain of life, 
whether political, familial or private that is not thought to be covered by theological 
ethics,  if for no other reason that nothing on earth can be considered beyond the 
sphere of the Creator's interest. 
Simultaneously, however, I think that Honecker has also shown that Christian ethics 
need not be considered a complete and absolute system, from which specified moral 
directives for nearly all domains of life must be derived. I think that “theological ethics” 
(or “Christian ethics”) as conceived of by Honecker should at the most be considered 
partially comprehensive, rather than taken as a complete system specifically covering 
(nearly) all fields of life. Christian ethics, as understood by Honecker should not be 
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 He makes it clear “daß es um theologische Grundlegungen geht , die ebenso in der Fundamental-
theologie, der theologischen Anthropologie, der Dogmatik erörtert werden können.”, M. Honecker, 
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 Let it be inserted that in chapter 5, “Quellen christlicher Ethik”, Honecker discusses the problem of 
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tion sein. Dazu kommt, daß zwischen Bibel und Gegenwart eine Geschichte der Aufnahme und Auslegung 
der Bibel als Heilige Schrift zu bedenken ist. Darauf will die Berücksichtigung der Geschichte christlicher 
Ethik aufmerksam machen.” M. Honecker, Einführung in die Theologische Ethik, Grundlagen und 
Grundbegriffe (1990), p.vii. 
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considered a complete and closed moral system or supposed to be more or less at odds 
with most other moral systems.  
Understanding “Christian ethics” as a partially comprehensive moral doctrine, more co-
operative and open, might make it easier for its adherents to arrive at a reasonable 
“overlap” with citizens holding other (partially) comprehensive views. But Rawls‟ 
opinion is obviously unaffected by this: No fully or even partially comprehensive 
doctrine can be taken as a common moral platform in modern pluralist societies. 
Rawls personally conceives of a much “thinner” moral conception for the political field, 
 paying due attention to the fact that people living within a shared social and moral 
framework might in fact have very different aims and conceptions of “the good”. But 
some “goods” seem nevertheless to be assessed in much the same way by most citizens 
and are considered necessary by nearly all. There are “goods” that are required for 
people simply to stay alive and lead a decent life. Let us call such kinds of “goods” the 
“basic goods”. The acquisition and possession of basic “goods” are a prerequisite 
without which it would not be possible for citizens to realise their different aims, ends, 
purposes, careers and particular life projects. But when it comes to the more specific 
goals that individual citizens consider it well worth striving for, there is obviously not 
one single and overarching telos that unites them.
295
 It is this aspect of pluralistic 
diversity and disagreement which is most clearly evident in modern societies. 
Hence it can be seen that Rawls  usually considered a deontologist since he sets the 
right prior to the good  takes teleological aspects into consideration in crucial stages of 
his theory: 
1. When defining the deontological principles of right for the political society, he finds 
it necessary to take the point of departure from some theory of the good, but in doing so 
he very strongly emphasises that “the concept of goodness has been used only in a rather 
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 He starts by discussing “Die Aporien einer „Theologie der Ordnungen‟”. M. Honecker, Einführung in 
die Theologische Ethik, Grundlagen und Grundbegriffe (1990), pp.291-303.  
295
 I will not here return to the debate about pluralism and monism as actualised by Charles Larmore. Of 
course there exist doctrines that strongly focus on a single overarching goal, as for instance Christian doc-
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thin sense.”296. The content of this “thin” theory of the good is specified by introducing 
the primary goods
297
, for which all people are supposed to have a basic need, independ-
ently of their more contingent life-plans and “thicker” conceptions of value. Thus Rawls 
assumes that all citizens have roughly the same need for primary goods, such as self-
respect, a minimum of economic means as well as basic rights and liberties and certain 
fair opportunities. 
2. When the fundamental rights and liberties are initially developed on the basis of a 
“thin” theory of the good, elementary deontological constraints on individual life-plans 
and self-interested aims that might prevent others from having sufficient primary goods, 
can most properly be settled. If the fundamental constraints are respected, people are 
free to pursue highly different life-plans and seek more substantial and complex con-
ceptions of the good.
298
 All citizens are namely expected to have also some “thicker” 
conception of the good, not just a “thin” one. 
Honecker too takes into account that the conception of the good might vary strongly, 
and is subject to influence by both cultural and historical distinguishing features. This 
can clearly be seen in his latest book on issues in theological ethics. In Grundriß der 
Sozialethik, he clearly develops a kind of ethics, characterised by himself as “Güter-
ethik”: In the introduction to “Grundriß” he stipulates that the notion of “Güter” should 
be taken very widely.  
“Der Mensch handelt, indem er sich etwas (einen Zweck, Skopos, eine Absicht) auf 
etwas hin (eine Endbestimmung, ein Ziel, Telos) vornimmt. Mit der Benennung 
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 “But the concept of goodness has been used only in a rather thin sense. And in fact I shall distinguish 
between two theories of the good. The reason for doing this is that in justice as fairness the concept of 
right is prior to that of the good. In contrast with teleological theories, something is good only if it fits into 
ways of life consistent with the principles of right already on hand. But to establish these principles it is 
necessary to rely on some notion of goodness, for we need assumptions about the parties‟ motives in the 
original position. Since these assumptions must not jeopardize the prior place of the concept of the right, 
the theory of the good used in arguing for the principles of justice is restricted to the bare essentials. This 
account of the good I call the thin theory: Its purpose is to secure the premises about primary goods 
required to arrive at the principles of justice.” J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), p.396.  
297
 The Rawlsian “primary goods are specified to include such things as the basic rights and liberties 
covered by the first principle of justice, freedom of movement, and free choice of occupation protected by 
fair equality of opportunity of the first part of the second principle, and income and wealth and the social 
bases of self-respect.” J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.76. 
298
 After having unfolded a thin theory of the good as required to arrive at the most proper principles of 
justice, Rawls continues: “Once this theory is worked out and the primary goods accounted for, we are 
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eines Zweckes, eines Wozu und Woraufhin des Handelns ist damit das Thema 
Güterethik angesprochen. … Der Begriff Gut beschreibt zunächst einmal vorsittliche 
Güter. Die sprachliche Formulierung „Hab und Gut‟ verweist auf etwas Faßbares, 
einen Besitz, ein Gut, das man besitzen kann. Man spricht beispielsweise von Kul-
turgut, von Rechtsgut, verblaßt auch von Saat„gut‟, oder Diebes„gut‟. In diesem 
Sinne ist von „Gütern‟ zunächst als etwas Gegebenem die Rede. Zugleich wird 
freilich ein Gut wie Leben, Gesundheit, Friede, Rechtsschutz usw. als „gut‟ be-
zeichnet. Die Anerkennung, Achtung und Wahrung von ethisch wertvollen Gütern 
ist Voraussetzung eines guten, gelungenen Lebens. Solche Güter beruhen auf 
geschichtlicher Überlieferung; sie sind Ergebnis und Ertrag geschichtlicher 
Erfahrung.”299 
Honecker is in the first place concerned about “goods” taken in a more pre-moral sense 
of the word; “goods” can just be taken as those things that people need, want and con-
sider valuable. Thereafter he brings in a moral perspective on people‟s use of these 
“goods”. The conception of the good, however, that people have, is to a wide extent 
influenced by historical, cultural, communal and personal factors, and cannot be the 
same for all. The teleological approach, when getting manifest in moral projects, tends 
naturally to foster plurality. There are necessarily many different conceptions of the 
good among the citizens of modern societies. I think that Honecker realises this as 
clearly as does Rawls. The many different conceptions of the good, which are generally 
to be considered a resource in a democratic society, are in themselves also a decisive 
obstacle for really establishing one “thick” shared value-platform. However, the many 
conceptions of the good should thrive (within some rather wide limits).  
3.4. A conclusion 
In a Western tradition, “true” moral doctrines are often assumed to provide the firm and 
stable fundament of society. But citizens in modern societies have to realise that the 
comprehensive doctrines they often relied upon when choosing values for building a 
societal moral platform, can no longer unanimously be called upon to provide society 
with a firm substantial moral basis. For even the “thick” comprehensive doctrines that 
might most likely be held true by many citizens, can no longer be endorsed as a pro-
fessed common basis of society as a whole. No comprehensive moral doctrine  making 
strong claims about moral, religious or philosophical truth  can (in the long run) pro-
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vide us with a platform that is acceptable as a shared moral basis for fair co-operation 
and coexistence in modern pluralist democracies. It is hard to see how the common 
standards of society, institutionalised as fundamental and equally binding on all citizens, 
could fairly reflect one particular conception of the good or be derived from any one of 
the (religious) doctrines existing in pluralist society. Simply put, no fully or partially 
comprehensive doctrine can provide society with a generally recognisable common 
framework for co-operation and coexistence.  
This “negative” conclusion  based mainly on the analysis of the fact of pluralism and 
the consequences drawn from this fact  seems to me to be plausibly argued for by 
Rawls. And I think that this conclusion can to a wide extent be supported also by 
Honecker since he assesses the fact of pluralism in much the same way as Rawls. But 
Honecker‟s premises for supporting such a kind of negative conclusion  that no com-
prehensive doctrine can legitimately provide society with a common moral framework 
and institutionalised standards that may be equally binding on all parties  differ from 
Rawls‟ premises in that they are not merely political, but in fact also theologically 
underpinned.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
should be supplied by a deontological one. And an essential aspect of virtue-ethics also plays a role in his 
books about ethics. 
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4. A BASIC CONSENSUS? 
4.1. Introducing the problem 
Rawls reaches the negative conclusion that a modern democratic and pluralistic society 
cannot (and should not) be unified by a comprehensive moral doctrine. Simultaneously 
he recognises that pluralism cannot be total, somehow it has to be limited. This is in my 
opinion already implicit in Rawls' elaboration of his first principle of justice which is 
intended to establish for each person “a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties 
which is compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all.”300 Both freedom and 
diversity are supported against the background of a fundamental consensus.
301
  
The fact of pluralism is certainly not to be ignored. But it is also a plausible assumption 
that the more pluralistic a society becomes the greater its need for some common stan-
dards and means of specifying elementary duties and rights for its coexistent citizens,  
Christian citizens as well as others. The goal of this chapter is to take decisive steps 
beyond the merely negative standpoint, that a modern democratic and pluralist society 
cannot be unified in any acceptable way by any particular comprehensive moral doc-
trine. The immediate question becomes how can such a consensus (that is supposed to 
be morally grounded
302
) be established and what could be the substantive content of 
such an agreement about essential principles of coexistence,  given that no compre-
hensive doctrine can provide us with principles, rules and values that can be accepted by 
all the parties in a pluralist society.  
Assuming the initial achievement of an agreement on some appropriate terms of coex-
istence, the next question becomes, how is that agreement to be maintained over time, 
what is to stop an initial agreement from being ignored whenever a particular group 
finds it both possible and advantageous to do so without risk?  
Returning to the first question,  if society is taken as a joint co-operative project, as in 
the Rawlsian conception, then there is an urgent need to “specify the fair terms of co-
                                                          
300
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.291. (Italicisation made by me). 
301
 In a book, recently published, Gerald F.Gaus (with reference to Donald Davidson) convincingly 
argues that “the facts of disagreement and agreement alike are intelligible only against a background of 
massive agreement.” G. F. Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism (1996), p.49. 
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 I shall later consider this basic assumption more thoroughly. 
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operation among the citizens…”303 The phrase “fair terms” means that the institutional 
scheme of society and the common standards that are binding on the citizens, could be 
willingly approved of by all of them. Consensus, the idea that the basic organisational 
scheme of society can be based upon an agreement about essential shared standards that 
can be willingly accepted, is an essential tenet of Rawlsian political liberalism, and the 
primary focus of this chapter. 
One way of grounding the organisation of a society on the consent of the governed, 
while simultaneously emphasising the binding character of that consent, is to make the 
institutional scheme the outcome of a contract between the different parties.  This 
approach deserves particular attention, especially given that Rawls' himself views his 
theory as reviving the contract-tradition. The following consideration of Rawls‟ con-
tractarian approach, including a brief theological discussion, serves as a prelude to a 
detailed analysis of his theory of an overlapping consensus. 
The morally grounded consensus-project presented by Rawls, appears open to the ob-
jection that it is both “unrealistic” and “utopian.” It might seem far too optimistic to 
base the institutional scheme of society on an act of consent from those governed. Nor is 
it all that obvious that a society, based on broad acceptance, will provide us with more 
justice than more hierarchically structured societies? And it seems truly a leap of faith to 
simply assume that individuals possess the moral capacity, political will and social 
virtues required for achieving a morally grounded consensus about the essential terms of 
coexistence.  Rawls realises that such objections might be raised against the liberal idea 
of a modern society based upon a morally grounded consensus which secures the fairest 
possible institutional framework, 
“The last difficulty I consider is that an overlapping consensus is utopian: that is, 
there are not sufficient political, social, or psychological forces either to bring about 




Another objection, that carries even more weight from a theological perspective, is that 
the liberal project of grounding the scheme of society on consent, implies more than just 
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a wish to make the scheme of society widely acceptable. It treats society and the state as 




On some intuitive level, this appears sharply at odds with a theological approach. It 
seems plausible to assume that a relatively just institutional scheme of society might 
most effectively be secured and upheld by a state-authority which has an unquestionable 
divine mandate and sufficient power to impose on all citizens the constraints that are 
required to hold that society together,  and make well-ordered and peaceful coexistence 
possible. Perhaps well-orderedness can most efficiently be secured by a political “Obrig-
keit”, which is supposed to have both a divine legitimate right and also the required 
power to rule. In some respect such a view, although fundamentally different from either 
modern or classical contractarian approaches, might be considered most “realistic”. 
Before considering more thoroughly the Rawlsian view and his idea of an overlapping 
consensus, I should therefore like to consider a theological approach, according to which 
society should most properly be “configured” not from the bottom up but from the top 
down, by state-authorities deriving their ultimate authority from God, not from those 
governed. In doing so I take my point of departure from Honecker‟s conception of social 
ethics,  especially his considerations concerning the Lutheran “Obrigkeits”- theology. 
4.2. Political rule  based on a divine mandate 
In his approach to “Das Staatsverständnis in der evangelischen Theologie”306 Martin 
Honecker starts by considering Biblical material. As usual when referring to Bible-texts 
his aim is not to engage in scriptural exegesis. Instead he is most concerned about the 
actual and proper use of sacred texts; he considers it particularly important to prevent 
any kind of misuse and ideological overinterpretation of the texts. This aim is reflected 
in the characteristic way Honecker proceeds in his discussion of state-ethics in Grundriß 
der Sozialethik: 
“Eine Staatslehre findet sich im Neuen Testament nirgendwo. Es geht allein um das 
Verhalten des Christen als Bürger gegenüber den Trägern politischer Herrschaft. 
Neben der Hauptbelegstelle Röm 13,1-7 sind für das Staatsverständnis zu beachten: 
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Die Bergpredigt mit der Unbedingtheit des Liebesgebotes (Mt. 5,43ff, Feindesliebe) 
und der Forderung des Gewaltverzichts. Die clausula Petri (Act 5,29) beschränkt alle 
irdischen Ansprüche durch die Forderung des Gehorsams gegenüber Gott. In der 
Apokalypse 13 verkörpert die politische Macht eine dämonische Bedrohung. Eine 
Begründung einer Staatslehre durch Röm 13 enhält eine Überinterpretation des 
Textes, wie die Auslegungsgeschichte zeigt. Röm 13 wurde als die Einsetzung der 
Obrigkeit durch Gott in der traditionellen katholischen Auslegung mit Hilfe einer 
Naturrechtsmetaphysik interpretiert. Das Luthertum findet in Röm 13 den Beleg für 
die Einsetzung des Staates als Gottesordnung. Eine dämonologische Deutung sieht 
in der „Gewalt‟ (e)cousi/a) eine Engelsmacht (G.Dehn, O. Cullmann) und relativiert 
damit die Staatsmacht eschatologisch. Karl Barths christologische Auslegung be-
zieht auch den Staat in den Herrschaftsbereich Christi ein. Tatsächlich kann man 
Röm 13 jedoch überhaupt nicht für eine Staatstheorie in Anspruch nehmen. Im 
Kontext von Röm 12 und Röm 13,8-10 (Liebesgebot) ist Röm 13,1-7 Paränäse. 
Paränäse ermahnt den Christen zum richtigen Verhalten. Die eschatologische Rela-
tivierung des Staates erlaubt bei Paulus keine Vernachlässigung und Mißachtung der 
Bürgerpflichten. In profaner Verwaltungssprache werden von ihm darum Funktionen 
und Leistungen römischer Staatsverwaltung beschrieben. Eine Auskunft über das 
Wesen des Staates wird aber nicht gegeben.”307  
Here is no thorough text-analysis, but evidence of Honecker‟s primary interest in pre-
venting ideological misuse of Bible-texts as well as texts from the church-history. Con-
sidering, for example, the key-role that Rom. 13 has played in the field of politics and 
state ethics throughout history, Honecker‟s sobriety seems much to the point.  
Honecker does not delve deeply into Rom.13,1ff., nor shall I do so here. Nevertheless, 
one can hardly overlook that in Rom. 13,1ff., St.Paul, although primarily intending to 
give practical advice (“Paränäse”) to Christians faced with the problem of double-
loyalty, nevertheless makes some assumptions concerning the state-institution as such. 
Behind the power of the state-authorities the Christian should discern the power of God 
the Almighty. Christians could therefore trust in the providence (and power) of the 
almighty God. State-authorities could, regardless of the explicit ideology they express, 
be considered the “servants” of God308,  with an exclusive right to use the “sword” 
according to their mandate. 
The term “sword” as used here symbolises power, the physical “coercive” power (po-
tentia coactiva), which includes the legitimate right to enforce directives that are con-
sidered necessary for the common good, and to use legal “sanctions” (penalties, impris-
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 M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.307f. 
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 In Rom.13,4 it is even clearly said about the state that “Jeou¤ ga\r diakono/j e)stin soi\ ei)j to\ a)gaJo/n.” 
The state is God‟s “diakonos” in bringing vital goods to people.  
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onment and sometimes even capital punishment) to uphold the order of society. In 
advising Christians St. Paul makes certain assumptions about state-ontology.
309
 
One might with a certain right say that St. Paul, when claiming obedience towards the 
state-authorities, draws upon reasons that should be plausible to the readers. And the 
reasons he gives for such obedience are of two kinds: First there is the mere fact that the 
state disposes over the coercive powers of society and therefore should be feared. And 
then it is emphasised that the power that belongs to the earthly political institutions, is 
ultimately grounded in the authority and power of the highest God, “for there is no 
authority (e)cousi/a) except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by 
God.”(Rom.13,1b) Thus worldly power is more or less directly derived from divine 
power, and the Roman authorities are therefore to be recognised by the Christians, “for 
rulers are not a terror to good conduct, but to bad” (Rom.13,3a). St.Paul thus takes for 
granted that the state has an exclusive and even theologically legitimate right to use 
coercive power to safeguard the common good.
310
 It seems as if St. Paul at least draws 
upon and furthers an implicit state-ontology, that is thereby given a certain theological 
status. Society is to be ruled by state-authorities that have their ultimate mandate from 
God himself.  
However, Honecker‟s main point is that St.Paul, when advising Christians in issues 
concerning their political conduct and loyalty towards the governmental authorities, 
makes use of conventional state-metaphysics, that is made theologically productive. The 
mere fact that there are also other and very different perspectives on the state-authorities 
within the New Testament (cf. Apc. 13) is itself a major reason why Honecker finds it 
urgent to emphasise that: 
“Die in sich eine sehr große Spannweite repräsentierenden Aussagen über die 
Stellung des Christen zur politischen Macht  neben Röm 13 steht Apk. 13  er-
lauben es jedenfalls nicht, eine biblische Staatslehre zu formulieren. Alle Aussagen 
zur politischen Macht im Neuen Testament sind usuell, allgemein üblich. Auch lag 
in der Urchristenheit aus vielen Gründen (eschatologische Naherwartung, staatliche 
Verfolgung, Missionssituation etc.) der Gedanke an eine Ausübung von Statsgewalt 
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 Most likely St.Paul draws upon (Stoic) ideas that were widely approved of in the political culture of 
his own time. 
310
 Some theologians have throughout history contested the view that the right to use coercive power 
belongs exclusively to the political “Obrigkeit”, holding instead that it was in principle the right of the 
church to use both swords. The doctrine of the two kingdoms, however, as elaborated within a Lutheran 
context, distinguishes the two powers clearly. 
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durch Christen völlig fern. Nach der konstantinischen Wende mußte deshalb das 
Staatsverständnis neu bestimmt werden. Die eusebianische Reichstheologie erneu-
erte Ideen eines sakralen Königtums, des Cäsaropapismus. Der Westen griff dagegen 
auf naturrechtliche Anschauungen zurück. Augustin verband in dem geschichtstheo-
logischen Entwurf „De civitate dei‟ in Unterscheidung und Zuordnung die zwei 
Herrschaftsverbände politisches Gemeinwesen und Kirche zu einem spannungs-
vollen Miteinander. Thomas von Aquin griff auf aristotelische Gerechtigkeits-
vorstellungen zurück und verpflichtete die politische Macht auf das Gemeinwohl”311 
By emphasising the conventional character of the state-ontology implied in certain 
Bible-texts, Honecker undermines the theological legitimacy of making these 
ontological aspects a normative part of Christian social ethics. 
Of course it would be entirely beyond the horizon of St. Paul to raise a more principled 
discussion as to whether state-power could also be legitimated by general consent from 
those governed. But the relation of church and individual Christians to the concrete 
phenomenon of political “power” was in no way unproblematic.  
Let me insert here that the phenomenon of power had to be considered over and over 
again by the church and its theologians, as the forms of power shifted. Christian theo-
logy has had to reflect on the legitimacy as well as on the practical use of political power 
throughout its whole history. Not least was the church confronted with the immense task 
of reconciling the ideas of worldly power and divine power,  for human beings are al-
ways to respect (and fear) not just the “sword” of the state, but even more the power of 
God.  
The power of a holy God may appear as a “mysterium tremendum et fascinosum”. 
God‟s power may be viewed as numinous and incalculable, but the leading perspective 
is nevertheless more that of God, as a moral world-ruler. The idea that God‟s own 
power, when he is acting as the governor of the world, can be considered an “ordained 
power”, not just an “absolute power”, makes the task of reconciling the power of the 
divine world-ruler and the power that genuinely belongs to worldly state-authorities or 
sovereigns easier from a moral point of view. The “ordained power” of God is morally 
qualified and predictable, and the worldly governors as servants of God, are therefore 
supposed to rule in accordance with moral principles and “ordained” (constitutional) 
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 From this there were only a few discrete steps to accepting that people were in 
their moral right to assess the governmental rule from the perspective of morality and 
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 The very distinction between God‟s “potentia absoluta” and his “potentia ordinata” is taken from the 
medieval theological discussion about the power of God. Cf for instance the chapters on Duns Scotus 
(II,3, p.47ff.) and William of Ockham (II,4, p.58ff.) in H. Syse; Natural law, Religion, and Rights. An 
exploration of the relationship between natural law and natural rights, with special emphasis on the 
teaching of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke (1997). Under the perspective of “absolute power” God‟s 
power might be considered unbounded, incalculable and even numinous. Under the perspective of “or-
dained” power, however, God can be seen as a ruler who has bound himself to act in accordance with firm 
laws and reliable principles. God will usually not break the ordinary course of events, neither will he act 
arbitrarily. Making analogies to the political domain this would mean that an absolute power, i.e. a power 
that is neither restricted nor regulated by any law, might be contrasted to a power ordained and restricted 
according to essential constitutive principles, laws and moral rules. This way of drawing structural paral-
lels between an ordained divine power and a political power restricted by constitutional principles can for 
instance be found in S. Holmes, Passions and Constraint. On the Theory of Liberal Democracy (1995). 
Dealing with the issue “Why a Will Can Be Bound to Itself” (p.150ff.) Stephen Holmes employs the theo-
logical idea of God binding himself, when he discusses a main objection to the liberal idea that people can 
impose on themselves really binding constitutional laws. He starts with the objection: “Self-rule is logical-
ly impossible,… because no man can have coercive powers over himself. Moreover, the essence of a fun-
damental law is that no one has the right to abolish it: but how is it beyond human power if it has been 
made by someone? Liberal constitutionalism is absurd because no political community can voluntarily 
create a legal framework today that it cannot arbitrarily alter tomorrow. A higher law necessarily and 
obviously presupposes a superior will enforcing obedience. How can people view with reverence a rule 
they created by choice? Liberal democracy represents a vain attempt at bootstrapping. Constitution 
making is the futile endeavor of a purely human will to device a law that can, preposterously enough, 
oblige that very same will. But such efforts will be unavailing. Without an external enforcer, people 
(singly and collectively) cannot be prevented from breaking their promises. As a result, constitutional 
obligations can be imposed only by a higher will or a „binding God‟. This argument is interesting. But it is 
less orthodoxy Christian … For one of the distinguishing features of Christianity, in contrast to pagan rel-
igions, is the idea of God who can bind himself. This innovative concept, in fact, seems to have been an 
important intellectual precondition for the emergence of constitutionalism in the West, that is, the impro-
bable modern idea of a self-binding human community.…” [And Holmes suggests that Jean Bodin, who 
was certainly not a liberal, was the first to realise this]”…To my knowledge, the first sustained attempt to 
adopt this classic theological argument, making it applicable to the political organization of human com-
munities, occurs in the Six livres de la république. Bodin sometimes asserts that no sovereign can be 
bound by promises he makes to himself. But his basic position, as we have seen, is much more flexible 
than this rigid stipulation would suggest. At the heart of his treatise is a list of restrictions that every 
sovereign should, and indeed must, impose upon himself. There was nothing unfamiliar about this idea, 
for Christian theology itself devoted elaborate attention to the concept of a self-binding highest power. 
Bodin‟s political theology, in fact, is explicitly based on a loose analogy between God‟s self-binding and 
the self-binding of the political sovereign: constitutional restrictions are less limits on, than expressions of, 
sovereign freedom and power.” Passions and Constraint, p.150f. For a further discussion of the impli-
cations of distinguishing between God‟s “potentia absoluta” and his “potentia ordinata” see also F. 
Oakley, Omnipotence, Covenant, & Order. En Excursion in the History of ideas from Abelard to Leibniz, 
(1984), especially from p. 47. 
313
 There were in fact influential medieval and late-medieval theologians, who gave some premises for a 
more modern view, since they did for instance not consider it a revolt against the divine order if political 
power was to be legitimated not exclusively by reference to “divine metaphysics” but as much through the 
consent of the people. (Ockam). But such a “liberal” view was theologically controversial. For it might be 
seen as conflicting with the theological view that the state-monopoly concerning the use of the (coercive) 
powers of society, could ultimately be legitimated only by reference to a divine mandate.  
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Let me now return to Honecker‟s view. His approach to the Lutheran Reformation 
closely parallels his method of handling biblical texts in matters concerning state and 
society. Although Honecker is in many respects taking over central hermeneutical 
“devices” from the Lutheran Reformation, he very clearly realises that: 
“Die Reformation hat im Widerspruch zum Mittelalter keine neue Staatslehre 
entworfen. Luthers Schrift Von weltlicher Obrigkeit, 1523, ist weder die erste 
neuzeitliche Staatslehre noch ein politischer Traktat, sondern seelsorgerliche 
Gewissensberatung. Gegen die überkommene Zuordnung von geistlicher und 
weltlicher Macht begründet Luther unter Berufung auf Röm 13 die Autorität der 
politischen Macht folgendermaßen: Das Amt der Obrigkeit is unmittelbar von Gott 
eingesetzt und damit allein Gott Rechenschaft schuldig, es wird nicht durch die 
Kirche verliehen. Die Unterscheidung der zwei Reiche befreit die weltliche Obrig-
keit aus klerikaler Bevormundung. Die Weltlichkeit und Eigenständigkeit der Obrig-
keit und politischen Herrschaft wird biblisch, paulinisch begründet und hierdurch 
zugleich relativiert. Die Obrigkeit wird dabei personal gedacht: Der Oberherr ist 
Landesherr, Landesvater. Eine solche personalistische Sicht der Obrigkeit ist patriar-
chalisch. Da die philosophische Begrenzung der Staatstheorie durch das Naturrecht 
entfällt, stärkt Luthers Obrigkeitsverständnis in der Folgezeit faktisch die politische 
Souveränität. Anders als bei Calvin war bei Luther die Staatsform und die Verfas-
sung kein eigenes Thema. Der moderne Staat ist in Geschichte und Theorie erst 
nach der Reformationszeit entstanden. Luthers politische Anschauungen sind vor-
neuzeitlich. Sowohl die paulinische Paränäse von Römer 13 wie Luthers Obrigkeits-
lehre sind nur begrenzt auf die neuzeitliche Wirklichkeit des Staates übertragbar.”314 
One of the main reasons for the unquestionable status afforded to the phenomenon of 
“Obrigkeit” within the state-ethics of the Lutheran tradition, is that this term was used in 
representative Bible translations of the key text of Rom. 13,1ff.
315
 And it is not just in 
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 M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.309. 
315
 The German Bishop, Otto Dibelius, ascribes to Luther the idea of introducing the notion “Obrigkeit” 
in the translation of Roman 13,1ff: “Als Martin Luther auf Wartburg das Neue Testament übersetzte und 
dabei zu Römer 13 kam, übersprang er in seiner genialen Selbstherrlichkeit alles, was es bis dahin an 
Verdeutschungen dieser Stelle gegeben hatte. Die deutschen Bibeln, die vor Luthers Übersetzung er-
schienen waren  sie sind heute in der Stuttgarter Landesbibliothek in großer Vollständigkeit beieinander 
, lesen es anders. Die meisten dieser Bibeln stammen aus Oberdeutschland, aus Straßbourg, Augsburg 
und Nürnberg. Sie haben sämtlich  mit ganz belanglosen Abweichungen  den Text: „Ein jeglich sel sey 
underthenig den höhern gewalten.‟ Dazu kommen vier niederdeutsche Bibeln aus Cöln, Lübeck und 
Halberstadt. Diese sagen es ebenso, nur in anderer Mundart: „En jewelike sele da sy underdanich den 
hoghesten ghewaldighen.‟ Das also war im vor-lutherischen Deutschland die Tradition gewesen. Es war 
die getreue Wiedergabe der lateinischen Vulgata: „Omnis anima potestatibus sublimioribus subdita sit.‟ 
Und diese lateinische Übersetzung gab ihrerseits den griechischen Urtext wortgetreu wieder. Luther 
ignorierte dies alles und schrieb: „Jedermann sei untertan der Obrigkeit, die Gewalt über ihn hat.‟ Er 
konnte nicht ahnen, was für bedeutsame Folgen diese seine Übersetzung haben sollte.” Otto Dibelius, 
Obrigkeit, Kreuz Verlag, Suttgart/Berlin 1963. p.53f. The Greek text does in fact not refer to State (im 
Singularis), at least not directly: “PaVsa ysuxh\ e)cousi/aij u(perexou/saij u(potasse/sJw. ou) ga\r e)/stin e)cousi/a 
ei) mh\ u(po\ Jeou¤, ai( de\ ouÅsai u(po\ Jeou¤ tetagme/nai ei)si/n. w(/ste o( a)ntitasso/menoj th¤ e)cousi/a? th¤? 
tou¤ Jeou¤ diatagh¤? a)nte/sthken, oi( de\ a)nJesthko/tej e(autoi¤j kri/ma lh/myontai.”  In a modern German 
Bible-translation Roman 13,1f. is tranlated as follows: “Jeder soll sich der Ordnungsmacht des Staates 
 132 
the German language that the Obrigkeits-conception is maintained and strengthened 
through a Bible-translation. In the Norwegian language as well one can find a clear 
equivalent to the German term “Obrigkeit”.316 Characteristic of the Obrigkeits-theology 
is that state-authority is seen and assessed in analogy with family-authority as shown, for 




“In dieses Gebot gehöret auch weiter zu sagen von allerlei Gehorsam gegen 
Oberpersonen, die zu gepieten und zu regieren haben. Denn aus der Eltern Oberkeit 
fleußet und breitet sich aus alle andere. … Also daß alle, die man Herrn heißet, an 
der Eltern Statt sind und von ihn Kraft und Macht zu regieren nehmen müssen. 
Daher sie auch nach der Schrift alle Väter heißen, als die in ihrem Regiment das 
Vaterampt treiben und väterlich Herz gegen den Ihren tragen sollen. Wie auch von 
Alters her die Römer und andere Sprachen Herrn und Frauen im Haus Patres et 
Matres familias, das ist Hausväter und Hausmutter genennet haben. Also auch ihre 
Landsfursten und Oberherrn haben sie Patres patriae, das ist Väter des ganzen Lands 
geheißen, uns, die wir Christen sein wöllen, zu großen Schanden, daß wir sie nicht 
auch also [als-so] heißen oder zum wenigsten dafür halten und ehren.”318 
This was not an unusual perspective, as can be seen from the well known book, Patri-
archa, written by Robert Filmer.
319
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
fügen. Denn es gibt keine statliche Gewalt, die nicht von Gott verliehen wird. Wer sich also gegen die 
staatliche Gewalt auflehnt, wiedersetzt sich der Anordnung Gottes und wird dafür bestraft werden.” Die 
Bibel in heutigen Deutsch, Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft Stuttgart, 1982. In the English text, Revised 
Standard Version, 2
nd
 Edition 1971 (which is the English text I usually refer to, when quoting from The 
New Testament), is Rom.13,1f. translated as follows: “Let every person be subject to the governing 
authorities. For there is no authority except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by God. 
Therefore he who resists the authorities resists what God has appointed, and those who resist will incur 
judgment.” 
316
 The Nowergian term “Övrighet” is a direct equivalent to “Obrigkeit”. In the revised 1930-edition, that 
was commonly used within the Norwegian church until 1978, Roman 13,1f. was translated as follows: 
“Hver sjel være lydig mot de foresatte øvrigheter! for det er ikke øvrighet uten av Gud, men de som er, de 
er insatt av Gud, så at den som setter seg imot øvrigheten, står Guds ordning imot; men de som står imot, 
skal få sin dom.” But now  in the edition authorised in 1978  the same verses are translated as follows: 
“Enhver skal være lydig mot de myndigheter han har over seg. Det finnes ingen myndigheter som ikke er 
fra Gud, og de som er ved makten, er insatt av Gud. Den som setter seg opp mot dem, står derfor imot 
Guds ordning, og de som gjør det, skal få sin dom.” 
317
 Honecker refers to Luther‟s use of the fourth commandment. “Seit der Reformation wurde staatliche 
Autorität patriarchalisch begründet. Sie genoß den Schutz des vierten Gebotes. Die Obrigkeit und nur sie 
allein, ist von Gott eingesetzt. Macht entfaltet sich nach diesem patriarchalischen und personalen Ver-
ständnis von Staatsautorität nur von oben nach unten. Machtausübung von unten her ist undenkbar. Im 
Staat stehen sich zwei Positionen gegenüber: Die Obrigkeit und die Untertanen. Deren Verhältnis wird 
nach Tugenden Befehl und Gehorsam geordnet.” M. Honecker, Konzept einer sozialethischen Theorie. 
Grundfragen evangelischer Sozialethik (1971), p.147 
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 M. Luther‟s “Großer Katechismus”, Die Bekenntnisschriften der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche 
(1967), p.596. 
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 A main reason why Patriarcha (most likely written between 1635 and 1642) has got so well known, is 
that it was strongly attacked by John Locke in The First Treatise of Government. (According to Locke 
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There is, however, no theological reason for giving such a patriarchal approach a nor-
mative status according to Honecker: “Eine Auskunft über das Wesen des Staates wird 
aber nicht gegeben”. Luther gives advice (Paränäse) to those living under the sovereign-
ty of different kinds of worldly authorities. Even in his most famous book on the issue 
of “politics”, Von weltlicher Obrigkeit, Luther‟s primary intention is to give advice to 
Christians in relation to the state-authorities they were actually facing. In doing so, how-
ever, Luther simultaneously makes some implicit assumptions concerning the nature, 
the power and the legitimacy of the “Obrigkeit”. And there is one such assumption, that 
seems to be implied in Luther‟s words: that society cannot be properly ordered and 
legitimated by the mere consent from those governed. 
According to Honecker, however, Luther‟s main intention is to distinguish clearly be-
tween the power of the church and the power of the state. The nature of the power 
exercised by the Obrigkeit is very different from the kind of power that belongs essen-
tially to the Church. While the power of the church is “spiritual”, derived from the 
authority inherent in the Word of God, the power of the Obrigkeit is by its very nature 
coercive power.
320
 These two kinds of power, each of which is legitimate in the contexts 
where it appropriately applies, should not be confused. But just as decisively as it is 
underlined that it would be contrary to the Christian nature of the church to use coercive 
power to promote its own goals, it is equally to be taken for granted that there has to be 
an institution with a legitimate right to order society and with sufficient power to settle 
laws, punish evildoers and maintain effectively certain constraints on the selfishness of 
individuals and groups. Thus there should be a clear distinction between the kind of 
power that is legitimately to be exercised by the church and the kind of power that is 
legitimately to be exercised by the state.
321
 Church and conscience should not be ruled 
                                                                                                                                                                          
there is a significant and decisive difference between the power that belongs to family-fathers and the 
power that belongs to state-leaders. Capital punishment can for instance not legitimately be carried out by 
the father.) 
320
 I use the phrase “coercive power”, referring thereby to the mere capacity for coercion that the state 
has, as far as it has at its own disposition the required coercive means and the legitimate right to use them. 
But there are also many other aspects of power, for instance the authority of those who are entitled to 
command other people, and there is the kind of power consisting in a (legitimate) capacity to influence 
effectively the distribution of rights, duties and social goods among the citizens. The power of state-
authorities can therefore not merely be qualified as coercive power. And it is also quite obvious that the 
Church has considerable power in many respects of the word, although the monopoly to use coercive 
power (to use the “sword”) belongs exclusively with the state. And that is my point here. 
321
 Cf. Confessio Augustana, article XXVIII, that sets out like this: “Von der Bischofen Gewalt ist vor 
Zeiten viel und mancherlei geschrieben, und haben etliche unschicklich den Gewalt der Bischofen und das 
 134 
by use of the “sword”, and society as such could not be ruled merely by principles 
directly derived from the Christian gospel. Just preaching the “word” of God would not 
do in the field of politics, and it would be very naïve to ignore the fact that there are 
other aspects of the human nature than just fair-mindedness and altruism that also have 
to be taken into account when ordering society. In Von weltlicher Obrigkeit Martin 
Luther makes this strikingly clear in a well-known “parable”: 
“Wollte man darum sich das Wagnis zutrauen, ein ganzes Land oder die Welt mit 
dem Evangelium zu regieren, so ist das ebenso, wie wenn ein Hirte Wölfe, Löwen, 
Adler und Schafe in einem Stall zusammentäte und jedes frei unter den andern gehen 
ließe und spräche: „Da weidet euch und seid rechtschaffen und friedlich unterein-
ander; der Stall steht offen, Weide habt ihr genug, Hunde und Prügel braucht ihr 
nicht zu fürchten.‟ Da würden wohl die Schafe Frieden halten und sich in dieser 
Weise friedlich weiden und regieren lassen; aber sie würden nicht lange leben, und 
kein Tier würde von dem anderen erhalten bleiben.”322 
The reason why this “parable” is so relevant is obviously that there are in society both 
righteous and unrighteous persons, selfish and unselfish individuals. And it is also a 
well-known fact that even a few evil persons might be sufficient to destroy the peace of 
society as a whole. Taking this “realistic” approach one might better accept the social 
need for a central institution, an “Obrigkeit”, with the mandate and the power to keep 
individuals in line. And one might also understand why Luther would certainly consider 
rule by consent a mere utopian (and even dangerous) idea. 
However, seeing the modern state mainly under the perspective of an “Obrigkeit” in 
Luther‟s sense of the word, would in Honecker‟s opinion provide us with a very narrow 
and even anachronistic perspective on the state. In Grundriß der Sozialethik Honecker 
therefore criticises the attempt made by Otto Dibelius to apply the “Obrigkeits-idea” to 
                                                                                                                                                                          
weltlich Schwert untereinander gemenget, und sein aus diesem unordentlichen Gemenge sehr große 
Kriege, Aufruhr und Emporung erfolgt, aus dem, daß die Bischofen im Schein ihres Gewalts, der Ihnen 
von Christo gegeben, nicht allein neue Gottesdienst angerichtet haben und mit Furbehaltung etlicher Fälle 
und mit gewaltsamen Bann die Gewissen beschwert, sonder auch sich unterwunden, Kaiser und Kunige zu 
setzen und entsetzen, ihres Gefallens; welchen Frevel auch lange Zeit hiervor gelehrte und gottfurchtige 
Leute in der Christenheit gestraft haben. Derhalben die Unsern zu Trost der Gewissen gezwungen seind 
worden, den Unterschied des geistlichen und weltlichen Gewalts, Schwertes und Regiments anzuzeigen, 
und haben gelehrt, daß man beide Regiment und Gewalten, um Gottes Gebots willen, mit aller Andacht 
ehren und wohl halten soll als zwo hochste Gaben Gottes auf Erden.” Die Bekenntnisschriften der 
evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche (1967). I shall later more thoroughly consider some aspects of the so 
called doctrine of the two kingdoms. 
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 M. Luther, Von weltlicher Obrigkeit. Wie weit man ihr Gehorsam schuldig sei (1523 Calwer Luther-




 Even in the 20
th
 century bishop Dibelius still holds both that: 
 only an “Obrigkeit” (instituted by God) can have the required authority. And there-
fore even the modern kind of democracy should be considered problematic. 
 Christians are not bound to be obedient towards an illegitimate state. (The experi-
ences with the “Nazi-authorities” obviously contributed to this view.) 
According to Honecker, however, there is no cogent reason why political authority 
should be bound to patriarchal state-forms. And Honecker emphasises that the modern 
problem of legitimacy cannot be solved simply by reference to St. Paul or Luther, espe-
cially since they were not so much concerned with the legitimacy of their respective 




It cannot be denied that Honecker himself can still consider the modern state-institution 
as instituted by God,  with a mandate to exercise proper “Staatsgewalt und politischer 
Macht”:  
“Christlicher Glaube anerkennt jedoch die Notwendigkeit von Staatsgewalt und 
politischer Macht, um dem Bösen willen. Deshalb bejaht er das Prinzip der 
'Staatlichkeit', als Gottes Setzung, als ordinatio divina.”325 
From a theological perspective the state-institution should be considered an “ordinatio 
divina”. God, the Creator of heaven and earth, uses the political institutions of society in 
upholding the world he has created. But even if this theological perspective on the state-
authority is also maintained by Honecker, he simultaneously stresses that the existing 
state-ontologies, that might for instance be taken as a conventional and implicit part of 
the reflections made by St. Paul (Rom.13) or St. John (Apc.13) or Luther (Von welt-
licher Obrigkeit), have no far-reaching theological significance. The theological signifi-
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 Cf. M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.335f. See also Otto Dibelius, Obrigkeit (1963). 
324
 Dibelius was sometimes criticised for using Rom.13 for political legitimacy-purposes, but sometimes 
he was in fact also criticised for the tendency to consider all “totalitarian” states, not just the Nazi-state, as 
theologically illegitimate states, falling outside the class of legitimate states taken into account by St. Paul 
in Rom. 13. Dibelius‟ critique of totalitarianism in politics might seem very much to the point. Neverthe-
less, he is criticised by Honecker who objects that the questions, raised by Dibelius, concerning theologi-
cal legitimisation of political institutions, should not be answered merely on the basis of a thorough exe-
gesis (of texts like Rom.13,1ff), or be settled definitely by reference to the theology of Martin Luther. In 
so far Honecker is right. But by raising the problem of legitimacy so sharply, Dibelius has at least made 
mere “state-positivism” very problematic from a theological point of view. 
325
 M.Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.337. 
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cance reaches hardly beyond a mere “daß”;  that there has to be state-authorities with a 
power that is sufficient to limit selfishness, and that the state-authority is ordained by 
God, the Creator. Since theological political ethics and moral advising have to be ad-
dressed, it has to be related to the problems caused by actual state-authorities. Taking 
“the fact of” actual political institutions as the point of departure for parenetical advice 
does, however,  not mean that particular state-authorities are theologically idealised. 
There is, according to Honecker, no sacrosanct state-form elaborated either by St.Paul 
nor by St. Augustine nor by Luther.326 And accordingly one cannot use particular Bible 
texts in a theological “consecration” of strictly hierarchical state-forms or in a principled 
rejection of democracies built on the principle of rule by consent. 
It follows that there may in theological social ethics be considerable elasticity regarding 
the form of state-institutions. And it also follows that there is no ideal or normative 
theological state-model that must be approximated in order for state-authorities to gain 
theological support or recognition from a Christian point of view.
327
 If a distinction 
between “the fact of” and “the essence of” state-authority, as introduced by Honecker, is 
ignored, it might in practice lead us to give legitimacy
328
 to factual state authorities and 
actual schemes of society in a way that runs the risk of confusing merely empirical 
issues with theologically normative ones.
329
 Although Honecker takes state-authority as 
such as an “ordinatio divina”, this does not lead him to treat any particular state-form, 
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 According to Honecker it is for instance typical of modern Catholic theology that the varieties of state-
forms are recognised without giving up the idea that the state should be considered “eine Institution der 
sittlichen Ordnung. Dabei hat die Institution des Staates als solche ihren Grund im absoluten Naturrecht: 
… Die Staatsform ist nach dem Sündenfall, also nicht von Ewigkeit her angeordnet. Damit bleibt bei der 
konkreten Ausgestaltung der Staatsordnung ein Entscheidungsspielraum. Demokratische Willenseinigung 
und Vertragstheorien haben ihren Platz bei der Begründung der konkreten Staatsordnung. Denn die Ver-
fassung des einzelnen Staates ist nicht durch das Naturrecht vorgeschrieben und festgelegt.” M. Honecker, 
Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.311f. 
327
 There might nevertheless be certain minimum-criteria that legitimate political authorities must fulfil, in 
accordance with St. Paul‟s general premise, that “… rulers are not a terror to good conduct, but to bad”. 
(Rom. 13,3a). Rom.13 represents in itself an example of a state-authority (although pagan) that could be 
approved of as legitimate, while Apc. 13 gives an example of a state-authority that has to be considered il-
legitimate. The issue of legitimacy  in a religious perspective  is also illustratively dealt with in Dan.7. 
328
 “Die christliche Gemeinde und die einzelnen Christen sind nicht vordringlich nach einem eigenen 
materialen theologischen ('theoretischen') Beitrag zur politischen Theorie gefragt, der in der Regel doch 
nur legitimatorischen Zwecken dienen würde oder dienstbar gemacht würde.” M.Honecker, Grundriß der 
Sozialethik (1995), p.337. 
329
 Most kinds of state-metaphysics tend in fact towards state-positivism, which is in my opinion clearly 
seen by Honecker: “Die Theologie der Ordnungen versteht menschliche Verhältnisse als Stiftungen 
Gottes. Daß in ihnen Gottes erhaltende Gnade wirksam ist, kann man wohl glauben. Aber man kann 
diesen Glauben nicht zur gesellschaftlichen Legitimation vorhandener Institutionen verwenden.” M. 
Honecker, Konzept einer sozialethischen Theorie. Grundfragen evangelischer Sozialethik (1971), p.2. 
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whether found in the Bible, church history or in the modern world, as having a sacro-
sanct status.  
Nevertheless, Honecker himself in fact considers democracy to be the state-form that 
corresponds most appropriately to such human capacities, duties, rights, needs and 
values that are vital in a theological perspective.
330
 Even if he is not idealising demo-
cracy, Honecker can say that there is within Christian faith itself an affinity to demo-




The preceding discussion and Honecker's position within it can be succinctly stated as 
follows: 
First, any theological perspective on society, which takes its point of departure from the 
“state-theology” of the Bible or the Reformation, faces the hermeneutic problem of the 
historical distance. The pagan state-institution that St.Paul had in mind or the Christian 
“Obrigkeit” that Martin Luther refers to, have in fact changed fundamentally, which 
implies that the state-ontology that was referred to, cannot any longer be taken as the 
decisive point of departure,  at least not in modern western societies.  
It is worth noting both that the term “Obrigkeit”, introduced in the Bible-translation and 
the state-theology by Luther, is given no normative theological significance, and that 
Honecker finds it necessary to make the rather trivial statement that Luther did not know 
the modern notion of state. One has to agree with Honecker that political models and 
devices “ursprünglich entworfen für ein einheitliches „Corpus christianum‟, in welchem 
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 Honecker says very openly: “Mit der Annahme, daß Demokratie am besten den Rechtsstaat sichern 
kann, habe ich bereits implizit mich gegen die These entschieden, daß es eine bessere, d.h. den mensch-
lichen Möglichkeiten und Schwächen angemessenere Staatsform geben könne, welche die Rechte des 
einzelnen so weit als überhaupt möglich zu gewährleisten vermag. Man kann sich zwar bessere Staats-
formen vorstellen; aber diese Vorstellungen abstrahieren von der Frage der Realisierbarkeit in der ge-
schichtlichen und gesellschaftlichen Situation. Dieser Einwand besagt freilich nicht, daß das im angel-
sächsischen Bereich entwickelte Modell der liberalen rechtsstaatlichen Demokratie so vollkommen ist, 
daß es überhaupt nicht mehr verbessert werden kann…”, M. Honecker, Konzept einer sozialethischen 
Theorie. Grundfragen evangelischer Sozialethik (1971), p.168. 
331
 But after he has emphasised that Christian faith recognises the fact that there has to be political power, 
even coercive power, and that the state authority could be taken as an “ordinatio divina”, Honecker, how-
ever, stresses that the coercive power of the state should be taken as “begrenzt durch die Macht Gottes, 
durch die Macht des Gewissens und durch die Macht des Glaubens. Von daher hat christlicher Glaube 
notwendig eine Affinität zu gemäßigten Staatsformen und zur Kontrolle der Macht, zur Demokratie, also 
zu den Garantien des Rechtsstates und zu vorstaatlichen Menschenrechten.” M. Honecker, Grundriß der 
Sozialethik (1995), p. 337 
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es noch keinen staats- und kirchenfreien Raum gab”332 cannot automatically be consid-
ered appropriate and normative in modern societies that might be pluralistic, secularised 
and also dependent on the consent of the citizens.
333
 
Second: There is within the context of those forms of theological social ethics which 
focus strongly on the mandate of the “Obrigkeit”, a natural tendency to promote a strict 
hierarchical (and patriarchal) perspective on society. Strictly hierarchical societies 
might sometimes be conceived of in a theocratic way. Even if the rulers are not taken to 
be above the law of God nor in a privileged position beyond the claims of natural law, 
they are often supposed to be in control of positive law. Therefore hierarchical societies 
are not safeguarded against tyranny, and theocracy might soon be transformed into some 




Third: Conceiving of authority in strictly personal categories, as is natural within a 
patriarchal view, might weaken the rights, liberties and safety of ordinary people. For 
there is no reason to believe that a sovereign ruler should be less subject to sin, selfish-
ness and human weaknesses than most human beings. It is therefore of importance that 
(coercive) power is publicly and continually controlled,  as is to a wide extent the case 
in modern democratic societies. I think that Honecker rightly stresses that the basic 
organisational scheme of a society has to express an elementary respect for the integrity 
of each person within that society.
335
 
Fourth: It is well worth noticing that the Lutheran reformation also seeks to distinguish 
between different institutionalisations of power and authority. There are two kinds of 
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 Martin Honecker: Konzept einer sozialethischen Theorie. Grundfragen evengelischer Sozialethik, 
Tübingen 1971, p.8f. 
333
 Of course one might say that Honecker is just referring to some facts, that are without doubt charac-
teristic of modern societies. And mere facts (of this kind) do not necessarily imply an “ought”. Let me, 
however, in this connection just underline that Honecker obviously means that we ought not try to restore 
a political idea of a “corpus christianum” based on a strictly hierarchical scheme of society, even if there 
should be a possibility that such ideas could be realised or enforced.  
334
 As previously mentioned it might be astonishing to see how Rawls  as a liberal  can assess some 
“hierarchical” schemes of society rather positively. In recent time he has distinguished between hierar-
chical societies “of good standing” and “tyrannical and dictatorial regimes [which] cannot be accepted as 
members in good standing of a reasonable society of peoples”. Cf. J. Rawls, “The Law of Peoples”, On 
Human Rights. The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993 (1993), p.42f. 
335
 Honecker emphasises very strongly “daß der einzelne vor Gott unendlich wertvoll ist (Mt 10,29-31; 
18,10-14); diese Anschauung vom unantastbaren Recht der Person muß auch im politischen und 
gesellschaftlichen Bereich geltend gemacht werden.” M. Honecker, Konzept einer sozialethischen 
Theorie. Grundfragen evangelischer Sozialethik (1971), p.166.  
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power that should not be confused. Thus Confessio Augustana XXVIII for instance 
attests to the view that there should in principle be a significant difference between the 
power of the Obrigkeit (princes) and the power of the Church (bishops). But a very 
sharp distinction might be problematic,  at least in practice.336 
Fifth: I think that Honecker plausibly criticises the more unreflected acceptance of 
state-metaphysics
337
 so often enmeshed in theological ethics, and he has convincingly 
cut off speculative legitimacy-projects taking their point of departure from particular 
Bible-texts like Rom. 13,1ff.
338
 Even if one should want to re-establish an Obrigkeits-
structure much like the one we can find in Luther‟s works and which we might also 
discern in Rom.13, such a project is to be considered empirically unrealisable and 
theologically dubious. It is also well worth noticing that the crucial question for St. Paul 
seems not so much to be whether regimes are “Christian” or not, whether they stick to 
Christian doctrines or not. He refers to the existing regime and its factual capacity to 
support good conduct and punish evildoers. And in fact St.Paul avoids the question 
whether more particular criteria should be established for deciding when regimes are to 
                                                          
336
 What makes the case even more difficult is that one can obviously distinguish along different lines. 
One can separate mainly between the different authorities holding institutionalised power in society. I 
think this is a main approach to power in CA XXVIII. One can also start by examining the different 
aspects of power inherent in the very notion itself. Then one might separate mainly along the lines of mere 
authority and naked force, as does for instance J. P. Mackey in his book about Power and Christian Ethics 
(1994). James P. Mackey can therefore very correctly “see power as something that oscillates between its 
twin forms of force and authority.”(p.12) Taking the two extremes of power to be the naked (and immoral) 
force on the one side, and on the other side the mere authority, which can only be accepted and approved 
of willingly and for good reasons, I think it would be rather appropriate to say that both the Church and 
the state might be seen as oscillating between those two extremes. Of course the Church should, as far as it 
reflects the gospel, approximate the pure “power by authority position”, but this will never to the full ex-
tent be the case in practice. And a more urgent question arises: Why shouldn‟t this approximation to the 
“power by authority position” be an ideal for the state as well,  at least for democratic state-authorities? 
It need not be considered a necessity that state-power should tend towards a “power by naked force 
position”. If one is also taking state-power “as something that oscillates between its twin forms of force 
and authority”, it seems obvious that state-authority might even to a decisive extent be dependent on the 
willing recognition from those governed. This should not render a distinction between Church-power and 
State-power futile, but might nevertheless illustrate the complexity of the phenomenon of power, both in 
relation to the church and to the state. 
337
 A metaphysics of the state is concerned with “das Geheimnis des göttlichen Waltens, daß sich die 
göttliche Erhaltungsgnade auch mitten durch das zwielichtige Handeln der Menschen hindurch zu 
beweisen vermag.”, M. Honecker, Konzept einer sozialethischen Theorie. Grundfragen evangelischer 
Sozialethik (1971), p.156. As already suggested, state-metaphysics is mainly concerned with the essence 
(das Wesen) of the state, as opposed to the actual functions of the state. 
338
 “Aus Glaubenssätzen und biblischem Zeugnis ist keine Staatsform herzuleiten. Der gegenwärtige Staat 






Sixth: Honecker‟s ideas about the nature of a just society corresponds to a large extent 
to Rawls‟ idea of society as a fair340 system of co-operation. And Honecker's criticisms 
of a comprehensive theological state-ontology would certainly be approved of by Rawls 
as well, since this kind of state-metaphysics may hamper the idea of society as a system 
of fair co-operation. Honecker‟s tendency towards a mere “daß” in respect of the divine 
orderedness and mandate of the state, can very well correspond with a search for the 
most reasonable and fair “was” in respect to a substantial ordering of the basic structure 
of society as a joint co-operative venture.
341
 The idea of society as structured from the 
top down, and an “alignment” of the citizens from the side of the powerful “Obrigkeit” 
 regardless of an eventual consent given by the governed themselves  should simply 
not be used to elaborate the Christian version of state-metaphysics. At least I think that 
one has to take openly into account what Honecker clearly stresses:
 
 
“Das neuzeitliche Staatsverständnis hat ein wechselvolle Geschichte hinter sich. 
Entscheidend war, verglichen mit dem Mittelalter, die Emanzipation des Staatslehre 
von Kirche und Theologie. Der Zweck des Staates und die Staatsziele werden rein 
innerweltlich begründet. Der moderne Staat ist in Europa ein Ergebnis der 
Säkularisierung. Toleranz und Religionsfreiheit sind Ausdruck der Säkularität des 
Staates. Da der Staat nicht auf einer Setzung Gottes, sondern auf dem Willen des 
Bürgers beruht, werden nun Vertragsideen wichtig.”342 
4.3. Rule by consent 
4.3.1. The contract argument 
Now it may be asked: Is it possible to find a way of legitimating the institutional scheme 
of society by the consent of the people that is at least as effective as the religious legiti-
mation was and has the required authority? Such questions have fueled the search for an 
appropriate shared basis (and a common moral ground), that has got so manifest in the 
                                                          
339
 This is the problem of Apc.13. And also of Dan. 7. Bringing Apc 13 into consideration, Honecker not 
least demonstrates that there are very different kinds of state-forms within the perspective of The New 
Testament itself. 
340
 Justice is quite clearly an aim to be (at least approximately) secured by the central institutions of 
society. And Honecker characteristically adds: “Während eine metaphysische ontokratische Staatslehre 
Gerechtigkeit als ewige Ordnung begreift, wird sie im gesellschaftlichen Prozess zu suchen und zu ver-
wirklichen. Die Gerechtigkeit liegt nicht vor, sie kann nur das Ergebnis eines demokratischen Consensus 
sein.” M. Honecker, Konzept einer sozialethischen Theorie. Grundfragen evangelischer Sozialethik 
(1971), p.160f. 
341
 And therefore he very much intends to avoid “Eine kerygmatische Einschärfung ethischer Grundsätze 
und jede Form von autoritärer Moralvermittlung…” M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.IX. 
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contract-tradition.  
Some theologians in modern societies, such as Martin Honecker, have clearly empha-
sised that an appropriate political “Willensbildung kann nur gelingen im Konsens der 
betroffenen Bürger”.343 By emphasising this so strongly Honecker takes his orientation 
mainly from the bottom up and shares at least some fundamental premises with a “vol-
untaristic” contractarian view (to which he explicitly refers just a few times). For a con-
tract to be valid, and binding on the parties, it must appropriately express the will of the 
contractors. The kind of agreement among citizens that is provided for in treaties or con-
tracts, is supposed to express the active will of the parties. The contract can be consid-
ered a mutually binding agreement, giving rise to specific obligations, only if the invol-
ved parties have entered voluntarily into it. (The problem of a more tacit consent will be 
touched upon later).  
One can find, for instance in the Bible, examples of covenants (“contracts”) where God 
as one of the parties has taken the initiative in establishing it and has also set forth the 
terms and the content to be agreed upon.
344
 In the Bible one can, however, find other 
kinds of covenants too, as for instance the “treaty of friendship” established between 
David and Jonathan (1.Sam.20) or the “treaty” between David and the tribes of Israel, 
before he is anointed king over Israel. This treaty is of great interest, and particularly 
deserving of some consideration in as much as it reflects a form of social contract made 
within the framework of a theocracy.  
“So all the elders of Israel came to the king to Hebron: and king David made a 
league
345
 with them in Hebron, before the Lord: And they anointed David king over 
Israel.” (2.Sam.5,3) 
The fact that David was already appointed king by God himself did not prevent the 
people from entering into a mutually binding agreement, a covenant, with him.
346
 In this 
                                                                                                                                                                          
342
 M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.317. 
343
 M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethi (1995), p.337. 
344
 This is for instance the case in the covenant between God and Abraham in Gen. 17,1ff. where God 
binds himself to fulfil a promise to the man he has especially blessed and elected, and where Abraham‟s 
obligation according to the terms of the covenant was to be obedient (for instance what concerns circum-
cision). 
345
 The word used in the hebrew text is “berit”, the usual term for covenant. 
346
 This might indeed seem surprising within the theocratic scheme of the ancient Israel. But there is 
obviously no conflict between the crucial fact that David was already appointed by God to be the new 
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context, it may also be of interest to note that the son of king Salmon was rejected by 
most of the tribes of Israel who had originally gathered in Schechem to anoint him a 
king upon the death of his father. When the son of Salmon, Rehabeam, however, refused 
to lighten the people's burdens, they refused to recognise him as king and appointed 
Jeroboam instead. (1.King.12) 
From a theological point of view, the thought that sovereigns ruled not just according to 
a mandate given directly by God, but also on certain terms set by the people, is not an 
entirely illegitimate one. Supporting Pope Gregory the VII against Henry IV, Manegold 
of Lautenbach writes for instance in a very frequently cited text: 
“King is not a name of nature but a title of office: nor does the people exalt him so 
high above it in order to give him the free power of playing the tyrant in its midst, 
but to defend it from tyranny. So soon as he begins to act the tyrant, is it not plain 
that he falls from the dignity granted to him? Since it is evident that he has broken 
the contract by virtue of which he was appointed. If one should engage a man for a 
fair wage to tend swine, and he finds means not to tend but to steal them, would one 
not remove him from his charge? … Since no one can create himself emperor or 
king, the people elevates a certain one person over itself to this end, that he govern 
and rule it according to right reason, give each one his own , protect the good, de-
stroy the wicked, and administer justice to every man. But if he violates the contract 
under which he was elected, disturbing and confounding that which he was estab-
lished to set in order, then the people is justly and reasonably released from its obli-
gation to obey him.”347  
The idea of theologically consistent contractual limits on sovereignty was in no small 
way a product of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation as oppressed groups like 
the Huguenots sought biblical sources upon which to base contractarian ideas.
348
  But 
these are not the only roots.  
In his study of the development of social contract theory, J.W Gough has given an ac-
                                                                                                                                                                          
king of Israel and the fact that David also had to enter into a mutually obligating “league” with the tribes 
of Israel, who were also to recognise him. 
347
 I have quoted from M. Lessnoff‟s Introduction in: Social Contract Theory, (ed. M. Lessnoff, 1990), 
p.5. 
348
 When facing severe oppression by the state, they developed the model of a “double contract” to legiti-
mate their resistance to the king. Inspired by the Old Testament they meant that the king had a double 
obligation. First he was contractually bound by the covenant between God and the king. And then he was 
contractually bound by the covenant between the people and himself. For this view they could refer to the 
fact that even the great Jewish king, David, also had to be recognised by the people. If the king is disobed-
ient to God and also breaks the mutual obligation with the people, one has the right of disobedience. Let it 
en passant be remarked that the Lutheran Church did not develop any contractarian theology like this. 
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count of contractarian motifs within the Greek (and Roman) political thought.
349
 He 
found contractarian motifs already among the Sophists, with their tendency to see law 
and political institutions as a result of convention rather than as a scheme essentially 
grounded in nature itself.
350
 In Plato‟s Republic this view, held by Glaucon, is dealt with 
by Socrates.
351
 In another way the contract-thought is taken up in Crito (51D-52A; 52C-
53A; 50c), and here the thought is that Socrates, by choosing to live in Athens, has in 
fact entered into a covenant, implying an allegiance to abide by the laws of Athens. A 
kind of tacit consent. 
And Aristotle (Politics, iii, 1280b10) also refers to the Sophists as the typical represen-
tatives of those considering the law to be merely a kind of contract.
352
 
There are, then, many different kinds of “contracts”, but in political contract-philosophy 
one need focus on just two main-types. Using Gough's terminology, the first may be 
classified as the contract of submission (which is also called a “contract of govern-
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 Cf. J.W.Gough, The Social Contract. A critical Study of its Development (1967). 
350
 “In the hands of some of the Sophists, however, the contrast of nature and convention led to a radically 
individualistic standpoint. The idea of a state of nature, in which individual men moved freely in pursuit of 
their own ends, was contrasted with civil society, in which man‟s natural freedom was hampered by laws. 
This state of nature might be portrayed as a poetical golden age in the distant past, from which man had 
fallen, but more usually it was regarded as a state of war (like the state of nature in Hobbes) in which 
every one was in competition and potential conflict with every one else. From this conception it was but a 
short step to the social contract. Every one in the state of nature was in danger of being injured by his 
neighbours, and therefore men made a contract or bargain (sunJh/kh, or o(mologi/a, are the Greek words 
most often used) with one another, by which each man undertook to refrain from injuring his neighbour, 
provided that his neighbour in return would refrain from injuring him. Thus laws were made, based on this 
convention between individuals, and with them came the idea of justice and the difference between right 
and wrong.” J.W.Gough, The Social Contract. A critical Study of its Development (1967), p.9f. 
351
 In Republic, Book II, Socrates is concerned with the question set forward by Glaucon: “Socrates, is it 
your desire to seem to have persuaded us or really to persuade us that it is without exception better to be 
just than unjust?” (357A). And then the “realistic” approach of Glaucon is explicated more thoroughly: 
“So that when men do wrong and are wronged by one another and taste of both, those who lack the power 
to avoid the one and take the other determine that it is for their profit to make a compact with one another 
[notice the Greek medium form: cunJe/sJai a)llh/loij] neither to commit nor to suffer injustice; and that this 
is the beginning of legislation and of covenants between men, and that they name the commandment of the 
law the lawful and the just, and that this is the genesis and essential nature of justice  a compromise 
between the best, which is to do wrong with impunity, and the worst, which is to be wronged and be 
impotent to get one‟s revenge. Justice, they tell us, being mid-way between the two, is accepted and 
approved, not as a real good, but as a thing honoured in the lack of vigour to do injustice, since anyone 
who had the power to do it and was in reality „a man‟ would never make a compact with anybody neither 
to wrong nor to be wronged; for he would be mad.” Plato, The Republic, Book II, 359A,B. Cf. also 
Plato‟s Laws, 889E. 
352
 Contrary to the Sophists providing us with a “picture of the natural man striving for his own ends, 
Plato presents us with an account of an organized society in which every man has his „station and its 
duties‟, with the implication that it is only in such a life that the nature of man can find its fullest expres-
sion. Aristotle‟s refutation of the sophists is essentially similar.” J.W.Gough, The Social Contract. A 
critical Study of its Development (1967), p.13. 
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ment”) and the second, as the genuine social contract (the “social contract proper”). The 
terminology here is taken from Gough but, obviously, both terminology, and the aspects 
meant to be emphasised, may differ. John Locke, for example, uses the notion 
“compact” for the genuine social contract. Or one might choose to distinguish between a 
horizontal (constituting a people) and a vertical contract (establishing a government). 
The former is taken as the true contract of association by Jean-Jeacques Rousseau.
353
 
Using another terminology one might also very properly distinguish between moral and 
merely prudential kinds of contract. Of even greater significance when dealing with 




For the moment, however, I just prefer to distinguish between “social contract” and 
“submission contract”, since this distinction covers very well the two types of basic 
“contract” that have in fact played a considerable role in matters of political legitimacy 
and political obligation.
355
 While the former kind of contract might have the greatest 
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 In chapter 16 of his well-known book on the social contract he takes up the problem of establishing an 
executive power after the legislative power has been well established by the people as the “sovereign” of 
the state. And he writes: “Since the citizens are all made equal by social contract, everyone can prescribe 
what everyone else should do, whereas no one has the right to require another to do anything he does not 
do himself. Now it is precisely this right, indispensable for imparting life and movement to the body 
politic, that the sovereign gives the prince in instituting the government. Some have claimed that this act 
of establishment was a contract between the people and the leaders it gives itself, a contract by which the 
two parties stipulated the conditions under which one party obligates itself to command and the other to 
obey. It will be granted, I am sure, that this is a strange way of making a contract! … There is only one 
contract in the state; it is that of the association; and that one by itself excludes any other. It would be 
impossible to imagine any other public contract that would not violate the first one.” Quoted from the 
English translation; “On Social Contract or Principles of Political Right”, Rousseau‟s Political Writings, 
(eds. A. Ritter and J. Conaway Bondanella, 1988), p.145f.  
354
 These aspects of modern contractarianism, which are a vital part of the Rawlsian approach, shall be 
considered more closely later, but let me now just suggest that the way one combines different 
perspectives on the social contract, might serve to underline various aspects of a contractual agreement, 
yielding different kinds of contractarianism. Let me illustrate this as follows: If we are just focusing on the 
aspects “real” versus “hypothetical” and “moral” versus “prudential”, there will for instance be four 
different combinations, yielding rather different kinds of contractarianism: 
a real contract for prudential reasons, 
a real contract for moral reasons. 
a hypothetical contract for mere prudential reasons, 
a hypothetical contract for moral reasons, 
The latter comes closest to the kind of contract that Rawls has in mind, as we shall se.  
I am indebted to Thomas Pogge for pointing to the different possibilities of combining the various aspects. 
There might be more complex ways of combining if additional relevant aspects are also introduced. 
355
 To the terminology see; J.W.Gough, The Social Contract, A critical Study of its Development (1967), 
p.2f. If using German terminology, one might appropriately distinguish between “Gesellschaftsvertrag” 
and “Herrschaftsvertrag”. If using French terminology, one might distinguish between “pacte d‟associa-
tion” and “pacte de gouvernement”. But even if the notion of contract is used in both cases, Gough‟s way 
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weight within a modern democratic perspective, the latter might historically be the 
primary one: The submission contract was primarily taken as a treaty between two 
parties. These two parties might, as suggested. be the sovereign on the one hand and the 
people (or groups of the people) on the other hand.
356
 In settling the appropriate terms of 
co-operation and obligation between the governor and the governed the governor had an 
obligation to protect those subject to his rule and provide elementary justice,  not to 
oppress them. And the people, seen as the other contractarian part, had to obey and 
comply with the political rule on the terms settled. The aim of this contractarian ap-
proach is to settle and to regulate properly the relation between the ruler and the ruled. 
Within the perspective of a genuine social contract, the “Konsens der betroffenen 
Bürger”357 is the real problem. It is the relation between the various co-existing parties 
that has to be settled in the genuine social contract. In this connection one, of course, has 
to decide on the kind of government which can properly maintain the terms inherent in 
the social contract in a way that can be approved of by all the contractors. There might 
be remnants of the submission-contract built into the proper social contract.  
The growing emphasis on the genuine social contract-scheme corresponds very closely 
to the great shift in outlook that has increasingly dominated the modern era. According 
to Wolfgang Kersting
358
 this shift entailed the break-up of the classic alliance between 
an Aristotelian Sittlichkeits-morality and a Stoic-Christian norm-morality. Kersting 
views Machiavelli and Hobbes as two of the most prominent persons behind this shift. 
The shift implies that the individual, originally taken to be embedded in “polis”, the 
laws of which he had to conform with, changed his ground-perspective, such that an 
individualism developed according to which the institutions had to be arranged in 
accordance with individual interests and needs. Institutions were no longer taken as 
given, they had to be legitimated, to conform with the basic interests of the persons 
living under them. It was basically left with the consenting individuals to provide 
institutions with basic legitimacy. But individual interests differed in fact to a con-
                                                                                                                                                                          
of viewing the latter is quite clear: “Properly this has nothing to do with the foundation of the state, but, 
presupposing a state already in existence, it purports to define the terms on which it is to be governed: the 
people have made a contract with their ruler which determines their relations with him.” (p.3).  
356
 The Sovereign might also be God, while the other part is the elected people. In this case we might 
most appropriately prefer to use the notion of covenant. 
357
 M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik, (1995), p.337. 
358
 Cf. W. Kersting, Die politische Philosophie des Gesellschaftsvertrags (1994). 
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siderable extent. The contract philosophy was an appropriate medium for handling 
questions of basic agreement among parties with highly different, but also with vital 
concurrent interests.  
The contract-argument proceeds in three stages: 
 The so called “state of nature” is taken as the point of departure. 
 The contractual “substance”, i.e. the content of the treaty, is worked out. 
 The very institutional scheme, that the contract is aiming for, is legitimated, justified, 
assessed or (re)established. 
The way the first stage is elaborated, gives the decisive premises for elaborating the 
content of the contract within stage two. And the second stage gives the substantial 
criteria for the institutional arrangements in stage three (and thereafter for the assess-
ment of an actual institutional scheme). 
As can easily be shown, the first stage is a crucial one. It provides both the vital social 
premises (e.g., that there is a more or less dominant scarcity, unrestrained liberty or 
virtual war between the parties), and crucial presuppositions about the original human 
nature (for instance that human beings are originally free and equal and primarily inter-
ested in self-preservation). 
One usually traces the modern contract-tradition back to the 17
th
 century,  although the 
idea of grounding a politically ordered society on a basic contract was not created ex 
nihilo by Enlightenment-philosophers. As suggested above, elements of a contractarian 
way of thinking about the foundation of society can be traced back to Greek philosophy, 
and some aspects of this approach can even be found within old religious traditions. 
John Rawls clearly employs the contract-tradition. In renewing this tradition he is in-
debted to contractarian philosophers like Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean Jacques 
Rousseau and also Immanuel Kant. However, it would lead me far beyond the focus of 
my thesis to elaborate thoroughly the kind of contractarian philosophy elaborated by 
each of these thinkers. Throughout the presentation and discussion of the Rawlsian 
approach, I shall, however, explicitly refer to the “classical” contractarians when it 
seems of special interest and is appropriate for clarifying the Rawlsian approach. But 
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before considering Rawlsian contractarianism, let me now turn to a dilemma within the 
social-contract-tradition as such: 
As suggested, a contractual agreement might be taken to express a real consensus, as an 
agreement established by real persons or parties as a historical event. Such a kind of 
contractual agreement is well known from daily life, for instance in the case of marriage, 
or when existing nations join together for political and economic purposes in a league 
established and confirmed through certain “ceremonies” and the signing of documents. 
It is, however, hard to imagine that people  as a historical event  actually once estab-
lished a real social contract, thereby in the most fundamental way settling the very 
institutional scheme of society in the first place. It is not to be supposed that citizens  
as an act of establishing an ordered society  have in fact given their explicit consent in 
matters of constitutional essentials, elementary political procedures, distributive justice 
and the institutional scheme as such.
359
 This is pointed out by David Hume who held the 
belief that individuals had once founded an ordered society as such by entering into a 
real social contract binding on all citizens, to be a fiction. Historically there never was 
an “original state” where the conditions for establishing such a real contract were at 
hand. Rather, one might say that the use of contract-terminology in itself presupposes a 
rather well-developed society with a political structure and a system of law. The contract 
model takes its strength by transforming arguments from an already established field of 
law to the field of politics by the means of analogy.  
Moreover, even if somebody really does accept that there once was a situation where an 
original contract was in fact recognised by real persons,  how can this contract be made 
binding on new generations of citizens in new kinds of situations? The idea of a binding 
social contract, securing the legitimacy of a scheme of society, initially agreed upon 
(and signed?) in an original state of nature, is just that;  an idea, which in some 
essential respect might apply by analogy.  
                                                          
359
 Of course one might in modern societies find cases where real persons are invited to give their explicit 
consent in what concerns “treaties” about basic questions and constitutional essentials. Treaties are estab-
lished or rejected all the time in modern societies. But this is something quite different from establishing 
an initial contract in an original position on the very foundation and basic structure of society. There are 
neither plausible historical reasons nor political indications for assuming that real persons have once 
established such a social contract, settling the very institutional scheme of society in the first and most 
fundamental place. 
 148 
On the other hand, Hume's strong objection that there is no historical evidence or indi-
cation that real persons ever actually entered into a basic social contract, does not render 
contractarianism a meaningless doctrine or futile endeavour. This indicates that the mere 
historical aspect is not the most important. The assumption that there once was a histori-
cal state of nature, which was brought to an end when real parties decided to sign a basic 
contract, is obviously not a necessary premise for maintaining contractarianism. I think 
that the vital moral assumption inherent in the contractarian approach, is of greater im-
portance. That ground-assumption is; 
“…that an obligation, to be really binding, must be freely assumed by the parties 
bound. The choices, wisely considered, may be inevitable when human nature is 
taken into account, but the compulsion is an inward one, flowing from the interests 
and the motives of the man himself. In the final analysis obligation cannot be im-
posed by force, but is always selfimposed. It was this conviction which made all 
obligation appear under the guise of a promise; what a man promises me may reas-
onably be held to, since he has himself created the obligation by his own act. In the 
larger question of a man‟s obligation to the community in which he lives, it was 
common to say that there was no rational way to conceive the obligation, except by 
attributing it to a promise. Whether such a covenant were historical or a methodo-
logical fiction, as Kant afterwards said, made little difference; in either case all 
binding obligation had to be represented as self-imposed.”360 
Thus the contract-situation is conceived of as a situation of self-imposed obligation, 
established through fundamental promises that can be taken as mutually binding on the 
parties. Since the social contract, entered upon by all the parties, is the most funda-
mental one, by which society as such is established, it seems quite obvious that society 
as well as the governmental institutions of society, are made by man and for man.
361
 
Accordingly the social contract might be taken as an appropriate means of limiting the 
power of kings, princes and governors, as can for instance be seen in the political 
philosophy of John Locke. 
Thomas Hobbes
362
, however, made the contract a means of defending (a nearly) 
absolute power. How could that be possible? To understand Hobbes approach one has to 
take into consideration that self-preservation, the very upholding of biological existence, 
is taken as the strongest motivational force of human beings. Consequently, individuals, 
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 G.H.Sabine and T.L.Thorson, A History of Political Theory (fourth edition, 1973), p. 398f. 
361
 The genuine social contract has priority to all kinds of submission-contracts. 
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living completely in an unorganised state of nature, can be expected to pursue what they 
consider essential to secure their own existence,  even at the cost of others. A perma-
nent and dangerous conflict with ones' neighbours is the obvious result of granting all 
human beings the unrestricted “right” and “freedom” to secure their own interests. In 
such a situation no one has any guarantee that he will succeed and survive.
363
  
Now, Hobbes‟ main point is that individuals living under such “natural” conditions, 
might be expected to leave the dangerous state of nature willingly, if they could just 
establish some kind of ordered way of coexisting that would be less dangerous and more 
advantageous for each of them. Thus they can be expected to give up something of great 
value in order to attain what they consider even more essential. Hobbes therefore sup-
poses that individuals, to avoid the danger of total individual “liberty” in a mere state of 
nature, would be willing to accept even strong constraints on their own freedom, includ-
ing constraints on the practising of religion, provided of course that all the others like-
wise accept such limitation of their freedom, and provided that this limitation of an indi-
vidual “right” to all things could effectively be arranged and maintained.  
“Hence it follows that a man should be willing, when others are so too, as far forth, 
as for peace, and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right 
to all thing; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would 
allow other men against himself. For practical purposes the whole weight of this law 
is borne by the clause, „when others are so too‟, since it would be ruinous to grant 
liberty to others if they would not grant the same to you. Thus the prime condition of 
society is mutual trust and the keeping of covenants, for without it there can be no 
certainty of performance, but there must be a reasonable presumption that others will 
meet you on the same ground.”364 
To guarantee this mutuality, an ordered society should be founded upon a binding cove-
                                                                                                                                                                          
362
 I shall here not discuss the problem how far Thomas Hobbes – in spite of the obviously illiberal 
features of his conception  might nevertheless be considered one of the main founders of “liberalism”. 
363
 “Since individuals are roughly equal in strength and cunning, none can be secure, and their condition, 
so long as there is no civil power to regulate their behavior, is a „war of every man against every man‟. 
Such a condition is inconsistent with any kind of civilization: there is no industry, navigation, cultivation 
of the soil, building, art, or letters, and the life of man is „solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short‟. Equally 
there is neither right nor wrong, justice nor injustice, since the rule of life is „only that to be every man‟s 
that he can get; and for so long as he can keep it‟.” G. H. Sabine and T. L. Thorson, A History of Political 
Theory (fourth edition, 1973), p. 429. It is well worth noticing that this is Hobbes‟ perspective on those 
living in a state of nature. This does not imply that people, as we know them from real life, should be con-
sidered entirely egoistic and non-moral persons. Thanks to education and the socialisation not least within 
the framework of the family, there will in the actual society always be civilised persons with a high moral 
standard, just as there will also be persons that are not civilized. But the moral virtues and benevolent atti-
tudes of some individuals are not a sufficient basis for establishing a well-ordered society. 
364
 G. H. Sabine and T. L. Thorson, A History of Political Theory (fourth edition, 1973), p. 432. 
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nant, which means that it has to be grounded on the consent of all the different parties 
pursuing their various interests. But Hobbes also sees quite clearly that a mutual trust 
and a mutual readiness to make contracts and keep promises will not alone be sufficient 
to maintain peace and safety in the long run. Just as the contractors could be supposed to 
pay a rather high price for peace and protection, thereby “sacrificing” to a very wide 
extent the liberty that belonged naturally to them in the state of nature, Hobbes takes for 
granted that they would also take further steps to make the contract really binding and 
effective, which, Hobbes argues, entails willingly and rather unconditionally handing 
over their original “rights” to a “sovereign”, with sufficient power to guarantee their 
safety. As a result of mere rational calculation individuals concerned with self-preser-
vation should prefer existence in an ordered society under civil government to existence 
in an unordered and dangerous state of nature. Provided that all are doing it, it is certain-
ly not irrational for the parties; 
“to conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of 
men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will: which is 
as much as to say, to appoint one Man, or Assembly of men, to beare their Person; 
and every one to owne, and acknowledge himself to be Author of whatsoever he that 
so beareth their Person, shall Act, or cause to be Acted, in those things which con-
cerns the Common Peace and Safetie; and therein so submit their Wills, every one to 
his Will, and their Judgments, to his Judgment. This is more than Consent, or Con-
cord; it is a reall Unitie of them all, in one and the same Person, made by Covenant 
of every man with every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every 
man, I Authorise and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this 
Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Author-
ise all his Actions in like manner. This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, 
is called a COMMON-WEALTH,  in latine CIVITAS. This is the Generation of that 
great LEVIATHAN… And in him consisteth the Essence of the Commonwealth; 
which (to define it,) is one Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutuall 
Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the Author, to the end 
he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their 
Peace and Common Defence. And he that carryeth this Person, is called SOVER-




, the absolute state-power, is required to keep the inhabitants of 
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 T. Hobbes, Leviathan, (ed. R. Tuck,1991), p. 120f. (Leviathan was first published 1651). 
366
 “Leviathan (hebr. Liwjatan), ein im Buch Hiob (Kap. 40 und 41) neben dem Landtier Behemoth 
genanntes Seeungeheuer, war ursprünglich wohl ein Gott der babylonischen Mythologie. Im Mittelalter 
lebte das Symbol in christlich-theologischen und jüdisch-kabbalistischen Traditionen fort. In der christ-
lichen Überlieferung geriet der L. bald in der Nähe der apokalyptischen Tiere und wurde mit dem Satan 
selbst identifizirt.… Erst mit Thomas Hobbes‟ „Leviathan‟ (1651) tritt das anti-politisch-theologische 
Symbol aus dem Dunkel der Geheimlehren als antitheologisch-politische Allegorie ins Zwielicht der 
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the country in awe, to direct their acts towards the common good and enforce the laws 
of the country. The rule of the government is therefore to be conceived of as nearly 
absolute. Since self-preservation is the supreme aim, one can better understand that 
people are expected to live with the Hobbesian Leviathan, at least as far as Leviathan 
does not himself bring them into mortal danger, but protects them from violent death. 
Having first appointed a sovereign, the absolute sovereignty could not just be with-
drawn.
367
 The Hobbesian covenant has paved the way for the great Leviathan. 
John Locke for his part sets quite another tone in Two Treatises of Government 
368
. He 
too takes the scheme of society to be based on consent from persons who have to coexist 
and co-operate. But the contract-situation conceived of by Locke is obviously taken to 
be quite different from the state of nature as described by Hobbes. The state of nature is 
not in the same way taken by Locke to be continually threatened by a war of all against 
all. Since, according to Locke, a fundamental “right to life, liberty, and estate” is prior to 
positive law and institutional arrangements
369, a basic “compact” among those living in 
the state of nature incorporates moral standards and can be a powerful instrument for 
assessing existing political institutions from an original moral point of view. The nearly 
absolute power that Hobbes ascribes to Leviathan is thereby broken or at least clearly 
limited. 
But why should people make a social covenant at all according to Locke? Let me just 
                                                                                                                                                                          
politischen Philosophie und Polemik. Für Hobbes ist „magnus ille L.‟ als eine mythische Totalität von 
Gott, Mensch, Tier und Maschine die Verkörperung von politischer Einheit: „Non est potestas super 
terram quae comparetur ei.‟(Motto aus Hiob 41,24: „Auf Erden ist seinesgleichen niemand.‟ dtsch. nach 
M.LUTHER).” Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie (1989), Vol.5, column 254 
367
 According to Hobbes people should  as made clear  be supposed to be willing to accept heavy con-
straints on their freedom for the sake of internal peace. If the sovereign, however, turns out to be so tyran-
nical that he really threatens life and self-preservation, even Hobbes should admit that the government 
should better be removed by those so threatened,  since it has obviously forfeited its most eminent task. Or 
better: They should just stop obeying such a state-power instead of removing the institution as such. 
368
 Two Treatises of Government was probably written in the years 1680-1683 and published in 1689. 
The first treatise is entirely directed against Sir Robert Filmer‟s book “Patriarcha”, (published about 
1650). The second treatise is reckoned as the most important, being of the greatest long-term value. I have 
used the first modernised version based on Locke‟s corrected text in the third edition, originally published 
in 1698. 
369
 They are prior in the sense that even in the original situation it is the case “That all individuals are en-
dowed by their creator with a right to life, liberty, and estate, aside from all reference to their social and 
political associations, [but this] is certainly not a proposition for which any empirical proof can be given. 
There seems to be no way whatever to prove it; it must stand, as Thomas Jefferson said, simply as self-
evident, an axiom from which social and moral theorems can be deduced, but which in itself is more 
obvious than any other ethical principle. Probably this is what Locke believed.” G. H. Sabine and T. L. 
Thorson, A History of Political Theory (1973), p. 488. 
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give one of the primary reasons: Locke (like Hobbes) takes it as a characteristic feature 
of the state of nature that there is unconstrained individual “freedom”. Even if Locke 
conceives of human nature of man differently than Hobbes, Locke clearly sees that 
insoluble conflicts might arise in the state of nature. And so he makes it clear that the 
aim of ordered society, as opposed to the mere state of nature, is; 
“…to avoid, and remedy those inconveniences of the state of nature, which neces-
sarily follow from every man‟s being judge in his own case, by setting up a known 
authority, to which everyone of that society may appeal upon any injury received, or 
controversy that may arise, and which everyone of the society ought to obey; wher-
ever any persons are, who have not such an authority to appeal to, for the decision of 
any difference between them, there those persons are still in the state of nature.
370
 
Note that it is foremost the ordered scheme of society as such that is constituted by the 
completely voluntary “compact” among the parties in the original situation, and this 
founding of a society has to be followed up by establishing governmental power.
371
 
Since the compact by which an ordered society is founded as well as the establishing of 
governmental rule, depends on an original consent from the side of the people, it seems 
plausible to claim that people are also entitled to withdraw their consent if the govern-
ment oppresses them and sets aside their elementary rights. Therefore, when the execu-
tive and even the legislative power are no longer being used by the government to pro-
tect natural rights and property, it should be considered legitimate for the citizens to 
deny their support, thereby rendering the government illegitimate. This is the “revo-
lutionary” aspect of Locke‟s theory.372 Governmental power should , in effect, always be 
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 J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government (ed. M. Goldie1993), p.158. Two Treatises of Government 
was written in the years 1680-1683 and published in 1689.  
371
 “Such a power can arise only by consent, and though this may be tacitly given, it must be the consent 
of each individual for himself. For civil power can have no right except as this is derived from the indi-
vidual right of each man to protect himself and his property. The legislative and executive power used by 
government to protect property is nothing except the natural power of each man resigned into the hands of 
the community, or resigned to the public, and it is justified merely because it is a better way of protecting 
natural rights than the selfhelp to which each man is naturally entitled. This is the original compact by 
which men incorporate into society; it is a bare agreement to unite into one political society, which is all 
the compact that is, or needs be, between the individuals, that enter into, or make up a commonwealth.” G. 
H. Sabine and T. L. Thorson, A History of Political Theory (1973), p. 490. 
372
 In modern democratic societies clear procedures for withdrawing support are institutionalised. Never-
theless, I think that John Locke‟s political writings, although conceived of in a political situation very dif-
ferent from ours, are in some respects still of great importance. When reading “The second Treatise of 
Government”, one gets the impression that it can never be easy for the citizens to fundamentally withdraw 
support, making the actual government illegitimate. Just as private persons should not be their own judges, 
it is also difficult to imagine that the citizens, or a majority of citizens, should be judges in their own sake 
when it comes to the question whether one should get rid of the existing government. Therefore Locke 
frequently emphasizes that there might be many situations when those suffering from political injustice 
have no other possibility but appealing to heaven. “The people have no other remedy in this, as in all other 
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reckoned as the power of free and equal citizens as a collective body. The very idea of a 
basic contract securing the elementary rights and obligations for the members of society, 
provides us with a powerful instrument for limiting and controlling institutionalised 
power and for regulating mutual obligations, as can most clearly be observed in the 
political philosophy of John Locke.  
John Rawls may consider John Locke as one of his predecessors in political philosophy. 
But even if Locke as well as Hobbes avoids the naïvism of making the social contract an 
actual historical event signed by real persons, both of them are according to Rawls, 
“bound to be substantially affected by contingencies and accidents of the as-if just 
historical process which has no tendency to preserve or to move toward background 
justice.”373 Rawls uses Locke to illustrate this point, pointing to the fact that;  
“He [Locke] assumes that not all members of society following the social compact 
have equal political rights: citizens have the right to vote in virtue of owning 
property so that the propertyless have no vote and no right to exercise political 
authority. Presumably the diverse accumulations of the as-if just historical process 
over generation has left many without property through no fault over their own.”374 
                                                                                                                                                                          
cases, where they have no judge on earth, but to appeal to heaven. For the rulers, in such attempts, exer-
cising a power the people never put into their hands (who can never be supposed to consent, that anybody 
should rule over them for their harm) do that, which they have not a right to do. And where the body of 
the people, or any single man, is deprived of their right, or is under the exercise of a power without right, 
and have no appeal, on earth, there they have a liberty to appeal to heaven, whenever they judge the cause 
of sufficient moment.” (p. 201). But nevertheless John Locke also sees the possibility that the people 
might be definitely best served “when the government is dissolved, … erecting a new legislative, differing 
from the other, by the change of persons, or form, or both as they shall find it most for their safety and 
good.” (p.226). But he is convinced that this will not happen very frequently and easily: “Secondly, I 
answer, such revolutions happen not upon little mismanagement in public affairs. Great mistakes in the 
ruling part, many wrong and inconvenient laws, and all the slips of human frailty will be borne by the 
people, without mutiny or murmor. But if a long train of abuses, prevarications, and artifices, all tending 
the same way, make the design visible to the people, and they cannot but feel, what they lie under, and 
see, whither they are going; „tis not to be wondered, that they should then rouse themselves, and endeav-
our to put the rule into such hands, which may secure to them the ends for which government was first 
erected…” (p.229) John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1689, ed. M.Goldie1993).Although cauti-
ous, Locke is here obviously providing legitimacy for the Revolution that brought William of Orange to 
the throne. 
373
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.287. 
374
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.287. But Locke might have avoided such an approach: “The 
constraints that Locke imposes on the as-if historical process are not strong enough to characterize a 
conception of background justice acceptable to free and equal persons. This can be brought out by sup-
posing that the social compact is to be made immediately following the creation of human beings as free 
and equal persons in the state of nature. Assuming that their situation with respect to one another suitably 
represents their freedom and equality, and also that (as Locke holds) God has not conferred on anyone the 
right to exercise political authority, they will presumably acknowledge principles that assure equal basic 
(including political) rights for all throughout the later historical process. This reading of Locke‟s view 
makes it an as-if nonhistorical doctrine…” Ibid p. 287f. 
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However, Rawls himself holds that his own contractarian approach avoids the different 




Contractarian consensus is without doubt seen by Rawls as the outcome of a hypotheti-
cal “contract”, to be established by imaginary persons, which means that Rawlsian con-
tractarianism is used mainly for the sake of argument. Thereby he avoids naïve histori-
cism as well as the kind of social contingencies brought in by Locke and Hobbes. Used 
as a thought experiment, the contractarian argument is a powerful device for arguing 
matters of actual politics and ethics, and for setting the fairness of the very institutional 
scheme of society on the agenda. Rawls contractarian approach (which also bears influ-
ence from Kant
376
) should clearly be considered hypothetical and paradigmatic rather 
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 I have earlier in this chapter referred to the kind of critique set forth by David Hume. In Political 
Liberalism, (pp.285-288) Rawls also considers the critique set forth by Hegel against the idea of an 
“initial” social contract. And Rawls finds it necessary “to show that the original position construction, 
which uses the idea of the social contract, is not open to the cogent objections that idealists raised to the 
contract tradition of their day. Thus Hegel thought that this doctrine confused society and the state with an 
association of private persons; that it permitted the general form and content of public law to be deter-
mined too much by the contingent and specific private interests and personal concerns of individuals; and 
that it could make no sense of the fact that it is not up to us whether we are born into and belong to our 
society. For Hegel the doctrine of social contract was an illegitimate and uncritical extension of ideas at 
home in and limited to (what he called) „civil society‟. A further objection was that the doctrine failed to 
recognize the social nature of human beings and depended on attributing to them certain fixed natural 
abilities and specific desires independent from, and for theoretical purposes prior to, society.” J. Rawls, 
Political Liberalism (1993), p. 285f. Rawls is of the opinion that neither Hobbes nor Locke would be able 
to answer this idealist critique. But Rawls defends himself against this kind of critique by stressing both 
the basic institutional aspect of justice as fairness and by taking the social nature of man very consciously 
into account: “I have attempted to reply to these criticisms first by maintaining that the primary subject of 
justice is the basic structure of society, which has the fundamental task of establishing background justice. 
… Finally, I have indicated how justice as fairness can accommodate the social nature of human beings. 
At the same time, since it proceeds from a suitably individualistic basis (the original position is conceived 
as fair between free and equal moral persons), it is a moral conception that provides an appropriate place 
for social values without sacrificing the freedom and integrity of the person.” Ibid. p.286. 
376
 I will not here consider Kant‟s use of contract-ideas more thoroughly. Let me, however, mention that 
Kant, especially in Die Metaphysik der Sitten (1797), employs contractarian ideas : After having given a 
kind of typology of contracts, and having applied it both to commercial, political, familial and ethical 
issues, “He also discusses the founding of a state in terms of the idea of an original contract, as „the act by 
which a people forms itself into a state‟ (MM p.315 …). In this contract, everyone exchanges their „exter-
nal freedom‟ for „civil freedom‟. Three distinct contracts are in fact undertaken in the formation of the 
state: the first is between future citizens in which „each complements the others to complete the consti-
tution of a state‟ (MM p.315 …); the second is between the people and a superior, the contract of „sub-
ordination‟; and the third is between the superior and the people through which „each subject is apport-
ioned his rights‟ (MM p.316 …); The idea of this original contract provides a regulative idea by which „to 
think of the legitimacy of the state‟ (MM p.315 …) and thus „involves an obligation on the part of the 
constituting authority to make the kind of government suited to the idea of the original contract‟ (MM 
p.340 …). Kant extends this original contract within a state to that between states, proposing a „league of 
nations‟ based on an association of sovereign authorities.” H. Caygill, A Kant Dictionary (1995), p. 133f. 
(The page-references in Caygill‟s Dictionary refer to the German „Academy Edition‟). It is important here 
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than real and empirical. 
4.3.2. Rawls’ use of the contract-argument 
As emphasised, the fundamental social contract should not be taken as an ordinary 
historical event of a distant past,  the theory of the social contract should better be 
transformed into an ideal and highly hypothetical regulative idea to be carried out as a 
thought-experiment with a considerable paradigmatic force. The latter approach to 
contractarianism is the concern of John Rawls. 
“What I have attempted to do is to generalize and carry to a higher order of ab-
straction the traditional theory of the social contract as represented by Locke, 
Rousseau, and Kant. In this way I hope that the theory can be developed so that it is 
no longer open to the more obvious objections often thought fatal to it.”377 
And Rawls indeed converts the contract-model into a powerful “hypothetical” device. 
The “classical” stages of the contract-argument can, however, still be discerned in 
Rawls‟ hypothetical conception: 
1 The state of nature is constructed by Rawls as an original position, where the con-
tract-parties can be supposed to come to a unanimous decision on which principles 
should most appropriately count as the normative ground and the final court of 
appeal in questions concerning the basic terms of their association. 
2 The original choice-situation, as conceived of by Rawls378, is designed to produce the 
substantially best outcome by a mere procedural course of action. The substantial 
outcome of a contractarian agreement made on these premises provides us, according 
to Rawls, with principles of justice, suitable for securing fundamental liberties, 
elementary rights and fair terms‟ co-operation for all the parties. 
3 The substantial principles arrived at in the original position can expectedly serve as a 
widely acceptable normative ground for assessing, justifying and (re)arranging the 
very institutional scheme of society. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
to notice that the contract is taken by Kant to provide us with a regulative idea by which we can properly 
think of the legitimacy of the state. 
377
 A Theory of Justice (1971), p. VIII 
378
 As we shall see Rawls is constructing an idealised imaginary contractarian situation by modelling into 
it the appropriate premises that are required for the fictitious contractors to arrive at an agreement about 
“essentials” that is assumed to be both unanimous, maximally fair and binding on all parties. 
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By modelling the intuitions about justice with which people are most familiar, into the 
very structure of the original position in a way that will necessarily be reflected in the 
decisions about the ordering of society made by the contractors, Rawls intends to ground 
the institutional scheme of society on principles of justice that will prove widely recog-
nisable and most justifiable. This means that ordinary ideas of fairness are given a de-
cisive role in the very construction of the initial situation and will expectedly influence 
the decisions taken by the contractors. The substantial principles, agreed upon by the 
contractors, are even supposed to follow strictly from ( i.e. be logically entailed by) the 
premises given in the very structure of the initial situation as such.
379
 
Of course, one might say that the second of the three stages sketched above  deciding 
on and spelling out in detail the substantial principles of justice  is the most crucial 
one. However, I shall not analyse the principles of justice as specified by Rawls nor the 
relation between these substantial principles. Neither shall I analyse in detail the con-
ception of justice as fairness elaborated in A Theory of Justice.
 380
 There are good 
reasons for limiting this part of my dissertation to the required minimum: Rawls‟ theory 
of justice has been intensively discussed since A Theory of Justice was first published 
and the amount of literature on this issue is therefore immense. Dealing thoroughly with 
the notion of justice as such, and trying to give a full account of Rawls‟ theory of 
justice, would by far exceed the limited space being at my disposal in this dissertation. 
Since the idea of justice, as elaborated by Rawls, is nonetheless such an important and 
integrated part of his theory as such, I cannot entirely avoid the issue of justice, even if I 
cannot contribute very much to furthering the debate in this field. I shall therefore draw 
upon the most obvious outcome of this debate, as far as this is necessary for my own 
purpose. One cannot discuss Rawls' consensual ideas without referring to the idea of 
justice as fairness. 
                                                          
379
 I prefer to use the terminology “follow strictly from” here. Rawls himself seems to be even stronger 
about this, saying that the premises built into the original situation should be such that “arguments from 
such premises can be fully deductive … We should strive for a kind of moral geometry with all the rigor 
which this name connotes”. A Theory of Justice (1971), p.121. But simultaneously he admits that “Unhap-
pily the reasoning I shall give will fall far short of this, since it is highly intuitive throughout. Yet it is es-
sential to have in mind the ideal one would like to achieve.” Ibid, p.121.  
380
 There is certainly an immense quantity of literature on Rawls‟ conception of justice as such. As far as I 
considered it necessary for my thesis, I have in chapter 1 and 2 of my dissertation given a short review of 
his theory of justice, as specified in the two principles of justice, and I have also given an account of the 
way Rawls‟ conceives of the circumstances of justice. Thereby I can all the way refer to the principles of 
justice and to the very idea of justice as fairness. 
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Just as I cannot go very deep into the theory of justice as such, I cannot now thoroughly 
use the principles elaborated in the original position for assessing concrete institutional 
schemes either. 
Since my primary concern is the possibility of arriving at a unanimous decision on a 
morally grounded framework that can be accepted by the diverse parties in pluralist 
societies as fair, I shall now concentrate rather thoroughly on the first of the three stages 
mentioned above; the initial situation, assumed to make the unanimous decision 
possible.  
4.3.3. Behind a veil of ignorance 
It is appropriate for my purpose to begin with a more thorough overview of Rawls‟ 
modelling of the so called “original position”, that is called “Rawls‟ most favored inter-
pretation of the contract”381. My overview and my comments now refer mainly to 
chapter III in A Theory of Justice, where Rawls develops his idea of the “original 
position” most extensively.382 
The “original position” is conceived of by Rawls as a constructed choice situation where 
imaginary parties are provided with the task of choosing
383
 decisive principles of justice 
that can serve as the shared basis when the terms of social coexistence are to be settled.  
Outside the original position, i.e. in real societies, people face very complex social 
circumstances, have particular interests and social attachments, different kinds of be-
liefs, opposing conceptions of the good life, and each of them has an immense amount 
of particular information and knowledge coming from many different sources. In such a 
“real” and complex situation the difficulty of arriving at a unanimous decision about 
principles of fairness, distributive guidelines and constitutional essentials is obvious 
(and if the parties should really succeed in coming to an agreement about these things, 
the result would most likely be trivial).  
                                                          
381
 Cf. R. Dworkin: The Original Position in: Reading Rawls. Critical Studies on Rawls‟ A Theory of 
Justice, (Ed. N. Daniels, 1975), p.43. 
382
 One might also refer to Lecture I, § 4. “The Idea of the Original Position” and Lecture VIII, § 4. “The 
Original Position” in J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), pp.22-28 and pp. 304-310. 
383
 According to Rawls the parties are assumed to choose from a list of different conceptions of justice, 
among others the Rawlsian “two-principles‟-conception”, classical and average utilitarian conceptions, 
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By contrast, in a hypothetically modelled original position, which is in many respects a 
simplified constructed model, the number of variables can be kept low. Such an initial 
choice-situation has to be modelled in a way that makes the (fictitious) contractors con-
centrate just on the most essential terms of coexistence. Rawls is very explicit about 
this, emphasising that the original position has to be structured in a way that may plau-
sibly provide us with the most appropriate principles of justice by pure procedural pro-
ceeding.  
To make clear which function the idea of an original position has according to Rawls, 
there are three points that I believe should be stressed: 
First: The heading of this chapter, “The veil of ignorance” is chosen to indicate an im-
portant characteristic of the initial situation as conceived of by Rawls. More than any-
thing else, the so-called “veil of ignorance” is used by Rawls as a means of modelling 
the original position in a way which makes it possible to focus on those terms that are 
most essential for elaborating shared principles of justice.  
In constructing the original position Rawls clearly realises that “somehow we must nul-
lify the effects of the specific contingencies which put men at odds and tempt them to 
exploit social and natural circumstances to their own advantage.”384 And that is just the 
function that the veil of ignorance has;  to “nullify the effects of specific contingen-
cies”. By placing the parties of the original position behind a “veil of ignorance”, Rawls 
restricts the amount of knowledge that the contractors can be permitted to have. There 
can be supposed to be among the contractors a radical lack of knowledge about the 
social place and status real persons would have in real society. Let me here insert the 
remark that it seems most appropriate to consider the contractors of the “original po-
sition” as representatives of citizens or groups of citizens within real society, as Rawls 
himself does in his later writings. Thus the contractors are entrusted with the task of 
securing the best available outcome for those they are representing.  
The parties in the original position have no knowledge about the actual social situated-
ness or about the natural assets, for instance, intelligence, physical abilities and psycho-
                                                                                                                                                                          
egoistic conceptions, intuitionistic conceptions and mixed conceptions. Cf. A Theory of Justice (1971), 
p.124. 
384
 A Theory of Justice (1971), p.136 
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logical characteristics of those represented.
385
 And there are many particular things con-
cerning the “real” society that they don‟t know either, for instance what political govern-
ment there is in the country, what economic and cultural level the society has achieved. 
Neither do the contractors know what religious beliefs or moral doctrines the repre-
sented persons really honour. In short: By placing the contractors within the original 
position behind a “veil of ignorance” Rawls has systematically ruled out from the initial 
choice-situation the kind of contingencies and particularities that are so often the source 
of interest-conflicts between people.  
But, by eliminating sources of conflict between people from consideration, I believe that 
Rawls exposes himself to the critique that he simply takes some values for granted.  For 
instance, Rawls assumes that the value of equality is highly recommendable, morally 
acceptable and to be taken as fundamental when designing the choice-situation. Thus 
Rawls assumes that he is morally justified in systematically limiting the parties‟ insights 
into precisely those economic, religious and political inequalities and kinds of social 
differences that might at the very outset unfairly influence the contractual outcome in 
terms of the ground-decisions about constitutional essentials and basic justice. By re-
ducing particular contingencies in the way Rawls does, the parties are as far as possible 
to be equally situated when they settle upon the fairest institutional scheme for all 
citizens. And, in fact, Rawls draws the conclusion that is near at hand, saying that: 
“… it is clear that since the differences among the parties are unknown to them, and 
everyone is equally rational and similarly situated, each is convinced by the same 
arguments. Therefore, we can view the choice in the original position from the 
standpoint of one person selected at random. If anyone after due reflection prefers a 
conception of justice to another, then they all do, and a unanimous agreement can be 
reached.”386 
By introducing the “veil of ignorance” Rawls makes it very clear that the original 
position is a “construct”, a thought-experiment that all persons in real societies, 
provided they have a normal capacity of abstraction and reasoning, should be able of 
reproduce simply by trying to set particular interests, contingent circumstances and 
                                                          
385
 A person in the original position does not even know “the special features of his psychology such as 
his aversion to risk or liability to optimism or pessimism”. A Theory of Justice (1971), p.137 This is an 
implication of introducing a “veil of ignorance” that is in no way unproblematic since Rawls elsewhere 
obviously assumes that the parties in the original position have a certain psychological constitution. They 
are for instance supposed to be rather risk-averse persons. 
386
 A Theory of Justice (1971), p.139 
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special life-plans aside (for a while). By introducing the idea of a “veil of ignorance”, 
thus bringing the parties of the original position in a situation with restricted insight, 
Rawls will force the contractors, since they cannot know what the social position and 
particular interests of the persons they represent might be, to choose principles of right 
not just for the benefit of their “clients”, but necessarily also for the benefit of everyone 
else as well. 
Second: It can be discussed how thick the “veil of ignorance” really is according to 
Rawls. How much of the circumstances that apply in the empirical world is really ruled 
out? How much are the parties supposed to know about the political reality they are 
making decisions for? Shouldn‟t they have at least some knowledge about the kind of 
empirical problems that really actualise the quest for fundamental principles of justice? 
These questions can best be answered by examining how far the so called circumstances 
of justice are supposed to apply in the original position. As already stated (in Chapter II) 
the circumstances of justice are those circumstances of conflicting and coinciding inter-
ests that really call for the virtue of justice. There are some objective and general back-
ground-circumstances that citizens in real societies are faced with and which the parties 
in the original position are likewise assumed to have in mind: Therefore one should sup-
pose that there is certain background information about the circumstances prevailing in 
the “real world”, which has to be reflected in the original position as well. The modelled 
original situation might be simplified, non-complex and focusing merely on the most es-
sential aspects, but it should not be conceived of in a way which is misleading or false. 
For example, according to Rawls, the contractors have to take the fact of moderate 
scarcity as an important premise. 
The contractors are also supposed to have a general insight into aspects of things which 
matter subjectively. Although the contractors themselves do not honour any particular 
conception of the good, pursue specific life plans or have any special moral allegiances, 
they are aware of the role that such things generally play in real life.
387
 In a similar way 
the parties in the original position are aware of the role that natural relations, family-
                                                          
387
 Rawls assumes that the parties‟ “goodwill stretches over at least two generations …having a desire to 
further the welfare of their nearest descendants”. A Theory of Justice (1971), p.128. The further problems 
raised by this assumption cannot be pursued here. 
 161 
bonds etc. play in connection with concrete lifeplans and individual conceptions of the 
good in real life, but they are nevertheless themselves “assumed to take no interest in 
one another‟s interest”.388  In short: The contractors are supposed to know that different 
people have various commitments, that they honour diverse conceptions of the good and 
have different social interests, but they themselves have only an insight in the general 
features of those particular, empirical circumstances.
389
  
Third: When Rawls models the original position, he cannot avoid making some as-
sumptions about the “nature” of the contractors. Are they conceived of as moral persons, 
are they altruistic or egoistic? And why are they conceived of as entirely autonomous 
individuals without any constitutive ties and deep attachments to other persons? Aren‟t 
the agents of the Rawlsian original position considered merely self-interested rational 
agents, as Wolfgang Kersting for instance supposes?
390
 How fair is it, however, to take 
Rawls‟ image of the contractors as a decisive indication of his conception of man as 
such? 
I cannot answer all these questions thoroughly, but let me stress the following:  
One might see the contractors as persons in a state of social “amnesia” who face the task 
of settling the terms of coexistence for all of the members of the society to which they 
shall themselves return. As already suggested, however, it seems more appropriate to 
consider the contractors of the original position as mere representatives of citizens or 
groups of citizens within real society. In so far the contractors are entrusted with the task 
                                                          
388
 In this connection Rawls emphasises that “the postulate of mutual disinterest in the original position is 
made to insure that the principles of justice do not depend upon strong assumptions. Recall that the origi-
nal position is meant to incorporate widely shared and yet weak conditions. A conception of justice should 
not presuppose, then, extensive ties of natural sentiment. At the basis of the theory, one tries to assume as 
little as possible.” A Theory of Justice (1971), p.129. With considerable right the contractors may be 
characterised as “detached selves”. 
389
 According to Michael J.Sandel Rawls is pressured to resort to a “notion of the original position which 
includes as part of its description an empirical account of characteristic human circumstances … And so it 
would appear that the two aspirations of Rawls‟ theory, to avoid both the contingency of the existing de-
sires and the alleged arbitrariness and obscurity of the transcendent, are uncombinable after all, the Archi-
medean point wiped out in a litany of contradictions.” M. J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice 
(1990, first published 1982), p.40. Thus Sandel means that Rawls tries to combine elements that are too 
disparate to be combined, namely a Humean empirical approach and a Kantian transcendental approach.  
390
 Wolfang Kersting takes the man of the original position to be the typical rational and self-interested 
“homo oeconomicus” and therefore he emphasises that “Die Grundthese ist, daß sich Gerechtigkeits-
prinzipien auf der Basis des rationalen Selbstinteresses gewinnen lassen, sofern dieses unter gewissen 
einschränkenden Idealbedingungen agiert. Auch der rechtfertigungstheoretische Kontraktualismus stützt 
sich auf ein Vertragsinhaltsargument der ökonomischen Rationalität.” Die politische Philosophie des 
Gesellschaftsvertrag (1994), p.268. 
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of securing the best available outcome for those they represent. This perspective enables 
us to understand the important, but very limited role the contractors have. And we can 
better see why the parties of the original position are supposed to be disinterested in the 
sense that they have no deeper interest in the interests of other persons. Michael Sandel, 
however, takes this as an indication of a deeper individualism in Rawls‟ philosophy as a 
whole.
391
 Individual man is fundamentally seen as prior to the ends he has, and to his 
social attachments and to the conceptions of the good that he pursues.  
This may be right in one respect: The persons of the original position are certainly not 
conceived of as benevolent, as having particular moral attachments, or belonging to a 
network of complex relations. But if one really intends to give a fair presentation of 
Rawls‟ conception of man, one should in my opinion not draw strong conclusions from 
the image he gives us of the contractors in the original position. The contractor is noth-
ing but a fictitional construct situated in a hypothetically modelled original position. The 
contractors can be supposed to have identical interests, what means that they are able of 
focusing only on the essential general features that are of the greatest importance when 
settling the institutional life-conditions for all members of society in the most impartial 
way. 
By denying the contractors nearly all information about particular interests and special 
social circumstances, the parties have no basis any longer for bargaining, promoting 
special interests or for manipulating others in certain directions. The deliberation of all 
parties may be mainly similar. Conceiving of the “inhabitants” of the original position in 
this way means that Rawls has quite deliberately presented us, not with some “real” 
persons, but in a sense with “detached selves”, without thereby claiming that he has 
provided us with the true conception of man. But by abstracting from particular attach-
ments and special interests, he hopes that a contract, conceived of in a hypothetical 
original position, might be decided without really reflecting the relative strength, power 
and bargaining advantage that some of the contracting parties might really have. Con-
                                                          
391
 Not “individualistic” in the sense that what counts is the right for each to pursue his own interests. But 
Sandel points to another and deeper kind of individualism: “All interests, values, and conceptions of the 
good are open to the Rawlsian self, so long as they can be cast as the interests of a subject individuated in 
advance and given prior to its ends, so long, that is, as they describe the objects I seek rather than the 
subject I am. Only the bounds of the self are fixed in advance. But this suggests a deeper sense in which 
Rawls‟ conception is individualistic.” M. J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1990, first 
published 1982), p.62. 
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ceiving of the contractors in this (“thin”) way serves a certain aim in Rawls‟ theory.  
Even the kind of bargaining which is usually associated with the formation of business 
contracts is missing in Rawls construction of the original position. Moreover, the 
Rawlsian “contract” is obviously formed in a situation where the different aspects of 
power are deliberately reduced to an absolute minimum,  although I suppose that the 
parties might be well aware of the general features of political power and the conflict 
potential of society. There is a far cry from the virtual war that we find within Hobbes' 
description of the state of nature. The agents of the Rawlsian original position are none-
theless different from the agents in a Hobbesian state of nature in an important respect: 
there is no envy between the parties within the Rawlsian original position. However, one 
has to stress, that these contractors do not present us with the Rawlsian conception of 
man as such. And whether one takes them as representing “clients” or as persons who  
in a state of widespread social “amnesia”  are planning for their own lives, it is quite 
clear that their sole task is to seek the highest possible degree of primary goods.
392
 In so 
far as this is true, they may be considered as self-interested as the Hobbesian man in the 
state of nature. They might also be considered fully rational agents,  able of “taking 
effective means to ends with unified expectations and objective interpretation of pro-
bability”.393 The contractor is the typical “homo oeconomicus”. 
And “homo oeconomicus”, when situated under a veil of ignorance in a Rawlsian origi-
nal position, is expected to take the maximin-principle as the most rational guideline for 
making vital decisions about the most appropriate conception of justice. Rational con-
tractors, being in a situation where they have no insight into the social situatedness, the 
particular interests, the power and the status of those who shall really live with the 
contract, will, according to Rawls, tend to choose the principles that are best for their 
“clients”, even if they should happen to be among those who are worst off in society. In 
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 I recall that the primary goods, “are things which it is supposed a rational man wants whatever else he 
wants. Regardless of what an individual‟s rational plans are in detail, it is assumed that there are various 
things which he would prefer more of rather than less. With more of these goods men can generally be 
assured of greater success in carrying out their intentions and advancing their ends, whatever these ends 
may be. The primary social goods, to give them in broad categories, are rights and liberties, opportunities 
and powers, income and wealth. (A very important primary good is a sense of one‟s own worth…) It 
seems evident that in general these things fit the description of primary goods. They are social goods in 
view of their connection with the basic structure; liberties and powers are defined by the rules of major 
institutions and the distribution of income and wealth is regulated by them.” J.Rawls, A Theory of Justice 
(1971), p.92. 
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short, the maximin-strategy aims at achieving the best of the worst.
394
 Being uncertain 
about the real situation of their “clients”, the contractors will hardly play hazard with the 
destiny of the persons they represent. In a situation of uncertainty  each of them has to 
act as if he should settle principles of justice for a “society in which his enemy is to 
assign him his place”.395   
Wolfgang Kersting finds Rawls' assumption that rational man should be as risk-averse 
implausible. Kersting believes that this assumption is both psychologically and empiri-
cally unjustified.
396
 In my opinion however, from a “contract-internal” perspective the 
maximin-strategy should hardly be considered implausible. For one, it is a fact that 
some groups are clearly disadvantaged in real society, and the contractors are supposed 
to have general knowledge about that. With clear reference to Rawls‟ A Theory of 
Justice (p.154), Thomas Pogge underlines appropriately that there are at least three 
conditions that should be fulfilled before one can consider the maximin-rule a rational 
principle: 
“1. Der beste Schlimmstfall ist erträglich und es ist nicht besonders wichtig, besser 
abzuschneiden.  
  2. Durch jede der anderen Optionen kann es zu unerträglichen Ergebnissen 
kommen. 
  3. Bei diesen anderen Optionen läßt sich die Wahrscheinlichkeit solcher unerträg-
licher Ergebnisse nicht abschätzen.”397 
                                                                                                                                                                          
393
 J.Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), p.146 
394
 There is a “bias” of perspective built into the maximin-strategy as such. The focus is necessarily 
directed towards the worst-off. Pogge uses a biblical allusion to underline this aspect of “Rawls‟s com-
mitment to the maximin idea. In analogy to the biblical idea of morality  „Whatever you have done to one 
of the least of these my brethren, that you have done to me‟ (Matthew 25.40)  the ranking of feasible al-
ternative basic structures is to depend upon the worst social position each of them tends to produce.” T. 
W. Pogge, Realizing Rawls (1991, first printing 1989), p.110. (Of course the essential christological 
implications of this central diaconical text are not taken more thoroughly into consideration here.) 
395
 J.Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), p.152. 
396
 And he concludes that: “Die leidliche Rationalität unserer Alltagsleben verdanken wir der Tatsache, 
daß wir nicht dieses hasenherzig-mißtrauische Entscheidungstemperament besitzen und die Maximin-
Regel weitgehend unangewendet lassen.” W. Kersting, Die politische Philosophie des Gesellschafts-
vertrag (1994), p.280. And Kersting seeks support from Harsanyi, whom he quotes: “„Wenn jemand wirk-
lich auf diese Weise handelte, er würde bald in einer Irrenanstalt landen‟ (Harsanyi. Can the Maximin 
Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality, in: Essays on Ethics, Social Behavior, and Scientific Explanation, 
Dordrecht - Boston: Reidel 1976, 37-63;40).” Ibid. p. 281.  
397
 T. W. Pogge, John Rawls (1994), p. 74. Pogge also asks whether a “Maximittelregel” (that the highest 
average-score would be preferable) might be preferable to Rawls‟ maximin-approach, and he then states 
most plausibly that: “Die von einem Durchschnittskriterium selegierte Grundordnung könnte einer 
Minderheit ganz enorme Lasten aufbürden  z.B. eine Religion verbieten, Sklaverei erlauben oder gar 
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There is in Rawls‟ theory a close correspondence between the way the original position 
is constructed and the principles of justice as fairness as a natural outcome. Thus, there 
is also a connection between the use of the maximin-rule and the difference-principle, 
which also addresses the situation of those worst off, saying that social inequalities 
should be approved of only if they are “to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged 
members of society”.398  
In itself, the maximin-rule is not a moral principle; it is a principle of rationality, but the 
original position is constructed in such a way that the application of the maximin rule, as 
the most rational, makes it irrational for the parties, even if they may be self-interested 
persons, to utilise merely egoistic and non-moral principles. This aspect is clearly em-
phasised by Kersting, when he says about the model of the original position that: 
“Sie zwingen der ökonomischen Rationalität eine moralisch-transsubjektive Per-
spektive auf, der die ökonomische Rationalität sich beugen muß, ohne dabei jedoch 
selbst moralisch werden zu müssen. Rawls überlistet den klugen Egoisten; er lockt 
ihn in eine Situation, in der dieser moralisch agieren muß, ohne es zu bemerken. Das 
Lehrstück vom Schleier der Unwissenheit bildet die moralphilosophische List, mit 
der Rawls‟ Gerechtigkeitstheorie die ökonomische Rationalität für ihre Zwecke ein-
                                                                                                                                                                          
Gladiatorenkämpfe zulassen  sofern diese Lasten hinreichend vielen anderen zugute kämen. (Ob das 
Kriterium eine derartige Grundordnung selegiert, hängt von hundertlei empirischen Umständen ab und 
läßt sich  wahrscheinlichkeitsmäßig nicht einmal ungefähr abschätzen). Solcherlei Lasten sind völlig 
unerträglich für Personen, die die drei höherrangigen Interessen haben. Um den ersten Fall herauszu-
greifen…: Jede Partei muß davon ausgehen, daß die von ihr vertretene Person eine Konzeption des Guten 
hat, zu der etwa religiöse und ethische Verpflichtungen gehören können. Solche Verpflichtungen werden 
in der Regel als unverzichtbar empfunden. Ein gläubiger Mensch würde die Freiheit, seiner Religion 
gemäß zu leben, um keinen Preis verkaufen oder riskieren. Wenn aber ein Leben ohne Gewissensfreiheit 
für manche unerträglich ist, dann dürfen auch die Parteien diese Freiheit nicht auf Spiel setzen, wenn sie 
ein Kriterium wählen können, das diese Freiheit unbedingt sichert. …Also werden sie, zum Schutz der 
ihnen anvertrauten Interessen, der Maximinregel folgen und Rawls‟ Kriterium einem Durchschnitts-
kriterium vorziehen.” T.W.Pogge, Ibid,  p. 76f. 
398
 Let me now briefly recall the two principles of justice: 
“1. Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which 
scheme is compatible with a similar scheme for all. 
  2. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they must be attached to offices 
and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they must be to the 
greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.”  
J. Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical”; Philosophy and Public Affairs (Vol.14, No.3, 
1985), p.227. (There are many different formulations of the two principles). Splitting the second principle 
into an opportunity-principle (the first part) and a difference-principle (the second part), it can easily be 
seen that the difference-principle as such corresponds to the maximin-principle. In both cases the focus is 
on the least-advantaged. The question whether the Rawlsian conception  should be considered supportable 
from the point of view of Christian social ethics depends to a wide extent on the substantial elements of 
his conception of justice. In a theological perspective should the difference principle, and the role that the 
maximin-rule plays in this connection, therefore be considered important. Thomas Pogge‟s question, 
whether “Rawls lets his lexical priority of the basic liberties (the first principle of justice) undermine his 
priority concern for the least advantaged” is a crucial question from the perspective of theological social 
ethics too. Cf. T.W.Pogge, Realizing Rawls, (1991, first printing 1989), p. 10. 
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spannt, und dieser bleibt gar nichts anderes übrig, als das Geschäft der Gerechtigkeit 
zu betreiben, obwohl sie nach wie vor auf Vorteilsmaximierung aus ist.”399 
Although the contractors themselves are strategic rationalists, aiming for the highest 
possible “score” (the most of primary goods) for their clients, the very structure of the 
original position is biased towards a moral outcome. Thus, Rawls‟ conception of justice 
does not ultimately end up as an egoistic theory.
400
  
In the original position the contractors are in all respects fairly situated. This fair situ-
atedness of the parties is necessarily reflected in the unanimous principles of justice, 
hence the notion of justice as fairness. What makes the initial situation fair is mainly the 
following features:  
 The parties are equally situated. (Since social contingencies are ruled out, the parties 
are all equals and have the same amount of liberty).  
 All of them have the same knowledge about the society they are providing a contract 
for (for instance that it is a society where moderate scarcity applies). 
 They have no insight in the particular interests of their “clients” (although they know 
that their clients have higher-order interests that are fundamental to them and should 
therefore not be sacrificed.)
401
 
 And as free and equally situated, and with the same strictly focused and limited 
knowledge, the parties are concerned about the distribution of the primary goods that 
are supposed to be essential for realising any kind of higher-order interest. 
As already suggested Rawls claims that the conceptions of justice, which are reckoned 
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 W. Kersting, Die politische Philosophie des Gesellschaftsvertrag (1994), p. 273f.  
400
 And so Rawls himself adds that: “Since the persons in the original position are assumed to take no 
interest in one another‟s interests (although they may have a concern for third parties), it may be thought 
that justice as fairness is itself an egoistic theory.…Now this is a misconception. For the fact that in the 
original position the parties are characterized as not interested in one another‟s concerns does not entail 
that the persons in ordinary life who hold the principles that would be agreed to are similarly disinterested 
in one another. Clearly the two principles of justice and the principles of obligation and natural duty re-
quire us to consider the rights and claims of others. And the sense of justice is a normally effective desire 
to comply with these restrictions. The motivation of the persons in the original position must not be con-
fused with the motivation of persons in everyday life who accept the principles that would be chosen and 
who have the corresponding sense of justice.” J.Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), p.147f. 
401
 There are three higher-order interests, mentioned by Rawls, namely the two connected with the 
development and the exercising of the two moral powers (man‟s capacity for a sense of justice and his 
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as possible “candidates” to be chosen by the contractors in the original position, first 
have to pass through a filter. This means, according to Rawls, that the enlisted “candi-
dates” should conform to certain formal constraints; they should be general, apply uni-
versally, be in accordance with the publicity condition, be able of bringing competing 
demands in order; and they should provide us with a final court of appeal in our practi-
cal reasoning.
402
 By introducing the “veil of ignorance” Rawls succeeds in modelling 
the original position in a way that makes the parties satisfy these criteria in their unani-
mous choice of basic principles of justice for a coexistent society.
403
 
Rawls‟ problems are not completely solved by constructing a fictive initial situation, 
modelled as entirely fair, that might produce the most adequate principles of justice by 
pure procedural rationality.
404
. One might still ask: what are the reasons for modelling 
                                                                                                                                                                          
capacity for a conception of the good) and there is also “a third higher-order interest to guide them”. J. 
Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.74. 
402
 The formal constraints on the conception of right that passed the filter for being possible candidates of 
choice in the original position are as follows: 1) The principles arrived at has to be general. (“…it must be 
possible to formulate them without the use of what would be intuitively recognized as proper names, or 
rigged definite descriptions.”), 2) The principles are to be universal in application (“They must hold for 
everyone in virtue of their being moral persons.”), 3) A conception of right must accord with the publicity 
condition. (“The point of the publicity condition is to have the parties evaluate conceptions of justice as 
publicly acknowledged and fully effective moral constitutions of social life.”), 4) A conception of right 
must impose an ordering of conflicting claims. (“This requirement springs directly from the roles of its 
principles in adjusting competing demands.”), 5) Then there is the condition of finality. (“The parties are 
to assess the system of principles as the final court of appeal in practical reasoning.”). Cf. J. Rawls, A 
Theory of Justice (1971), pp.130-136. 
403
 But let it be added that Rawls, especially in Political Liberalism, has made it clear that the conception 
of “justice as fairness” exactly as elaborated by himself, should not in any exclusive sense be considered 
the only possible agreed basis for coexistence and cooperation. In Political Liberalism he emphasises that 
“each of us must have, and be ready to explain, a criterion of what principles and guidelines we think 
other citizens (who are also free and equal) may reasonably be expected to endorse along with us. We 
must have some test we are ready to state as to when this condition is met. I have elsewhere suggested as a 
criterion the values expressed by the principles and guidelines that would be agreed to in the original 
position. Many will prefer another criterion. Of course, we may find that actually others fail to endorse the 
principles and guidelines our criterion selects. That is to be expected. The idea is that we must have such a 
criterion and this alone already imposes very considerable discipline on public discussion. Not any value 
is reasonably said to meet this test, or to be a political value; and not any balance of political values is 
reasonable. It is inevitable and often desirable that citizens have different views as to the most appropriate 
political conception, for the public political culture is bound to contain different fundamental ideas that 
can be developed in different ways. An orderly contest between them over time is a reliable way to find 
which one, if any, is most reasonable.” J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p. 226f. Here Rawls is with-
out doubt rather weak concerning the more substantial principles, which can appropriately be expected to 
play the basic unifying role in pluralist societies (and be taken as the focus of an overlapping consensus).  
404
 Rawls himself stresses that: “The idea of the original position is to set up a fair procedure so that any 
principles agreed to will be just. The aim is to use the notion of pure procedural justice as a basis of 
theory.” J.Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), p.136. And in Political Liberalism Rawls explains what 
characterises a purely procedural way of establishing principles of justice as follows: “The essential 
feature of pure procedural justice, as opposed to perfect procedural justice, is that what is just is specified 
by the outcome of the procedure, whatever it may be. There is no prior and already given criterion against 
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the original position just as Rawls does? I believe Wolfgang Kersting has this problem 
in mind when emphasising that:  
“Die begründungstheoretische Leistungsfähigkeit des Vertrags ist prinzipiell be-
grenzt; die Vertragstheorie vermag nicht auf eigenen Füßen zu stehen, sie bedarf 
immer fremden systematischen Beistandes.Der Grund findet sich in der mangelnden 
obligationstheoretischen Autarkie des Vertrages selbst.”405 
4.3.4. Contract-external premises 
I have suggested that the Rawlsian contract-argument cannot stand alone. Although it 
may be considered a good model of “explication”, it is nonetheless subject to some of 
the objections usually directed towards social-contract-arguments. In Rawls‟ case it 
might be objected that the “covenant” achieved by fictive persons in a highly hypo-
thetical contract-situation should hardly deserve the name contract. At least there is no 
(real) person who has “signed” (or agreed to in any meaningful sense) anything at all.  
Thus the contract made in the Rawlsian original position is not what one would gene-
rally consider to be a valid or legitimate contract, and the way in which it is formed is so 
abstract and hypothetical that one wonders whether Rawls would do better without it. 
And indeed, the contract-construction seems to play a minor role in Rawls‟ later writ-
ings. But it is still vital,  for instance in Political Liberalism (1993). There are certain 
crucial aspects of the idea of an organisation of society based on consent that are most 
appropriately figured out by the means of a social contract.
406
 Rawls identifies two of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
which the outcome is to be checked. … Pure procedural justice means that in their rational deliberations 
the parties do not view themselves as required to apply, or as bound by, any antecedently given principles 
of right and justice. Put another way, they recognize no standpoint external to their own point of view as 
rational representatives from which they are constrained by prior and independent principles of justice. 
This models the idea that when citizens are fairly situated with respect to one another, it is up to them to 
specify the fair terms of social cooperation in light of what they each regard as to their advantage, or good. 
Recall … that those terms are not laid down by some outside authority, say by God‟s law; nor are they 
recognized as fair by reference to a prior and independent order of values known by rational intuition.” J. 
Rawls, Political Liberalism, p.73. Cf. also A Theory of Justice (1971), § 14. 
405
 W. Kersting, John Rawls zur Einführung (1993), p.115. 
406
 The contractualism, as conceived of by Rawls, guarantees both that the scheme of society can be taken 
as settled by the parties themselves, and that it can be arranged under conditions that are maximally fair. 
“How are fair terms of cooperation to be determined? Are they simply laid down by some outside author-
ity distinct from the persons cooperating? Are they, for example, laid down by God‟s law? Or are these 
terms to be recognized by these persons as fair by reference to their knowledge of an independent moral 
order? For example, are they recognized as required by natural law, or by a realm of values known by 
rational intuition? Or are these terms established by an undertaking among persons themselves in the light 
of what they regard as their reciprocal advantage? Depending on which answer we give, we get a different 
conception of social cooperation. Justice as fairness recasts the doctrine of the social contract and adopts a 
form of the last answer. ...” J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.22f. 
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the main reasons for maintaining the idea of a contract arrived at within the framework 
of a hypothetical original position:  
First: There is no better way of handling the problem of justifying the basic structure 
itself. Rawls recognises that; 
“… agreements in everyday life are made in some more or less clearly specified 
situation embedded within the background institutions of the basic structure. Our 
task, however, is to extend the idea of agreement to this background framework 
itself. Here we face a difficulty for any political conception of justice that uses the 
idea of contract, whether social or otherwise. The difficulty is this: we must find 
some point of view, removed from and not distorted by the particular features and 
circumstances of the all-encompassing background framework, from which a fair 
agreement between persons regarded as free and equal can be reached.”407  
The contract-construction is the most appropriate way of modelling a fair initial 
situation.  
Second: The original contract-position is a representative device by virtue of which the 
principles that are selected can be supposed to be valid from the point of view of those 
being represented: 
“The idea is to use the original position to model both freedom and equality and 
restrictions on reasons in such a way that it becomes perfectly evident which 
agreement would be made by the parties as citizens‟ representatives.”408 
I think Rawls has given good reasons for maintaining the contract-instrument,  as an 
important explicatory and representative device.
 409
 
Even if the device of the contractarian original position might have a considerable ex-
planatory force, Wolfgang Kersting holds that the idea of a contract is not necessary for 
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 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p. 23. 
408
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p. 26. 
409
 Let me here add that Ronald Dworkin holds that the contractarian conception in itself is at least pro-
viding us with an appropriate method of achieving a consensus and is also an adequate instrument for 
advancing equality and liberty. And so he considers Rawls‟ theory a “right-based theory” (in contrast to 
“duty-based” and “goal-based theories”) and explains its characteristic in this way: “Right-based theories 
are ... concerned with the independence rather than the conformity of individual action. They presuppose 
and protect the value of individual thought and choice. ... It is for this reason that the social contract is so 
important a feature of Rawls‟ methodology. It signals that his deep theory is a right-based theory, rather 
than a theory of either of the other two types. The social contract provides every potential party with a 
veto: unless he agrees, no contract is formed.” R. Dworkin: “The Original Position”,: Reading Rawls, (ed. 
N. Daniels, 1975), p.42. Another issue is that Dworkin obviously means that “the importance, and even 
the existence, of this veto is obscured in the particular interpretation of the contract that constitutes the 
original position”. (Ibid. p.42). In my opinion the point of Rawls is, however, to guarantee a fair “ante-
cedent veto-right” that is morally based and thereby deeper than vetos based merely on actual selfinterest. 
Ibid. p.46f. 
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the conception of justice as elaborated by Rawls.  
Kersting may be right that it is not a strictly necessary part of a Rawlsian conception of 
justice. It is, however, a model that is highly appropriate for grasping (and accepting) the 
main features of justice as fairness. When stressing that the contract-argument can in no 
way stand alone, I think that Kersting raises an important concern. The social-contract-
idea cannot by itself justify what it aims at making rationally evident. Rationality is rela-
tive to a certain (value-laden) framework.
410
 This means that a strict contract-internal 
perspective has to be supported by a normative contract-external argument that provides 
for the binding character of the contractarian agreement. 
In respect to the contract-external premises, which have a decisive impact upon the 
design of the original position, one may sometimes get the impression while reading 
Kersting, that he holds that “Rawls sich bei ihrer Formulierung rhapsodisch aus einem 
Fundus moralischer Intuitionen bedient hat.”411 But this kind of criticism is hardly 
justified; Rawls' contractarianism is supported by a coherent and convincing-argument. 
Without doubt he aims at establishing a conception of justice that can be justified by 
being coherent with our considered judgements, beliefs, principles and knowledge. 
412
 
Thus Rawls tries to justify his design of the original position by modelling it in a way 
that he believes matches the considered convictions of justice and fairness that people 
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 “Verträge können rational oder irrational sein; rationale Verträge sind effektive Kooperationsmittel; 
sie beruhen auf einer nutzbringenden Instrumentalisierung der vertragsspezifischen normativen Qualitäten 
und weisen ein vorteilhaftes Verhältnis von Leistung und Gegenleistung auf. Freilich kann die Rationali-
tätsbeurteilung bei den beteiligten Parteien aufgrund der Relativität der Rationalität unterschiedlich aus-
fallen.” W. Kersting, Die politische Philosophie des Gesellschaftsvertrag (1994), p.49. But let it be said 
that Kersting immediately adds: “Jedoch müssen die Verträge des Kontraktualismus so konzipiert sein, 
daß ein universales, für alle Beteiligten gleichermaßen zutreffendes Rationalitätsurteil gesichert ist. Aus 
vertragsmoralischer Perspektive können Verträge gültig oder ungültig sein. Wenn ein Vertrag gültig ist, 
dann kann er seine interne Normativität entfalten; wenn er ungültig ist, bricht seine interne Normativität 
zusammen, vermag er keine Verpflichtungen und Asprüche zu erzeugen.” Ibid, p.49. 
411
 W. Kersting, Die politische Philosophie des Gesellschaftsvertrags (1994), p. 120. 
412
 He makes it quite clear that “A conception of justice cannot be deduced from selfevident premises or 
conditions on principles; instead, its justification is a matter of the mutual support of many considerations, 
of everything fitting together into one coherent view.” J.Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Oxford University 
Press, 1971, p.21. (The very notion of “coherence” actualises difficult philosophical problems concerning 
the issues of justification and truth,  problems that cannot be considered here. Let it however, be made 
clear that a coherence-view in matters of justification is in any case more demanding than just seeking 
logical consistency. This can be noticed in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy taking its point of 
departure “from the following intuitive idea: a coherent system of belief is one in which each belief is 
epistemically supported by the others, where various types of epistemic support are recognized, e.g. 
deductive or inductive arguments, or inferences to the best explanation.” Cf. M. DePaul‟s article on 
“Coherentism” in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Ed. Robert Audi, 1995, p.134.)  
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with a normal sense of justice are supposed to hold. Rawls makes it quite clear that “we 
shall find a description of the initial situation that both expresses reasonable conditions 
and yields principles which match our considered judgments duly pruned and adjusted. 
This state I refer to as reflective equilibrium.”413  
This means that our considered moral judgements  and especially the judgements in 
which persons with a normal sense of justice have the greatest confidence  play a 
decisive role in the construction of the original position, and thereafter take shape in the 
principles of justice agreed upon. Let it, however, be added that our considered judge-
ments may be of two kinds. There are the more substantial judgements we make in 
concrete cases, and there are the more general judgements we make. The principles of 
justice, as conceived of by Rawls, are supposed to match both kinds of considered 
judgements, but it is obviously the general judgements alone that Rawls has employed 
when weaving the “veil of ignorance”.  
The relation between our ordinary considered judgements and the overarching principles 
that we also hold is supposed to be dynamic and dialectic, each subject to continuous 
evaluation and adjustment. The principles we honour are supposed to be continually 
modified to reflect our considered judgements, and our considered judgements subject 
to revision in the light of coherence-furthering principles. In this process of mutual 
adjustment of principles and considered judgements, there is no reason to believe that a 
definite and non-revisable state of perfect reflective equilibrium will ever be achieved. 
I shall not discuss Rawls‟ method of seeking reflective equilibrium further than this is 
required to state two things that are of special importance in a theological perspective:  
First: This method of continually seeking a reflective equilibrium implies that an ulti-
mate, objective and non-revisable truth
414
 about the right order of society, founded on 
some kind of “Letztbegründung”, is not to be given. 
Second: The built-in dialectic in the Rawlsian process of seeking reflective equilibrium 
also implies that Rawls‟ conception is somehow to be grounded in moral common-sense 
judgements. In the end it is not homo oeconomicus, but moral man, endowed with a 
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 A Theory of Justice (1971), p.20. He explains this by adding that a “reflective equilibrium … is an 
equilibrium because at last our principles and judgments coincide; and it is reflective since we know to 
what principles our judgments conform and the premises of their derivation.” Ibid, p. 20.  
414
 “I do not claim for the principles of justice proposed that they are necessary truths or derivable from 
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sense of justice, who sets the premises
415
. Thus one can solve the problem built into the 
very structure of contractarianism,  that it cannot be justified by itself. In the end I 
think that Rawls in fact solves the contractarian dilemma by taking his point of de-
parture from aspects of common-sense-morality,  beyond the contract-situation as 
such. As far as I can see, it is possible to find clear support for this conclusion also in 
Kersting‟s recent writings on Rawlsian contractarianism: 
“Eine normativ-kontraktualistische politische Philosophie kann darum nicht den 
Anspruch erheben, letztbegründete und objektiv gültige Grundsätze zu entwickeln. 
Sie muß sich damit begnügen, die Gerechtigkeitsvorstellungen ihrer Zeit in Ge-
danken zu fassen. In ihrer explikatorischen Leistung untersteht sie stets der Kon-
trolle durch die common-sense-Moralität. Nur insoweit die von ihr an die Wirklich-
keit herangetragenen normativen Grundsätze mit unseren fundamentalen moral-
ischen Überzeugungen harmonieren, vermag die politische Philosophie zu über-
zeugen.”416 
Rawls is certainly not interested in systematically elaborating a common sense morality 
as such. His aim, as emphasised in his later writings, is clearly political. What seems 
nevertheless to be the case, is that in developing a conception of political liberalism 
aiming at principles for a just scheme of society, that can be the focus of an overlapping 
consensus, Rawls draws heavily on vital aspects of a common-sense morality. This is in 
itself an important conclusion to reach here.  
4.4. A basic consensus for the political domain. 
4.4.1. Varieties of consensus 
I have considered the original position which is characterised as “Rawls‟ most favored 
interpretation of the contract”417. Rawls has constructed a contract-situation where the 
parties can plausibly be supposed to come to a unanimous decision on principles of 
justice, a decision that reflects the fairness built into the very structure of the original 
situation. I have also taken one step “backwards”, to ask whether Rawls' modelling of 
the original position can itself be justified. And I found that the way Rawls designs the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
such truths.” J.Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), p. 21. 
415
 This corresponds to the way Rawls after all takes the “reasonable” to be prior to the “rational”. But 
since Rawls takes vital and general aspects of common (sense) morality to be woven into the “veil of 
ignorance” within the original position, instead of considering common-sense morality a personal moral 
quality of the contractor, he can still maintain the view that the contractors act on pure proceduralism. 
416
 W. Kersting, Die politische Philosophie des Gesellschaftsvertrags (1994), p. 284. 
417
 R. Dworkin in Reading Rawls. Critical Studies on Rawls‟ A Theory of Justice (ed. Norman Daniels, 
1975), p.43. 
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original position could be justified only insofar as it draws upon our most reliable moral 
judgements. The principles that the contractors are supposed to agree upon will then 
reflect moral concerns built into the original position, which in turn reflects our most 
reliable general moral judgements. Such reliable moral considerations are especially 
drawn upon when weaving the “veil of ignorance”. 
The in-depth attention given to Rawls' conception of justice as fairness since the publi-
cation of A Theory of Justice in 1971 clearly indicates the interest generated by Rawls' 
theory (very much conceived of as an alternative to utilitarianism). However, the unani-
mous decision of Rawls‟ contractors on principles of justice suitable for consolidating a 
well-ordered society, have in no way been met with a unanimous acclamation in the 
ordinary philosophical, ethical and political debate. Immense political conflicts and 
controversies still remain. And one might ask: How can fair principles of co-operation, 
settled upon in a hypothetical contractarian situation, be endorsed by all groups, safe-
guarded, and made stable in modern societies that are in fact characterised by a deep 
pluralism and a diversity of comprehensive doctrines (as shown in chapter 3)? In his 
recent writings Rawls is very much aware of this problem, as he makes quite clear in the 
introduction to Political Liberalism: 
“To explain: The serious problem I have in mind concerns the unrealistic idea of a 
well-ordered society as it appears in Theory. An essential feature of a well-ordered 
society associated with justice as fairness is that all its citizens endorse this concept-
ion on the basis of what I now call a comprehensive philosophical doctrine. They 
accept, as rooted in this doctrine, its two principles of justice. Similarly, in the well-
ordered society associated with utilitarianism citizens generally endorse that view as 
a comprehensive philosophical doctrine and they accept the principle of utility on 
that basis. Although the distinction between a political conception of justice and a 
comprehensive philosophical doctrine is not discussed in Theory, once the question 
is raised, it is clear, I think, that the text regards justice as fairness and utilitarianism 
as comprehensive, or partially comprehensive, doctrines. Now the serious problem is 
this, A modern democratic society is characterized not simply by a pluralism of 
comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines but by a pluralism of 
incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines. No one of these doctrines is 
affirmed by citizens generally.”418 
This means that Rawls now realises that his conception of justice as fairness in itself 
constitutes a comprehensive doctrine and is, therefore, but one of many such competing 
doctrines in a pluralistic society. He makes it clear that in A Theory of Justice he did not 
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 J.Rawls, Political Liberalism1(993), p.xvi. 
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distinguish clearly enough between “a moral doctrine of justice general in scope” and “a 
strictly political conception of justice”.419 A political conception of justice should not be 
conceived of as a comprehensive doctrine. Yet, given the radical pluralism of modern 
societies, it is difficult to conceive of how one can achieve political consensus on a non-
trivial conception of justice. 
Before considering the role played by the idea of an “overlapping consensus” in Rawls' 
political theory, I want to be a bit more explicit about the notion of “consensus” as such, 
which is subject to various uses in modern philosophical and political discourse. The 
term “consensus” connotes something more than contractarian consent. Websters En-
cyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language provides us with different 
meanings
420
 of the term: 
 general agreement or concord. 
 majority decision. 
The first of these definitions of “consensus” comes closest to my immediate under-
standing of the word as used by both Rawls and Honecker. But there is obviously more 
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 J.Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), p.xv. The consequence of this is that Rawls finds it necessary to 
recast his theory, although the main ideas are preserved.  
420
 It might in this connection be informative to see how Webster‟s Dictionary deals with the notions con-
sensus (of opinion), consent and related terms: “CONSENSUS OF OPINION is felt by many grammarians 
and teachers to be a redundancy, but it is so only if CONSENSUS is taken in the sense of „majority of 
opinion‟, rather than its equally valid  and according to available evidence, earlier  sense of „accord or 
general agreement‟.”(p. 312) Thus it is underlined in Webster‟s Dictionary that there is a certain evidence 
for taking consensus in the meaning of “accord or general agreement”  There are, however, indeed many 
terms that might be used to express such a general agreement. The term accord is sometimes used. To 
accord can, if following Webster‟s Dictionary, be taken to mean: a) to be in agreement or harmony; 
agree. b) to make to agree, or correspond; adapt. c) Archaic. to settle , reconcile. As a noun accord could 
mean: a) consent or concurrence of opinions or wills; agreement. b) an international agreement, settlement 
of questions outstanding among nations. And the term consent is very often used in different contexts. To 
consent might be taken to mean: a) to permit, approve, or agree; comply or yield. b) to agree in sentiment, 
opinion, etc.; be in harmony. As a noun consent could mean: a) permission, approval, or agreement; com-
pliance; acquiescence. b) agreement in sentiment, opinion, a course of action, etc., c) Archaic. accord, 
concord, harmony. Faced with the different nuances of meaning that these terms have, it seems not to be 
of very much help to take a merely terminological point of departure when elaborating the idea of con-
sensus for the political field. I think that it will be more appropriate for my purpose if I just take my point 
of departure from within the very conception of Rawls. This is the best way to proceed, especially since 
the notion of an overlapping consensus without doubt should be taken as a “terminus technicus” con-
ceived of within the framework of Rawlsian political liberalism. When this is made clear I can also use 
related terms, as for instance terms like acquiescence, which expresses a more passive attitude. But 
sometimes I will also use the term tacit consent to express the more passive acquiescence. Very often, 
however, it is sufficient simply to use the more general (and less precise) term agreement. Cf. Websters 
Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language. (1994-edition). 
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to say beginning with a rough distinction made between;  
 active consensus, where the agreement is explicitly affirmed by the parties,  
 passive consensus, where an outcome is taken to be approved of if no party has 
blocked it.  
It is a question how far the latter, which might also be characterised as  tacit consent, 
can really be taken as a kind of consent, that might be of any use in issues of politics.
421
  
In addition, the problem of consensus can hardly be discussed irrespective of the kind of 
substantial issues one aims at agreeing upon. Nicholas Rescher holds that in matters of 
value, belief and conduct agreement is not only difficult to achieve, it is likely to be im-
possible.  In Pluralism. Against the Demand for Consensus (1993), Rescher presents us 
with the following account of consensus: 
“Consensus is a matter of agreement. But people can of course agree or disagree on 
many different sorts of things  not beliefs and opinions alone, but also tastes, 
wishes, desires, goals, and so on. In particular, one must distinguish between agree-
ment regarding what is to be thought, what is to be done, and what is to be prized. 
For consensus  agreement among diverse individuals or groups  can prevail in all 
three of these arenas: the theoretical/cognitive, which is concerned with agreement 
or disagreement in matters of belief, the practical/pragmatic, which is concerned 
with agreement or disagreement with respect to action; and the evaluative/axio-
logical, which is concerned with matters of value. All these issues clearly play a 
major role in the larger human scheme of things.”422  
I think Rescher's distinctions between an agreement (or disagreement) concerning what 
is to be prized, to be done and to be thought, is helpful although I would emphasise that 
these different levels cannot always be completely separated. I believe that it is 
especially urgent to underline that an agreement in matters of value normally also 
implies an agreement in matters of knowledge and belief. 
It is generally considered easier to achieve consensus on essential issues within the hard 
sciences like physics and chemistry than it is within the so-called “soft sciences” such as 
ethics and politics. A more in-depth discussion of this issue in terms of the different 
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 In Crito, however, one can for instance see how Socrates argues that a citizen of Athens, by remaining 
in the “polis”, tacitly accepts the laws of the state. Plato, Crito, xiii (p. 15f), (ed. J. Adam,1961). 
422
 N. Rescher, Pluralism. Against the Demand for Consensus (1993), p. 5. 
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scientific disciplines is obviously well beyond the scope of this paper.
423
  
But I do think that Rescher has plausibly argued that “value-consensus” might be among 
the kinds of consensus that it would be hardest (and most unrealistic) to attempt or 
achieve in modern societies. That is a main reason why he titles his book about plural-
ism “against the demand for consensus”. He views with scepticism any claim that 
citizens in modern democratic pluralistic societies may be capable of arriving at a shared 
moral basis for establishing the just organisation of society.
424
  
In spite of the fact of deep pluralism, and in spite of Rescher‟s arguments “against the 
demand for consensus” in matters of moral value, moral issues are obnviously playing 
an increasing role in political debate. This may indicate that many people involved in 
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 Cf. to this problem K. E. Tranöy, Vitenskapen  samfunnsmakt og livsform (1986). Tranöy is obvi-
ously more nuanced about these things: “Et påfallende trekk ved moderne vitenskap er enighet blant 
fagfolk på samme fagområde. Ganske særlig gjelder dette for naturvitenskapene og for vitenskaper som 
matematikk og logikk. Sammenfallende syn og meninger er en vesentlig forutsetning for at vitenskaps-
samfunnet skal være en sosial realitet. Enighet er likevel neppe det beste ordet for å beskrive en slik 
sosialt befestet og varig, men ikke evigvarende vitenskapelig opinionsdannelse. Konsensus er kanskje 
bedre. Men det er uklart hva forskjellen er mellom konsensus og enighet. Og det er slett ikke på forhånd 
klart hva vitenskapsfolk innen ett og samme fagfelt egentlig er enige om. Det er langt fra tilfelle at alle 
kompetente og meningsberettigede er enige om alt. De er også uenige om ganske mye uten at det gjør noe, 
så å si, uten at fagmiljøets funksjonsdyktighet kommer i fare.… Konsensus mellom fagfeller med hensyn 
til T (= en teori, påstand, hypotese eller liknende) foreligger når de enten aksepterer T eller er enige om at 
T er akseptable, dvs. at det er legitimt å akseptere og hevde T selv om de ikke selv vil gjøre det.” (p.207) 
… Det gjør ikke så meget om X og Y er uenige om T hvis de er enige om normer de begge aksepterer, 
tillater både aksept og forkastelse, hevding og nekting av T når slik hevding og nekting er begrunnet slik 
at etterprøving og kritikk er mulig. Den enighet det her er snakk om, er i så fall like meget en enighet om 
idealer som om realiteter.” Ibid, p.208. What is important within the scientific community (as well as 
within the wider political society) is to establish a normative framework by a fundamental consent, within 
which concrete disagrements and even conflicts can be carried out in acceptable and reasonable ways 
according to basic rules. 
424
 And neither does he consider it necessary for a community to function well that it rests on a platform 
of agreed moral principles “The belief that consensus plays a leading role in matters of rational inquiry, 
decision, and evaluation is among the oldest and most pervasive ideas of philosophy. Consensus, various 
theorists have repeatedly urged, is somehow the touchstone of truth and the guarantor of correctness in 
matters of belief and of adequacy in matters of decision and action. Time and again, thinkers proceeding 
from very different points of view have reached the conviction that some sort of rationale or agency is at 
work that guides the community aright, at least over the long run. And in particular, from the early days of 
the subject in classical antiquity onwards, various philosophers have regarded communal agreement as a 
pivotal factor in the human quest for knowledge. There is good reason, however, to call into question this 
attractive but deeply problematic idea. … There is thus much to be said on behalf of consensus as an 
epistemic touchstone. But, perhaps, unfortunately, much can also be said against it. Wise leaders, after all, 
do not ask their advisers for a collective opinion from which all element of dissent has been eliminated: 
they realize that the interests of understanding are best served by a complex picture that portrays the state 
of existing information and speculation  and ignorance!  in its full complexity. Dissensus and diversity 
can often play a highly constructive role in human affairs. It will, accordingly, be maintained here that 
contemporary partisans of consensus methodology seriously overestimate the need and desirability for 
according a central position to consensus, and that  in matters of inquiry and praxis alike  strong claims 
to cogency and appropriateness can be urged on behalf of a less consensus-oriented, more pluralistic 
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social cooperation, takes it for granted that there exist a moral “commonwealth” and 
they even hope that it shall be possible to arrive at some shared moral standards.
425
  
Rawls, like the theologian Martin Honecker, places great importance upon the existence 
of some kind of stabilising consensus. This is evidenced by Rawls' usage of the social-
contract-tradition. But as mentioned above, Rawls realises that reinterpreting the social-
contract-doctrine, in effect, converting it into a kind of universal rational thought ex-
periment, will not necessarily generate principles of coexistence and co-operation that 
people will have sufficient reasons to stick to and accept in the long run. The question is 
how a basic consensus can be brought about, endorsed and safeguarded. And it is also a 
question how far it can be supposed to reach. 
4.4.2. Accepting a modus vivendi? 
It might be easier to grasp Rawls‟ idea of an overlapping consensus if I start with an 
approach that differs from the genuine overlapping consensus that is his goal. Rawls 
emphasises “that an overlapping consensus is quite different from a modus 
vivendi...”426 
One can think about a modus vivendi as a sort of agreement, brought about as a result of 
negotiations and bargaining between parties that have nearly the same amount of power. 
More precisely: The modus vivendi is an agreement supposed to reflect the relative 
bargaining strength that the parties in fact have. Adequate behaviour in such a context 
consists in living up to certain obligations that are the result of balancing self- and 
groupinterests in a way that can be accepted by all the parties involved. Although it may 
not be the optimum for any of the parties, it would not be advantageous for any of them 
                                                                                                                                                                          
approach.” N. Rescher, Pluralism. Against the Demand for Consensus (1993), p.6f. In his book Rescher 
mentions John Rawls and especially Jürgen Habermas as “partisans of consensus”. 
425
 It is obviously the case in modern pluralistic societies that: “… i økende grad reises spørsmål og pro-
blemstillinger som har kontroversielle etiske of moralske implikasjoner. En ting er å oppnå enighet om 
den rette dosering av makroøkonomisk innsats og om hjelp til underpriviligerte og trengende, noe annet er 
det [å] oppnå enighet om hva som skal gjøres når det gjelder intrikate verdispørsmål. I dag må politikere 
ta stilling til de homofiles rettsstillling, til medisinske prioriteringer, spørsmålet om kvinnelige prester o.l.. 
Når spørsmålene er intrikate og dreier seg om livssyn, og beslutningsfatningen involverer etiske overleg-
ninger og viser til ulike oppfatninger av det gode liv, er det mindre håp om å oppnå enighet. Det kan der-
for se ut som om skeptikerne får rett. Det praktiske problem blir imidlertid å kunne fatte bindende beslut-
ninger i en kompleks, verdi- og interesseheterogen verden uten at de forskjellige livsformers krav på 
autonomi krenkes. I et slikt perspektiv blir den offentlige deliberasjon ikke mindre viktig, selv om 
utsiktene til konsensus er heller små.” E. O. Eriksen, “Den politiske diskurs - fra konsensus til modus 
vivendi?”, Den politiske orden, (ed. E. O. Eriksen, 1994), p.98f.  
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to break with the settled standards. Establishing a modus vivendi might simply be con-
sidered the best alternative for all parties to avoid a state of “omnium bellum in omnis”. 
Rawls explains the characteristics of a modus vivendi as follows: 
“A typical use of the phrase „modus vivendi‟ is to characterize a treaty between two 
states whose national aims and interests put them at odds. In negotiating a treaty 
each state would be wise and prudent to make sure that the agreement proposed re-
presents an equilibrium point: that is, that the terms and conditions of the treaty are 
drawn up in such a way that it is public knowledge that it is not advantageous for 
either state to violate it. The treaty will then be adhered to because doing so is re-
garded by each as in its national interest, including its interest in its reputation as a 
state that honors treaties. But in general both states are ready to pursue their goals at 
the expense of the other, and should conditions change they may do so. This back-
ground highlights the way in which such a treaty is a mere modus vivendi. A similar 
background is present when we think of social consensus founded on self- or group 
interests, or on the outcome of political bargaining: social unity is only apparent, as 
its stability is contingent on circumstances remaining such as not to upset the fortu-
nate convergence of interests.”427 
The thirty years‟ war ended with what we can take as a typical example of a modus 
vivendi, an ordered peace that was mostly considered advantageous for all parties.428  
There are more modern examples.  During the years of the “cold war” one might say 
that peace was safeguarded as a form of modus-vivendi-agreement. In an age of nuclear 
weapons it was advantageous for all parties to avoid as far as possible the kind of 
actions that might have lead to a world-war. Nor is such pragmatic modus vivendi 
reasoning unusual in theological social ethics. The theologian Walter Künneth, for one 
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 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.147. 
427
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.147 
428
 This is taken by Rawls himself as a typical example: “This becomes clear once we change our example 
and include the view of Catholics and Protestants in the sixteenth century. At that time there was not an 
overlapping consensus on the principle of toleration. Both sides held that it was the duty of the ruler to 
uphold the true religion and to repress the spread of heresy and false doctrine. In such a case the accept-
ance of the principle of toleration would indeed be a mere modus vivendi, because if either faith becomes 
dominant, the principle of toleration would no longer be followed. Stability with respect to the distribution 
of power is lacking.” J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.148. There are two things that should be 
mentioned in this connection. First; that the peace was by far a result of the exhaustion of the parties. 
Second; that the modus vivendi is to be considered a good thing as far as it reached in that situation. There 
were obviously not sufficient resources for bringing about a deeper and more stable consensus between 
the parties. 
429
 In his dissertation about nuclear weapons and social ethics Trond Bakkevig summarizes the view held 
by Walter Künneth as follows: “Als Prinzip soll sich der Staat mit dem militärischen Mitteln ausrüsten, 
die der Bedrohung entsprechen, der er gegenübersteht. Wenn diese Bedrohung aus Atomwaffen besteht, 
muß folglich dem Staat die Freiheit eingeräumt werden, auch die eigene Armee mit solchen Waffen aus-
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There are in history, however, shifting historical power-structures. History teaches that a 
mutually advantageous and contingent balancing of political power might very easily be 
disturbed, broken up and altered. When a power-structure shifts, it will perhaps not be 
considered advantageous from the perspective of the stronger party to continue comply-
ing with the previously established agreement. If the premises for the modus vivendi 
change, the treaty between the parties might itself be undermined. This was very clearly 
realised by Rawls and is therefore a main reason why he aims at removing such unstable 
contingencies when seeking an agreement on the more enduring principles of justice as 
fairness. 
While Rescher took Rawls‟ ideas of consensus to be too “ideal”, Rawls himself seems 
more concerned about refuting the criticism that “the idea of social unity founded on an 
overlapping consensus on a political conception of justice ... is a mere modus 
vivendi.”430 So Rawls finds it necessary to underline that:  
“Finding a stable conception is not simply a matter of avoiding futility. Rather, what 
counts is the kind of stability, the nature of the forces that secure it.”431 
The objection, however, that even a Rawlsian consensus will most likely end up in a 
kind of modus vivendi has at least two aspects: 
 First it says that Rawls‟ conception is itself so “ascetic”432 about substantial moral 
values, that it should most likely further moral indifferentism, thus undermining the 
very nature of the moral forces that could secure it. 
 Then it says that Rawls‟ conception of justice as fairness to such an extent abstracts 
from substantial community-values, that it looses sight of the stabilising effect that 
                                                                                                                                                                          
zurüsten.” T. Bakkevig, Ordnungstheologie und Atomwaffen (1989), p.78.  And Künneth finds support in 
utterances from a Spandauer Synode for such a “realistic” approach, as opposed to the view that “Die 
Nachfolge Christi schließt die Atomausrüstung aus … Im Kontrast dazu stoßen wir auf die nüchternen 
Erwägungen jener, die ein „bedingtes Ja‟ rechtfertigen zu können meinen. Schon die Spandauer Synode 
sah sich genötigt zu konzedieren, „daß Situationen denkbar sind, in denen in der Pflicht zur Verteidigung 
der Widerstand mit gleichwertigem Waffen vor Gott verantwortet werden kann‟. Diese Konzeption wird 
von der Überzeugung getragen, daß „eine Politik, die mit der Atombombe rechnet und sie in politisches 
Kalkül einstellt‟, keineswegs „an sich schon einen Verstoß gegen den Glauben‟ darstellt (Wilhelmi). Weil 
es um die Erhaltung des Friedens durch das politisch-militärische Mittel der atomaren Abschreckung geht, 
ist diese Theorie und solches praktische Verhalten für Christen durchaus möglich. ”, W. Künneth, Politik 
zwischen Dämon und Gott. Eine christliche Ethik des Politischen (1961), p.264f. 
430
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.145. 
431
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.142. 
432
 Rawls is accused of advancing “scepticism” about the truth of substantial moral claims. This seems 
plausibly to be a natural consequence of his non-comprehensive approach to the pluralist-problem.  
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such a rootedness in stable values might provide. 
These two objections are closely connected. And I think that both of them point to a 
dilemma in Rawls‟ conceptual framework. 
It is evident that Rawls wishes to achieve more than  a mere modus vivendi that will not 
provide any long term stability. Both in Political Liberalism and in the essay on The 
idea of an Overlapping Consensus 
433
 Rawls stresses that the idea of an overlapping 
consensus is to be distinguished from less demanding and less stabilising views. The 
question is whether he really succeeds in doing so.  
Stability depends according to Rawls on two things: 
 that there is among the persons that makes the basic agreement the required readiness 
to stick to it not just for strategical or tactical reasons,  which implies that the agents 
themselves can be supposed to have sufficient moral resources and a normal sense of 
justice. 
 that the agreement is in itself somehow connected to the vital moral doctrines 
normally flourishing within communities and associations. 
These moral assumptions are of vital significance when Rawls now tries to take a step 
beyond the mere modus vivendi. Rawls‟ project is to take decisive steps beyond a 
ground-agreement based simply on relative bargaining-advantages in pluralist society. A 
“ground-consensus”, mainly conceived of as a project of balancing power, egoism and 
group-interests, will not solve the problem of instability,  even if it may be considered 
an appropriate first step to overcoming open conflicts. The distribution of power in 
society might rapidly change, as we saw, and if the very institutional scheme and the 
distributive mechanisms of society just reflect the contingent bargaining strength of the 
parties, it is a question whether a fair scheme of society can ever be maintained.
434
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 J. Rawls, “The idea of an overlapping consensus”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, (Vol. 7, No 1, 
1987). The essay is originally a revision of a lecture given at Oxford in 1986. 
434
 Erik Oddvar Nielsen tries in an interesting article to upgrade the aim of establishing a modus vivendi 
in modern societies, emphasising that there might be moral concerns for a modus vivendi, it does not just 
reflect contingent bargaining strength: “Modus vivendi betegner at deltakerne gjennom en slik diskusjon 
bare blir enige om en foreløpig overenskomst. Med dette skal vi ikke bare forstå en overenskomst som er 
slik at ingen av partene ser  seg tjent med å bryte den. Det er ikke en overenskomst som kun er kommet i 
stand gjennom strategisk samhandling der advarsler og trusler brukes, slik den vanligvis forstås gjennom 
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However, when focusing on the nature of the forces capable of securing some common 
standards, rendering them fair, acceptable and well worth maintaining in the long run, 
Rawls obviously recognises that moral aspects,  both the moral doctrines normally 
flourishing within communities and associations as well as the citizens sense of justice, 
are of vital significance. Let me now take a further step beyond the mere modus vivendi 
to the kind of basic agreement in society that might best be characterised as a consensus 
on constitutional essentials.  
4.4.3. An agreement on constitutional essentials? 
After rejecting a mere modus vivendi as insufficient to secure enduring justice in 
modern societies, Rawls elaborates further “steps to constitutional consensus.”435 
Urged by Kurt Baier
436
 Rawls asks whether a consensus on constitutional principles 
might be a more realistic goal than a consensus on a broad conception of justice. A 
constitutional consensus is supposed to be a kind of required minimum-agreement on 
those guidelines and rules that are most essential for fair coexistence, but “it is not deep 
and it is also not wide: it is narrow in scope, not including the basic structure but only 
the political procedures of democratic government.”437 
Thus a constitutional consensus; 
 has to provide for the constitutive rules for the governmental structure, thereby set-
tling the fundamental rules for the powers of the legislature, executive and the judi-
ciary, as well as rules for political election, democratic procedures, practising of the 
majority-principle (guaranteeing simultaneously the rights of minorities), and rules 
                                                                                                                                                                          
forestillingen om en optimal likevekt som ingen av partene tjener på å ødelegge. Midlertidige overens-
komster involverer i standardtilfeller et normativt minimumsgrunnlag, og er ikke kun uttrykk for en 
konvergens mellom konkurrerende interesser. De reiser straks krav om likeverdige kontraktsbetingelser, 
og om at pakten skal kunne rettferdiggjøres i henhold til et begrep om riktighet. Et modus vivendi skal her 
forstås som noe deltakerne ser som en rimelig og akseptabel pakt under de rådende forhold. Det er uttrykk 
for et legitimt arrangement. Det er ikke det aktørene ideelt kunne ønske seg, men det er det de kan godta 
og stå inne for i denne bestemte situasjonen. Aktørene har ulike grunner for å akseptere pakten, og kunne 
egentlig ha ønsket seg et annet resultat. De slår seg til ro med dette som en suboptimal, men likevel 
akseptabel løsning.” E. O. Nielsen, “Den politiske diskurs  fra konsensus til modus vivendi?”, Den 
politiske orden, (ed. E. O. Nielsen), p.116f. The modus vivendi is obviously considered a fair compro-
mise. I think that Rawls might also consider the modus vivendi to be justified in certain situations, as is 
made clear in the way he emphasises that the thirty years‟ war was brought to an end by a typical modus 
vivendi arrangement, which was the most one could hope for under those circumstances. 
435
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.158. 
436
 Cf. K. Baier: Justice and the Aims of Political Philosophy, Ethics 99 (July 1989). 
437
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.159. 
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for public inquiry, for assessing evidence, etc. (There is a certain emphasis on the 
procedural aspects). 
 has to clarify what basic rights and liberties (of individuals and minorities) in a 
society should be permanently guaranteed and so to say be taken off the agenda of 
daily political struggle and calculation of interests. 
When the constitutional essentials are taken to cover these elements, they are certainly 
of the greatest importance. And there can be little doubt that Rawls considers a consti-
tutional consensus to be a decisive “ pact to maintain civil peace”438, since the consti-
tutional is taken to cover the most basic freedoms: 
“Whether the constitutional essentials covering the basic freedoms are satisfied is 
more or less visible on the face of constitutional arrangements and how these can be 
seen to work in practice.……we can expect more agreement about whether the prin-
ciples for the basic rights and liberties are realized than about whether the principles 
for social and economic justice are realized.”439 
Moreover, 
 
a constitutional consensus on fundamental essentials, basic freedoms and 
elementary rights, can provide for a liberal “climate” that in many ways will favour co-
operation and coexistence as such. Thus there might be an “educational” side-effect of 
the constitutional achievements that are secured in a society
440
, although the consti-
tutional essentials might in themselves be mainly procedural and formal. 
It should be noted that constitutional issues can be pursued differently by different 
persons. Jan-Erik Lane, among others, points to the considerable differences in framing 
one's constitutional focus. Maybe we can assume that the formal level, with an emphasis 
on written articles and settled procedures that safeguard the rights of individuals, groups 
and associations (simultaneously limiting the power of governmental authorities), might 
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 “The constitution is, as it were, honored as a pact to maintain civil peace.” J. Rawls, “The Idea of 
Public Reason Revisited”, The University of Chicago Law Review (1997;3), p.781. This kind of civil 
peace would for instance be threatened if a group tried to change the constitution (with coercive force) so 
as to establish a religious hegemony, - since it would be unreasonable to expect that those suffering from 
such a constitutional change should voluntarily accept that their own religious doctrine is brought into 
danger. 
439
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.229. 
440
 Rawls assumes that an effective safeguarding of constitutional essentials in society might “…tend to 
encourage the cooperative virtues of political life: the virtues of reasonableness and a sense of fairness, a 
spirit of compromise and a readiness to meet others halfway, all of which are connected with the willing-
ness to cooperate with others on political terms that everyone can publicly accept.” J. Rawls, Political 
Liberalism (1993), p.163. 
 183 
be of primary interest from the point of view of the constitutional lawyer, while the 
political scientist “is first and foremost interested in describing the real constitution, or 
how the country is actually ruled.”441 
Rawls clearly recognises that a consensus on certain constitutional essentials by itself is 
not sufficient to secure both institutional arrangements and effective distributive 
mechanisms, which are both fair and stable. A constitutional consensus is not wide 
enough to cover the field of basic justice, since its purpose is mainly to establish the 
minimal essential constitutional means for moderating rivalry and regulating the differ-
ences of interest according to acceptable guidelines and procedures.  Neither is a con-
stitutional consensus deep enough, since it is not grounded in fundamental ideas about 
persons, politics and society, A stable consensus has - somehow - to be morally rooted. 
When Rawls accordingly takes a further step, proceeding from an agreement on a mere 
constitutional framework to a morally grounded consensus that has a wider aim and is 
more substantial and in some way also deeper
442
, he faces considerable difficulties. For 
if the basic structure of society is to be regulated by a conception of justice that is both 
deeper and broader, covering also more complex questions of social justice than merely 
constitutional principles can comply with
443
, and is also supposed to be morally 
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 Cf. J-E. Lane, Constitutions and political theory (1996), p.12. In his instructive book on constitutions 
and political theory Lane also emphasises that “there exists nothing like a compact theory about consti-
tutions. What there is is a set of ideas, concepts and models drawn from various disciplines that refer to 
constitutions, either the constitutions of the many countries in the world or to some ideal constitution or 
other.”(Ibid, p. 3). And he adds that “the word „constitution‟ is ambiguous. It has two senses which are 
most often mixed up: „constitution meaning either a compact written document, comprising paragraphs 
with rules for the governance of the State, or „constitution‟ standing for the regime, i.e. the real institutions 
in terms of which the State is actually operated. „Constitution‟ as a „set of rules‟ is an expression with 
double meanings: (1) constitutional articles in a written document or (2) constitutional institutions as they 
are actually practiced in ongoing state activities.”(ibid, p.5). Although the two levels are hardly to be sepa-
rated by Rawls, I think we should say (if applying Lane‟s distinction on him) that Rawls  even when he is 
underlining that the constitutional concern is mainly procedural and formal  is in fact very much con-
cerned with “the second meaning of „constitution‟, standing for the actual principles or maxims in terms of 
which the country is ruled. Except for States which suffer from anarchy or civil war or which are about to 
be dissolved or have just recently been founded, each state has a constitutional practice. This practice 
need not be in accordance with the formally enacted constitution nor must there be a single constitutional 
document giving guidance. „Constitution‟ here refers not to a written document, but to the actual manner 
in which a country is ruled, the regime or the set of fundamental state institutions.” (ibid, p.9) 
442
 “The outline is in two stages. The first stage ends with a constitutional consensus, the second with an 
overlapping consensus. The constitution at the first stage satisfies liberal principles of political justice. As 
a constitutional consensus, these principles are accepted simply as principles and not grounded in certain 
ideas of society and person of a political conception, much less in a shared public conception. And so the 
consensus is not deep.”, J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.158. 
443
 This can be seen when turning to chapter IV, §§ 6-7 in Political Liberalism: “The constitutional con-
sensus is not deep and it is also not wide: it is narrow in scope, not including the basic structure but only 
the political procedures of democratic government.” p. 159. One might ask whether a constitution should 
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grounded, Rawls‟ aim of achieving an “overlap” faces the accusation of being overly 
idealistic and utopian. Rawls indirectly admits as much when saying that we can expect 
more agreement in matters concerning the constitutional principles for securing ele-
mentary rights and liberties than in matters of basic justice, involving social and eco-
nomic issues.
444
 One gets the impression that in seeking a consensus beyond the level of 
mere constitutional essentials, Rawls is to some extent leaning on the kind of compre-
hensiveness, which he has already rejected as inadequate for modern pluralist demo-
cracies. It seems unavoidable that Rawls‟ conception should be characterised as being at 
least partially comprehensive. 
4.4.4. The idea of an overlapping consensus 
4.4.4.1. The main features  
A constitutional consensus, is without doubt fundamental, and might in itself provide 
for a liberal “climate” in favour of co-operation, coexistence and discourse in society. 
But let me now, nevertheless, follow Rawls‟ way from a constitutional towards a 
genuine overlapping consensus. Rawls asks: 
                                                                                                                                                                          
not contain more, e.g. a specified list of basic rights and also particular constraints within economic life. 
Let me here recall that Rawls himself, at least in Lecture VI, §5 of Political Liberalism, in fact brings 
some of these elements into the “constitutional essentials” as such, saying that there are two “classes” of 
constitutional essentials which it is very urgent to settle: “There is the greatest urgency for citizens to 
reach practical agreement in judgement about the constitutional essentials. These are of two kinds: a. fun-
damental principles that specify the general structure of government and the political process: the powers 
of the legislature, executive and the judiciary, the scope of majority rule; and b. equal basic rights and 
liberties of citizenship that legislative majorities are to respect: such as the right to vote and to participate 
in politics, liberty of conscience, freedom of thought and of association, as well as the protection of the 
rule of law.” J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.227. But he does not just stress that there are two 
kinds of constitutional essentials, he also distinguishes between constitutional essentials on the one side 
and the principles that concern basic matters of distributive justice on the other side. The latter phenomena 
are of great importance, and Rawls is very much concerned with these things in his conception of political 
liberalism as well as in his theory of justice. But matters of distributive justice might admittedly be rather 
complex, and it might be much harder to establish a fundamental agreement about them. Unlike a merely 
constitutional consensus, an overlapping consensus, which is also concerned with wider issues of basic 
justice, is more demanding. It covers a wider field of issues and also goes deeper: “The depth of an over-
lapping consensus requires that its political principles and ideals be founded on a political conception of 
justice as fairness that uses fundamental ideas of society and person as illustrated by justice as fairness. Its 
breadth goes beyond political principles instituting democratic procedures to include principles covering 
the basic structure as a whole; hence its principles also establish certain substantive rights such as liberty 
of conscience and freedom of thought, as well as fair opportunity and principles covering certain essential 
needs.” Ibid, p. 164. 
444
 This might also be explained as follows: One might expect more agreement in matters belonging with-
in the perspective of the first principle of justice than in matters concerning social and economic equalities 
and differences. It seems as if the concern for constitutional essentials has a clear affinity towards the safe-
guarding of the fundamental liberties and rights subsumed under Rawls‟ first principle of justice (plus a 
basic social standard required for making use of these liberties and rights). 
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“What are the forces that push a constitutional consensus toward an overlapping 
consensus, even if supporting a full overlapping consensus is never achieved but at 
best only approximated? I mention some of these forces as they relate to depth, 
breadth, and how specific, or how narrow, the class of conceptions in the focus.”445 
A constitutional consensus, when it is in place, will, as we have already seen, cover only 
a very limited range of the important common issues that have to be considered funda-
mental in a modern society . The constitution cannot be concerned with the whole of the 
basic structure of a society. Therefore a constitutional consensus will prove too narrow. 
There will always be new problems, which raise questions concerning basic justice; 
there will be a need for renewed amendments and an ongoing process of legislation. 
There are many vital issues which can not be resolved just by applying constitutional 
principles according to a set of formal rules and established procedures. There must also 
be an underlying idea of justice that is “sufficiently unified and cohesive”446, and which 
might serve as a common basis of reference for the different co-operating and coexistent 
persons and groups who enter the public forum. People are supposed to discuss issues of 
basic justice with one another, try to justify their standpoints, and thereby gain support 
for their views. This seems both required and desirable when persons leave their narrow 
circle and address a broader audience. When people have to explain publicly
447
 the 
meaning of their standpoints, they should be expected to give the best reasons they can 
for their decisions and position. And reason in itself relates in a way to depth, since con-
stitutional essentials, procedural guidelines, practices and matters concerning social co-
operation have to be defended, explained and interpreted. A conception of justice, ap-
plying to the whole institutional scheme of society should therefore have a certain depth. 
In specifying that the kind of consensus he aims at requires a certain depth, Rawls pre-
supposes that shared political principles for a pluralist democracy can be grounded on a 
conception of justice that at least incorporates some explicit and fundamental ideas 
about society as well as about human beings as moral persons. Rawls is obviously not 
satisfied with just providing formal principles, guidelines and “procedures for mode-
rating political rivalry within society.”448 So the consensus that Rawls considers it 
essential to aim for, is clearly more substantial than mere consensus on some consti-
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tutional essentials,  and therefore may be supposed to be more controversial. 
From premises Rawls has himself laid down, it would therefore seem that the idea of 
establishing an overlapping consensus might be a very demanding project, at least if 
justice as fairness, which might unavoidably be regarded a rather substantial principle, 
is supposed to be the focal point of the “overlap”. For the claim that an overlapping con-
sensus has to be deeper, broader and more specific than both a “modus vivendi” and a 
mere “constitutional consensus”, and simultaneously “non-comprehensive”, seems at 
the first glance to render the entire idea of an overlapping consensus implausible. At 
least there might be a built-in tension in Rawls‟ standpoint. To see what Rawls‟ main 
idea really is, however, and whether he succeeds in realising his demanding project in a 
plausible way, I will now consider more specifically the idea of an “overlapping con-
sensus”. 
The notion of “consensus” as such is dealt with earlier. Let me therefore now just state 
that Rawls seems to aim for an agreement that is more than just a tacit and relatively 
undemanding concurrence of moral and political standpoints and interests. Usually he 
presupposes that the essential principles of justice, which are taken as the focus of an 
overlapping consensus, are intentionally endorsed and supported. A consensus on a 
political conception of justice is therefore supposed to be willingly and freely estab-
lished.
449
 Nor, it should be noted, is “consensus” to be viewed as the automatic product 
of a majority vote. 
What Rawls aims at, is a consensus that is acceptable from the perspective of all the 
citizens, even though they may hold very different reasonable comprehensive doc-
trines.
450
 The very notion “overlapping” presupposes that the persons who are supposed 
to endorse an overlapping consensus, take disparate points of departure. But “overlap” 
does not only imply that there are considerable differences between the parties,  it also 
implies that there is something that the parties can be supposed to have in common.  
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Therefore the term “overlapping” might lead us to think that Rawls seeks to find a low-
est common denominator between all of the different religious, ideological, moral and 
philosophical comprehensive doctrines taken together, or that he is aiming at crystal-
lising some elements of a core-morality, that might already be found within all the more 
complex and comprehensive doctrines that the endorsing parties honour. The idea of an 
overlapping consensus should accordingly be expected to rest on the optimistic assump-
tion, that it is possible to extract from all comprehensive doctrines at least a minimum 
of shared moral principles (of justice), after having first carefully ignored all the parti-
cular elements that might be controversial. 
But I think that Rawls‟ idea of an overlapping consensus451 is different, and also more 
complex. 
First: The idea of the overlap as a minimum-extract from the different comprehensive 
doctrines that exist in society is not Rawls‟ idea. Rawls does not take his point of de-
parture directly from the different religious, philosophical or moral doctrines that al-
ready exist in society. When working out his idea of an overlapping consensus, he starts 
instead from some moral and philosophical ideas that are essential and fundamental 
within the political culture we in fact belong to.
452
 And therefore Rawls is justified in 
saying that the content of an overlapping consensus “should be, so far as possible, 
presented as independent of comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doc-
trines ... as a „freestanding‟ view ...”453 Not the lowest common denominator, but a 
“freestanding” view, that is what Rawls envisions. Any aspects of Christianity or other 
comprehensive views which play a role in this connection, do so only in an indirect way, 
 as more or less influential elements within the background-culture which serves Rawls 
as the main source in the development of an overlapping consensus. 
Thereafter, however, Rawls hopes for support from within the different comprehensive 
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doctrines, which are also related to and are at least in some respect more or less closely 
woven together with the background culture that is the first source for Rawls. After 
having first elaborated the “overlap” as a freestanding view, Rawls now assumes that it 
relates so closely to the comprehensive views, that it will be possible also to recognise 
the “overlap” from premises genuinely given within the reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines themselves. Accordingly Rawls can characterise the political conception of 
justice, which he aims at, as a module, designed to fit into, and to be supported by many 
different kinds of comprehensive moral doctrines.  
“I assume all citizens to affirm a comprehensive doctrine to which the political 
conception they accept is in some way related. But a distinguishing feature of a 
political conception is that it is presented as freestanding and expounded apart from, 
or without reference to, any such wider background. To use a current phrase, the 
political conception is a module, an essential constituent part, that fits into and can 
be supported by various reasonable comprehensive doctrines that endure in the 
society regulated by it. .....its content is expressed in terms of certain fundamental 
ideas seen as implicit in the public political culture of a democratic society.”454 
This is the way justice as fairness can be taken as the focus of an overlapping consensus 
and can also be supposed to fit together with and to be endorsable from the perspective 
of different comprehensive (religious) doctrines in a world where the comprehensive 
views should be considered essential to people.
455
 The comprehensive views which 
people honour, provide them in fact with the deepest and most vital motives for acting, 
although it is simultaneously the case that no one comprehensive view has any realistic 
chance of being commonly and widely recognised as the shared basis for co-operation 
and common life. For to emphasise it once more; it is obvious that religion, ideology or 
“philosophy as the search for truth about an independent metaphysical and moral order 
cannot . . .provide a workable and shared basis for a political conception of justice in a 
democratic society.”456 Rawls nevertheless hopes that religious people (and people 
holding other comprehensive views) will ultimately be able to support an “overlap” 
from within their own belief and ground-orientation, thus contributing to establishing a 
common basis for co-operation and coexistence in pluralist societies. It should in fact be 
possible both to maintain that a political (and moral) “overlap” can be established and 
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maintained regardless of the comprehensive doctrines that people hold, and simultane-
ously also stress that people are supposed to endorse an overlapping consensus from 
within their own religious view. That is Rawls‟ intention as expressed in Political 
Liberalism. He develops an “overlap” to fit closely with the diverse comprehensive 
views that people hold, an “overlap” that is, however, in a way independent of all kinds 
of comprehensive doctrines, challenging them and drawing on them simultaneously. 
The overlapping consensus, which Rawls aims at, is supposed to be strictly political in 
its very nature. I think that is an important reason why it can be supposed to be endorsed 
from within different religious comprehensive doctrines, without really being identical 
in aim with any of them. But the political nature of an “overlap” also means that an 
“overlapping consensus” has to be conceived of as limited in aim. Rawls clearly and 
explicitly stresses that he aims at a strictly political “overlap” with a minimum of 
“metaphysical” ambitions457 : 
“Thus, political liberalism looks for a political conception of justice that we hope 
can gain the support of an overlapping consensus of reasonable religious, philo-
sophical, and moral doctrines in a society regulated by it. . . . Public reason  
citizen‟s reasoning in the public forum about constitutional essentials and basic 
questions of justice  is now best guided by a political conception the principles and 
values of which all citizens can endorse. That political conception is to be, so to 
speak, political and not metaphysical.”458 
As I will show later Rawls is not very explicit about the meaning of “metaphysics”. 
Nevertheless there can be little doubt that he tries as far as possible to avoid systemati-
cally “metaphysical” assumptions459, which he takes to be opposed to merely “political” 
principles for fair coexistence, which he hopes can be taken as the focus of an overlap-
ping consensus in a modern pluralist society. It is certainly quite crucial according to 
Rawls that; 
“Principles of justice can be argued for as valid, or desirable, or appropriate without 
reliance on any particular comprehensive view, though the validity of these prin-
ciples will depend largely on their capacity to fit with an overlapping consensus of 
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comprehensive views. It is in this sense that Rawls argues that political philosophy 
need not be metaphysical. In a well-ordered society, a plurality of comprehensive 
views will support the basic political structure and ideas of justice (though some 
unreasonable comprehensive views will not).”460 
Briefly recapping:  
 An overlapping consensus is in the first place to be established as a freestanding 
view, taking its point of departure from some vital premises given within the political 
culture itself. 
 An overlapping consensus, which is supposed to be of any lasting value in pluralist 
societies, cannot make strong (negative or positive) assumptions in matters of 
religious truth or moral philosophy. 
 An overlapping consensus, although a political achievement, is nevertheless sup-
posed to be morally motivated and endorsable from premises that are genuinely in 
accordance with the different (religious) views that citizens freely affirm. 
So far it is sufficient to say that the way Rawls has elaborated the idea of an overlapping 
consensus demonstrates both that he distinguishes rather sharply between a political per-
spective and the different non-political (or “metaphysical”) points of view.461 Simul-
taneously, however, he also very closely relates the two perspectives. Although the 
“overlap” is in the first place conceived of as a “freestanding” view, the whole idea of 
establishing an overlapping consensus might be futile if not closely related to premises 
inherent in the comprehensive doctrines, which people hold and take as their most vital 
commitment. The question is whether an overlapping consensus can bear the tension 
built into it by Rawls,  since it is simultaneously considered both a freestanding con-
ception and a “project” decisively dependent on support from within the comprehensive 
doctrines themselves. 
4.4.4.2. Consensus by avoidance rather than by agreement? 
I have shown that an overlapping consensus is to be based on support from within the 
different comprehensive doctrines. But it seems as if such a support might be achieved 
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only by systematically avoiding issues that are supposed to be unacceptable from the 
point of view of comprehensive doctrines. One always has to take into consideration 
that comprehensive doctrines are strongly committed to truth, which might easily lead to 
conflicts.  
It might be said, however, that Rawls to a wide extent succeeds in reducing the weight 
of comprehensive motives in politics, and especially those that are highly controversial, 
the truth of which can hardly be commonly recognised. And the doctrines he still needs 
are those that are intuitively taken for granted and widely shared as vital “cultural 
achievements” within the political culture itself.462 Thus Rawls is without doubt devel-
oping an idea of political consensus that is rather weak and to a very wide extent free of 
metaphysical stumbling blocks.  
In proceeding like this he employs a method, which he himself characterises as a method 
of avoidance. Rawls will avoid developing political liberalism as just another compre-
hensive system, for as already stated there is in pluralist, democratic societies hardly a 
possibility of making a particular comprehensive value-system the common basis of 
social co-operation. Rawls clearly realises that comprehensive religious and moral doc-
trines, in accordance with their own nature, normally have to make strong claims about 
truth, and it would be contrary to the very idea of politics to make religious “truths” an 
essential part of the basic political framework of society. Accordingly Rawls stresses 
that ideology, religion or “philosophy as the search for truth about an independent meta-
physical and moral order cannot  . . .  provide a workable and shared basis for a political 
conception of justice in a democratic society.”463 
For Rawls, a conception of justice for society as a whole should not be developed as a 
metaphysically and epistemologically demanding conception, but only as a strictly pol-
itical and inclusive one. By avoiding a metaphysically demanding conception of justice, 
as far as it is possible, he can use the liberal principles of justice in establishing the insti-
tutional basis that society needs as a framework for fair co-operation among its free and 
equal citizens,  thereby avoiding the more specific and controversial metaphysical 
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views that people may simultaneously be supposed to be strongly committed to. 
Of course it would be rather naïve to believe that all kinds of “metaphysical”464 pre-
mises can be entirely removed from a political conception. And I think that Rawls rea-
lises this, as may be obvious from the way he himself defines justice as fairness, as a 
conception which is after all deeper and more demanding than a mere modus vivendi or 
a consensus on merely constitutional essentials. But nevertheless it is clear that Rawls, 
especially in his later writings, uses what he calls a “method of avoidance”, which 
means that he systematically reduces all kinds of reference to comprehensive truths and 
transcendent reasons to a minimum degree. For he realises rightly that if he does not 
succeed in doing so, the conception he works out would be comprehensive and “thick” 
in a way that might render it completely unsuitable as the focus of an overlapping con-
sensus. But this does not mean that Rawls avoids all controversy. There are certainly 
political ideals, norms and assumptions built into his conception of justice as fairness, 
for instance assumptions concerning society as a system of social co-operation and 
assumptions concerning the moral nature of man, and there are norms safeguarding the 
fundamental rights of citizens, taken as free and equal human beings. In my opinion the 
“method of avoidance” as employed by Rawls is used just as a means to establish an 
“agreement” on an institutional scheme of society by removing as far as possible so 
called “metaphysical” stumbling blocks, which might unnecessarily block the kind of 
“overlap” required for political coexistence and social co-operation. 
4.4.4.3. Setting vital issues off the agenda? 
I have stressed that there are certain religious (comprehensive) “truths” that are neither 
to be denied nor affirmed from a political point of view. This avoidance of political re-
ference to religious and metaphysical doctrines in no way implies any devaluation of 
religious “truth”,  it may rather be taken as a recognition of the limits of politics. If a 
consensus in matters of politics shall be established, Rawls considers it necessary to find 
agreed ways “to bypass religion and philosophy‟s profoundest controversies”465,  the 
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kind of controversies that have earlier caused endless conflicts. Such a “bypass-ope-
ration” seems even more urgent in highly pluralist societies. 
Erik Oddvar Eriksen, however, finds this way of avoiding sensitive questions and “by-
passing” certain controversialities very problematic, especially in modern societies with 
their complex and overloaded agendas. The difficult question according to Eriksen is 
who has the power to write the agenda and to set issues off the agenda.
466
  
It appears to me that Rawls‟ emphasis upon the removal of certain issues from the pol-
itical agenda, is not really intended to remove issues that are controversial or difficult 
from the political debate, just because they are too problematic. Nor is Rawls‟ removal 
of these issues from the agenda a way of accepting that people should simply agree to 
disagree in matters of religion and metaphysics.  
Rawls clearly intends more than a trivial “avoidance” of troublesome issues. It is charac-
teristic of constitutional democracies that there are some issues and some fundamental 
achievements, which are considered too important to be made the subject of daily pol-
itical struggle, and which should therefore not very often and very easily be changed or 
reversed. Most modern democratic societies no longer debate such matters as equal pol-
itical rights and liberties for men and women, or the right of all citizens to vote and to a 
fair trial, as well as the freedom of conscience and the right to publicly express one‟s 
personal and religious beliefs. Consensus about these things means that they are taken as 
constitutionally established and safeguarded. They are considered unquestionable by 
(nearly) all parties in society. The issue of slavery, once a disputed political theme, has 
for instance been removed from the political agenda in this sense, meaning that the pol-
itical issue of slavery is no longer open to question, but considered resolved once and 
for all. It is to be taken for granted,  as an irreversible achievement, safeguarded by 
being set off the ordinary agenda of political bargaining. There is also a moral aspect 
that should not be overlooked in this connection  it should be considered a moral 
achievement as well that slavery is now taken as out of the question in the sense that it 
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should be considered morally impermissible 
467
 There are in society many issues like 
this that are safeguarded by being removed from the ordinary political debate. Guaran-
teeing equal liberty of conscience for instance means that society has found a way of 
removing questions about religious faith off the political agenda, which implies a safe-
guarding of the freedom of conscience for each citizen. What Rawls really means by 
setting issues off the agenda is summed up by him as follows: 
“To explain: When certain matters are taken off the political agenda, they are no 
longer regarded as proper subjects for political decision by majority or other plural-
ity voting. In regard to equal liberty of conscience and rejection of slavery and serf-
dom, this means that the equal basic liberties in the constitution that cover these 
matters are taken as fixed, settled once and for all.”  468   
There is within the Rawlsian conception no “neutrality” in moral, legal and political, 
matters of this kind. Rawls really takes for granted that there are certain political posi-
tions or achievements which should be “taken as fixed, settled once and for all”, achieve-
ments which are now well worth fighting for if attacked again. Rawls does not, of course,  
provide us with a complete list of issues that deserve to be set off the agenda of ordinary 
political bargaining in this way. Nevertheless, I think that the weight of Rawls‟ argu-
ments in this connection should be recognised and supported, not least from the per-
spective of Christian social ethics, even if it is simultaneously important to prevent the 
premature removal of certain “achievements” from the ordinary political agenda.469 
4.4.4.4. Keeping focus unsharp? 
There has been an intensive discussion about Rawls‟ specific principles of justice,  the 
first of which stresses the right to equal basic liberties, and the second of which focuses 
on equality/inequality and is divided into an “opportunity-principle” and a “difference-
principle”. In his more recent publications Rawls appears to be more realistic about the 
difficulties in attaining an agreement on a precise conception of justice, including some 
specified principles, than he was when the conception of justice as fairness was first 
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worked out by the means of a hypothetically modelled original “test-position”. He now 
emphasises that; 
“… citizens are to conduct their fundamental discussions within the framework of 
what each regards as a political conception of justice based on values that the others 
can reasonably be expected to endorse and each is, in good faith, prepared to defend 
that conception so understood. This means that each of us must have, and be ready 
to explain, a criterion of what principles and guidelines we think other citizens (who 
are also free and equal) may reasonably be expected to endorse along with us. We 
must have some test we are ready to state as to when this condition is met. I have 
elsewhere suggested as a criterion the values expressed by the principles and guide-
lines that would be agreed to in the original position. Many will prefer another cri-
terion.”470   
Rawls‟ revised position might be difficult to understand to a full extent. For it seems to 
imply that he now realises that the original position  constructed to provide us with 
appropriate principles of justice by a pure procedural line of decision  will not be taken 
by all as an appropriate device for specifying the most obvious principles of justice or 
for testing whether principles of justice can hold universally. There might be different 
reasons why people take another approach than Rawls has proposed when elaborating 
their conception of justice.
471
 I need not go deeper into this problem. I believe, however, 
that Rawls would still consider the original position an appropriate philosophical “in-
strument” for testing whether principles of justice can be considered fair by all parties 
and can be supposed to hold universally. Rawls still holds that the conception of justice 
as fairness, as conceived of in A Theory of Justice, should be considered the standard 
example of a conception of justice to be taken as the proper focus of an overlapping 
consensus. But he now also adds that:  
“Finally, as to how far an overlapping consensus is specific, I have for simplicity 
assumed all along that its focus is a specific political conception of justice, with 
justice as fairness as the standard example.  There is, however, another possibility 
that is more realistic and more likely to be realized. In this case the focus of an 
overlapping consensus is a class of liberal conceptions that vary within a certain 
more or less narrow range. The more restricted the range, the more specific the 
consensus. ... When overlapping consensus is characterized this way, the role of 
justice as fairness will have a special place within conceptions defining the focus of 
the consensus.”472 
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In the text quoted above Rawls seeks a “possibility that is more realistic and more likely 
to be realized” than just grounding an overlapping consensus on premises of justice, 
elaborated by a specific philosophical procedure, resulting in two specific principles of 
justice. Rawls no longer sees the need for defining exact and strict principles of justice 
that must be recognised word for word, point for point as the focus of an “overlap”,  
before an acceptable ground consensus can be brought about.
 473
 Now he admits that the 
focus of an overlapping consensus need not be absolutely sharp  possibly it should 
rather be recognised as consisting of a class of related versions of justice. There is rather 
a “focal class” of conceptions of justice that might be taken as sufficiently focused to 
play the decisive role in rendering modern democratic societies well-ordered in a way 
that is acceptable from a liberal point of view. 
It is at the same time important to see that Rawls now also takes into account the pos-
sibility that “a full overlapping consensus cannot, it seems, be achieved.”474 I think this 
is a reason why he now tries to make the premises for bringing about an overlapping 
consensus weaker. However, he also faces the possibility that the best one can achieve 
in the first place is a partial consensus, which he hopes might serve as a decisive first 
step towards a deeper and more enduring consensus. According to Rawls there might be 
good reasons for hoping that the experiences people have with constitutional regimes 
and with societies based on liberal principles and (relatively) just institutions will 
psychologically and practically help prepare the ground for achieving a genuine 
overlapping consensus. 
“Gradually, as the success of political cooperation continues, citizens gain increasing 
trust and confidence in one another. This is all we need to say in reply to the 
objection that the idea of overlapping consensus is utopian.”475  
This kind of growing confidence in one another as a precondition for a broad and fun-
damental consensus about fair terms of coexistence depends, however, to a wide extent 
on the capacity of liberal societies to provide for the social standards, required for 
citizens as free and equal to participate in society as a fair system of cooperation. If this 
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is not the case, the positive psychological effect caused by people‟s experiences with 
liberal regimes will hardly be as Rawls hopes. 
The basic institutions in a well-ordered Rawlsean society are clearly supposed to pro-
vide effectively both for social security and for the respect of basic rights, liberties and 
toleration. A liberal society will, for instance, therefore safeguard the kind of basic 
rights and liberties that are necessary for religious worship. On the other hand an over-
lap on liberal premises will also allow for moral attitudes and liberties that might freely 
oppose religious faith and morality within reasonable limits. One cannot accept the 
Rawlsian form of fairness without including the latter possibility. 
Even if Rawls is now opening up for a “focal class” of conceptions of justice that might 
be taken as sufficiently focused to be the core of an overlapping consensus, and even if 
the width of such a focal class might be considerable, it should be emphasised that the 
relevant conceptions of justice are still supposed by Rawls to be liberal in nature. What 
the actual conceptions of justice have in common, is that they are drawing on some 
moral values and cultural achievements, which are essential within the liberal tradition 
(as for instance the idea of toleration, human rights and the respect of individual liberty). 
Rawls is of the opinion that the political culture, to which he belongs, in fact offers 
favourable conditions for establishing an overlapping consensus on the basis of a family 
of conceptions of justice,  genuinely liberal in scope. 
The objection that Rawls‟ view should be qualified as rather “utopian” 476, as suggested 
for instance by Nicholas Rescher,  seems therefore hardly justified. One might even 
say that Rawls has become much more “realistic” in recent time. The way he allows for 
a certain “latitude” in terms of  the focal class of adequate conceptions of justice, bears 
witness to his realistic and very strong concern for bringing about a shared platform for 
coexistence.  In this connection one should bear in mind that Rawls also assumes that 
there is a certain “latitude” and “looseness” in most comprehensive doctrines. It is im-
possible once and for all to specify a complete set of Christian moral doctrines. There is 
a certain changeability, just as there is a certain flexibility and latitude. 
Turning the focal point of an overlapping consensus into a „focal class‟ the Rawlsian 
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overlap might expectedly be more easily approved of from a religious point of view. A 
certain “latitude” both in Rawls‟ idea of justice and in the Christian approach in matters 
of social ethics might reduce the possible or likely areas of conflict. 
4.4.5. Rawls  parasitic on existing comprehensive doctrines? 
Rawls and Honecker share an important premise. They are both of the opinion that the 
pluralism of modern societies is closely allied with human freedom, but nevertheless has 
to be limited in some way. Thus there has to be a common framework for coexistence 
and social co-operation. 
I have discussed the way Rawls in a first stage employs the contractarian tradition to 
elaborate fundamental principles for the basic structure of society,  principles that 
might be considered fair by all. But I have also shown how Rawls has become increas-
ingly concerned with the moral foundation of the very scheme of society, how it can be 
maintained and safeguarded as a fair institutional scheme. Rawls addresses this concern 
for “stability” through the elaboration of the idea of an overlapping consensus. In elabo-
rating his idea of an overlapping consensus Rawls very clearly realises that principles 
for fair coexistence cannot be fundamentally at odds with the comprehensive views and 
belief-systems which people actually hold, but have to be endorsable from within these 
same diverse comprehensive views. In Political Liberalism Rawls clearly states that it is 
necessary for a liberal conception both to draw on the moral resources latent in the pol-
itical culture and also to gain a willing support from within the comprehensive moral 
views. The idea is that: 
“All those who affirm the political conception start from within their own compre-
hensive view and draw on the religious, philosophical, and moral grounds it pro-
vides. The fact that people affirm the same political conception on those grounds 
does not make their affirming it any less religious, philosophical, or moral, as the 
case may be, since the grounds sincerely held determine the nature of their affirm-
ation.”477   
Although the Rawlsian idea of an “overlap” is elaborated as a freestanding view, the 
“from-within-principle” says that the realisation of an overlapping consensus in society 
depends for its acceptability on premises genuinely given within the different kinds of 
reasonable religious and non-religious views which people hold. In principle Rawls 
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thereby makes the support from existing comprehensive doctrines a test to the plausi-
bility of his conception as such.  
“Thus, a conception of justice may fail because it cannot gain the support of 
reasonable citizens who affirm reasonable comprehensive doctrines; or as I shall 
often say, it cannot gain the support of a reasonable overlapping consensus. Being 
able to do this is necessary for an adequate political conception of justice.” 478 
And I think that the question of establishing an overlapping consensus with this aim had 
a considerable influence upon Rawls more recent recasting of his system of justice. 
It is generally assumed that any conception of justice which forms the overlapping con-
sensus cannot itself be comprehensive and deep. That is, it cannot provide us with a 
deeper justification for the “overlap” required in a pluralist society. This means, how-
ever, that when deeper reasons, or even “Letztbegründungen” are asked for, people must 
refer to the comprehensive doctrines they hold,  as far as these are indeed supportive of 
the “overlap”. This is the reason why Wolfgang Kersting holds that: 
“Damit zehrt die politische Gerechtigkeit, die keine eigene Wahrheit besitzt, para-
sitär von den vielen Wahrheiten der umfassenden metaphysischen und moralischen 
Lehren. Der politische Philosoph Rawls arbeitet hier als Rechtfertigungspolitiker: Er 
delegiert die Rechtfertigungsaufgabe an die internen Begründungsstandards der 
bestehenden Überzeugungssysteme und verteilt so die Rechtfertigungslast auf viele 
Schultern. Rawls bemüht sich jedoch vergeblich, seine Gerechtigkeitskonzeption 
vom Verdacht des Hobbesianismus freizuhalten: Auch wenn sie keinen Modus 
vivendi der Klugheit vorschlägt, so formuliert seine Konzeption doch einen Modus 
vivendi der Moral, deren Verbindlichkeit von der politischen Philosophie als ge-
schichtliches Faktum vorausgesetzt wird und deren Bewahrheitung privatisiert wird: 
Aus je eigenen Gründen stimmen die Anhänger der umfassenden moralischen und 
metaphysischen Theorien dem konstruktiven Vorschlag der Philosophen zu.”479 
Kersting is right to the extent that the overlapping consensus, if it shall really be an 
“overlap”, cannot provide the comprehensive justification for itself. Rawls therefore 
leaves it to the representatives of each comprehensive doctrine to provide for the deeper 
justifying reasons, when such reasons are required or desirable. And he seems rather 
confident that the political conception of an overlapping consensus can and will be 
affirmed by people from within the context of the different comprehensive religious, 
moral and philosophical views that are most commonly held in democratic societies to 
day  and presumed to be reasonable.  
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But I think that Rawls also aims at something more, that is not taken into consideration 
by Kersting. It is not just the deeper justification of the “overlap” that Rawls leaves to 
the comprehensive doctrines. I think that he also realises that there is within the compre-
hensive moral doctrines a deep moral commitment and a motivational force that should 
be of decisive value not just for bringing about an overlapping consensus in society, but 
even more for making the political “overlap” firm and stable. This is in my opinion one 
of the primary justifications for Rawls characterisation of the overlapping consensus as 
a morally grounded consensus. When characterising the Rawlsian “from-within-prin-
ciple” as “parasitär”, one overlooks both the respect for the comprehensive doctrines 
and the anti-Hobbesian genuinely moral concern built into the very idea of an over-
lapping consensus. If Rawls succeeds in drawing adequately on the moral commitment 
inherent in the comprehensive moral doctrines, he will succeed in making the overlap 
stable, thereby overcoming the limitations of agreements based upon a mere modus 
vivendi. He aims at an overlapping consensus, which depends not just on a balancing of 
contingent power and interests, but is also upheld for genuinely moral reasons.  
There are even more reasons why Rawls‟ idea of an overlapping consensus should not 
so easily be taken as “parasitic” on existing comprehensive doctrines.  
As discussed, the overlapping consensus is in the first place conceived of as a “free-
standing” conception, which is, however, assumed to gain the support from the com-
prehensive doctrines. Even if one agrees with the objection  that Rawls does not entirely 
succeed in developing his conception as a “freestanding” view, independent of compre-
hensive moral doctrines, this objection can hardly justify more than the obvious con-
clusion that Rawls is in fact drawing on some substantive shared premises, inherent in 
our political culture. This is an insight which in itself cannot justify the strong charac-
terisation of his conception as “parasitic”. 
Rather than characterising the idea of an overlapping consensus as “parasitic”, one 
might instead be justified in saying that a Rawlsian “overlap” does not just lean on the 
substantive morality of existing comprehensive doctrines,  it may also serve as a 
“filter”, sorting out those comprehensive views, which are at odds with fundamental 
values as defined by political liberalism. This “filter-function” is not unproblematic, but 
has to be taken clearly into account before characterising the Rawlsian conception as 
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“parasitic”. Rawls‟ idea of an overlapping consensus might in fact be rather demand-
ing.
480
 He requires something from the doctrines which are expected to be supportive of 
an overlapping consensus, even if he can simultaneously admit that the criteria for 
“filtering” out some comprehensive doctrines as incompatible with political liberalism 
have to be rather loose.
481
 
4.5. Lutheran social ethics  finding an approach to the 
question of political consensus.  
As discussed in chapter 3, Honecker‟s analysis of the pluralist society parallels in some 
respects that of Rawls. And both Rawls and Honecker agree that a shared moral frame-
work or a common value-platform has to be established in society. Even if an overlap-
ping consensus should be conceived of in a way that allows for highly different kinds of 
“Letztbegründungen”, it seems as if there also has to be at least a minimum of common 
moral ground and shared moral resources for an “overlap” to be successfully established 
and maintained. The question now is how theological social ethics should appropriately 
meet the problem of establishing and maintaining a morally grounded consensus, and 
especially how one should assess the Rawlsian solution, as presented in the idea of an 
overlapping consensus.  
I. According to Honecker it should be emphasised that there is in fact among the 
citizens already some shared ground-values, and that acceptable laws are to a wide 
extent in place, and that there are also political institutions providing for the common 
good. All these things reflect that there already is a certain consensus about vital moral 
ideas, principles of justice and basic values, which are the outcome of a long historical 
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Although Honecker may sometimes be questioning the very notion of “value” as such, 
he also stresses that there is  even in highly pluralist societies  a fundamental “Wert-
system”, which society cannot be without.483 And Honecker can take a rather pragmatic 
approach to the actual value-system of society. 
“Es gibt kein „für sich bestehendes Reich der Werte, … einen echten Kosmos 
noetos, der ebenso jenseits der Wirklichkeit, wie jenseits des Bewußtseins besteht‟ 
[Nicolai Hartmann, Ethik 1926. S.108]. Werte sind vielmehr Grundgegebenheiten 
des sozialen Zusammenlebens, die als Leitbilder faktisch anerkannt werden und als 
Normen des Handelns der Gesellschaftsmitglieder bestimmen oder bestimmen sol-
len. Das Wertsystem einer Gesellschaft beruht sowohl auf gesellschaftlicher Über-
lieferung wie auf der Anerkennung, dem Konsensus der Gesellschaftsmitglieder wie 
auf seiner motivbildenden Kraft. Sittliche, religiöse, politische Werte sind also 
jeweils der Gesellschaft vorgegeben und aufgegeben. Der Begriff „pragmatische‟ 
Begründung meint dabei eine Einstellung, die von der faktischen Gegebenheit von 
Werten, Grundwerten ausgeht, deren theoretische Ableitung und Begründung jedoch 
bewußt offenläßt und offenhält. Diese pragmatische Begründung von Grundwerten 
ist der Natur der Sache ihrer Argumentation nach pluralistisch. Sie ist nicht genötigt, 
sich auf eine spezifische Argumentationsfigur der Wertbegründung und der Erkennt-
nistheorie festzulegen. Sie ist vereinbar mit ontologischer, utilitaristischer und emo-
tivistischer Argumentation. Da sie nicht auf eine bestimmte Begründung der Werte 
festgelegt ist, ist sie auch offen für verschiedene Auslegungen auch der Grundwerte 
und deren Anwendung. Gerade wegen der pluralistischen Begründung der Grund-
werte kann eine Grundwertauffassung zur Wertordnung einer weltanschaulich 
pluralistischen Gesellschaft werden.”484 
Given this, it is enough to point out that Honecker desires to find a reasonable way to 
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achieve a workable value-consensus in society without stressing the necessity of giving 
ultimate reasons,  agreeing also on some particular kinds of “Letztbegründungen”, 
which all parties can accept as true. Honecker‟s pragmatic approach implies that a 
common value basis of society can be recognised theologically and also be considered 
justifiable from various philosophical, religious or non-religious points of view. Thus 
Honecker seems to come rather close to Rawls‟ idea of an overlapping consensus. 
But shouldn‟t theology have more absolute norms and standards of it‟s own for asses-
sing the institutional scheme of society and for recognising or rejecting the moral values 
playing a role within the political domain? Certainly, but Honecker realises that quest-
ions like this might pose a dilemma for a Lutheran social ethics. Part of the problem is, 
according to Honecker, that the Lutheran church lacks an established tradition of natural 
law, which can be practically utilised, clearly interpreted and authoritatively applied (by 
the church-institution). And even applying the sola-scriptura-principle has become in-
creasingly problematic (especially in matters of social-ethics) due to actual knowledge 
and insight into hermeneutic problems.
485
 It should therefore not be denied that the 
Lutheran church (and the Catholic church as well) faces some fundamental hermeneutic 
problems when conceiving of social ethics in modern societies. 
“Das Verhältnis von Grundwerten und christlicher Ethik stellt vor das Problem eines 
theologischen Ansatzes von Ethik überhaupt. Während die katholische Moraltheo-
logie ihre Normen begründet aus einem Naturrecht, ist der Ansatz evangelischer 
Ethik gegenwärtig umstritten und wird als problematisch erfahren. Auch zwischen 
der Grundwerteauffassung, wie sie dem Konsensus einer demokratischen Gesell-
schaft zugrundeliegt, und der katholischen Naturrechtsdoktrin kann es zu Span-
nungen und Gegensätzen kommen … Evangelische Ethik steht hier vor größeren 
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 204 
Problemen, sofern sie einem biblizistischen und exklusiv christozentrischen Ansatz 
folgt, nicht aber, wenn sie sich auf die Evidenz des Humanum beruft. Es liegt auf 
der Hand, einmal, daß in einer religiös und weltanschaulich pluralistischen Gesell-
schaft nicht eine biblische Legitimation ethischer Werte verbindlich gemacht werden 
kann. Dazu kommt, daß für eine Reihe aktueller und konkreter Probleme der Grund-
werte gar keine Auskunft aus der Bibel zu erlangen ist. Denn diese Probleme lagen 
der gesellschaftlichen Situation wie der Lebenswelt der biblischen Autoren noch 
geschichtlich völlig fern. Allenfalls eine bestimmte Grundeinstellung läßt sich daher 
den biblischen Texten entnehmen.”486 
It is not difficult to agree roughly with Honecker‟s analysis. But even if one, as the 
result of such a view, should abstain from theological legitimation of particular political 
values or social projects in modern societies, Honecker has to admit that a certain 
“Grundeinstellung”, essentially in accordance with the Bible, should be of some signifi-
cance in matters of politics. But Honecker is really rather vague about what this should 
mean.
487
 But what Honecker certainly cannot approve of is an approach to the political, 
which assumes an exclusive set of religiously revealed understandings and unquestion-
able political insight, thereby bringing religious citizens in a privileged position of better 
knowledge in matters concerning social co-operation and the institutional framework to 
be shared by all citizens. 
II. Let it here be stressed that the more “pragmatic” approach, taken by Honecker to the 
question of a value-consensus in society, is theologically motivated. The “co-operative 
attitude” he takes concerning the political ordering of matters of this world, can theo-
logically be justified by reference to the central theological distinction between “law488 
and gospel”. In a theological perspective it is, according to Honecker, the “usus-aspect” 
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of the law, which is primarily to be focused, not the question of its “Herkunft”. This 
supports the more pragmatic approach.
489
 
Since one might theologically assume that what the “law” requires, has been written in 
the hearts of all human beings, God‟s law should not be considered something entirely 
new, according to Honecker. It should not be considered a new moral codex with which 
all human beings are at the very outset supposed to be so unfamiliar that it must be 
taught them like a foreign language. From a substantial point of view is God‟s law both 
universally recognisable and accessible to human reason.
490
 So far I think that Honecker 
comes rather close to Gerhard Ebeling, who even more strongly stresses that the char-
acteristicum of God‟s “law” is not to be found in some particular substantial paragraphs 
or rules. What God‟s “law” first of all focuses upon, is the capacity of man to comply 
with it. And so Ebeling emphasises that; 
“…sofern man sagen kann, daß das Gesetz Erkenntnis wirkt, handelt es sich nicht 
um Erkenntnis des Guten, sondern um Erkenntnis der Sünde; nicht um Erkenntnis 
dessen, was geschehen soll, sondern um Erkenntnis dessen, was geschehen ist; nicht 
um Erkenntnis der offenen, sondern um Erkenntnis der ausgeschlossenen und 
verlorenen Möglichkeiten.”491 
It seems as if Honecker, just as Gerhard Ebeling, will avoid seeing the characteristics of 
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the “law” of God mainly in certain substantial standards, thereby reducing it to a “Ge-
setzeskodex” which can be compared or contrasted to other law-codes or law-con-
ceptions within society. Of course no law can be without a substantial content. For St. 
Paul the Jewish “tora” could mostly be referred to as the materialised “law”492.  
But I think that Honecker wishes to stress that from a merely substantial point of view 
the proprium of the “law”, taken in a genuinely theological sense, can never be found. 
Rather, from a merely substantial perspective one should accept that God‟s “law” might 
manifest itself in the practice of individuals and different groups as well as in the very 
groundvalues and in the scheme and the laws of society.
493
 If basic standards of human-
ity (“das Humanum”) penetrate the ground-values and institutional scheme of society, 
why shouldn‟t one say that what God wills for this world is  at least to some extent  
articulated in the ground-scheme or in the institutionalised practice of society
494
,  even 
if no specific religious commitment is signalled.  
III. It is required, however, to distinguish between two different ways the “law” can be 
used: an “usus theologicus legis” and an “usus politicus legis”. There is one aspect of 
this distinction, which should briefly be taken into account now, since it concerns the 
way the political domain is to be “limited” when seen in a theological perspective. 
When faced with God‟s “law” persons are confronted with absolute and ultimate claims. 
This is the reason why Ebeling could say that “…sofern man sagen kann, daß das Gesetz 
Erkenntnis wirkt, handelt es sich nicht um Erkenntnis des Guten, sondern um Erkennt-
nis der Sünde…”495 In this context it has to be stressed that the theological notion of law 
                                                          
492
 This is made obvious by Ebeling when distinguishing between the understanding of “law” in St.Paul‟s 
writings and in the theology of the Reformation: “Die am ehesten ins Auge fallende Verschiedenheit 
zwischen dem Paulinischen und dem reformatorischen Gesetzesbegriff ist die, daß Paulus unter no/moj 
normalerweise die Tora versteht, während die reformatorische Lehre vom Gesetz strenggenommen das 
jeden Menschen als Menschen angehende Gesetz meint.” G. Ebeling, Wort und Glaube I (1967), p.271. 
And he also makes it clear that: “Gewiss konnte Luther von dem grundsätzlichen christlichen Konsens 
seiner Zeit ausgehen, daß das Gesetz im strikten Sinne Gottes Gesetz ist und sich inhaltlich unbestritten in 
Texten wie den zehn Geboten, der Bergpredigt und dem Doppelgebot der Liebe darbiete.” G.Ebeling, 
“Usus politicus legis  usus politicus evangelii”, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche (1982), p.331.  
493
 I think this is the reason why Honecker can write that: “Um über die Wirklichkeit ethisch und theo-
logisch urteilen zu können, muß man diese zunächst einmal kennen und begreifen. Theologisch ge-
sprochen: Um den usus politicus legis recht wahrnehmen zu können, muß man die Wirklichkeit, die 
konkrete Gestalt von Gesetz heute erkennen.” M.Honecker, “Sind Denkschriften „kirchlicher Lehre‟?”, 
p.261, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche (1984), p.261. 
494
 At least Honecker might be understood in this way when saying: “Eine solche theologische Auffassung 
der Grundwerte als eines Inbegriffs von Aspekten des Humanum entspricht der reformatorischen Lehre 
vom Gesetz.”, M. Honecker, Sozialethik Zwischen Tradtition und Vernunft (1977), p. 154 
495
 G. Ebeling, Wort und Glaube I (1967), p.257 
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belongs within the wider distinction between law and gospel. Redemption from sin may 
be given in the gospel as proclaimed by the church.  
But the way God uses his “law” is not necessarily in all respects to be interpreted, ex-
plained, mediated or canalised through the church-institution. And the distinction be-
tween an “usus theologicus legis” and an “usus politicus legis” reminds us that the 
“law” of God, as suggested already in Rom.2,14f, has more than just one particular “Sitz 
im Leben”. It is not another code of law which is revealed in the “usus politicus”, but it 
is another use of God‟s “law”,  with another purpose and properly adjusted to another 
context. 
“Aber im usus politicus soll das Gesetz ja nicht primär anklagen oder gar töten, 
sondern das Leben, wenn auch nicht schaffen, so doch pflegen. Deshalb muß die 
meist verengte Vorstellung vom usus politicus legis zu der ganzen Weite und zu 
dem Reichtum menschlicher Kultur hin geöffnet werden. Nicht etwa nur der 
christlichen.”496 
This means that problems of social justice, political arrangements, liberties and rights 
might be properly handled theologically within the perspective of an “usus politicus 
legis”. Within this perspective one might aim at the best solutions given the realistically 
achievable and workable social arrangements available. From the perspective of “usus 
politicus” one is often faced with the question of more or less; this means that Honecker 
is ready to honour political projects as far as they in fact contribute to more justice in 
society. In moving from a strictly theological perspective on the “use of the law” to the 
perspective of an “usus politicus legis” Honecker in fact takes “absolutism” out of 
politics, making it a field of the relatively best.  
“Damit relativiert die theologische Erkenntnis des Gesetzes alle Möglichkleiten 
menschlichen Handelns. Ethische Aufgabe kann es nicht sein, vollkommene Frei-
                                                          
496
 G.Ebeling, “Usus politicus legis  usus politicus evangelii”, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 
(1982), p. 333. And the text quoted continues as follows: “In der konkreten Ausgestaltung des usus pol-
iticus legis spielt in der Reformationszeit selbstverständlich noch die Idee des Corpus Christianum eine 
gewisse Rolle. Aber gerade Luther hat den usus politicus legis so konzipiert, daß jede Gestalt weltlicher 
Ordnung und Moral darunter fällt (innerhalb seines Gesichtskreises z.B. auch die Türken). Sein Grund-
verständnis hat sich von dem ohnehin damals schon brüchig werdenden Corpus Christianum unabhängig 
gemacht. Damit ist er dem Geschichtsverlauf weit vorausgeeilt. Wichtiger jedoch ist, daß selbst der Christ 
in seinem Handeln keine höhere Stufe erschwingt als die iustitia civilis, sofern man sie nicht leichtfertig zu 
etwas Minderem degradiert, sondern an der hohen, ja unüberbietbaren Aufgabe mißt, die Welt und das 
menschliche Leben inmitten der Kreatur zu erhalten.” Ibid. In his article “Sind Denkschriften „kirchliche 
Lehre‟?”, Zeitshrift für Theologie und Kirche (1984) Honecker refers to Ebeling‟s article, since Ebeling in 
his article applies the principle of an “usus politicus legis” on the so called “Friedensdenkschrift der 
EKD”. 
 208 
heit, vollkommene Gerechtigkeit, vollkommene Solidarität zu verwirklichen und 
herzustellen, sondern allein mehr Freiheit zu ermöglichen, mehr Gerechtigkeit zu 
schaffen und mehr Solidarität zu verwirklichen. Indem eine theologische Deutung 
des Gesetzes an die Grenzen des auch ethisch Machbaren erinnert, relativiert sie 
alles gesellschaftliche Handeln. Relativieren heißt freilich nicht, gleichgültig und 
sinnlos machen. Vielmehr hält Theologie und Verkündigung gerade damit dazu an, 
das Relative in seiner Relativität unbedingt ernst zu nehmen. Denn gerade nur dann, 
wenn das Relative über sich hinausweist, ermöglicht es ein Handeln, das sich weder 
überschätzt noch verzweifelt resigniert.”497 
Honecker might even appear to render all political arrangements and institutions a kind 
of “provisorium”. For the category of the “law” - in its “usus politicus” - applies to the 
present scheme of the world, which is fundamentally imperfect, marked by the power of 
sin and eschatologically relativised. In a world thus constituted, the relatively best is 
often the most one can properly aim for.  
IV. According to Honecker the “usus politicus legis” should be clearly distinguished but 
not isolated from the “usus theologicus legis”. The notion of the “relative” is only 
meaningful in connection with an idea of the “absolute” which must be maintained.  
Honecker takes the transition from the usus politicus legis to the usus theologicus legis 
to be existentially urgent.
498
 Thus the “usus politicus” might very well become trans-
parent for an “usus theologicus legis” (the proper “use” of which is closely connected 
with the proclamation of the gospel). Human existence under the perspective of “usus 
politicus legis” will necessarily actualise questions, apories and dilemmas that cannot be 
solved with just political means.
 499
 “Law” means in itself that human beings are con-
fronted with standards, obligations, norms and not least the fundamental constraints of 
life itself. Thereby the “law” will also demonstrate that moral shortcoming, guilt and sin 
                                                          
497
 M. Honecker, Sozialethik Zwischen Tradition und Vernunft (1977), p. 156. 
498
 In fact it seems as if Honecker is of the opinion that this “transition” should be considered (nearly) 
cogent for human beings, - provided they are honest. It might now be tempting also to mention that Rawls 
takes for granted that being a human being implies having some final ends (for instance of a religious 
nature or of a deeper philosophical kind), which can in no way be satisfied by merely political means. 
People necessarily have also (three) higher order interests, - the second of which is characterised as “a 
determinate conception of the good, that is, a conception specified by certain definite final ends, 
attachments, and loyalties to particular persons and institutions, and interpreted in the light of some 
comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrines.” J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.74.  
499
 “Die lutherische Lehre betont daher, daß der theologische Gebrauch des Gesetzes, in Vergleich zum 
politischen , der eigentliche ist. Was aber heißt das? Die christliche Verkündigung hat auf Grenzen des 
Ethischen und des ethisch zu verantwortenden aufmerksam zu machen. Gerade am Phänomen des Ethis-
chen brechen Probleme und Aporien auf, die ethisch nicht lösbar sind, ja die den Horizont des Ethischen 
sprengen. Der Mensch erfährt in der Begegnung mit dem ethischen Anspruch einen Absoluten Anspruch.” 
M. Honecker, Sozialethik Zwischen Tradition und Vernunft (1977), p. 155 
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belong inevitably to the conditio humana,  and it even reminds us that the ultimate 
boundary of man is death.
500
 
Theological social ethics should always maintain a perspective which transcends the 
merely political and the strictly moral.
 
Ultimately the “usus politicus legis” is therefore 
dialectically related to the gospel;  in the end the “law” has to abdicate from its hard 
rule, giving way to the mercy of God. Thus theological social ethics ultimately trans-
cend a strictly political-moral perspective.
501
 Pointing to the limits of the political (and 
the social-ethical) may be one of the most important political contributions that theology 
can bring. Theology should inevitably remind us of the very limits of politics.  
So far, I will conclude by saying: When theology encounters phrases like “an over-
lapping consensus”, it will naturally interpret them in accordance with the models and 
hermeneutic keys with which theology is already well acquainted. And the theological 
notion of “law”, which should not be taken mainly as a code of laws and substantial 
paragraphs
502
, might be transformed into a key-term within a theological hermeneutic  
not just when concerned with the interpretation of Bible-texts  but also when approach-
                                                          
500
 “Wenn der Mensch sich an Grundwerten ausrichtet, so hat er Maßstäbe vor sich, hinter denen er stets 
und grundsätzlich zurückbleibt, denen er niemals und unbedingt zu genügen vermag. Die Realität des 
Menschseins setzt dem Unbedingten Grenzen. Schuld, Schicksal und Tod ziehen Grenzen.” M.Honecker, 
Sozialethik Zwischen Tradition und Vernunft (1977), p. 155 
501
 There can be little doubt that Honecker stresses the (relative) autonomy of politics,  as well as of 
ethics more generally. One might therefore ask what the genuinely Christian contribution within these 
fields could appropriately be, according to Honecker: “Wie aber können Ethik [as well as politics] und 
Theologie dann überhaupt noch in Beziehung gebracht werden, wenn man die Autonomie der Ethik 
anerkennt? Dafür sehe ich zwei Ansätze.  a) Die Frage „Why to be moral‟, warum überhaupt ethisch 
verantwortlich handeln, ist eine Frage, die zwar in der Ethik selbst entsteht, aber nicht mehr von der Ethik 
beantwortet werden kann. … Warum soll ich mich überhaupt rational, vernünftig, human verhalten? Eine 
Antwort auf diese Frage kann nicht mehr nur ethisch gegeben werden. Hier ist eine Antwort von einer 
metaethischen, einer metaphysischen oder theologischen Perspektive her möglich und wahrscheinlich 
sogar unvermeidlich.  b) Der andere Ansatz geht aus von den Grenzen des Ethischen. Ethik umfaßt gerade 
nicht das Ganze menschlichen Lebens. Es gibt nämlich Phänomene menschlichen Daseins, die nicht mehr 
allein ethisch zu bewältigen sind durch verantwortliches und vernünftiges Urteilen und Handeln. Dafür sei 
verwiesen auf Schuld, Schicksal, Tod und Leiden, welche menschlichem Handeln Grenzen ziehen. Zur 
Einsicht in die Aufgabe und Verantwortung von Ethik gehört deswegen auch die Einsicht in die Grenzen 
der Ethik, des Ethischen.” M. Honecker, “Erfahrung und Entscheidung”, Zeitschrift für Theologie und 
Kirche (1978), p.501. What concerns the two “Ansätze” that according to Honecker transcend the merely 
ethical (and the merely political), the former “Ansatz” (concerned with the question „why be moral?‟) is of 
less indirect importance within the field of politics than the latter “Ansatz”(concerned with the question 
about the existential limits). 
502
 I think this is a main concern in Honecker‟s writings, for which he seeks support from Gerhard 
Ebeling, whom he quotes, and from Martin Luther. “Gesetz ist ferner „für Luther nicht eine statuarische 
geoffenbarte Norm, zu der sich der Mensch so oder so verhält, sondern Gesetz ist für Luther eine exi-
stentiale Kategorie, in der die theologische Interpretation des faktischen Menschseins zusammengeballt 
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ing issues of social ethics.  
More precisely: The very distinction drawn between “law and gospel” (including the 
distinction between the different uses of the theological notion of “law”), provides a 
means for distinguishing properly between the requirements of Christian faith and 
secular political action, and provides us with a “device” for interpreting and under-
standing consensual moral/political projects,  as developed for instance by Rawls. 
I have now at least arrived at a theological “Ortsbestimmung”503 for handling theologi-
cally political and moral questions concerning a shared framework of coexistence and 
social co-operation. Ebeling gives an “Ortsbestimmung des Politischen” which is very 
much in accordance with Honecker‟s approach. And it is an “Ortsbestimmung” which 
also maintains, as an ultimate perspective on the political domain, that it is subject to the 
will of God, simultaneously, however, making the actual ordering of society a shared 
task for all human beings, endowed as they are by their Creator with reason and moral 
sense. 
There can be little doubt that Honecker‟s conception of theological ethics assumes a 
basic confidence in human reason in matters of social ethics,  even if theological ethics 
can never ignore the apories, dilemmas, shortcoming and the selfishness arising within 
the political and social domain. But by employing the notion of an “usus politicus legis” 
as Honecker in fact does, one can at least make it very clear that the field of politics and 
social ethics should be considered common ground.
504
 And there is  theologically 
speaking.  reason to hope that it might be possible to agree upon some moral standards 
within the domain of the political. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
ist.‟” [Cf. G. Ebeling: Wort und Glaube I, 3.Aufl. 1967, S.64f.]. Sozialethik Zwischen Tradtition und 
Vernunft (1977), p. 154f 
503
 This term is taken  not directly from Honecker, but from Gerhard Ebeling. When discussing the 
phrase “usus politicus legis” within the wider framework of a distinction between law and gospel, he 
makes it clear that the “formula” is not developed to get a “…Neben- und Abstellgeleise für solcherlei 
Fragen der Weltverantwortung, welche die Theologie von sich abschiebt. Diese Formel ist vielmehr eine 
zentral theologsiche Ortsbestimmung des Politischen.” G.Ebeling, “Usus politicus legis  usus politicus 
evangelii”, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche (1982), p.325. 
504
 The meaning of this cannot be that reference to religion, belief-systems and one‟s comprehensive 
moral doctrines should entirely be excluded from the field of politics. These problems will be discussed 
more thoroughly later. 
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4.6. A consensus  backed up by common sense 
morality? 
As far as I can see it may be possible to find in Rawls‟ theory, as expressed both in A 
Theory of Justice and in Political Liberalism, a double fundament
505
: 
First there is the constructivist basis of his theory. He models hypothetically a contract-
situation where a consensual basis for a common institutional framework can be fairly 
established  as a thought-experiment. In the hypothetically modelled original position, 
which provides us with a simplified constructed model, where the number of variables 
can be kept low, it should be possible to conceive of the most appropriate principles of 
justice for the scheme of social co-operation by pure procedural proceeding. Such an 
initial choice-situation has to be modelled in a way that makes the (fictitious) con-
tractors concentrate just on settling the most essential and fair terms of coexistence, 
which can thereafter reasonable serve the testing of real political institutional schemes. 
In addition Rawls hopes that there are among citizens, either they are religious or non-
religious, sufficient moral resources, some shared intuitions about the right, an inter-
nalised set of natural duties, and not least a fundamental sense of justice, making it 
possible for people to secure a just scheme of society over time.  
In concluding this chapter it is the second point that I primarily wish to stress. As 
already underlined, I did not find Wolfgang Kersting‟s critique of Rawls for being 
“parasitic” on existing doctrines correct, but it may be easier to follow Kersting when 
emphasising that Rawls is to a wide extent dependent on common-sense morality for 
developing the conception of justice. Kersting holds that; 
“… die Gerechtigkeitsvorstellungen gar nicht aus dem rationalen Selbstinteresse 
gewonnen [sind], sondern aus den die Rahmenbedingungen der Verfassungsent-
scheidung bestimmenden Fairneßvorstellungen des common sense. Die Interessen-
kalkulation der Verschleierten produziert genau die Gerechtigkeitsprinzipien, die in 
den Definitionsmerkmalen der Wahlsituation als a priori gültige moralische Korrek-
tive individueller Vorteilssuche bereits eingelassen waren. Oder anders formuliert: 
Der Schleier der Unwissenheit entindividualisiert die Parteien des Urzustandes, ent-
individualisiert das Individuum der ökonomischen Vernunft so gründlich, daß es 
aufs Haar dem allgemeinen Subjekt der vernunftbegründeten Moralphilosophie 
gleicht, dessen Position wir alle als vernünftige Wesen einnehmen können und ein-
nehmen müssen, um eine unparteische, moralische Betrachtungsperspektive auf 
                                                          
505
 Of course both aspects are not equally stressed in both of these works. 
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unser eigenes Handeln und auf die Handlungen anderer zu gewinnen.”506 
According to Kersting common-sense-values are even necessary for the Rawlsian con-
tract-argument to hold. And in Rawls‟ more recent writings he stresses even more than 
earlier the importance of taking the point of departure from certain values, achieve-
ments, norms and ideas already inherent in one‟s political culture. And it seems as if the 
idea of an overlapping consensus, elaborated by Rawls several years after he wrote A 
Theory of Justice, is as such basically rooted in common-sense morality. 
I have stressed that the Rawlsian conception of an overlapping consensus is initially 
worked out independently of the existing comprehensive views, thereby making it 
possible that it could reflect some moral assumptions, which might be supposed to be 
commonly acceptable. Thus an “overlap” is not simply to be established by seeking the 
lowest common denominator between all the endorsing parties, i.e. the different com-
prehensive doctrines. For an overlapping consensus to be stable and hold it should in 
itself be morally grounded at the very outset. It has to be based both on elementary 
natural duties
507, man‟s moral capacity and on a basic but thin theory of the good.508  
As far as I can see Rawls‟ idea of an overlapping consensus draws heavily on the fact 
                                                          
506
 W. Kersting, Die politische Philosophie des Gesellschaftsvertrags (1994), p. 274.The common-sense-
perspektive is very often stressed in Kersting‟s more popular book on Rawls too: “Rawls‟ dynamisiertes 
Kohärenzmodell verwickelt die wohlüberlegten Gerechtigkeitsurteile des Common sense und die philo-
sophische, prinzipienlogische Explikation der ihnen zugrunde liegenden formalen und materialen moral-
ischen Vorstellungen gleichermaßen in einen Lernprozeß. Common sense und philosophische Ethik 
arbeiten sich aneinander ab, bis ein Zustand erreicht ist, in dem moralische Common sense die philo-
sophische Theorie als Explikation seiner Grundanschauungen akzeptiert und ihr damit zugleich natürlich 
auch lebensweltliche Unterstützung verschafft.” W. Kersting, John Rawls zur Einführung (1993), p.121f. 
507
 The fact of natural duties (and rights) has obviously no explicit place in Rawls‟ latest book about 
Political Liberalism. A reason for that may be that Rawls assumes that “a feature of natural duties is that 
they hold between persons irrespective of their institutional relationship; they obtain between all as equal 
moral persons.” A Theory of Justice (1971), p.115. And Rawls‟ main concern is obviously with the in-
stitutions of society. The phenomenon of natural duties is however far more explicated in A Theory of 
Justice: “The following are examples of natural duties: The duty of help [to] another when he is in need or 
jeopardy, provided that one can do so without excessive risk or loss to oneself; the duty not to harm or 
injure another, and the duty not to inflict unnecessary suffering. The first of these duties , the duty of 
mutual aid, is a positive duty in that it is a duty to do something good for another; whereas the last two 
duties are negative in that they require us not to do something that is bad. The distinction between positive 
and negative duties is intuitively clear in many cases, but often gives way. I shall not put any stress upon 
it. The distinction is important only in connection with the priority problem, since it seems plausible to 
hold that, when the distinction is clear, negative duties have more weight than positive ones.” (Ibid. 
p.114). Elements of what one might call common (sense) morality are reflected in Rawls explanation of 
natural duties.    
508
 Men‟s conceptions of the good are countless, and so the conception of the right has to be settled prior 
to the good. Nevertheless Rawls sets out from a thin theory of the good, meaning that he initially has to 
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that there are among the citizens a sufficient sense of justice and, in fact, (culturally 
based) elements of a common morality. Of course these aspects are not thoroughly and 
philosophically discussed, systematically elaborated or integrated within Rawls‟ con-
ception,  perhaps because he fears that to do so would render his liberal political con-
ception unnecessarily comprehensive.
509
 But the conclusion seems nevertheless plau-
sible: Rawls‟ conception of a morally grounded overlapping consensus is dependent on 
the fact of common (sense) morality, which is on vital points to be taken for granted.
510
  
Accordingly Rawls considers it appropriate that: 
“... we turn ... to the fundamental ideas we seem to share through the public political 
culture. From these ideas we try to work out a political conception of justice congru-
ent with our considered convictions on due reflection. Once this is done, citizens 
may within their comprehensive doctrines regard the political conception of justice 
as true, or reasonable, whatever their views allows.”511 
Thus Rawls and Honecker share the basic assumption that there might exist a sufficient 
basis of shared moral resources upon which to establish and maintain a morally based 
political framework,  even in radically pluralist democracies, and even if an “overlap” 
cannot be expected to be substantially very “thick”. Although Rawls‟ project is rather 
limited (and focused), he draws, as far as I can see, nonetheless on aspects of a com-
mon-sense morality when setting out for a fair scheme of social co-operation based on 
consent.  
4.6.1. EXCURSUS: Common-sense morality. 
In drawing upon an assumption of  shared moral resources as a basis for social co-
operation, Rawls and Honecker place themselves firmly within a long tradition in 
Western philosophy (and theology). As human beings we are in possession of a sensus 
communis.
512
 Although the assumption of “sensus communis” has been differentiated 
and interpreted differently throughout history, nevertheless it might still provide us with 
                                                                                                                                                                          
count with some primary human goods, like fundamental liberties, elementary rights and opportunities, 
material basics and a certain amount of self-esteem as universally accepted goods. 
509
 But this kind of comprehensiveness should not necessarily be controversial. 
510
 A more general conclusion might be that the basic institutions of modern (welfare)societies are to a 
wide extent dependent on citizens moral sense if they shall properly fulfil their task. 
511
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.150f. 
512
 Rawls does not explicitly go deeply into such ideas, most likely because it should have rendered his 
approach unnecessarily comprehensive, as already suggested. But in my opinion this might nevertheless 
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relevant background-material for understanding notions like “common reason”, “shared 
values” , “common sense of justice” or simply “common morality”. It might therefore be 
appropriate here to trace briefly the idea of “sensus communis” as it has developed 
along different lines: 
 First there is the line focusing on the kind of “sensorium” that human creatures have 
in common. According to Aristotle (De Anima, II,1-2) the reports given by the five 
senses are to be organised, compared and held together by a superior sense,  a 
sensus communis. Thus the sensus communis is primarily seen as an “inner sense”, 
with the “synthetic” task of structuring and holding together the experiences we make 
when using our different senses. This “synthetic” process of inner ordering should 
fundamentally be taken to be essentially the same for all human beings. 
 Secondly there is the line focusing mainly on the shared “sententiae” typical of 
rational beings. Stoic influence might sometimes be found here; as for instance in the 
assumption that man is endowed by nature (i.e. by God) with essential innate ideas 
(koi/nai e)nnoi/ai) of a highly moral significance. Although the Stoic inheritance might 
sometimes be obvious, this might, however, be characterised as a “modern line”, 
especially elaborated in the time following the age of Enlightenment with its 
confidence in a ratio naturalis and in the role of sound reason(ing). This is the line 
which is typically manifested by the so-called common-sense-tradition. 
It is especially the “modern line”, that is of interest now. And I think that this line 
should also be divided into two sublines: 
 The idea of a sensus communis might be ascribed an essential role within episte-
mology. This means that commonly recognised knowledge is considered trustworthy 
and should accordingly be given an epistemological primacy,  thereby undermining 
radical scepticism. Common opinion can be taken as the most reliable indication of 
truth.
513
 Since common opinion is trustworthy it should also outweigh merely private 
                                                                                                                                                                          
be an appropriate point of departure when looking for some underlying premises for establishing a 
common platform, -thereby taking common reason as a shared basis. 
513
 At the time of the Scottish school of the 18th century the common sense-philosophy was at its height. 
According to Thomas Reid, maybe the most prominent of these Scottish philosophers, common sense was 
assumed to provide us with the most reliable access to the truth. Reason should be closely allied with 
common sense. Representatives of the common-sense-philosophy sometimes applied this principle in 
matters of religion as well. Such elements within religion, which are considered contrary to our common 
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opinions that conflict with common sense.
514
 
 An appeal to sensus communis (common sense) might also be ascribed an essential 
role more specifically within the field of morality.
515
 Common sense in the form of 
prudence or prudent behaviour, is considered essential for building and upholding a 
community or society. The possibility of reaching a moral consensus and arriving at 
shared opinions about standards of coexistence depends to a very wide degree on the 
force of common sense, which is therefore also considered fundamental for the readi-
ness to honour common civic duties. 
One might, however, appropriately distinguish between two views when considering the 
role that sensus communis plays in a moral connection:  
 There is the normative view: As far as sensus communis is supposed to manifest 
itself in sound reason, good judgement and recta ratio as contrasted to unsound 
                                                                                                                                                                          
sense and our sound koi/nai e)nnoi/ai should most appropriately be ruled out or revised. Thus common 
sense might even be taken as a reliable criterion for what should be disqualified as superstition and un-
reasonableness within religion and metaphysics. In matters of epistemological philosophy Reid reacted to 
Hume and therefore claimed that scientific knowledge had to be subordinated to sound common sense if it 
should in any way be possible to escape scepticism. Even George Berkeley saw it as a task to banish meta-
physics and recall men to common sense. And it might with considerable right be said that: “Damit ist in 
England der Höhepunkt der Aufwärtung von „common sense‟ als erkenntnistheoretischem Terminus er-
reicht: „common sense‟ ist nun gleichbedeutend mit „the genuine uncorrupted judgement of all mankind” 
[Berkeley: Hylas 3, p. 244] und steht für diejenigen Überzeugungen , die von allen Menschen zu allen 
Zeiten für wahr gehalten werden, über die also ein „common consent‟ besteht.” Cf. Historisches Wörter-
buch der Philosophie, (Vol. 9, 1995), p. 643. Immanuel Kant was critical of such a view, i.e: he was 
critical of theories that tended to make common “applause” and merely conventional comprehensions a 
decisive criterion for truth. But Kant nevertheless emphasised that common sense might play a limited, but 
still important role in practical life. Let it now also be underlined that neither Rawls nor Honecker takes 
common-sense or conventional morality as sign of truth. Although both of them might honour a morally 
grounded consensus, neither of them defends a consensus-theory of truth. 
514
 Within the field of religion this would mean that the widely recognised interpretation of the Christian 
doctrine might be used against private readings and against those referring to particular “revelations”. 
515
 It might in this connection be worth mentioning that Giambattista Vico stressed the practical aspect of 
sensus communis in a way that in many respects sounds “modern”. In Historisches Wörterbuch der Philo-
sophie (Eds. J. Ritter und K. Gründer, 1995), p. 644, it is underlined that Vico was of the opinion that 
sensus communis “bezieht sich vielmehr auf den Willen und erschließt den Menschen die „umane neces-
sitá o utilitá‟ [G. Vico: Principj di una scienza nuova, 1725, Opere, hg. G. Gentile/F. Nicolini (Bari 1914-
41), 4/2,11], die ewigen Wahrheiten hinsichtlich ihres Handelns. Als ein solches spontanes praktisches 
Prinzip ist der s.c. „il criterio insegnato alle nazioni dalla provvedenza divina‟ [Ibid. 4/2,13], ein allge-
meiner Sinn für das Rechte und wird folglich nicht nur Quelle des Naturrechts, sonderns zum Prinzip 
sozialer Tugend überhaupt.”  I cannot here pursue these issues of common sense any further, let it none-
theless be mentioned that Henry Sidgewick for instance utilises an idea of common sense when develop-
ing his moral theory. An intuitive common-sense morality is taken for granted. And in earlier times the 
Earl of Shaftesbury can be considered an example of a philosopher taking common sense to imply a 
“sense of Publick Weal, and of the Common Interest; Love of the Community or Society, Natural Af-
fection, Humanity, Obligingnesse, or that Sort of Civility, which rises from a just Sense of the common 
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reason, bad judgement and false use of ratio, “common-sense” based morality is 
taken to be genuinely normative.
516
  
 There is also the conventional view: Common-sense-morality can be taken to ex-
presses the moral opinions (sententiae) that most people in society in fact hold. For 
even in pluralist societies there seems to be at least some moral principles and norms 
that most people actually share.
517
 This might appropriately be characterised as an 
“average” common-sense-morality, a more or less coherent system of conventional 
standards. 
Since both theological social ethics (Honecker) and political liberalism (Rawls) ob-
viously relate more or less explicitly to common-sense-morality, I think that this widely 
shared moral basis might even be ascribed an intermediate function, for instance as an 
important station en route between a comprehensive theological view characterised as 
Christian and a liberal position like the Rawlsian one. Although vague and substantially 
flexible, it is in a way prior to both of them and something that both of them refer to and 
utilise. But simultaneously it has to be added that common sense morality is indeed 
vague. 
Immanuel Kant finds for instance, when writing about common sense in “Kritik der 
Urteilskraft”518, that much of what is honoured as a manifestation of sensus communis, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Rights of Mankind, and the natural Equality there is among those of the same Species.” The quotation is 
taken from Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, (Vol. 9, 1995), p. 644. 
516
 There are highly different ways of explaining the normative role of “common-sense”. It might be 
combined with some version of traditional natural law. Or it might be part of a religious moral view, 
according to which all human beings - simply by being created by God  are supposed to be endowed by 
the Creator with a capacity of participating in the divine logos and in the eternal moral law, what means 
that they are supposed to have an innate capacity for knowing what is right and what is in accordance with 
God‟s will,  simply by using the moral capacities they have got, i.e. sound reason. But since common-
sense insight is vague and is often taken by religious people to be disturbed by sin, there might be a need 
for advice, interpretation and guidance (for instance by the church). Of course such ways of clarifying the 
implications of common-sense morality would end up with highly comprehensive  and most likely rather 
controversial  moral doctrines. Therefore Rawls might for instance combine the common-sense approach 
with the contract-idea, which is assumed to provide for the binding character of the agreement. In passing, 
let me say that there seems in any case to be much more to common-sense-morality than just an empirical 
interest in finding out (by means of statistical surveys) what most people actually believes. 
517
 Such values might be identified by using value-surveys. 
518
 I use the edition of Kant‟s works in 10 volumes, published by Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 
(WBG), Darmstadt, 1968. Kritik der Urteilskraft, Vol. 8, pp. 237 - 625. (The first edition of Kritik der 
Urteilskraft was published in Berlin 1790, the second revised edition in 1973 and the third revised edition 
in 1799. All these editions are reflected in the WBG-edition). The chapter that I particularly refer to in this 
connection is “§ 40. Vom Geschmacke als einer Art von sensus communis”, pp.388-392. 
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is just an expression of “das vulgare, was man allenthalben antrifft”.519  
Both Rawls and Honecker, who draw heavily on the fact of common-sense-morality,  
are very much concerned about avoiding merely “applauding” conventional morality, 
when seeking a shared basis for an overlapping consensus in modern societies. They are 
both aiming at common standards, which can be morally binding on all parties, inde-
pendent of the shifting “applause” of convention.  
                                                          
519
 This critique from the side of Immanuel Kant might be well worth considering: “Der gemeine 
Menschenverstand, den man, als bloß gesunden (noch nicht kultivierten) Verstand, für das geringste 
ansieht, dessen man nur immer sich von dem, welcher auf den Namen eines Menschen Anspruch macht, 
gewärtigen kann, hat daher auch die kränkende Ehre, mit dem Namen des Gemeinsinnes (sensus 
communis) belegt zu werden; und zwar so, daß man unter dem Worte gemein (nicht bloß in userer 
Sprache, die hierin wirklich eine Zweideutigkeit enthält, sondern auch in mancher andern) so viel als das 
vulgare, was man allenthalben antrifft, versteht, welches zu besitzen schlechterdings kein Verdienst oder 
Vorzug ist.” Cf.I.Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft,(§ 40), 1790, (WBG, 1968,Vol. 8), p. 389. 
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5. CHRISTIAN FAITH  PUBLIC REASON 
5.1. The problem 
Both Honecker and Rawls agree that a clear distinction has to be made between political 
(public) reason and Christian faith
520
 (or between “the things that are Caesar‟s and …the 
things that are God‟s.” Cf. Matt. 22,21). 
Honecker therefore draws on the doctrine of the two kingdoms as a suitable theological 
hermeneutic key for distinguishing properly. Let it here be emphasised that the distinc-
tion between the two realms  in a complex way  reflects the fundamental distinction 
between law and gospel as discussed in the previous chapter
521
 (where an “Ortsbestim-
mung” for dealing theologically with Rawls‟ consensual efforts was given). 
Employing the doctrine of the two kingdoms seems, at first sight, to make it relatively 
easy to support Rawls‟ idea of an overlapping consensus from a comprehensive theo-
logical position. For Rawls‟ main thesis is that even if the different parties in modern 
pluralist societies might disagree fundamentally in matters of comprehensive moral 
doctrines and religious truth, it might nonetheless be possible for them within the 
political domain to arrive at some shared principles and standards that all parties can 
recognise as a reasonable basis for social coexistence. The idea of the reasonable, as a 
commonplace, is crucial in Rawls‟ conception. 
                                                          
520
 Let it, however, at the very outset be made quite clear that neither Honecker nor Rawls are just con-
cerned about the relation between faith and reason in general,  as a typical problem within the field of 
philosophy of religion. They are concerned about practical reason as a means of solving shared problems 
which people within modern societies are facing. 
521
 This complexity is for instance very clearly marked by G. Ebeling in his “Leitzäze zur Zweireiche-
lehre”: “Das Verhältnis der Unterscheidung zwischen Gesetz und Evangelium zur Unterscheidung der 
beiden Reiche wäre verfehlt, wenn man dabei an eine Aufteilung in zwei Texte und an deren Verteilung 
auf zwei Wirklichkeitssektoren dächte, anstatt zu bedenken, daß das Evangelium nicht ohne das Gesetz 
und das Gesetz nicht ohne das Evangelium verstanden werden kann, daß sich darum mit der Verkünd-
igung des Evangeliums stets Auslegung des Gesetzes auf seinen zweiten (geistlichen), aber auch auf 
seinen ersten (politischen) usus hin verbindet und deshalb mit der iustitia fidei stets die Befreiung zu 
rechter iustitia civilis, so daß man es in beiden Reichen mit Gott und seinem Liebeswillen zu tun hat, aber 
eben deshalb auf der Hut sein muß, nicht etwa das Evangelium in ein Gesetz der Welt zu pervertieren und 
so das Reich der Welt gar als Inbegriff des Evangeliums zu proklamieren.” G. Ebeling, Wort und Glaube 
III (1975), p.583f. Cf. M. Honecker, Sozialethik zwischen Tradition und Vernunft (1977), p.194. What 
concerns Honecker‟s own approach, he makes it several times quite clear that he seeks support in 
Ebeling‟s interpretation and application of the doctrine of the two kingdoms: “Sie stellt vor „die funda-
mentaltheologische Frage‟, wie die Wirklichkeit des Wortes Gottes in der Wirklichkeit der Welt zu 
verantworten sei. Notwendig ist die Zweireichelehre daher um des Evangeliums willen. Sie ist dabei 
zugleich konkrete Einübung der Unterscheidung von Gesetz und Evangelium.” M. Honecker, Sozialethik 
zwischen Tradition und Vernunft (1977), p.180. 
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The doctrine of the two kingdoms, if really taking the worldly realm as a domain of 
political reason, would seem to go well with the idea of grounding an overlapping con-
sensus which can be recognised by different parties as reasonable. Both Honecker and 
Rawls would stress the need to refrain from confusing genuinely religious doctrines 
with strictly political and reasonable conceptions. In a political context Honecker can, as 
strongly as Rawls, therefore open up for “die Bildung eines ethischen Konsensus durch 
rationale Diskussion…”522  
At the same time, both Honecker and Rawls simply assume that people will most likely 
strive to achieve coherence between their religious and political commitments  relating 
somehow their commitment in matters involving political values to the comprehensive 
religious doctrine they hold.
523
 Thus it should be emphasised that the doctrine of the two 
kingdoms does not just help us keep things apart. Gerhard Ebeling, to whom Honecker 
often refers, seems right when he stresses that the doctrine of the two kingdoms gives an 
“Anleitung, das Verhältnis des Christen zu Welt gesamttheologisch zu bedenken.” 524 
When focusing on the doctrine of the two kingdoms, I will therefore consider both the 
question how the two “realms” are most properly to be distinguished and how they are to 
be related. And, in particular, I discuss what Honecker means when emphasising that 
“Das weltliche Regiment ist ein Regiment der Vernunft.”525 This approach may be of 
importance for the participation in political (public) reasoning? In modern pluralist well-
ordered democracies a shared forum of public reasoning is of the greatest importance, 
since it makes it possible to deal with conflicts and handle common issues on terms that 
all citizens may reasonably endorse.  
5.2. Distinguishing and relating … 
Citizens might be expected to support a political conception or endorse a political 
overlap because of the religious view they hold.
526
 But, simultaneously, religious and 
                                                          
522
 M. Honecker, Sozialethik zwischen Tradition und Vernunft (1977), p.200. 
523
 In Rawls‟ case this can especially be observed in his most recent writings. 
524
 G.Ebeling, Wort und Glaube III (1975), p.574. 
525
 M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.20. 
526
 In his book about Rawls, Thomas Pogge rightly emphasises that: “Religiöse Menschen sollen nicht 
ihrer Religion zum Trotz, sondern ihr zuliebe kulant sein. Andererseits ist fraglich, ob man realistisch 
darauf hoffen kann, daß Menschen ihre religiöse, moralische oder philosophische Weltanschauung im 
Rawlsschen Sinne verstehen werden.”T. W. Pogge, John Rawls (1994), p. 138. (To be “kulant” is 
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strictly political approaches should, as I have emphasised, not be confused. I think that 
this raises the problem of drawing a distinction and establishing a proper correlation be-
tween a comprehensive (religious) view and a (liberal) political conception. 
5.2.1. The doctrine of the two kingdoms  a suitable theological 
hermeneutic key? 
According to Honecker the doctrine of the two kingdoms provides us with a proper 
theological point of departure for approaching the domain of the political. But he can 
also add that it should not be taken as the only and exclusive scheme for understanding 
theological social and political ethics properly.
527
 There are also various viable ap-
proaches to interpreting and applying the doctrine of the two kingdoms, and it is there-
fore difficult to offer a clear formulation of what should be considered the genuine 




                                                                                                                                                                          
according to Pogge to live up to a duty of civility,  a phenomenon which I shall later more thoroughly 
deal with. “Kulant”=“entgegenkommend” according to DUDEN Deutsches Universal-Wörterbuch, 
Munksgaards Ordbøger 1984, p.748.). 
527
 According to Honecker “wäre es ein Mißverständnis, wenn die Besinnung auf die Bedeutung der 
Zweireichelehre für eine evangelische Sozialethik dahingehend interpretiert würde, als schließe das andere 
mögliche Ansätze aus. Eine Pluralität theologischer Begründungen und Ansätze in der Sozialethik scheint 
mir unvermeidbar, theologisch sogar zulässig zu sein… Nicht alle theologischen Konzeptionen sind mit-
einander vereinbar, auch wenn man in Anschlag bringt, daß viele Alternativen, beispielsweise die emphat-
isch behauptete von Zweireichelehre und Königherrschaft Christi, aber auch die von Zweireichelehre und 
Gesellschaftsdiakonie oder von Zweireichelehre und Eschatologie, in ihrer Zuspitzung konstruiert und auf 
die Gegenüberstellung von Schlagworten reduziert sind. Die Zweireichelehre ist also sicherlich nur eine 
theologische Voraussetzung evangelischer Sozialethik.” M. Honecker, Sozialethik zwischen Tradition und 
Vernunft (1977), p.176f.  
528
 “Inzwischen gibt es ganz verschiedene Typen der Deutung der Zweireichelehre, die manchmal nur die 
Berufung auf denselben Begriff gemeinsam haben. In der Zweireichethematik überschneiden sich nämlich 
verschiedene Fragestellungen. Es geht einmal um das Recht, sich auf Luthers theologische Weltdeutung 
berufen zu können. Die Zweireichelehre gilt dann als genuin lutherische Gesellschaftstheorie, also ein 
konfessionelles proprium, um dessen richtige Inanspruchnahme der Streit geht. Zum anderen wird die 
Zweireichelehre zugleich zur Interpretationskategorie heutiger Weltdeutung. Schließlich wird der Begriff 
Zweireichelehre polemisch verwendet, um eine als unpolitisch abgelehnte Kirche und Theologie zu brand-
marken. Angesichts dieses Sachverhalts sprach schon 1957 Johannes Heckel vom „Irrgarten der Zwei-
reichelehre‟, Gerhard Sauter von einem „unentwirrbaren Problemknäuel‟.” M. Honecker, Grundriß der 
Sozialethik (1995), p.14f. 
529
 It is due to the “rediscovery” of the doctrine of the two kingdoms in the 20th century that the amount of 
literature has grown so immensely. The book Reich Gottes und Welt (Wege der Forschung, CVII, Wissen-
schaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1969) gives for instance an overview over how fast an intensive debate de-
veloped, - with a great amount of literature and articles on the issue.  Honecker  states that: “Im 19. jahr-
hundert war eine „Zweireichelehre‟ weithin unbekannt. Sie wurde im 20. Jahrhundert wiederentdeckt.” M. 
Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.14. But as can for instance be seen in a documentation of 
the “Umdeutungen der Zweireichelehre in 19. Jahrhundert”, Texte zur Kirchen und Theologiegeschichte 
21 (1975, eds. U.Duchrow, W.Huber, Louis Reith), the ideas inherent in the doctrine of the two kingdoms 




The terminology in itself does not provide us with a clear key to a right interpretation of 
the doctrine, as Honecker himself realises, even if there are certain features that should 
be taken as an integrated and permanent part of a doctrine of two realms. 
It can hardly be denied that the terminology of the doctrine of the two kingdoms is 
ambiguous, and the ground-idea(s) not very perspicuous. And this is even more obvious 
from the fact that Luther himself appears to treat the more “spatial” term, Reich, as 
being interchangeable with the more “military” term Regiment. Thus the idea of two 
“kingdoms” can alternate with the idea of two “regiments”. Honecker on his part, how-




The doctrine of the two kingdoms cannot be understood independently of the historical 
                                                          
530
 “Man kann folglich nicht eine Zweireichelehre von einer Zweiregimentenlehre unterscheiden. Regi-
ment bedeutet Herrschaftsweise wie Herrschaftsbereich. Eine Studie der VELKD spricht von einer „zwei-
fachen Regierweise‟ Gottes. Man muß also die ganze Unbestimmtheit und Weite des Wortes „Reich‟ be-
achten will man die Zweireichelehre nicht schematisierend interpretieren und mißdeuten.” M. Honecker, 
Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.16. In this Honecker disagree for instance with Ulrich Duchrow, who 
takes the shift in terminology to be highly significant, as can for instance be seen in Duchrow‟s study over 
Luther‟s theology in Christenheit und Weltverantwortung. Traditionsgeschichte und systematische Struk-
tur der Zweireichelehre (1970): “Man kann Luther den Vorwurf nicht ersparen, daß er durch ständig 
wechselnde Begriffe und terminologische Überschneidungen es seinen Lesern nicht leicht macht, den 
Gesamtkomplex des Reichsthemas zu überschauen, zumal er im einzelnen Fall stets nur Ausschnitte des 
Ganzen behandelt. Es scheint tatsächlich an vielen Stellen, als ob sich Reiche und Regimente einfach 
deckten, nicht zuletzt an der grundlegenden Stelle in „Von weltlicher Obrigkeit‟ [WA 11,249,24ff.]. 
Außerdem spricht er unterschiedslos von zwei Reichen im Blick auf regnum dei und regnum diaboli 
einerseits und geistlichem Regiment und weltlichem Regiment andererseits. In letzterer Bedeutung ist 
besonders seine Rede vom Reich Gottes zur Rechten und zu Linken bekannt geworden. Ich habe bisher 
zur Verdeutlichung der Unterscheidung meist im Anschluß an die verschiedenen Traditionslemente von 
zwei civitates (regna = Herrschaftsverbände) einerseits und von zwei (drei) potestates (Gewalten, Regi-
menten, Institutionen) andererseits gesprochen. Will man eine einfache Bezeichnung als Reichelehre 
festhalten, so sollte man in Zukunft von Dreireichelehre sprechen, um die Dreiheit von zwei Reichen 
Gottes und Reich des Bösen deutlich zu machen. Da man aber damit keineswegs die Gesamtstruktur von 
Luthers Denken ausgedrückt hätte, sondern diese erst sichtbar wird, wenn man das weltliche Regiment im 
Zusammenhang der drei Regimente mit ihren jeweils zugeordneten menschlichen Ämtern sieht, sollte man 
von Reichs- und Regimentenlehre, Reichs- und Gewaltenlehre oder Reichs- und Institutionenlehre 
sprechen. Damit müßte man freilich anders als Luther den Begriff des Reichs auf die civitates eingrenzen, 
was Luther selbst nicht konsequent getan hat. Wie man sich terminologisch auch entscheiden mag, sach-
lich ist es von ausschlaggebender Bedeutung, daß es bei der Frage des weltlichen Regiments nicht um die 
Person, sondern um das Werk geht. Die Person gehört wie der Glaube vor Gott, das Werk wie die Liebe 
vor die Welt und die Menschen. Hat man einerseits die primäre Verknüpfung des regnum dei und regnum 
diaboli mit der Ebene der Person und des Glaubens und andererseits die primäre Verknüpfung des welt-
lichen Regiments mit der Ebene des Werks und der Liebe klar erkannt, so stellt sich bereits von Luthers 
Grundsatz, der Rechtfertigungslehre her die Frage der politischen Verhältnisse nicht auf der Ebene der 
Person, sondern des Werks.” (pp. 525-527). Here it seems as if Duchrow on his part is very much aware 
of the fact that he is to some extent really schematizing the texts of Luther.  
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situation within which it originally developed.
531
 But this should not prevent us from 
reinterpreting it. In his most thorough discussion of the doctrine of the two realms, 
Honecker makes it quite clear “daß nicht eine historische Untersuchung, sondern eine 
vergegenwärtigende Reflexion beabsichtigt ist und daher vieles historisch Bedingte gar 
nicht zur Sprache kommt.”532 Honecker intends a reinterpretation of the doctrine of the 
two kingdoms in the development of his theory of social ethics and in addressing speci-
fic questions concerning actual political value-formation. I take the same approach. 
Let it be noted, however, that the mere fact that Confessio Augustana, with its central 
place among “Die Bekenntnisschriften der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche”, draws on 
a distinction between the two “realms” (in Art. XVI and especially in XXVIII), secures a 




The doctrine of the two kingdoms has been intensely debated throughout the 20
th 
cen-
tury, as may be expected given the background of political crises and the apories
534
 
which are raised thereby within Churches and within theological social ethics.  
                                                          
531
 Honecker emphasises that it is important to be very much aware of the historical background of the 
doctrine of the two kingdoms: “Zu beachten ist zunächst, daß die Unterscheidung der zwei Reiche bei 
Luther von der Kritik an mittelalterlichen Vorstellungen eines corpus Christianum und an der weltlichen 
Herrschaft von Papst und Bischöfen ausging. Die reformatorische Unterscheidung der zwei Reiche ist 
abgrenzend auf dem Hintergrund der mittelatlerlichen Gesellschaftstheorie zu begreifen.” M. Honecker, 
Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.14. But Honecker does for instance not discuss himself “in welcher 
Weise Luther einerseits auf Augustin‟s Unterscheidung von civitas dei und civitas terrena fußt, anderer-
seits die mittelalterliche Zweischwerter- und Zweigewaltenlehre zur Voraussetzung hat, gegen welche er 
sich kritisch abgrenzt.” M. Honecker, Sozialethik zwischen Tradition und Vernunft (1977), p. 217. 
532
 M. Honecker, Sozialethik zwischen Tradition und Vernunft (1977), p.179f. 
533
 The doctrine was for instance taken in the Norwegian church during the time of the Nazi-occupation as 
a basis for opposing legitimately the Nazi-government. Cf. T. Austad, Kirkens Grunn. Analyse av en 
kirkelig bekjennelse fra okkupasjonstiden 1940-45 (1974), (I can especially refer to Article V of “Kirkens 
Grunn”. Cf. T Austad, p.30f.). 
534
 In his theological conception Honecker is very much concerned about what he characterises as the 
aporia of theological social ethics: “Diese Aporie einer theologischen Sozialethik steht hinter meinem 
ersten Versuch einer Neubestimmung ihres Ansatzes [Konzept einer sozialethischen Theorie. Grund-
fragen evangelischer Sozialethik (1971)]. Die Aporie entsteht aus dem Widerspruch von gesellschaft-
lichen Anforderungen einerseits und theologischen Ansprüchen andererseits. Sie führt vor das Dilemma, 
daß von sozialwissenschaftlicher Seite überhaupt die Möglichkeit einer theologischen Sozialethik be-
stritten wird, weil Theologie prinzipiell ohne Gesellschaftsbezug sei … Beide Positionen machen, wenn 
auch von verschiedenen Perspektiven aus, auf dieselbe Aporie aufmerksam. Sie ist nun freilich keine 
spezifische konfessionelle, sondern eine generelle Aporie einer wie immer begründeten theologischen 
Soziallehre, die sich darum oft in einer traumatischen Suche nach dem „christlichen Proprium‟ gesell-
schaftlichen und politischen Handelns äußert. Die Aporie ist deswegen nicht primär ein Problem der 
Praxis, sondern ein theoretisches Problem und sollte auch als solches erkannt werden.” M. Honecker, 
Sozialethik zwischen Tradition und Vernunft (1977), p.201f. 
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Nevertheless, Honecker himself takes the doctrine of the two kingdoms as a proper 
theological key in matters actualising the “Gesellschaftsbezug” of Christian faith (and of 
churches). Although I wrote initially that the “doctrine” can hardly be put into one 
formula, I will nonetheless try to do so now,  taking my point of departure from a 
scheme elaborated by Honecker which attempts to provide a pedagogic structure to 
some of the main ideas inherent in this specific model of the Reformation.
 535
 
“Schematisch kann man den Unterschied beider Reiche (Regimente) so darstellen: 
 Geistliches Regiment Weltliches Regiment 
Regierweise: durchs Wort, ohne Schwert Schwert 
Betroffene: diejenigen, die fromm und 
gerecht werden wollen 
die Bösen 
Forum: vor Gott  
(coram deo) 
vor der Welt  
(coram mundo) 
Ausübende (Träger): Predigtamt weltliche Obrigkeit 
Ziel: Ewiges Leben Äußerer Friede 




Reichweite: Person für sich 
(Christperson) 
Person für andere im Amt 
(Weltperson)”536 
This table provides no more than a brief schematic account of some of the more general 
features that may be taken as historically and factually typical of the doctrine of the two 
kingdoms. Such a scheme might  in spite of the obvious lack of details and nuances, 
provide us with a basis for drawing special attention to some relevant aspects, which can 
thereafter be more thoroughly elaborated and discussed below. 
                                                          
535
 Honecker states that “Die Zweireichelehre gilt als spezifisch reformatorisches Modell einer Zuordnung 
und Unterscheidung von Glauben und Weltverhalten, Evangelium und weltlicher Realität.” And immedi-
ately he adds that “Die Zweireichelehre Luthers ist zunächst aus der historischen Situation der Reforma-
tionszeitalters heraus zu verstehen. Luther hat mit ihrer Hilfe die Unabhängigkeit der weltlichen Gewalt 
von der geistlichen Gewalt begründet: Die Autorität der „Obrigkeit‟, des „Staates‟ ist nicht von der geist-
lichen Gewalt verliehen, also damals durch den Papst und die Bischöfe, wie die Zweigewaltenlehre des 
Mittelalters lehrte, sondern unabhängig davon von Gott selbst eingesetzt. Die Zweireichelehre tritt damit 
für eine „Entklerikalisierung‟ der Welt ein.” M. Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die 
evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p. 156. 
536
 This scheme is taken from M. Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische 
Sozialethik (1978), p. 157. 
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The doctrine of the two kingdoms has a wider scope than just to serve as a theological 
“Grundformel einer politischen Ethik”537, even if it cannot be denied that the political 
implications are obvious enough. In the most fundamental way the domain of the politi-
cal is thereby qualified as a “von Gott selbst zugewiesene Ort des Dienstes.”538 But the 
very ground-distinction, expressed in the doctrine of the two realms, is simultaneously 
fundamental and crucial insofar as it also prevents “die Auflösung der Theologie in 
Politik.”539 According to G. Ebeling (to whom Honecker often refers), the question “wie 
das Evangelium als Evangelium zu Gehör kommt” should be considered the most fun-
damental concern of the doctrine of the two kingdoms.
540
  
A doctrine of two realms should effectively prevent a confusion of the gospel with 
strictly political obligations or with other purely “worldly” concerns. But it bears 
emphasising that both the keeping apart and the relating of the two realms are settled 
theologically through one and the same “Fundamentalunterscheidung”541, as most 
basically expressed in the underlying dialectic between law and gospel. Thus Honecker 
                                                          
537
 Honecker refers in this connection to Ebeling‟s theses about the doctrine of the two kingdoms: 
“Ausgegangen sei in den folgenden Überlegungen, wie heute die Zweireichelehre interpretiert werden 
kann, vom hermeneutischen Verständnis der Zweireichelehre wie es G. Ebeling dargestellt hat. Für ihn ist 
die Zweireichelehre keine ethische Doktrin, erst recht nicht die Grundformel einer politischen Ethik, 
sondern das „Grundproblem der Dogmatik selbst‟.” M. Honecker, Sozialethik zwischen Tradition und 
Vernunft (1977), p.180. 
538
 M. Honecker, Sozialethik zwischen Tradition und Vernunft (1977), p.218. Let it en passant be 
mentioned that the political perspective implied in the doctrine of the two kingdoms is a very wide one: 
“Sie enthält implizit bereits eine „Theologie der Welt‟, eine theologische Würdigung der weltlichen (und 
politischen) Existenz der Christen.” Ibid., p.218. Honecker emphasises the wide understanding but he has 
simultaneously in mind that the understanding of the political might also be more limited (as is for in-
stance the case in political liberalism). Often I mark the difference between a wide and a more limited 
perspective on the political by using the phrase “strictly political” when concerned with Rawls‟ political 
liberalism. 
539
 M. Honecker, Sozialethik zwischen Tradition und Vernunft (1977), p.218. 
540
 Cf. G.Ebeling‟s article on “Die Notwendigkeit der Lehre von den zwei Reichen”, where he takes the 
doctrine of the two kingdoms as a fundamental theological distinction, closely related to the distinction 
between law and gospel: “Wenn die Lehre von den zwei Reichen in dieser Zuordnung zur Lehre von 
Gesetz und Evangelium verstanden sein will, dann steht dabei nicht irgendein Teilaspekt der Theologie, 
sondern das Fundamentalproblem der Theologie zur Debatte. Dieses Fundamentalproblem ist, schlicht 
gesagt, dies: wie das Evangelium als Evangelium zu Gehör kommt.” Wort und Glaube I (1967), p.410. 
541
 The very notion “Fundamentalunterscheidung” is taken from Gerhard Ebelings article on “Das rechte 
Unterscheiden”(1987) published in Wort und Glaube IV (1995), where he among other things is very 
much concerned about “die Unterscheidung von Gesetz und Evangelium … um das Evangelium als 
Thema der Theologie rein zu halten, muß das Gesetz dabei sein, jedoch in klarer Erfassung seiner Unter-
schiedenheit vom Evangelium. Die Theologie wird eben dadurch zu Pseudo-Theologie, daß sie es unter-
läßt, in sich selbst jene Fundamentalunterscheidung auszutragen. In dieser Deutlichkeit ist es sonst nie 
erfaßt worden: Was für die Theologie und das Theologesein konstitutiv ist, besteht in einer besonderen 
Weise des Unterscheidens. Sie gehört unabdingbar zur Sache der Theologie und zu rechter Wahrnehmung 
theologischer Verantwortung und Urteilskraft.” p.423.  
 225 
 as already mentioned  takes the doctrine of the two kingdoms as an appropriate 
“Einübung der Unterscheidung von Gesetz und Evangelium.”542 
In passing I would mention that the term “Fundamentaltheologie”, as used by Honecker 
and Ebeling, might itself sometimes be considered problematic in a Lutheran context.
543
 
Without descending into the details of this debate (discussing for instance how far a 
Lutheran approach draws on the subject of “Fundamentaltheologie” as elaborated in a 
Catholic context), I will explain the programmatic double concern that Honecker and 
Ebeling have:  
 In the “Fundamentaltheologie” traditional dogmatic and ethics are to be reconsidered 
from the point of view of what is taken as the most fundamental ground of Christian 
faith/theology itself.
544
 There is an inner-theological integrative concern,  i.e. the 
need for a theological discipline to counteract the atomism and specialisation stem-
ming from the many topical divisions within contemporary theology.
545
 
 But “Fundamentaltheologie” also reflects the terms of modernity in so far as it takes 
into account that “certainty”,  even about the most fundamental matters referred to 
in theology, has become profoundly problematic.
546
  
                                                          
542
 M. Honecker, Sozialethik zwischen Tradition und Vernunft (1977), p.180. 
543
 It will be beyond my scope here, however, to consider more thoroughly Honecker‟s and Ebeling‟s use 
of the notion of “Fundamentaltheologie”. I would instead like to refer to Ebeling‟s article on the issue, 
“Erwägungen zu einer evangelischen Fundamentaltheologie” (1970), published in Wort und Glaube IV 
(1995, pp.377-419). And let me also add that the deeper and more fundamental perspective on the doc-
trine of the two realms, as stressed in Honecker‟s (and Ebeling‟s) fundamental-theological approach, 
should be suitable when considering Rawls‟ demand for a support of an overlapping consensus from 
within the Christian doctrine itself (as well as from within other comprehensive doctrines). 
544
 “Das Fundamentum organicum ist die Schrift, also etwas, mit dem man umgehen, das man wie ein 
Werkzeug gebrauchen soll. Und das fundamentum substantiale ist Christus. Das kann ja nur heißen: nicht 
ein christologisches Dogma, sondern der lebendige Christus selbst; Fundament also verstanden als 
Inbegriff und Ursprung des Lebens, mit dem die Theologie zu tun hat, als lebenspendendes Leben.” G. 
Ebeling, Wort und Glaube III (1975), p.409. 
545
 G. Ebeling himself presents “Drei Postulate für die Aufgabe evangelischer Fundamentaltheologie. … 
Das eine Postulat lautet: Integration theologischer Arbeit in die Sache der Theologie. Es wird nachgerade 
zum Ärgernis, daß die Spezialisierung und Multiplizierung theologischer Arbeit die Theologie selbst zum 
Verschwinden zu bringen droht. … Ein zweites Postulat lautet: Konzentration des Christlichen auf den 
Grund des Glaubens. …Endlich ein letztes Postulat: Lokalisation des Glaubens im natürlichen Leben.” Cf. 
“Erwägungen zu einer evangelischen Fundamentaltheologie” (1970) in G. Ebeling, Wort und Glaube IV 
(1995). 
546
 “Die Auseinandersetzung mit der Neuzeit nötigt die Theologie, sich mit dem traditionellen Theologie-
verständnis auseinanderzusetzen und über ihr eigenes Wesen Rechenschaft zu geben. Ob dabei die Frage 
nach der inneren Einheit und Struktur der Theologie als Wissenschaft im Vordergrund steht, wie das unter 
dem Stichwort „Enzyklopädie‟ der Fall ist, oder ob die Bedrängnis durch die Anfechtung der Zeit die 
„Apologetik‟ im herkömmlichen Sinne als in erster Linie dringlich erscheinen läßt oder ob der theolog-
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The theological “Fundamentalunterscheidung”, as exposed in the distinction between 
two realms, serves  as underlined  to protect the gospel from being politically ex-
ploited, but Honecker simultaneously very clearly emphasises that the doctrine has 
“Folgerungen für die Ethik und die politischen Existenz der Christen…”547 Therefore 
Honecker can also take “die Zweireichelehre durchaus als die reformatorische Form 
„politischer‟ Theologie…”548 This does, however, not mean that the doctrine of the two 
kingdoms provides us with a “scheme” for configuring and ordering the domain of the 
political according to divine instructions. “So verstanden kann sie [die Zweireichelehre] 
darum nicht das vorgegebene Ordnungsschema einer Sozialethik sein, sondern wird zu 
deren Hermeneutik, die sich im Vollzug theologischer Sozialethik selbst zu bewahren 
hat.”549 The doctrine of the two kingdoms expresses a fundamental theological distinc-
tion which provides us with an interpretative perspective applicable to different political 
schemes and practises. The very “Fundamentalunterscheidung”, as expressed in the 
theological distinction between two kingdoms, does not prescribe one particular 
political outcome. Therefore, the “Fundamentalunterscheidung” as presented by 
Honecker, is not incompatible with pluralism.  
When considering the doctrine of the two kingdoms, however, one should really ask 
what is primarily to be distinguished. Different concerns (which might be combined in 
various ways) might be pursued:  
Man kan “unterscheiden: a) das Verhältnis von Reich Christi und Reich der Welt 
oder das Verhältnis geistlich-weltlich überhaupt; zwischen der Christenheit bzw. den 
Erwählten und der Welt besteht ein exklusives, ein äonisches Verhältnis; zwei 
Reiche im Sinne der Interpretation Johannes Heckels stehen sich ausschließend 
gegenüber;  b) das Verhältnis von ecclesia und politia (Mittelalter: sacerdotium und 
Imperium, Neuzeit: Kirche und Staat): hier besteht ein institutionelles Verhältnis; 
die beiden Größen erscheinen in dieser Dimension nicht als exclusiv, sondern als 
inklusiv und können als Regimente verstanden werden;  c) das Verhältnis von per-
sona privata und persona publica, die der Christ je als einzelner ist: in dieser Dimen-
sion handelt es sich um ein existenzielles Verhältnis, um zwei Hinsichten derselben 
                                                                                                                                                                          
ischen Prinzipienlehre in Gestalt einer „Fundamentaltheologie‟ der Primat zuerkannt wird, in allen Vari-
anten geht es um das Gewißheitsproblem, das die christliche Theologie in der Neuzeit überfallen hat.” G. 
Ebeling, Wort und Glaube IV (1995), p.403. I think that Ebeling‟s “diagnosis” in fact supports the view 
held by Rawls,  that citizens of modern societies cannot any longer be unified by taking the truth of any 
particular comprehensive doctrine for certain.  
547
 M. Honecker, Sozialethik zwischen Tradition und Vernunft (1977), p.182. 
548
 Cf. his most thorough article on the doctrine of the two kingdoms, “Zweireichelehre und Sozialethik” 
in Sozialethik zwischen Tradition und Vernunft (1977, pp.174 - 278), p.218. 
549
 M. Honecker, Sozialethik zwischen Tradition und Vernunft (1977), p.182f.  
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Person, sofern der Christ einerseits für sich selbst lebt und andererseits für andere zu 
handeln hat, hier herrscht weder ein exklusives, noch ein inklusives, sondern ein 
Identitätsverhältnis. Die folgenden Überlegungen gehen aus von der dritten Einsicht, 
der existentiellen Betroffenheit des Christen durch zwei Bezüge. Sie verengen damit 
unbestreitbar die historische Fragestellung der Zweireichelehre, indem sie besonders 
auf den anthropologischen Aspekt eingehen. Daher ist ausdrücklich gesagt, daß nicht 
eine historische Untersuchung, sondern eine vergegenwärtigende Reflexion beab-
sichtigt ist… ”550  
The different perspectives are to be maintained simultaneously, it is more a question of 
how they are to be weighted and balanced. And Honecker stresses especially the third of 
the three perspectives. 
a) In a strictly teleological perspective one might stress the transcendent telos, thereby 
throwing the scheme of this world clearly into relief,  making the contrast between the 
coming ai)w/n and the scheme of this world sharp and clear. This does not imply that the 
aim of maintaining the common good of the present world, upholding (internal) peace 
and providing for social justice and political order should be ignored, but political 
values and ends are then clearly to be relativised. Thus the doctrine of the two kingdoms 
might be considered a means of distinguishing sharply between the eschatological good 
and the relative goods of this world. 
b) In an institutional perspective the doctrine of the two kingdoms provides a means of 
properly understanding the relation between the state-institution and the church.
551
 This 
relation might be very complex, since the state, as the most important institution within 
the worldly realm, should theologically be seen as participating in God‟s governing of 
                                                          
550
 M. Honecker, “Zweireichelehre und sozialethik” in M. Honecker, Sozialethik zwischen Tradition und 
Vernunft (1977), p.179. 
551
 Let it, however, be remarked that Honecker  himself can simultaneously underline that: “Für den 
Christen stellt sich die Zweireichelehre jedoch nicht dar als Theorie über das Verhältnis von Staat und 
Kirche oder als Theorie theologischer Geschichtsschau oder ähnliches, sondern als Frage nach der Ver-
einbarkeit seines Glaubens an Christus als Herrn mit ethischen Anforderungen und politischen Verpflicht-
ungen.” M. Honecker, “Thesen zur Aporie der Zweireichelehre”, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 
(1981), p.138. Nonetheless can Honecker himself refer to the doctrine of the two kingdoms when seeking 
theological “Kriterien zur Abgrenzung des Auftrages der Kirche von den Aufgaben des Staates … Im 20. 
Jahrhundert wurden in Auseinandersetzungen mit staatlichen Totalitätsansprüchen zwei Interpretations-
modelle entwickelt, nämlich die sog. Zweireichelehre und das Bekenntnis zu Königherrshaft Christi. 
Beide Modelle haben Vorzüge und Schwächen. Sie sind deshalb nicht alternativ, sondern sich gegenseitig 
befragend und korrigierend zu interpretieren. … [In any case] sind die jeweiligen Grenzen von kirch-
lichem Auftrag und staatlichen Aufgaben zu beachten. Det Staat hat keinen Anspruch auf die Herrschaft 
über die Gewissen. Die Kirche verfehlt und verdirbt ihren geistlichen Auftrag, wenn sie selbst staatliche 
Funktionen ausübt oder politische Sachkompetenz mit theologischer Autorität verwechselt und vermischt. 
Die Zuordnung der Abgrenzung zwischen kirchlichem Handeln und die Wahrnehmung gemeinsamer 
Aufgaben ist Aufgabe der Kirchenpolitik.” M. Honecker, “Der Auftrag der Kirche und die Aufgabe des 
Staates”, Essener Gespräche zum Thema Staat und Kirche (1991), p.78. 
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the world, while the church is both a community of those truly believing in Christ, and 
also an organisation within the worldly realm, involved in politics, economics and legal-
structures in the same way as other associations.  
In ruling the world and fulfilling his aim God employs political authorities as well as the 
church-institution in his service. It is therefore a crucial theological assumption that God 
has both “regiments” in his hand. But the doctrine of the two kingdoms nevertheless 
implies that the mandate of the state-institution and the church-institution should not be 
confused. It should be obvious that the institutional aspects of the doctrine of the two 
realms are of great importance.  
c) But there is in Honecker‟s works nonetheless the most serious concern about what he 
characterises as the anthropological
552
 perspective,  as can clearly be seen in his most 
thorough article on the doctrine of the two kingdoms in Sozialethik zwischen Tradition 
und Vernunft (1977), where he emphasises that: “Die Thematik der Zweireichelehre 
kann heute nur verständlich werden, wenn es gelingt, sie als Beschreibung einer Grund-
situation des Menschseins zu formulieren.”553 
This means that Honecker, like Ebeling, takes the doctrine of the two kingdoms first and 
foremost as an appropriate key to understanding the so called “forum-situation” of 
man
554, as standing simultaneously “coram-deo” and “coram-mundo”.555 Thus the doc-
trine of the two kingdoms should most properly be characterised as a “two-relations-
doctrine” rather than a “two spheres-doctrine”.556  
                                                          
552
 Using the term “anthropological” and “Anthropologie” i refer to theological anthropology, the theo-
logical doctrine of man.  
553
 M. Honecker, Sozialethik zwischen Tradition und Vernunft (1977), p.183. 
554
 “Die Zweireichelehre wird damit zur hermeneutischen Anleitung für das betroffene Subjekt, zwischen 
verschiedenen Bezügen zu unterscheiden, dem Bezug auf Gott hin und dem Bezug auf die Welt.” M. 
Honecker, “Thesen zur Aporie der Zweireichelehre”, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche (1981), p.137. 
555
 Cf. to this dual-relation also M Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995): “Der Begriff Zweireiche-
lehre bezeichnet einen komplexen Sachverhalt: Es geht um die Stellung des Menschen vor Gott und vor 
der Welt, coram deo und coram mundo, coram hominibus. Diese Unterscheidung hat ihren Ort in der 
Fundamentaltheologie. … In der Zweireichelehre geht es um eine Fundamentalunterscheidung: Worauf 
kommt es vor Gott und worauf vor der Welt an?” (p.15). The distinction is crucial, since the two relations 
should not be confused, but it should nonetheless be added that in the existence coram mundo is the coram 
deo-perspective not excluded, while an existence coram deo, rightly understood, also implies the relation 
coram-hominibus. 
556
 Especially Dietrich Bonhoeffer has in his book “Ethik“ (1949, An English translation, Ethics, is pub-
lished at Collins Clear-Type Press, London and Glasgow, 1955.) objected to the Lutheran doctrine of the 
two kingdoms that it tends to divide the world into two spheres, a kind of criticism that is not quite to the 
point according to Honecker:, “Es geht also nicht um eine statische Abgrenzung zweier Bereiche, zweier 
Räume, zweier Zuständigkeiten. D.Bonhoeffers Polemik gegen ein Denken in zwei Räumen versteht 
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Like Ebeling again, Honecker in fact takes a genuinely theological approach to the 
domain of the political, since both the keeping apart as well as the way of connecting the 
two “realms” have, as we saw, to be settled through one and the same “fundamental-
theologischen” approach. In this context the recognition of the political realm as “ein 
Regiment der Vernunft”557 cannot be considered simply a pragmatic adjustment to 
essential terms of modernity, but must be taken as based on a principled “Fundamental-
unterscheidung” which is essential within theology itself.558 This further implies that 
upholding a forum of political reason, due to the distinction between the two realms, 
should be considered essential from a theological point of view.
559
 Honecker is of the 
opinion that his interpretation of the doctrine of the two kingdoms is very much in 
accordance with Luther‟s own theology: 
“Er [Luther] betont ferner an anderen Stellen, daß im weltlichen Reich die Vernunft 
die Maßstäbe setze. Das weltliche Regiment ist ein Regiment der Vernunft. In der 
Welt ist folglich die Vernunft das höchste Gut. In der Gottesbeziehung ist die Ver-
nunft hingegen blind und sogar irreführend.”560 
                                                                                                                                                                          
„Reich„ in diesem Sinne als Bereich, Sphäre des Einflusses oder der Zuständigkeit.” M.Honecker, Grund-
riß der Sozialethik (1995), p.15f. Bonhoeffer‟s critique applies, however, to certain misinterpretations of 
the doctrine of the two kingdoms that might still be influential and widely approved of. These kinds of 
misinterpreations belong to what G. Ebeling characterises as “die trivialsten Verzerrungen”: “Die hohe 
Anforderung der Zweireichelehre an die Fähigkeit , geschichtlich und theologisch zu denken, gibt vor 
allem in einer Zeit, welcher beides abhanden zu kommen droht, zu verhängnisvollen Mißverständnissen 
Anlaß. Die trivialsten Verzerrungen seien im voraus als solche plakatiert: als handele es sich um zwei 
(räumlich, zeitlich oder personell) getrennte Bereiche; als wolle die betonte Unterscheidung die hier 
waltenden Lebensbeziehungen zerreißen, anstatt sie als solche zur Geltung zu bringen; als werde die Welt 
aus der Abhängigkeit von Gott und der Glaube aus der Weltverantwortung entlassen; als handele es sich 
um die Konkurrenz (oder den Kompromiß) zweier Moralgesetze oder gar um die Trennung von Moral 
und politik.” G. Ebeling, “Leitsätze zur Zweireichelehre”, Wort und Glaube III (1975), p.575f. Honecker 
and Ebeling very clearly avoid taking the doctrine of the two kingdoms as a theological means for an 
“Abgrenzung zweier Bereiche, zweier Räume”. But even if the mostly used terms, as for instance “two 
kingdoms” and “two realms”,  might give an occasion to “die trivialsten Verzerrungen”, I shall still use 
these terms, just as Honecker and Ebeling do, instead of speaking about the “two-relation-doctrine”. The 
traditional terminology is well settled. 
557
 M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p. 20. 
558
 Honecker makes it quite clear that “Die Unterscheidung der zwei Reiche verweist auf die Unter-
scheidung von Vernunft und Glaube, von Gesetz und Evangelium.” M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozial-
ethik (1995), p.17. 
559
 Let it, however, be added that Honecker is very much aware of the problems and the “Strukturwandel 
der Öffentlichkeit”  
560
 M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.20. Let it be remarked here that in his analysis of 
“Traditionsgeschichte und systematische Struktur derZweireichelehre” Ulrich Duchrow has given a very 
thorough documentation of the role that “reason” is supposed by Luther to play within the political realm. 
A ground for seeking very strongly to avoid anarchy and chaos is according to Duchrow the clear as-
sumption , which Luther shared with most citizens; that “die Vernunft, die eigentlich das Szepter im 
weltlichen Regiment führen muß, kommt im akuten Zustand des Kampfes aller gegen alle nicht mehr zu 
Gehör.” U. Duchrow, Christenheit und Weltverantwortung. Traditionsgeschichte und systematische 
Struktur der Zweireichelehre (1970), p.496. 
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It should be made quite clear that Honecker does not confine himself to a merely in-
strumental way of understanding reason (ratio), but takes reason to be closely allied with 
an ideal of “humanity”.561 Referring to Descartes, Honecker can simultaneously stress 
that: “Nichts in der Welt ist gleichmäßiger unter den Menschen verteilt als der gesunde 
Verstand.”562  
According to Honecker reason is primarily to be taken as a means of communication, 
providing us with shared resources for discussing matters of common interest,  and a 
means for justifying to one another (controversial) standpoints in matters of public im-
portance.
563
 Thus, Honecker writes: 
“Vernunft nenne ich zunächst ganz pragmatisch das Mittel einer Verständigung, und 
zwar einer einsichtigen Verständigung zwischen verschiedenen Menschen.”564 
Honecker seems to share with Rawls the crucial assumption that an attempt to derive 
norms for the strictly political and public field from a particular comprehensive doctrine 
instead of setting out from shared reason in matters of public interest may be considered 
not just exclusive, but also authoritarian
565
 and perhaps even a rather arrogant
566
 project. 
                                                          
561
 Honecker therefore criticises the view that reason is merely a means of finding the most efficient way 
of realising ends that cannot in themselves be rationally defined or justified. “Solche nur instrumentell 
verstandene Vernunft sichert aber keineswegs Humanität. Effiziente Lösungen können durchaus in-
humane, unmenschliche Wirkungen und Folgen zeitigen und in den Dienst inhumaner Zwecke gestellt 
werden. Gegen einen solchen nur instrumentellen Gebrauch von Vernunft ist daran festzuhalten und aus-
drücklich darauf aufmerksam zu machen, daß Vernunft von Humanität nicht zu trennen ist, ja daß die Auf-
gabe und das Ziel von Vernunft die Verwirklichung von Menschlichkeit ist.” M. Honecker, Sozialethik 
zwischen Tradition und Vernunft (1977), p.206.  
562
 M. Honecker, Sozialethik zwischen Tradition und Vernunft (1977), p.205. 
563
 This means that reason, as referred to by Honecker, “bezeichnet nicht eine „ewige‟ Vernunft”. M. 
Honecker, Sozialethik zwischen Tradition und Vernunft (1977), p.205. Honecker makes it very clear 
that:“In meinen Erwägungen ist Vernunft jedoch nicht als universales, ontologisches Prinzip verstanden, 
an dem Kraft ihrer Natur alle Menschen teilhaben, sondern als regulatives Idee, als Postulat. Der Appell 
an die Vernunft enthält nichts anderes als die Aufforderung an jedermann, Verständigung mit seinen Mit-
menschen zu suchen, und zwar mit Mitteln der Vernunft und Rationalität, und damit besagt die Berufung 
auf die Vernunft die Absage an alle ohne das Bemühen vernünftiger Verständigung vorgenommenen 
Wahrungen von Eigeninteressen mit Hilfe von Gewalt und Macht. Vernunft ist Aufgabe. Gerade bei 
Luther liegt nicht eine Vernunftontologie vor, sondern ein praktisches Verständnis von Vernunft. Ein 
praktisches Verständnis von Vernunft schließt die Frage nach allen Menschen gemeinsamen Grundwerten 
ein. Diese Grundwerte sind freilich nicht vorgegebene universale, zeitlos gültige, festgelegte Normen … , 
sondern Orientierungshilfen, über die Menschen vernünftig sollten verständigen können.” M. Honecker, 
Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p. 165f 
564
 M. Honecker, “Das Problem der Eigengesetzlichkeit”, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche (1976), 
p.121. 
565
 “Dazu kommt als Problem jeder nicht auf rationale Evidenz hin angelegten Ethik, daß sie „autoritär‟ , 
als bloße Setzung wirkt, also auf eine der ethischen Sachanforderung fremde Autorität sich berufen muß.” 
M. Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p. 30. 
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Reason has to be taken as a shared means, making it possible for people to come to an 
agreement about common standards and reasonable premises for social co-operation. 
Shared terms of social co-operation can be settled and maintained by means of (public) 
reason,  guided by an elementary principle of reciprocity.567 
In stressing so clearly the “Orientierung ethischer Forderungen am Maßstab der Ver-
nunft…”568 in matters belonging within the worldly realm, Honecker in no way takes it 
for granted that reason will more or less automatically lead us to agreed substantial 
standards recognised by all as true.
569
 Instead Honecker expects that, by itself, reason 
should further pluralism rather than consensus in matters involving substantial values.
570
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
566
 What I have in mind here is the way Honecker criticises both Barthianism and Augustianism, the 
former for not being able of assessing properly morals and ethics produced by Non-Christians and the 
latter for taking the virtues of Non-Christians as “glänzende Laster”. M.Honecker, Das Recht des 
Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p.30.  
567
 It is just consequent when Honecker in the lines preceding his scheme of the doctrine of the two king-
doms (as presented above) clearly stresses that: “Das geistliche Reich wird vom Evangelium, das welt-
liche Reich von der Vernunft bestimmt; das weltliche Reich ist in dieser Hinsicht ein Vernunftreich. Die 
Forderungen der Vernunft kann man auch ohne Christus erkennen. Ihr Maß ist die Goldene Regel Mt 
7,12.” M. Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p. 
156f. Reason can expectedly reflect also what it would be reasonable for others to accept, from their point 
of view. Let it now be added that Rawls on his side is also drawing very decisively on an idea of reci-
procity as essential in public reasoning,  as can be clearly observed not least in The Idea of Public 
Reason Revisited (1997). 
568
 Honecker is thereby criticising the Barthian approach  with its emphasis on the need for “preaching” 
(social) ethics. “Wenn aber das Verkündigungsgeschehen als solches keine Unterscheidungskriterien an 
die Hand gibt, dann bleibt zu fragen, ob nicht doch die Orientierung ethischer Forderungen am Maßstab 
der Vernunft sinnvoll bleibet. Denn das Urteil der Vernunft steht prinzipiell jedem Menschen zu. Es ist 
kein Privileg eines kerygmatischen Vollzugs oder prophetischer Voraussicht.” M. Honecker, Das Recht 
des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p. 29. 
569
 In this respect I think that Honecker might be in accordance with Luther‟s view, as explained by 
Ulrich Duchrow. The mere use of ratio does not in itself lead to right answers. There might be very dif-
ferent opinions about what shall count as reasonable.“Fragt man nach den Hauptbestimmungselementen 
des „regnum rationis‟ bei Luther, so fällt zunächst der häufige Gebrauch des Begriffs „Billigkeit‟ (aequi-
tas) auf. Dieser meint ein Eingehen auf Personen, Umstände und zeitgeschichtliche Besonderheiten, die 
durch das abstrakte geschriebene Recht nicht in den Blick kommen können. Sie entspricht der freien Ver-
nunft und soll Meisterin der geschriebenen Gesetze und ungeschriebenen Gewohnheiten sein. … Die Ver-
nunft … denkt für Luther nicht von einem unveränderlichen Prinzip aus, sondern fragt nach dem Nutzen 
für den Mitmenschen im Rahmen des gemeinsamen Ganzen, welches das weltliche Regiment steuern soll. 
Damit sind Gemeinnutz und Friede als die entscheidenden Orientierungspunkte der Vernunft und ihrer 
„kybernetisch‟-politischen Funktion anvisiert…” U. Duchrow, Christenheit und Weltverantwortung. 
Traditionsgeschichte und systematische Struktur der Zweireichelehre (1970), p.498f. 
570
 But this problem can according to Honecker not be solved by introducing an “absoluten christlichen 
Ethik”: “Hinsichtlich der Möglichkeit einer christlichen Begründung sozialethischer Imperative, welche 
konkrete soziale, wirtschaftliche oder auch politische Fragen betreffen, ist Skepsis angebracht. Entweder 
sind solche sozialethischen Imperative, wenn sie gesamtgesellschaftliche Verbindlichkeit beanspruchen 
wollen, evident; dann bedürfen sie jedoch einer besonderen christlichen Begründung nicht mehr. Oder sie 
berufen sich auf den Anspruch einer absoluten christlichen Ethik, können dann aber nicht für die Gesamt-
gesellschaft Verbindllichkeit beanspruchen.” M. Honecker, Sozialethik zwischen Tradition und Vernunft 
(1977), p.203f.  
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Moreover, what counts as reasonable  in matters of politics and social ethics is 
revisable,  which paves the way not for relativist attitudes as much as for the idea of 
improvement.
571
 In any case, according to Honecker there are certain limits to what can 
be achieved by (moral) reasoning.
572
 Thus Honecker‟s social ethics does not allow for a 
practical “deification” of human reason.573 Notwithstanding the limits and the historical 
embeddedness of human reasoning, nor ignoring how easily human ratio can be misused 
and misguided, it is the free use of reason which makes social co-operation, communi-
cation and public debate possible. This is essential for the very understanding of reason 
according to Honecker.
574
 A human society has no alternative to seeking the reasonable 
in matters of public interest. 
“Aus der Krise der Vernunft rettet keine Flucht in Irrationalismus, in Unvernunft. 
Sie zwingt vielmehr geradezu zur Besinnung auf Vernunft, auf die Möglickeiten, 
Gefährdungen und nicht zuletzt die Verantwortlichkeit der Vernunft. … Der Streit 
um das Vernünftige kann ja auch nur wieder mit der Vernunft ausgetragen werden. 
Oft genug besteht jedoch die Neigung, den Streit nicht durch die Vernunft zu 
beenden, sondern gewaltsam zu entscheiden. Vernunft wird mit Unvernunft 
blockiert.”575 
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 Thus Honecker opens up for a cumulutave perspective both in politics, science and social ethics: “Die 
geschichtlichkeit der Vernunft führt dazu, daß das Maß vernünftiger Einsichten wachsen kann. In die Ver-
nunft gehen geschichtliche Erfahrungen und geschichtlich gewonnene Erkenntnisse ein. Vernunft ist eben, 
weil sie die Vernunft eines geschichtlichen Menschen ist, nicht fertig, sondern offen und damit wand-
lungsfähig.” M. Honecker, Sozialethik zwischen Tradition und Vernunft (1977), p.206. The very notion of 
cumulative, which I find appropriate for characterising Honecker‟s view, as exposed here, is not taken 
from Honecker, but from Richard Boyd, who uses it in a different context, characterising “scientific 
reasearch as cumulative by successive approximations to the truth”. Cf. R. Boyd, “How To Be a Moral 
Realist”, Moral Discourse and Practice (1997), p.111.  
572
 One consequence to be drawn from this insight is that: “Strukturen und Institutionen sind jedoch 
deswegen nicht einfach aus Vernunft abzuleiten oder rational zu konstruieren. Sie sind geschichtlich 
vorgegeben als objektivierte Lebenszusammenhänge. Aber es ist durchaus möglich, ihre Lebensdien-
lichkeit, ihre Funktionsfähigkeit, sowohl in technischer als auch in humaner Hinsicht zum Gegenstand 
vernünftiger Erörterungen zu machen.” Cf. “Das Problem der Eigengesetzlichkeit”, Zeitschrift für Theo-
logie und Kirche (1976), p.122. Honecker obviously wishes to avoid a misunderstanding of his own 
position when emphasising that: “Die Vernunft ist nicht die schlechthinnige „Basis‟ der Moral , aber sie ist 
das alleinige Mittel, mit deren Hilfe zwischen verschiedenen Moralen ein Konsensus über gemeinsame 
ethische Verhaltensweisen zu erreichen ist.” Ibid. p. 121. 
573
 In accordance with this Honecker can add: “Sie werden meinen Überlegungen zur Ethik entnommen 
haben, daß ich keine direkte „Theologisierung‟ der Vernunft anstrebe und insofern für eine autonome 
Ethik eintrete.” M. Honecker, “Erfahrung und Entscheidung”, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 
(1978), p.499. 
574
 This remains a crucial concern in Honecker‟s conception of social ethics, and once more he seeks 
support for his view in Luther‟s theology:  “Luther vertritt also keineswegs eine Allzuständigkeit der 
Vernunft. Aber sie ist das Mittel der Verständigung für eine kommunikative Ordnung und damit für die 
Grundlegung einer universalen humanen Rechtsgemeinschaft.” M. Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. 
Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p. 163. 
575
 M. Honecker, Sozialethik zwischen Tradition und Vernunft (1977), p.206. 
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A more thorough analysis of the limitations and burdens of reason is undertaken below. 
For now, it is sufficient to conclude that Honecker, in his conception of social ethics, 
shares the Rawlsian concern for securing through public reasoning the fairest possible 
political scheme, within which individuals (and groups) can participate in social co-
operation. By employing the Lutheran “Fundamentalunterscheidung” Honecker can seek 
a reasonable “justice coram mundo”(iustitia civilis) without confusing it with the theo-
logical concern for “justice coram deo” (iustitia spiritualis).576 
5.2.2. Rawls’ dualism? 
If defining the “worldly realm” so clearly as a domain of shared (political) reason, it 
seems as if one has to establish a sharp divide between the domain of the political and 
the sphere of religion. This may seem to fit quite well with Rawls‟ approach, since a 
main concern for Rawls is to elaborate a conception of political liberalism that can be 
seen as fundamentally independent of particular comprehensive doctrines.
577
 Thereby he 
might tend to establish a kind of “dualism” between a strictly political approach on the 
one side and the many points of view of comprehensive doctrines on the other side. This 
“dualism” between the political domain and a so called “metaphysical” domain, is 
especially prominent in Rawls' later writings, and is evident in his book about “Political 
Liberalism” (1993).  
The title of Political Liberalism is in itself programmatic. Political liberalism is con-
trasted, not just to religious doctrines, but also to comprehensive and more “metaphysi-
cal” kinds of liberalism. The Rawlsian kind of “dualism” between a metaphysical per-
spective and a strictly political perspective is apparently thought necessary to further 
broad communication and equal citizenship and to make public reasoning and con-
sensual efforts viable. Rawls therefore stresses that; 
“citizens‟ reasoning in the public forum about constitutional essentials and basic 
questions of justice  is now best guided by a political conception the principles and 
values of which all citizens can endorse… That political conception is to be, so to 
speak, political and not metaphysical. Political liberalism, then, aims for a political 
                                                          
576
 Let it also be added that corresponding to the two kinds of justice there also have to be two kinds of 
power that should in no way be confused. This is a main concern in Confessio Augustana XXVIII. 
577
 But he simultaneously makes it clear that “The dualism in political liberalism between the point of 
view of the political conception and the many points of view of comprehensive doctrines is not a dualism 
originating in philosophy. Rather, it originates in the special nature of democratic political culture as 
marked by reasonable pluralism.” J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.xxi. 
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conception of justice as a freestanding view. It offers no specific metaphysical or 
epistemological doctrine beyond what is implied by the political conception 
itself.”578 
This “dualism” between a political approach and metaphysical doctrines is demon-
strated in the most obvious way already in Rawls‟ essay with the programmatic title 
Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical (1985).
579
 Where Rawls previously 
focused upon some general and wider problems of a theory of morality, his aim now is 
strictly political and he is now critical of certain aspects of the conception of justice he 
elaborated in A Theory of Justice (1971).
580
  
But what does Rawls really mean when using the expression  “political not metaphysi-
cal” about the basic theory of justice? According to Rawls a strictly political conception 
of justice has three characteristic features: 
First; it is defined as political by the issue involved, i.e. the subject of the conception, 
which is the basic institutional structure of society. This means, however, that “politi-
cal” should not be contrasted to “moral”. Rawls still aims at elaborating a moral581 
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 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism(1993), p.10. 
579
 Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1985, Vol. 14, No 3. 
580
 “One thing that I failed to say in A Theory of Justice, or failed to stress sufficiently, is that justice as 
fairness is intended as a political conception of justice.… In particular, justice as fairness is framed to 
apply to what I have called the „basic structure‟ of a modern constitutional democracy.” J. Rawls, “Justice 
as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical”, Philosophy and Public Affairs (1985, Vol. 14, No 3), p. 224. Let 
me add, however, that Brian Barry belongs to them who “wish to maintain that the later Rawls attributes 
to the Rawls of A Theory of Justice errors that he did not in fact commit. What exactly was wrong with A 
Theory of Justice, according to Rawls? In a nutshell, his answer is that the theory contained in the earlier 
book constituted a „comprehensive philosophical doctrine‟.… The essential point seems to be that „no 
distinction is drawn between moral and political philosophy‟, so that „a moral doctrine of justice general 
in scope is not distinguished from a strictly political conception of justice‟ (PL, p.xv). However, Rawls 
himself insists that, while justice as fairness is a political conception, it is also a moral conception. The 
political is thus not to be contrasted with the moral. Rather, the political is a subset of the moral, defined 
by its limited subject matter. Thus, Rawls says that „while [a political] conception [of justice] is, of course, 
a moral conception, it is a moral conception worked out for a specific kind of subject, namely for political, 
social, and economic institutions‟ (PL, p.11). On this definition of the political, it is hard to see why A 
Theory of Justice should not be said to contain a political conception of justice.” Brian Barry, “John 
Rawls and the Search for Stability”, Ethics (1995, vol.105, No.4), p.876f. 
581
 Rawls clearly makes moral assumptions what “concerns the subject of a political conception. While 
such a conception is, of course, a moral conception, it is a moral conception worked out for a specific kind 
of subject, namely, for political, social, and economic institutions. In particular it applies to the „basic 
structure‟ of society … By the basic structure I mean a society‟s main political, social, and economic 
institutions, and how they fit together into one unified system of social cooperation from one generation to 
the next.” J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.11.Let it now be added that the use of the term “moral” 
in this context means that political values are taken to express ideals, principles, standards and norms that 
can be assessed from an ethical point of view. Cf. Political Liberalism, p.11 (note 11). To avoid mis-
understandings, let it, however, also be added that Rawls‟, when characterising the political conception as 
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conception, but it is a moral conception developed for the institutional political scheme 
as such, it is not a “morally comprehensive” theory designed to cover nearly all kinds of 
subjects and human phenomena that can be morally assessed. 
Second; a strictly political conception of justice is defined as political by its special 
“mode of presentation” which means that it is to be presented in a way that neither 
refers to nor depends upon a particular comprehensive doctrine or religious ground-
view, but can entirely be argued for in terms of public reason. This accords with what I 
have stressed earlier, namely, that the Rawlsian conception is meant to be “free-
standing”. However, although “freestanding”, the political conception is simultaneously 
conceived of as a “module” which can fit within the various reasonable doctrines.582 
Third; a strictly political conception of justice presents itself as political by taking its 
point of departure from politically vital values inherent in the shared political culture.
583
 
But of course it should be added that metaphysics, religion and comprehensive moral 
theories have significantly influenced the background culture which is such a decisive 
source for Rawls when a political conception is to be elaborated. Even if Rawls is just 
drawing on certain fundamental ideas, the very fact that he sets out from the shared 
background-culture indicates that the “dualism” between a political conception and the 
comprehensive doctrines that have to a wide extent shaped the (political) culture, cannot 
be drawn too sharply. 
What is most characteristic of Rawls‟ strictly political conception is, as far as I can see, 
that it is entirely guided by the idea of society as a fair system of co-operation between 
free and equal persons. This means for instance that; 
“In their political thought, and in the context of public discussion of political 
questions, citizens do not view the social order as a fixed natural order, or an in-
stitutional hierarchy justified by religious or aristocratic values. Here it is important 
to stress that from other points of view, for example, from the point of view of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
moral, also finds it necessary to stress that “justice as fairness is not intended as the application of a gene-
ral moral conception to the basic structure of society, as if this structure were simply another case to which 
that general moral conception is applied.” J. Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical”, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs (1985, Vol. 14, No 3), p. 225.  
582
 Rawls makes it quite clear that “the political conception is a module, an essential constituent part, that 
fits into and can be supported by various reasonable comprehensive doctrines that endure in the society 
regulated by it.” J.Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.12. 
583
 “The third feature of a political conception of justice is that its content is expressed in terms of certain 
fundamental ideas seen as implicit in the public political culture of a democratic society.” J.Rawls, 
Political Liberalism (1993), p.13. 
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personal morality, or from the point of view of members of an association, or of 
one‟s religious or philosophical doctrine, various aspects of the world and one‟s 
relation to it, may be regarded in a different way. But these other points of view are 
not to be introduced into political discussion.”584 
Over and over again Rawls makes a point of explaining what it means to say that 
political liberalism as a political conception is not dependent on and need not refer to 
any morally comprehensive, religious and metaphysical ideas.
585
 I think that Rawls 
repetitive insistence that the conception of justice be understood as political and not 
metaphysical reflects two underlying concerns:  
Rawls first concern, when trying to establish principles of justice that might guide the 
coexistence and social co-operation of all citizens in the most fair way, is to bypass the 
controversies inherent in most comprehensive doctrines,  with their strong and usually 
also controversial commitment to truth. 
“…Philosophy as the search for truth about an independent metaphysical and moral 
order cannot; I believe, provide a workable and shared basis for a political con-
ception of justice in a democratic society. We try, then, to leave aside philosophical 
controversies whenever possible, and look for ways to avoid philosophy‟s long-
standing problems. Thus …we try to avoid the problem of truth and the controversy 
between realism and subjectivism about the status of moral and political values”.586 
As suggested earlier, Rawls is in a way setting the question of truth ( in matters of 
religion, moral doctrines and “philosophy‟s longstanding problems”) in brackets when 
concerned with questions of basic justice and constitutional essentials for the political 
                                                          
584
 J. Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical”, Philosophy and Public Affairs (1985, Vol. 
14, No 3), p.231. 
585
 Rawls starts the essay about Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical very programmatic by 
saying: “In this discussion I shall make some general remarks about how I now understand the conception 
of justice that I have called „justice as fairness‟ (presented in my book A Theory of Justice). I do this 
because it may seem that this conception depends on philosophical claims that I should like to avoid, for 
example, claims to universal truth, or claims about the essential nature and identity of persons. My aim is 
to explain why it does not. I shall first discuss what I regard as the task of political philosophy at the 
present time and then briefly survey how the basic intuitive ideas drawn upon in justice as fairness are 
combined into a political conception of justice for a constitutional democracy. Doing this will bring out 
how and why this conception of justice avoids certain philosophical and metaphysical claims. Briefly, the 
idea is that in a constitutional democracy the public conception of justice should be, so far as possible, 
independent of controversial philosophical and religious doctrines. Thus, to formulate such a conception 
of justice is to be political, not metaphysical.” J Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical”, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs (1985, Vol. 14, No 3), p. 223. I think this essay may be Rawls‟ attempt to 
answer to the critique set forth by Michael Sandel in his book about Liberalism and the Limits of Justice 
(1982). 
586
 J. Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical”, Philosophy and Public Affairs (1985, Vol. 
14, No 3), p.230. 
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society. I think this is most characteristic of political liberalism as a non-metaphysical 
conception. For metaphysics is usually concerned with the essential questions of ulti-
mate truth, while a political conception of justice is mainly practical.
587
 
It would, however, certainly be naïve to claim that a political (and moral) conception 
could be elaborated entirely without metaphysical premises. And Rawls seems after all 
to be aware of that
588
. So I think it might be more in accordance with his genuine in-
tention just to say that he aims at presenting a political theory of justice that is as meta-
physically unambitious as a practical political conception can possibly be. And this is 
the only way he can hope that a political conception might be endorsable from the point 
of view of highly different metaphysical, religious and philosophically comprehensive 
doctrines, each with their own strong claims about truth.  
The second concern that Rawls has when conceiving of a strictly political liberalism, is 
to avoid the more ambitious political aims that might also be an inherent part of some 
political ideologies, rendering the political perspective the dominating one. Rawls is in 
fact limiting the domain of the political, thereby opening up sufficient space for the 
“non-political” spheres of life.589 According to Rawls the domains of the 
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 “Thus, the aim of justice as fairness as a political conception is practical, and not metaphysical or 
epistemological. That is, it presents itself not as a conception of justice that is true, but one that can serve 
as a basis of informed and willing political agreement between citizens viewed as free and equal persons.” 
J.Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical”, Philosophy and Public Affairs (1985, Vol. 14, 
No 3), p. 230. 
588
 And the very notion of “metaphysics” is in itself not clear according to Rawls. And so he underlines 
that “Part of the difficulty is that there is no accepted understanding of what a metaphysical doctrine is. 
One might say … that to develop a political conception of justice without presupposing, or explicitly 
using, a metaphysical doctrine, for example, some particular conception of the person, is already to pre-
suppose a metaphysical thesis: namely, that no particular metaphysical doctrine is required for this pur-
pose. One might also say that our everyday conception of persons as the basic units of deliberation and 
responsibility presupposes, or in some way involves, certain metaphysical theses about the nature of 
persons as moral or political agents. Following the method of avoidance, I should not want to deny these 
claims. What should be said is the following. If we look at the presentation of justice as fairness and note 
how it is set up, and note the ideas and conceptions it uses, no particular metaphysical doctrine about the 
nature of persons, distinctive and opposed to other metaphysical doctrines, appears among its premises, or 
seems required by its argument. If metaphysical presuppositions are involved, perhaps they are so general 
that they would not distinguish between the distinctive metaphysical views  Cartesian, Leibnizian, or 
Kantian; realist, idealist, or materialist  with which philosophy traditionally has been concerned. In this 
case, they would not appear to be relevant for the structure and content of a political conception of justice 
one way or the other.” J.Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical”, Philosophy and Public 
Affairs (1985, Vol. 14, No 3), p. 240 (note 22). 
589
 It is for instance important for Rawls to emphasise that “In this respect political liberalism is sharply 
different from and rejects Enlightenment Liberalism”, which left a very limited room for what Rawls calls 
“orthodox Christianity”. Cf. J. Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, The University of Chicago 




, the personal and the familial should be considered the most typical 
examples of the “non-political” domains of life.591 These “non-political” spheres of life 
are not to be considered less important or less valuable than the domain of the strictly 
political
592
 and are to be safeguarded by the very political scheme and the basic insti-
tutions of society. The comprehensive views that citizens hold, and the affectional atti-
tudes that belong within the associational, familial and personal sphere, are in no way to 
be considered second-rate to the strictly political concerns. Political liberalism should 
not be conceived of in a way that permits for putting different spheres of life in a hier-
archical order in a way that makes the domain of the strictly political overarching in all 
respects. It should be clearly at odds with political liberalism if the “non-political” 
spheres were entirely subordinated to the domain of the political. The political scheme 
and basic institutions of a well-ordered liberal society, should be conceived of to “allow 
sufficient space for ways of life worthy of citizens devoted allegiance”.593 It is charac-
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 Churches are for instance supposed to belong to the domain of the “associational”. 
591
 “The political is distinct from the associational, which is voluntary in ways that the political is not; it is 
also distinct from the personal and the familial, which are affectional, again in ways the political is not. 
(The associational, the personal and the familial are simply three examples of the nonpolitical; there are 
others).” J Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.137. This way of holding apart the “spheres” of the 
political and the non-political by the means of a strict limitation of the domain of the political, is not 
uncontroversial from a theological point of view. For a theological approach to “the political” I can for 
instance refer to: P. Frostin, Politik og hermeneutik. En systematisk studie i Rudolf Bultmanns teologi med 
särskild hänsyn til hans Luthertolkning (1970). The scope of “the political” is here much wider than it 
seems to be in Rawlsian liberalism. Frostin will reactualise an Aristotelian approach to politics, as op-
posed to the understanding within modern liberalism (libertarianism): “Särskilt på två punkter avviker 
Aristoteles‟ uppfattning från mange moderna politiska teorier, i det finala betraktelsessättet och i upp-
fattningen av människan som en politisk varelse, politikon zoon. … Den politiska teorien måste låta sin 
målsättning präglas av en uppfattning om människan och vad som hör till ett mänskligt liv. Politikens telos 
är att söka utforma samhället så att det i största möjliga utsträckning uppfyller samhällsmedborgarnas 
behov som människor. Genom denna humanistiska innriktning av politiken undviker Aristoteles en kon-
flikt mellan samhällets och den enskilde medborgarens telos. Han er därför främmande för den nutida 
distinktionen mellan privat och offentligt. Samhället är en koinonia … Inom liberalismen har man, under 
bibehållande av åtskillnaden mellan etik och politik, sökt eliminera denna konfliktrisk [mellan statens och 
individens interessen] genom att skilja mellan en privat och en offentlig sfär. Till statens uppgifter hör att 
garantera medborgaren rätt till ett privatliv genom att ge honom vissa friheter som privatperson, t.ex i 
fråga om religionen. Förverkligandet av dessa friheter är en politisk fråga men hur medborgaren väljer att 
använda dem är inte en politisk fräga utan hör  enligt liberalismen  till hans privatliv. Den strävar därför 
att begränsa statens makt. Politiken blir därmed en begränsad sektor av det mänskliga livet.” (pp.3-5). Let 
it, however, just be stressed that political liberalism as conceived of by Rawls, does not aim at separating 
politics from ethics or keeping the public so sharply apart from the so called private sphere, as is obvi-
ously the case in the kind of liberalism focused by Frostin. 
592
 “We need not consider the claims of political justice against the claims of this or that comprehensive 
view; nor need we say that political values are intrinsically more important than other values and that this 
is why the latter are overridden. Having to say that is just what we hope to avoid…” J. Rawls, Political 
Liberalism (1993), p.157. 
593
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.210. Let me just remark that Rawls also holds that “the prin-
ciples of a liberal conception of justice realize political values and ideals that normally outweigh whatever 
other values oppose them.” Ibid., p.209.It cannot be denied that Rawls  even within the framework of a 
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teristic of political liberalism, as conceived of by Rawls, that it leaves a central place for 
the ways and spheres of life that are essential of civil society.
594
  The distinction be-
tween “the political” and “the non-political” is first of all a matter of scope and the 
scope of the political is rather narrow, which means that: 
“we must be prepared to accept the fact that only a few questions we are moved to 
ask can be satisfactorily resolved [by political means]. Political wisdom consists in 
identifying those few, and among them the most urgent.”595 
However, this limitation in scope that is typical of a political liberal conception, does 
not prevent Rawls from claiming simultaneously that “justice as fairness is complete as 
a political conception”.596 Saying that a political conception is complete does not mean 
that it covers all issues, religious, metaphysical and moral, in breadth and depth. As far 
as I can see, it just means that the political ideas required for establishing and main-
taining a common framework for co-operation and coexistence among citizens are gene-
rated independently of premises taken from any particular comprehensive doctrine, and 
can on its own provide us with the answers we need for settling the political issues of 
basic justice and constitutional essentials. This is also the reason why Rawls can also 
suppose that “the political conception can win our initial allegiance more independently 
of our comprehensive views and prior to conflicts with them”.597  
The claim that Rawlsian liberalism assumes a “dualism” (the term used by Rawls him-
self) between the political and the metaphysical or between the political and the non-
political, seems justified. But in the essay, that Rawls published in 1985, where this 
“dualism” is focused so sharply in the very title, one also realises that most of the essay 
is in fact not concerned with “dualism”, but instead with ways of relating the two 
domains. It seems as if Rawls  when conceiving of political liberalism  is eager not 
just to keep the (religious and moral) comprehensive doctrines at an arm‟s length when 
                                                                                                                                                                          
liberal society  is ready to put at least some constraints on the comprehensive (religious) doctrines that 
citizens in pluralist societies might hold. 
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elaborating political values, but also aims at relating his political conception and the 
comprehensive doctrines properly.  
Modyfying his “dualism”, the question gets urgent: how to distinguish and how to relate 
in a proper way? Rawls raises this question in Political Liberalism (Lecture IV, § 8). 
And his aim, when doing so, is not to define narrow criteria which theological or com-
prehensive doctrines more generally have to pass before they are worthy of being ac-
cepted or integrated within a philosophical or political perspective. Rather he is con-
cerned with understanding how citizens, holding religious (and other) comprehensive 
doctrines, can possibly endorse the central political values upon their own premises. 
But there is one crucial presupposition made by political liberalism, namely that the 
comprehensive (Christian) doctrines themselves are reasonable. The idea that religion 
should comply properly with an ideal of reasonableness, seems to be part of the liberal 
tradition from the very beginning and is for instance clearly expressed both by John 
Locke and Immanuel Kant, two philosophers who have clearly influenced Rawls. Let us 
therefore continue with a brief look at how this idea is expressed by Locke and Kant. 
Thereafter I can show how Rawls differs from his two liberal “predecessors”. 
5.3. Claiming the ”reasonableness of Christianity” 
It seems as if only so called reasonable comprehensive doctrines” can be supposed to fit 
properly within the political scheme of a liberal society. What then about religious and 
Christian views and doctrines? Can they so easily be supposed to conform with such a 
claim? I will now consider more thoroughly the liberal demand for “reasonableness”, 
and in doing so I find it appropriate to distinguish the Rawlsian approach on the one side 
from the approach of Kant and Locke on the other side. 
5.3.1. Following in the footsteps of Locke and Kant? 
In his claim for reasonableness Rawls might at the first glance seem to be very much in 
line with traditional liberalism. In 1695 John Locke published his book on “The Reason-
ableness of Christianity”.598 Locke‟s main question(s) here can be formulated as fol-
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lows: What in particular can reasonably be believed as belonging to Christian faith and 
how far and in what way can there be genuine knowledge about religion? 
Locke‟s way of raising the question about the reasonableness of Christianity should in 
no way just be considered a side-track within philosophy since man can after all be 
considered a deeply religious being. It is therefore not surprising that Locke also deals 
with the problem of the reasonableness of (the Christian) religion in his central main 
work An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. (1693). He realised clearly that the 
reason for lack of agreement in matters of religion might lie with ourselves. It was 
therefore urgent to examine our own abilities, and see what kind of “objects” human 
understanding was able of dealing properly with.
599
 
It might now be appropriate to turn directly to Bk. IV, Ch. 17, §§ 23-24, of An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding where Locke makes the following distinction be-
tween “above, contrary, and according to reason”. 600  
“23. Above, contrary, and according to reason. By what has been before said of 
reason, we may be able to make some guess at the distinction of things into those 
that are according to, above, and contrary to reason.  1. According to reason are such 
propositions whose truth we can discover by examining and tracing those ideas we 
have from sensation and reflection; and by natural deduction find to be true or pro-
bable.  2. Above reason are such propositions whose truth or probability we cannot 
by reason derive from those principles.     3. Contrary to reason are such propositions 
as are inconsistent with or irreconcilable to our clear and distinct ideas. Thus the 
existence of one God is according to reason; the existence of more than one God, 
contrary to reason; the resurrection of the dead, above reason. Above reason also 
may be taken in a double sense, viz. either as signifying above probability, or above 
certainty: and in that large sense also, contrary to reason, is, I suppose, sometimes 
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taken.”601   
It might be well worth noticing that the resurrection of the dead (and the fall of some of 
the angels) are taken by Locke to be above reason. The existence of one God, however, 
is entirely according to reason; while the belief that there exists more than one God is 
held by Locke to be clearly contrary to reason. This means that Christian faith, accord-
ing to Locke, might very well be above reason and even exceed what should be con-
sidered most probable by most people, but according to Locke is nevertheless “reason 
and faith not opposite, for faith must be regulated by reason”.602 In a way we must 
simply understand the propositions to which we are expected to consent of faith. We 
should all the way make use of “the light and faculties God has given” (Essay IV, 
Ch.17, § 24) to us, thus making us rational creatures, also accountable for the mistakes 
following from not using our reason. No one can claim to be inspired by God, no one 
can ask for assent of faith, if the proposition he utters is “contradictory to our clear 
intuitive knowledge”.603 
According to Locke there are good reasons for accepting the Christian religion. And so 
Christian religion should very appropriately be characterised as reasonable. But it is also 
important for Locke (due to his empirical orientation) to emphasise that religious beliefs 
are very much dependant on “outward signs”.604 Locke therefore holds that; 
“… the revealed truths which the Christians are to believe are those propositions to 
which the assent of faith is asked on the credit of the proposer as coming from God. 
In short, says Locke, we have to believe the revealed truths of the Christian faith on 
the credit of Jesus of Nazareth, and the outward signs which make such belief 
reasonable are two: (1) fulfilment of the prophecies about Messiah and (2) the 
performance of miracles.” 605 
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Locke is well aware of the boundaries of reason and respects the nature of faith. Nev-
ertheless, the two should be related, but simultaneously distinguished in a way that does 
not make them rivals. After having summarised the boundaries of reason, Locke makes 
this very distinction clear: 
“… From these things thus premised, I think we may come to lay down the measures 
and boundaries between faith and reason: the want whereof may possibly have been 
the cause, if not of great disorders, yet at least of great disputes, and perhaps 
mistakes in the world. For till it be resolved how far we are to be guided by reason, 
and how far by faith, we shall in vain dispute, and endeavour to convince one 
another in matters of religion. … 
Reason, therefore, here, as contradistinguished to faith, I take to be the discovery of 
the certainty or probability of such propositions or truths which the mind arrives at 
by deduction made from such ideas, which it has got by the use of its natural 
faculties; viz. by sensation or reflection.   
Faith, on the other side, is the assent to any proposition, not thus made out by the 
deductions of reason, but upon the credit of the proposer, as coming from God, in 
some extraordinary way of communication. This way of discovering truths to men, 
we call revelation.”606 
By claiming the “reasonableness of Christianity” Locke obviously aims at different 
things, but the following aspects of his thoughts are noteworthy in this connection: 
First: We do not find in Locke‟s conception a triumph of ratio over faith. He is aware 
that reason alone might not take us very far, and moreover, that reason often fails us.
607
  
 Sometimes we simply have no ideas, and accordingly our reasoning stops. 
 Sometimes our ideas are obscure, confused or imperfect. 
 Sometimes we lack the intermediate ideas required to come to the right conclusions. 
 Often we proceed upon the wrong principles, bringing ourselves into absurdities and 
contradictions. 
 Often we employ doubtful terms and “uncertain signs”. 
Thus Locke is well aware of the difficulties that reason has to comply with, – and cannot 
entirely overcome.  
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Second: Despite pointing to the limits of reason, the mere title of Locke‟s book “The 
Reasonableness of Christianity” suggests that Locke risks the rationalisation of Chris-
tian doctrine itself. However, Locke leaves the central aspects of Christology and even 
the miracles largely intact.
608
 He holds that when Jesus arrived, the label of Messiah, 
given by the prophets hundred of years earlier fitted perfectly. And the miracles that 
Jesus carried out, were taken as outward manifestations of his divinity. One just need 
eyes to see with to realise that Christ was representing God.
609
 The very reasonableness 
of Christianity depends on a recognition of the fact that the gospel itself can not be taken 
to appeal merely to an “ontological peculiarity of which we have no echoes else-
where.”610 And while Locke emphasises that  “reason must be our last judge and guide 
in everything”611, he does not deny the mystery of the gospel, arising from the fact that 
there is something in Christianity, that is above reason and that transcends a narrow 
empirical approach.  
Third: Locke is obviously sympathetic towards the Christian religion as such. This 
means, however, that there may even be clear “dogmatic” implications and theological 
concerns found in Locke‟s philosophy. (When claiming for instance that the belief in 
one God is according to reason while the belief in several gods is contrary to reason, one 
can understand why he was also accused of having sympathy with the theological 
concern of Socianism.) 
Immanuel Kant’s philosophy leaves us with a different impression than Locke's treat-
ment of reason does, although there are parallels. Kant too is seriously concerned with 
the question of the reasonableness of religion.  
I cannot do more here than touch upon some aspects of Kant‟s philosophy which ad-
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dress the “reasonableness” of the Christian religion. Nor can I delve into the ways in 
which Kant's views changed over the course of his life. For present purposes, I will 
mainly take my point of departure from Kant's “Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der 
Blossen Vernunft”, (a relatively late work, published in 1793, when Kant was almost 70 
years old).
612
 The very title of the book indicates that Kant took a rather reductionist 
approach to (Christian) religion which he seems to treat as being conceived of entirely 
within a framework settled by autonomous reason. 
There are three things that I want to stress in this connection: 
First: The title that Kant has chosen for his most central book on religion might at the 
first glance give the impression that reason as such is relatively firm and unproble-
matic.
613
 But that may not be the case. Before unfolding the (Christian) religion within 
the limits of reason alone, it should be focused on the limits of reason itself, what Kant 
does in his philosophy. Reason itself is not to be taken as unproblematic within Kantian 
philosophy, as Kant clearly emphasises in the introduction to his “Kritik der reinen 
Vernunft”: 
“Die menschliche Vernunft hat das besondere Schicksal in einer Gattung ihrer Er-
kenntnisse: daß sie durch Fragen belästigt wird, die sie nicht abweisen kann, denn 
sie sind ihr durch die Natur der Vernunft selbst aufgegeben, die sie aber auch nicht 
beantworten kann, denn sie übersteigen alles Vermögen der menschlichen Vernunft. 
In diese Verlegenheit geräth sie ohne ihre Schuld. Sie fängt von Grundsätzen an, 
deren Gebrauch im Laufe der Erfahrung unvermeidlich und zugleich durch diese 
hinreichend bewährt ist. Mit diesen steigt sie (wie es auch ihre Natur mit sich bringt) 
immer höher, zu entfernteren Bedingungen. //AVIII// Da sie aber gewahr wird, daß 
auf diese Art ihr Geschäfte jederzeit unvollendet bleiben müsse, weil die Fragen nie-
mals aufhören, so sieht sie sich genöthigt, zu Grundsätzen ihre Zuflucht zu nehmen, 
die allen möglichen Erfahrungsgebrauch überschreiten und gleichwohl so unver-
dächtig scheinen, daß auch die gemeine Menschenvernunft damit im Einver-
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ständnisse steht. Dadurch aber stürzt sie sich in Dunkelheit und Widersprüche, aus 
welchen sie zwar abnehmen kann, daß irgendwo verborgene Irrthümer zum Grunde 
liegen müssen, die sie aber nicht entdecken kann, weil die Grundsätze, deren sie sich 
bedient, da sie über die Gränze aller Erfahrung hinausgehen, keinen Probierstein der 
Erfahrung mehr anerkennen. Der Kampfplatz dieser endlosen Streitigkeiten heißt 
nun Metaphysik.”614 
Thus the role of theoretical, empirical and practical reason is clearly restricted according 
to Kant. And neither can “speculative reason” take us any further. It is well known how 
Kant rejects attempts to “prove” God‟s existence; – such “proofs” can in no way count 
as valid proofs. We can have no sensuous intuitions about God that fit within our ratio-
nal concepts, – i.e. within the categories of reason that belong to us as human beings. 
Second: Man has a dual nature and should be considered both a „sensible‟ and an „in-
telligible‟ being. As part of the “phenomenal” world, i.e. as a physical being, man is 
subject to the physical laws of nature. As such a being he is not free. As an intelligible 
being, however, he can be supposed to participate in the “noumenal” world and is there-
by to be considered essentially free. Speculative reason may realise this, but its hypo-
theses are nevertheless highly uncertain. Practical reason, however, can conform to the 
freedom of the noumenal world in quite another way.   
Therefore practical reason can comply with the claim of morality. An idea of moral 
obligation only makes sense within the noumenal sphere. Obligation implies freedom. 
And freedom is illusory if man is considered as only an integrated part of the empirical 
world. Thus morality makes sense only with reference to a noumenal world, – where the 
very idea of moral freedom applies. Freedom means both a capacity of practical reason 
to conform with genuinely moral obligations and an “inner” independence of the empiri-
cal necessities of the “phenomenal” sphere.615  
According to Kant, morality has to be taken as an indisputable fact. But morality‟s 
deepest ground remains unknown to us. It is a holy mystery that cannot be fully pene-
trated by reason and made an ordinary object of knowledge. Morality is apriori.  
According to Kant‟s view, as elaborated in Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen 
Vernunft, morality contains an inherent idea of the highest good,  and even an idea of a 
moral lawgiver and ruler over the world  that transcends what man can have unfailing 
                                                          
614
 I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1771), (p.11. in WBG-edition, 1968, Vol.3) 
 247 
knowledge about. 
“Weil der Mensch die mit der reinen moralischen Gesinnung unzertrennlich ver-
bundene Idee des höchsten Guts (nicht allein von Seiten der dazu gehörigen Glück-
seligkeit, sondern auch der notwendigen Vereinigung der Menschen zu dem ganzen 
Zweck) nicht selbst realisieren kann, gleichwohl aber darauf hinzuwirken in sich 
Pflicht antrifft, so findet er sich zum Glauben an die Mitwirkung oder Veranstaltung 
eines moralischen Weltherrschers hingezogen, wodurch dieser Zweck allein möglich 
ist…. 
Diese Idee eines moralischen Weltherrschers ist eine Aufgabe für unsere praktische 
Vernunft. Es liegt uns nicht sowohl daran, zu wissen, was Gott an sich selbst (seine 
Natur) sei, sondern was er für uns als moralische Wesen sei; wiewohl wir zum 
Behuf dieser Beziehung die göttliche Naturbeschaffenheit so denken und annehmen 
müssen, als es zu diesem Verhältnisse in der ganzen zur Ausführung seines Willens 
erforderlichen Vollkommenheit nötig ist (z.B. als eines unveränderlichen, allwis-
senden, allmächtigen etc. Wesens), und ohne diese Beziehung nichts an ihm er-
kennen können. 
Diesem Bedürfnisse der praktischen Vernunft gemäß ist nun der allgemeine wahre 
Religionsglaube der Glaube an Gott 1) als den allmächtigen Schöpfer Himmels und 
der Erden, d.i. moralisch als heiligen Gesetzgeber, 2) an ihn, den Erhalter des 
menschlichen Geschlechts, als gütigen Regierer und moralischen Versorger des-
selben, 3) an ihn, den Verwalter seiner eignen heiligen Gesetze, d.i. als gerechten 
Richter.”616 
Kant postulates a moral order in the universe which ultimately guarantees a certain 
correspondence between people‟s morality (virtue) and their ultimate happiness. The 
idea of a morally good God as a just lawgiver, governor and judge is required by 
practical reason in its concern with the moral law. One might say that Kant who so 
strongly emphasises the autonomy of morality at the very outset, in the end brings 
morality and religious belief together again. This, in my opinion, is clearly evident in 
Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft. And my point now is just this;  
to demonstrate how religion in the end serves the maintenance of the moral order, and is 
thereby in a way required for the sake of practical reason itself. 
Third: There were influential contemporaries who considered Religion innerhalb der 
Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft a dangerous work from a theological and Christian point 
of view because of its obvious implications not just for morality in the most narrow 
sense of the word, but for central issues within Christian dogmatic as well. After having 
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been approved of by the official censors in Berlin, the first part of Religion innerhalb 
der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft was published in Berlinische Monatschrift (1792). But 
thereafter the second part of the work was stopped by the censors. And this decision was 
even confirmed in a special letter from the king. Kant‟s stated aim was simply to present 
the Christian religion clearly to people in a way that might really be meaningful to them. 
And indeed, – a reader of Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, must 
admit that Kant is well acquainted both with Scriptural exegesis, with Christology, 
Church-dogma and, last but not least, with issues within philosophy of religion such as 
the problem of evil, a problem that he discusses thoroughly in the book. There can be 
little doubt that Kant held (the Christian) religion in high esteem, despite his ambiguity 
towards pietism and ecclesiastical authorities. Moreover, Kant employs the most central 
religious symbols (as for instance “the kingdom of God”) within a framework that is 
primarily defined by a moral perspective and by human reason. 
“Man kann aber mit Grunde sagen: „daß das Reich Gottes zu uns gekommen sei‟, 
wenn auch nur das Princip des allmähligen Überganges des Kirchenglaubens zur 
allgemeinen Vernunftreligion und so zu einem (göttlichen) ethischen Staat auf Erden 
allgemein und irgendwo auch öffentlich Wurzel gefaßt hat: obgleich die wirkliche 
Errichtung desselben noch in unendlicher Weite von uns entfernt liegt. Denn weil 
dieses Princip den Grund einer continuirlichen Annäherung zu dieser Vollkommen-
heit enthält, so liegt in ihm als in einem sich entwickelnden und in der Folge wieder-
um besamenden Keime das Ganze (unsichtbarer Weise), welches dereinst die Welt 
erleuchten und beherrschen soll.”617 
As far as I can see Kant tends to ascribe to religion first of all an instrumental value, in 
the way he subordinates it to morality
618
 and in the significance ascribed to it as a shared 
moral resource within the wider framework of public life. It seems as if we might be 
justified in saying that Kant, when claiming the reasonableness of Religion, simultan-
eously makes rather strong assumptions about the very substance of the Christian re-
ligion as such, assumptions that imply a certain “reductionism” in terms of the nature of 
(the Christian) religion, – what is already suggested in the very title of Religion inner-
halb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft. 
The purpose of my brief accounts of s Kant‟s Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der 
                                                          
617
 Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft (1793), III; 172, (p.786 in WBG-edition, vol.7) 
 249 
bloßen Vernunft and Locke‟s The Reasonableness of Christianity is twofold: 
 to show that Locke and Kant stressed (and claimed) the reasonableness of the 
Christian religion in a way that was not without substantial implications for religion 
itself,  and, 
 that Locke and Kant convincingly point to the limits of theoretical as well as practical 
reason, while taking into account that there are elements of genuine religion that are 
above reason and by far transcend what reason can comprise. 
And now the question is how can Rawls, who is without doubt influenced both by 
Locke and Kant, and, like them, also claims the “reasonableness” of (the Christian) 
religion, avoid making similarly strong and controversial (reductionist) assumptions 
about religion as such.
 The very idea of the “reasonableness” of (the Christian) religion, 
which Rawls shares
619
, seems in any case to imply that there might also be some 
(religious) doctrines which are not reasonable. When claiming the reasonableness of the 
(religious) doctrines, Rawls will, however, avoid making the same kind of rather strong 
substantial assumptions about religion itself as is made by Locke and especially by 
Kant. The question is how this may be possible. 
5.3.2. Rawls’ demand for reasonableness 
It can clearly be observed that Rawls is very careful not to define the reasonableness of 
religion or of Christianity in the “doctrinaire” way Locke and Kant did. Their treatment 
of religion is one reason, I assume, why Rawls  although influenced by both of them  
considers Locke and Kant to be typical representatives of liberalism conceived of as a 
comprehensive doctrine.
620
 Rawls wishes to avoid the rather strong assumptions about 
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religion they made, and it is one of the primary reasons he introduces a “method of 
avoidance”. 
However, if a distinction between reasonable and non-reasonable doctrines, that Rawls 
considers so important, is to be of any use at all, it is necessary that that there be some 
criterion of “reasonableness” by which to judge whether to include a given comprehen-
sive doctrine as “reasonable” or exclude it as “unreasonable”. If we are to understand 
what it means for something to be included or excluded we must more thoroughly 
examine the notion of the “reasonable”621 as employed in Rawls‟ conception of political 
liberalism.  
5.3.2.1. Distinguishing between the rational and the reasonable 
To understand how Rawls uses the notion of the “reasonable”, it might be of interest to 
notice how he distinguishes “the reasonable” from “the rational”. In Political Liberalism 
(Lecture II: § 1) Rawls explicitly focuses on the distinction between “The Reasonable 
and the Rational”.622 We will start with the latter notion (the rational), – which will 
make it easier afterwards to give an account of the distinctive marks of the former. 
According to Rawls there are three things that make agents rational,  namely that: 
 they can use their judgement in seeking ends that are peculiarly their own. 
 they are capable of adopting the most effective means to achieve their ends. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
whether Kant – as far as his political philosophy is concerned – provides us with comprehensive values 
that are doctrinally more demanding than those launched by Rawls himself. Freedom is for both of them 
the quite essential value. And I think that it is important to see that Kant in correspondence with the dis-
tinction he makes between “legality” and “morality” also distinguishes two kinds of freedom: “Within 
Kant‟s moral theory there are two main types of freedom: inner freedom and outer freedom. Inner freedom 
is the primary subject of Kant‟s ethical theory, while outer freedom might be considered the primary sub-
ject of Kant‟s theory of justice. External freedom in the most general sense is independence of constraints 
imposed by others, but from a normative perspective it is divided into two further categories: „rightful‟ 
external freedom, which is freedom of action circumscribed by laws of justice, and „lawless‟ or „wild‟ 
external freedom, which is the unrestrained, anarchic liberty of the state of nature.” A. D. Rosen, Kant‟s 
Theory of Justice (1996), p.7. I think that the distinction Kant makes within the latter (external) freedom is 
important, because an “external freedom, which is freedom of action circumscribed by laws of justice” is 
the only kind of freedom that can be compatible with the similar freedom of others. Of course Kant goes 
far more thoroughly than Rawls into ethical theory as such, but as far as the political perspective is con-
cerned, I think that Kant may after all come rather close to Rawls.  
621
 Let me here insert the remark that the distinction between reasonable and non-reasonable (or 
unreasonable) doctrines corresponds with Rawls‟ way of distinguishing reasonable pluralism from 
pluralism as such. The problem of the “reasonable” is clearly actualised in both places. In a way the 
discussion of the reasonable now connects to and deepens issues of chapter 3 about pluralism. 
622
 See J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), pp.48-54. 
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 they have a capacity to decide how well the different ends they pursue cohere. 
What merely rational agents obviously lack according to Rawls, is the moral ability 
required for engaging in fair social co-operation. Merely rational agents might even be 
characterised by Rawls as “psychopathic”.623 
Rawls holds that there are also three important features that make agents reasonable, – 
namely that: 
 they are motivated to honour fair terms of co-operation. 
 they accept a duty to appeal to public reason and explain to one another the reasons 
they have for their decisions and their attitudes in matters of common interest.
624
 
 they have insight in the nature and limits of their own political judgement.625 
The main point here is that reasonable persons can be supposed to propose principles 
defining fair terms of co-operation, and that they are also ready to implement the re-
quired standards for establishing such terms and to abide by them,  provided that others 
are willing to do the same.
626
 The idea of “the reasonable”, which they stick to, should 
be considered morally qualified in a way that “the merely rational” is not. Societies 
characterised by reasonable pluralism consist mainly of reasonable citizens who are 
                                                          
623
 “What rational agents lack is the particular form of moral sensibility that underlies the desire to engage 
in fair cooperation as such, and to do so on the terms that others as equals might reasonably be expected to 
endorse. I do not assume the reasonable is the whole of moral sensibility; but it includes the part that con-
nects with the idea of fair social cooperation. Rational agents‟ approach being psychopathic when their 
interests are solely in benefits to themselves.”, J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.51. And in a foot-
note Rawls tries to explain this “defect” of merely rational agents by referring to a remark made by Im-
manuel Kant: “Rational people lack what Kant calls in the Religion, Ak, VI:26, „the predisposition to 
moral personality‟…” Ibid., p.51. 
624
 I will introduce and discuss thoroughly the idea of public reason at the end of this chapter. 
625
 What I refer to here is Rawls‟ requirement that all citizens  participating in public life and debate  
should accept certain “burdens of judgment”, as shall soon more thoroughly be taken into consideration. 
626
 A reciprocal premise is taken as essential, as can also be seen in Rawls‟ most recent essay, where the 
criteria for reasonableness are even more clearly specified: “citizens are reasonable when, viewing one 
another as free and equal in a system of social cooperation over generations, they are prepared to offer one 
another fair terms of cooperation according to what they consider the most reasonable conception of pol-
itical justice; and they agree to act on those terms, even at the cost of their own interests in particular situ-
ations, provided that other citizens also accept those terms. The criterion of reciprocity requires that when 
those terms are proposed as the most reasonable terms of fair cooperation, those proposing them must also 
think it at least reasonable for others to accept them, as free and equal citizens, and not as dominated or 
manipulated, or under the pressure of an inferior political or social position. Citizens will of course differ 
as to which of these conceptions they think the most reasonable, but they agree that all are reasonable, 
even if barely so.” J. Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, The University of Chicago Law 
Review (1997;3), p.770.   
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holding reasonable doctrines,  and are honouring an idea of fair coexistence. A 
fundamental moral idea of fair co-operation can be realised by reasonable persons in the 
midst of the radical diversity of modern societies, – even if a reasonable pluralist society 
should be “neither a society of saints nor a society of the self-centred.”627 
According to Rawls, however, the rational and the reasonable have to work in tandem. 
And the one is not to be derived from the other.
628
 Most appropriately one should there-
fore say that there is a complementarity between the reasonable and the rational which 
means that people should be supposed to behave both as rational agents and as reason-
able co-operative citizens.  
We have now met the reasonable agent, – as distinguished from the merely rational 
person. And we have simultaneously learned that the idea of the “reasonable”, which is 
so central in Rawls‟ conception, is genuinely morally laden, – implying an idea of fair 
co-operation. And the idea of social co-operation is closely connected with the role 
ascribed to the public in Rawls‟ theory.  
5.3.2.2. The reasonableness of doctrines according to Rawls 
I have tried to make clear the essential features of the reasonable and the rational by 
distinguishing the characteristic attitudes of rational and of reasonable agents. Turning 
to Political Liberalism it seems to me as if the criteria for defining persons as “reason-
able” are more specific than the criteria Rawls uses for defining comprehensive doc-
trines as reasonable (or unreasonable). 
In Political Liberalism reasonable doctrines have three main features:
629
 
 they cover elementary philosophical, moral or religious aspects of life within an 
intelligible view. (Thus “a reasonable doctrine is an exercise of theoretical 
reason”.630) 
 they display the most significant values in life, and give guidelines for how to 
balance them when they conflict. (Thus “a reasonable doctrine is also an exercise of 
                                                          
627
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.54. 
628
 And so Rawls openly corrects a mistaken remark that he made in A Theory of Justice, (p.16), where he 
made the theory of justice as fairness decisively dependent on a theory of rational choice. 
629
 Cf. J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.59. 
630
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.59 
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practical reason”.631) 
 they draw upon a particular tradition, what gives them a certain stability and a basic 




These criteria of reasonableness are satisfied by many different and even competing 
doctrines reflecting highly different historical backgrounds, representing more than one 
intelligible (and coherent) perspective on human life and displaying highly different 
ways of balancing moral values. One does therefore well in considering reasonable 
pluralism an integrated and persistent part even of a well-ordered society. But Rawls 
clearly admits that his “account of reasonable comprehensive doctrines is deliberately 
loose”, and I have in chapter 3 suggested that the reason for this is that Rawls will 
obviously as far as possible avoid disqualifying particular (religious) doctrines as 
unreasonable for political reasons.
633
 
But the question is whether his account of reasonable comprehensive doctrines is too 
loose and vague to be of any use. Rawls is, however, more specific in his recent 
writings. He now stresses that the idea of a reasonable overlapping consensus of 
comprehensive doctrines requires;  
“that all of these doctrines, both religious and nonreligious support a political 
conception of justice underwriting a constitutional democratic society whose 
principles, ideals, and standards satisfy the criterion of reciprocity. Thus, all 
reasonable doctrines affirm such a society with its corresponding political insti-
tutions: equal basic rights and liberties for all citizens, including liberty of con-
science and the freedom of religion.”634 
                                                          
631
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.59 
632
 Thomas Pogge summarises the three features of a reasonable comprehensive doctrine as follows: 
“Eine umfassende Lehre ist vernünftig, wenn sie den Anforderungen der theoretischen und praktischen 
Vernunft gerecht wird, also zumindest konsistent und verständlich ist, und in einer Tradition steht, die 
sich, wenn überhaupt, auf von innen her plausible Weise fortentwickelt.” T. W. Pogge, John Rawls 
(1994), p.144. 
633
 Let me just recall what Rawls himself makes explicitly clear, – namely that his “…account of reason-
able comprehensive doctrines is deliberately loose. We avoid excluding doctrines as unreasonable without 
strong grounds based on clear aspects of the reasonable itself. Otherwise our account runs the danger of 
being arbitrary and exclusive. Political liberalism counts many familiar and traditional doctrines  religi-
ous, philosophical, and moral  as reasonable even though we could not seriously entertain them for our-
selves, as we think they give excessive weight to some values and fail to allow for the significance of 
others. A tighter criterion is not, however, needed for the purposes of political liberalism.” J. Rawls, 
Political Liberalism (1993), p.59f. 
634
 J. Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, The University of Chicago Law Review (1997;3), 
p.801. 
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Rawls makes it clear that comprehensive doctrines that cannot “affirm such a society 
with its corresponding political institutions” are to be considered unreasonable.635 (He 
does not say, however, how unreasonable doctrines are to be dealt with in a liberal 
society.)  
But Rawls does not claim that reasonable comprehensive doctrines have to be liberal. 
(They should nonetheless satisfy the elementary criterion of reciprocity). Neither does 
he claim that transcendent values should ultimately be subordinated to political values. 
He entirely accepts that reasonable comprehensive doctrines, as for instance religious 
doctrines, might have another ranking of values than implied in a conception of political 
liberalism. The reasonableness of religious doctrines is nevertheless obvious in that they 
make it possible to endorse the most vital political values and institutions on internal 
premises, thereby honouring fair “worldly” arrangements. In recent time Rawls becomes 
very explicit about this:  
“In a reasonable comprehensive doctrine, in particular a religious one, the ranking of 
values may not be what we might expect. Thus suppose we call transcendent values 
such values as salvation and eternal life – the Visio Dei. This value, let‟s say, is 
higher, or superior to, reasonable political values of a constitutional democratic 
society. These are worldly values and therefore on a different, and, as it were lower, 
plane than those transcendent values. It does not follow, however, that these lower 
yet reasonable values are overridden by the transcendent values of the religious 
doctrine. In fact, a reasonable comprehensive doctrine is one in which they are not 
overridden, it is the unreasonable doctrines in which they are. This is a consequence 
of the idea of the politically reasonable as set out in political liberalism. Recall §3.2 
where it was said: In endorsing a constitutional democratic regime, a religious 
doctrine may say that such are the limits God sets to our liberty.”636 
Rawls is still defining a “reasonable (religious) doctrine” in a way that makes it possible 
to include most religious doctrines as reasonable, but he has now also got workable 
criteria for excluding some as unreasonable. Simultaneously it should be repeated that 
the way he understands the notion of reasonableness avoids quite effectively the “doc-
trinaire” implications (and the reductionism in matters of religion) which can be found 
in more comprehensive versions of liberalism. But simultaneously “transcendent 
                                                          
635
 Rawls once more draws on the principle of reciprocity, – making it a distinguishing mark of unreason-
able doctrines that: “Their principles and ideals do not satisfy the criterion of reciprocity, and in various 
ways they fail to establish the equal basic liberties. As examples consider the many fundamentalist religi-
ous doctrines…” J. Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, The University of Chicago Law Review 
(1997;3), p.801.  
636
 J. Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, The University of Chicago Law Review (1997;3), 
p.801f. 
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values” and “worldly values” cannot be kept very sharply apart. There are overlapping 
concerns opening the possibility of mutual support as well as of conflict. 
5.4. Claiming the reasonableness of politics?  
As discussed above, Honecker quite clearly emphasises the significance of appealing to 
political reason in matters of social ethics and social co-operation (simultaneously, how-
ever, he reminds us of the limits of reason). By stressing the role of human reason Hon-
ecker declares the political domain a “moral commonwealth”. This means for instance 
that churches are not in the privileged situation that they can draw on an esoteric know-
ledge in matters belonging within the “worldly kingdom”. In so far Honecker has an 
important theological concern. But thereby it seems as if both Honecker and Rawls 
come very close to underpinning an “Eigengesetzlichkeit” of the political domain; 
 the former by stressing that churches (and Christians) have no privileged insight in 
substantial matters belonging within the domain of politics,  
 the latter by stressing the “freestandingness” of a political conception, 
 and both of them by claiming the reasonableness of politics. 
From a theological as well as from a liberal point of view it seems unsatisfactory to 
draw a sharp line of demarcation between “the two realms”. One has to find some way 
of relating them properly. Before considering Honecker‟ way of relating within the doc-
trine of the two kingdoms, aiming at a “Vermittlung” between the two realms, I should 
like to address the problem of “Eigengesetzlichkeit” more thoroughly in order to timely 
present some appropriate background-material for the further discussion.
637
 
5.4.1. “Eigengesetzlichkeit” – modified? 
The notion of “Eigengesetzlichkeit” is often associated with the Lutheran doctrine of the 
two kingdoms
638, and serves to stress the “autonomy” of different spheres of life,  not 
                                                          
637
 Rawls‟ way of “relating” will be considered when introducing the idea of public reason (chapter 5,6) 
and especially when discussing the problem of practising a duty of civility (chpt.6). The problem of 
“relating” is also clearly actualised by the so called “from-within-principle”.  
638
 Let it, however, be emphasised that the problem of “Eigengesetzlichkeit” is not just to be considered 
an isolated or peripheral aspect, but concerns various fundamental issues within Lutheran theology. “Das 
Stichwort Eigengesetzlichkeit verweist gewiß präzis auf Grundsatzüberlegungen reformatorischer Theo-
logie wie die Unterscheidung von Gesetz und Evangelium, der beiden Reiche Gottes, des regnum mundi 
und des regnum Christi, der Unterscheidung von christlichem Glauben und profaner Vernunft. Es kann 
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least of which is the political sphere. The idea of an “Eigengesetzlichkeit der Lebens-
gebiete” which is so characteristic of the modern age, is described as follows in the great 
theological encyclopaedia “Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart”: 
“Was mit der sog. E.d.L. [Eigengesetzlichkeit der Lebensgebiete] gemeint is, ist 
nicht ohne weiteres eindeutig. Es kann gedacht werden an den seit der Aufklärung 
deutlichen Prozess der Ablösung aller Lebensgebiete von der christlichen Religion 
und Theologie, von der biblischen Offenbarung und der kirchlichen Tradition. Für 
die Wissenschaft und alle ihre Zweige, für die Ethik, für die Staatslehre und die 
Staatsleitung oder für das Recht sind nicht mehr biblische Normen und Prinzipien 
maßgebend, sowohl was das Erkennen als auch was das Handeln betrifft, sondern 
den Sachgebieten selbst immanente Gesetze und Normen.”639 
The way Honecker employs the doctrine of the two kingdoms seems to a certain extent 
actually to further the “Eigengesetzlichkeit” of the worldly regiment, – at least in a 
modified form.
640
 Honecker sharply criticises fundamentalism, overrules all tendencies 
of theocratic politics, avoids the derivation of political principles or programs exclus-
ively from Christian revelations, and does not pay much attention to a religiously inter-
                                                                                                                                                                          
jedoch nicht losgelöst vom politischen und wirtschaftlichen Gebrauch in Theorie und Praxis des Luther-
tums und also von seiner konkreten Anwendung betrachtet werden, wobei zunächst völlig dahingestellt 
bleiben mag, ob solche Anwendung – verglichen mit Luther selbst - zu Recht oder zu Unrecht erfolgte. 
Das Problem der Eigengesetzlichkeit kehrt dabei unter historischer Perspektive wieder vor allem als die 
Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Politik und Theologie, von Gesellschaft und Kirche in der deutschen 
Geistes- und Sozialgeschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts. … Die Thematik der Autonomie der Lebensgebiete 
verbindet sich sodann mit dem Gedanken der Verweltlichung, Verselbständigung, Entklerikalisierung von 
Wirtschaft, Politik, Kultur, also mit der Säkularisierungsthematik.” M. Honecker, “Das Problem der 
Eigengesetzlichkeit”, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche (1976), p. 95. 
639
 Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (RGG), Bd. II (1958), p.354. In RGG the problem of the 
so called “Eigengesetzlichkeit” is further sharpened by the question: “Stehen Staat und Wirtschaft in dem 
Sinne unter eigenen, etwa gar naturhaft-zwangsmäßigen Gesetzen, daß das christliche Liebesgebot oder 
überhaupt irgendeine ethische Norm hier völlig außer Kraft gesetzt sind? Das hieße: Im politischen Leben 
gilt die Staatsräson und geht es um den Erwerb und die Steigerung von Macht, in der Wirtschaft um den 
Erwerb von Gütern und dem höchstmöglichen Gewinn. Da der Christ einerseits unter dem Gebot der un-
bedingten Gottes- und Nächstenliebe steht, andererseits als Staatsbürger politisch handeln und, um sein 
Leben zu fristen, wirtschaftend tätig sein muß, führt er danach eine Doppelexistenz. Amts- und Person-
sphäre sind auseinandergerissen, wobei noch zu fragen ist, welcher konkrete Raum für die Personsphäre, 
in der das Liebesgebot gilt, überhaupt bleibt. Die Lage in der heutigen ev. Ethik ist, da der Gedanke einer 
Doppelexistenz vor Gott absurd erscheint, so, daß maßgebende Theologen (Barth, Thielicke, Söe u.v.a.) 
die ganze Vorstellung von der E.d.L. [Eigengesetzlichkeit der Lebensgebiete]  scharf zurückweisen, und 
zwar auch und vor allem deshalb, weil die Königsherrschaft Christi und der Anspruch des Wortes Gottes 
auf die ganze Wirklichkeit unseres Lebens durch sie akut gefährdet sind. Da die Lehre von der E.d.L., 
namentlich wo sie innerhalb der luth. Theologie verhandelt wird, regelmäßig auf Luthers sog. Lehre von 
den beiden Reichen …bezogen ist, ist diese Lehre Luthers mit in eine Krise gekommen.” (RGG, II, 
p.355).  
640
 However, Honecker clearly admits that a doctrine of the two kingdoms, closely connected with an idea 
of “Eigengesetzlichkeit” for the worldly regiment, has in many cases in fact proved disastrous, for instance 
during the second world war. It might therefore be very hard nowadays to defend even the slightest idea of 
“Eigengesetzlichkeit”. But Honecker nonetheless also seems to be worried about the consequences of re-
 257 
preted natural law tradition. And Honecker clearly stresses the role of reason in social 
ethics, and in matters belonging within the worldly “realm”. The way Honecker draws 
upon the doctrine of the two kingdoms may fit very well within a Rawlsian perspective, 
since Rawls stresses that his conception, as strictly political, is to be elaborated as a 
freestanding conception.  
Before arriving at a conclusion concerning the problem of “Eigengesetzlichkeit” (and 
the “freestandingness” of the domain of the political) I would like to consider more 
specifically Honecker‟s article on “Das Problem der Eigengesetzlichkeit”.641 In this 
article Honecker starts by underlining that the very notion of “Eigengesetzlichkeit” is far 
from clear and “daß darunter sehr verschiedenartige Einzelfragen sich verbergen”.642 He 
realises, however, that whatever the precise meaning of the term, the problem of “Eigen-
gesetzlichkeit” is appropriately to be considered within a modern setting.643 The German 
term has become more or less a “terminus technicus” first in the twentieth century644, 
although the problems covered by the term “Eigengesetzlichkeit” are actualised much 
earlier, not least in the 19
th
 century, in connection with the debate about the social im-
pact of the Reformation theology. But it seems in any case obvious that the notion of 
“Eigengesetzlichkeit” can only be fully understood within a modern context. And Hon-
ecker ascribes to Max Weber the main responsibility for introducing the term into the 
modern debate.
645
 Thereafter, the idea of “Eigengesetzlichkeit” was embraced by theo-
                                                                                                                                                                          
jecting entirely the very idea of “Eigengesetzlichkeit”. It may appropriately be asked whether the concern 
inherent in the idea of “Eigengesetzlichkeit” is somehow to be maintained, – at least in a modified form. 
641
 M. Honecker, “Das Problem der Eigengesetzlichkeit”, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche (1976), 
pp.92-130. 
642
 “In heutigen sozialethischen Texten wird das Wort „Eigengesetzlichkeit‟ häufig gebraucht. Dabei 
verbindet sich mit dem Begriff sofort die Vorstellung von einer bestimmten sozialethischen Theorie; 
freilich ist man sich oft genug dessen nicht bewußt, daß der Begriff nicht eindeutig bestimmt und fest-
gelegt ist und daß Begriff und Theorie nicht notwendig deckungsgleich sind. Die Formulierung meines 
Themas „Das Problem der Eigengesetzlichkeit‟ ist also bereits Ausdruck einer Verlegenheit, nämlich der 
Verlegenheit, daß weder der Begriff präzis definiert noch die Theorie so klar ist, wie man es sich wünscht. 
Es läßt sich vielmehr zeigen  und zwar haben dies bereits andere getan  , daß darunter sehr verschieden-
artige Einzelfragen sich verbergen.” M. Honecker, “Das Problem der Eigengesetzlichkeit”, Zeitschrift für 
Theologie und Kirche (1976), p.92. 
643
 “Der Gedanke einer Eigengesetzlichkeit von Politik, Wirtschaft und der einzelnen Lebensgebiete ist, 
wie schon gesagt, ein typisch neuzeitlicher Gedanke, ein Gedanke der Aufklärung, Zwar hat Luther be-
tont, daß das weltliche Regiment „sein eigen Wesen‟ habe [WA 51, 238,16]. Aber dieses Eigenwesen des 
weltlichen Regiments ist umgriffen vom Gesetz Gottes.” M. Honecker, “Das Problem der Eigengesetz-
lichkeit”, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche (1976), p.105. 
644
 “Zunächst ist festzustellen, daß der Begriff erst im 20. Jahrhundert in der deutschen Sprache nachzu-
weisen ist.” M.Honecker, “Das Problem der Eigengesetzlichkeit”, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 
(1976), p.92. 
645
 “Da Max Weber in seinen genannten Aufsätzen [Vgl. Max Weber, Ges. Aufs. zur Religionssoziologie 
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logical political ethics where it soon became a distinctive feature (and a problem) 
closely associated with Lutheran social ethics. 
The notion of “Eigen-gesetzlichkeit” belongs naturally within a group of terms, char-
acterised by Honecker as the so called “„Eigen‟-bildungen, wie Eigenart, Eigenwürde, 
Eigenwert, Eigenständigkeit usw”.646 Such terms serve to mark the distinctive character 
of certain subject areas, their immanent value-structure.
647
 Claiming the “Eigengesetz-
lichkeit” of economy might for instance imply that an economic program has to be 
elaborated entirely according to the nature of economics itself, - and not according to 
“foreign” rules of (theological) ethics. The same might be the case in strictly political 
matters. 
The notion of “Eigengesetzlichkeit” should, however, mainly be qualified in accordance 
with the second part of the term,  referring to “Gesetzlichkeit”or “Gesetz” The way we 
understand the notion of “Gesetz (lichkeit)” in modern age is primarily taken from the 
domain of natural science, with its search for regular (causal) relations between the 
phenomena of the natural world.
648
.Or the notion might be used in a more Hegelian 
sense;  to express the objective orderliness of history and cosmos as a whole.649 The 
                                                                                                                                                                          
I, (1920) 1972
6…] den Begriff Eigengesetzlichkeit ziemlich häufig benutzt, dürfte somit ihm die Priorität 
der Prägung des Begriffs zuzusprechen sein.” M. Honecker, “Das Problem der Eigengesetzlichkeit”, 
Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche (1976), p.97f. Honecker once more underlines , that a lot of “Hin-
weise sprechen dafür, daß der Begriff kurz vor 1920 aufgekommen ist, sich dann rasch durchgesetzt hat 
und seit Mitte der 20er Jahre allgemein gebraucht wird, freilich ohne eindeutig definiert zu sein. Ich ver-
mute, daß MAX WEBER in seinen religionsoziologischen Untersuchungen den Begriff geprägt und in die 
Diskussion gebracht hat.” (Ibid, p.97) 
646
 M. Honecker, “Das Problem der Eigengesetzlichkeit”, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche (1976), 
p.92. 
647
 Hartmut Kreß has tried to distinguish between different aspects of the use of the term “value”. In doing 
so he also singles out different “Wertbereiche” in a way that might be illustrative when discussing the 
phenomenon of “Eigengesetzlichkeit”: ”Unter Wertbereichen  (oder Wertsphären) sind die verschiedenen 
kulturellen und institutionellen Ausformungen von Werten zu verstehen, die u.a. von G.Simmel und 
E.Troeltsch hervorgehoben worden sind: Religion, Recht, Wissenschaft, Kunst usw. repräsentieren jeweils 
eigene Wertbereiche.” Cf. H. Kreß, Ethische Werte und der Gottesgedanke. Probleme und Perspektiven 
des neuzeitlichen Wertbegriffs (1990), p.202. 
648
 And according to Honecker there are three characteristics that might be considered typical of the 
modern notion of “Gesetz(lichkeit)”, - namely causality, necessity and universality. “Der Gesetzesbegriff 
wird allgemein gekennzeichnet durch die Merkmale der Kausalität, der Notwendigkeit und der Allgemein-
gültigkeit. Das Gesetz bringt Determiniertheit zum Ausdruck, Festlegung im Unterschied zum Zufall, zur 
Kontingenz, zur Nicht-Notwendigkeit. Es ist jedoch einmal nicht notwendig, Gesetz mit Kausalgesetz ein-
fach gleich zu setzen.” M. Honecker, “Das Problem der Eigengesetzlichkeit”, Zeitschrift für Theologie 
und Kirche (1976), p.113. 
649
 “Im neuzeitlichen Gesetzesbegriff sind zwei grundsätzliche Tendenzen zu unterscheiden. Der natur-
wissenschaftlich orientierte Begriff behandelt das Gesetz vorwiegend als relationales Zusammenhang, 
durch den der menschliche Verstand die Gegenstände der Natur in eine mathematisch-physikalisch faß-
bare Beziehung bringt. Das Gesetz ist also nach diesem Verständnis eine vom menschlichen Subjekt 
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latter understanding corresponds quite well with a traditional (Western) perspective, - 
the notion of “law” might thereby be used irrespective of any decisive difference be-
tween laws of nature and laws for the moral [and social] domain. 
As far as I can see, however, it should be emphasised that “Gesetz(lichkeit)” means 
different things when used within different contexts and spheres of life. There are 
“Sinngesetze” and there are “Verhaltensgesetze”, and there are also “soziale, wirt-
schaftliche, historische Gesetze”, and beside this the notion of “Gesetz” has a special 
meaning when used in a theological context. The very notion of “Gesetz”, as used 
within the more or less autonomous spheres of life, – each with its own “laws”, reflects 
in itself the modern fragmentation The result of this might be that:  
 people have to comply with multiple kinds of norm- and value-systems,  which 
might lead to considerable difficulties in making reality cohere.   
 the “laws” of one particular life-sphere easily becomes dominant,  which results in 
the discrediting or subjection of other life-spheres.  
 religion has its own “laws” as one aspect of life,  which might lead to an under-
mining of the overarching perspective that was so often essential of religion.
 650
 
These things makes the idea of “Eigengesetzlichkeit”, which is so often allied with the 
doctrine of the two kingdoms, ambiguous and problematic. An approach from “creation 
theology” (which has often tended to support at least to some extent the idea of “Eigen-
                                                                                                                                                                          
hergestellte Beziehung zwischen Gegenständen der Natur, so daß sich vor allem erkenntnistheoretische 
Fragen nach Art und Gültigkeit dieser Beziehung ergeben. Die andere Tendenz, vertreten vor allem von 
Hegel und der marxistisch-leninistischen Philosophie, begreift das Gesetz als objektiven Zusammenhang 
eines Weltganzen und betrachtet es als abhängiges Moment Einer Totalität. Dieses Gesetzesverständnis 
kann sich bereits auf die antike Tradition berufen, die im Gesetz ein immanentes Ordnungsprinzip der 
Welt, des Kosmos, sah. Strittig ist jedoch, inwieweit der Gesetzesbegriff für Natur und Geschichte 
gleicherweise gültig ist, ob hier Differenzen in der Anwendung des Gesetzesbegriffes notwendig sind, und 
ob Gesetz ein deskriptiver Begriff oder ein normativer, d.h. präskriptiver Begriff ist, der erst durch die 
Gesetzgebung der menschlichen Vernunft konstituiert wird (so Kant mit seiner Unterscheidung von Natur-
gesetz und moralischem Gesetz).” M. Honecker, “Das Problem der Eigengesetzlichkeit”, Zeitschrift für 
Theologie und Kirche (1976), p. 109f. 
650
 This “particularisation of the theological and of the religious perspective is clearly seen by Honecker: 
“Vor dem neuzeitlichen Welt-, Wirklichkeits und Gesellschaftsverständnis sind Ansprüche von Kirche 
und Theologie partikular geworden. Kirchliche Verkündigung und Lehre erreichen bestimmte gesell-
schaftliche Teilbereiche nicht mehr unmittelbar mit ihrem Anspruch und ihren Forderungen. Auch der 
wissenschaftliche Universalitätsanspruch der Theologie ist damit hinfällig.” Martin Honecker, “Das 
Problem der Eigengesetzlichkeit”, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, J.C.B.Mohr, 176, pp.92-130, 
p.107. The question whether Rawls contributes to such a “particularisation” depends on how he can cope 
with the  so-called “from within-principle”. I will come back to these issues. 
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gesetzlichkeit”) has therefore not seldom been met with an approach to the political 
which is clearly “christocentric” (breaking radically with the idea of “Eigengesetzlich-
keit). Honecker attempts to escape from both of these positions. To illustrate this I will 
quote rather extensively from his article on “Eigengesetzlichkeit” before giving further 
comments: 
“Der Gedanke sozialer und ökonomischer Gesetze kann mit Hilfe einer am ersten 
Glaubensartikel orientierten Schöpfungslehre und Ordnungstheologie nicht an-
gemessen interpretiert werden. Denn diese Gesetze sind menschliche Verhaltens-
gesetze, also nicht irgendwie naturgegebene, zeitlos zu begreifende Gesetzmäßig-
keiten. Sie sind vom Menschen geschaffene Strukturen, in welcher der Stiftungs-, 
Schöpfungs und Erhaltungswille Gottes allenfalls verborgen anwesend ist. Es ist 
aber nach meinem Dafürhalten auch nicht möglich, das Problem der Eigengesetz-
lichkeit vom zweiten Artikel her theologisch anzugehen. Die dauernde ungelöste 
Spannung zwischen der Berufung auf den Herrschaftsanspruch Christi, der die 
Anerkennung anderer Gesetze ausschließe, und der notwendigen Beachtung 
immanenter Sachgesetzlichkeiten dokumentiert dies m.E. zureichend. Darüber 
hinaus bin ich im Zweifel, ob sich die Christologie überhaupt als Fundament 
theologischer Sozialethik eignet, Fundament in dem Sinne, daß daraus positive 
Folgerungen ableitbar sind. Ihr heuristischer Wert für die Sozialethik besteht darin, 
als Korrektiv und negatives Kriterium Unvereinbarkeiten zwischen christlichem 
Glauben und sozialem, gesellschaftlichem Handeln aufzuweisen. Für die Grund-
legung theologischer Sozialethik möchte ich deshalb vorschlagen vom dritten 
Glaubenartikel auszugehen, nämlich so, daß es Aufgabe christlicher Interpretation 
von Wirklichkeit, auch von gesellschaftlicher Wirklichkeit ist, deren Unabgeschlos-
senheit und Transcendenzbezug herauszuarbeiten. Selbstverständlich bedarf es dazu 
auch der Hilfe des ersten und zweiten Glaubensartikels. Aber der Zugang zu heut-
igem Verstehen von Wirklichkeit scheint nur mit Hilfe des Heiligen Geistes als der 
Macht der Erleuchtung sich erschließen zu lassen, die den Schein der Verdinglich-
ung durchbricht und auf Erkenntnisgewinn hoffen läßt. Das bedeutet für die theo-
logische Interpretation des Phänomens sozialer Gesetze, daß sie deren Relativität 
reflektiert, die Komplexität analysiert und gegen alle monistischen Tendenzen an der 
Differenziertheit und damit Vielfältigkeit der Wirklichkeit festhällt. Die Frage ist 
nicht, ob es Systeme in Natur und Gesellschaft gibt, diese Frage erledigt und beant-
wortet sich durch bloße Beobachtung. Die Frage ist vielmehr, ob diese Systeme als 
geschlossene  d.h. ethisch gesprochen als Systeme unentrinnbaren Zwanges  ver-
standen werden, oder als offene Systeme, welche Raum für andere Entscheidungen 
läßt. Zur Diskussion steht also, ob gesellschaftliche Realität als unveränderliches 
Faktum verstanden wird oder als offenes System, als Prozess, der für ethische Ver-
antwortung offen ist. Die Pneumatologie und ebenso das von daher verstandene 
gesamte chistliche Glaubensbekenntnis könnten gerade durch die Art und Weise, 
wie sie Wirklichkeitsdeutung ermöglichen und vollziehen, eine Einübung in den 
rechten Umgang mit dem Gesetz und der Struktur von gesellschaflicher Wirklichkeit 
leisten.”651 
                                                          
651
 M. Honecker, “Das Problem der Eigengesetzlichkeit”, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche (1976), 
p.115f. 
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It seems as if Honecker seeks a position which transcends the traditional controversy 
between (Lutheran) social ethics based strictly on a doctrine of creation and (Barthian) 
social ethics based more exclusively on the christological dogma.
652
 While the former 
tends to take political and social institutions and structures as settled (once and for all) 
in a divine act of creation, the latter tends to make the exclusive and revealed law of 
Christ the ultimate norm of society and its institutions. Honecker refers to the second 
thesis of the Barmen Declaration as the clearest example of a christological approach, 
according to which the slightest idea of “Eigengesetzlichkeit” must be rejected as funda-
mentally at odds with a genuinely Christian perspective on the scheme of society and the 
political responsibility of Christians.
653
  
However, the tendencies to make christology a derivative basis for political decisions or 
for substantial social programs, has always ended up with arbitrary solutions. On the 
other hand, a political legitimation based mainly on a theological doctrine of creation 
will soon have to realise that the Creator remains in many respects a “deus absconditus”. 
In spite of this one might ask: What is theologically to be gained by taking instead the 
                                                          
652
 I shall here not thoroughly discuss which role Honecker‟s own tentative approach really plays in his 
later writing. It is important now just to underline that he presents his own attempt to establish a position 
beyond two traditional approaches in social ethics merely as a working-hypothesis. (“Für die Integration 
des sozialwissenschaftlichen Gesetzesverständnisses in die theologische Sozialethik möchte ich thetisch 
folgende Arbeitshypothesen formulieren…”, M. Honecker, “Das Problem der Eigengesetzlichkeit”, Zeit-
schrift für Theologie und Kirche, 1976, p.115.) Even if one might also in more recent writings find some 
suggestions that he still intends to take a standpoint beyond the traditional controversy between a social 
ethics based strictly on the doctrine of creation and an ethics based more exclusively on christology, the 
approach he suggests here is not systematically worked out, but nevertheless well worth considering 
653
 “Als erstes sei erinnert an einen nunmehr schon historisch gewordenen, vielfach interpretierten und 
dennoch in seinem Verständnis nach wie vor kontrovers gebliebenen Text, nämlich die zweite Barmer 
These von 1934. Sie fordert, Jesus Christus sei „so und mit gleichem Ernst‟ zu verkündigen sowohl als 
„Gottes Zuspruch der Vergebung aller unserer Sünden‟ wie als „Gottes kräftiger Anspruch auf unser 
ganzes Leben‟. Der Verwerfungssatz erklärt darum die Annahme für falsche Lehre, „als gebe es Bereiche 
unseres Leben, in denen wir nicht Jesus Christus, sondern anderen Herren zu eigen wären, Bereiche, in 
denen wir nicht der Rechtfertigung und Heiligung durch ihn bedürften‟. Unter Berufung auf Barmen II hat 
vor allem eine streng christozentrisch entworfene Theologie und theologische Sozialethik betont, jede 
Anerkennung einer Eigengesetzlichkeit sei unvereinbar mit dem Bekenntnis zum Herrsein Christi, sei 
Verleugnung des Herrschaftsanspruchs Christi über die Welt. Karl Barth hat beispielsweise im Rahmen 
seiner Ablehnung des Naturrechts als eines zulässigen Orientierungspunktes für christliche Entscheid-
ungen im politischen Raum beiläufig und fast unwirsch die Rechtmäßigkeit einer Berufung auf politische 
und wirtschaftliche Eigengesetzlichkeit für Christen bestritten. … Nach Barth kann es zwar weltliche, 
profane Aufgaben, aber keine weltlichen, profanen Maßstäbe geben. Die Bürgergemeinde hat „keine vom 
Reich Jesu Christi abstrahierte, eigengesetzlich begründete und sich auswirkende Existenz, sondern sie ist 
 außerhalb der Kirche, aber nicht außerhalb des Herschaftskreises Jesu Christi  ein Exponent dieses 
seines Reiches‟ [KD IV/3, 165ff (§ 69,2)]. Auf Barth beruft sich durchgängig die Kritik an der reforma-
torischen Zwei-Reiche-Lehre und die dazu vertretene Antithese, welche im Theologoumenon von König-
herrschaft Christi programmatisch formuliert is.” M. Honecker, “Das Problem der Eigengesetzlichkeit”, 
Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche (1976), p.98f. 
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point of departure mainly from the third article of faith,  i.e. from the pneumatology? 
As already suggested Honecker‟s position is not developed enough to see quite exactly 
what kind of “Erkenntnisgewinn” we should have in matters of social and political 
ethics if taking our point of departure mainly from pneumatology.  
The way Honecker stresses that substantial rules and institutional schemes for the 
domain of the political are not to be derived directly from christology or from creation 
theology, applies obviously to pneumatology as well. Evidence in substantial matters of 
social and political ethics can normally not be expected to be brought about by some 
kind of divine spiritual illumination. I think nevertheless that a pneumatological ap-
proach as conceived of by Honecker, even if presented merely as a working hypothesis, 
might have some implications of political significance: 
Political systems are in principle to be held open for innovation. Since political systems 
are neither to be considered “Systeme unentrinnbaren Zwanges”654 nor sacrosanct 
institutional schemes which must be taken as unrevisable, the political domain is left 
open for genuine moral responsibility. This also implies that present schemes of society 
have to be characterised by incompleteness, relativity, complexity and plurality.
655
  
Let me insert a remark here: 
It might be expected that an approach from the perspective of the third article of faith 
should bring social (political) ethics and the issue of ecclesiology very close to one 
another, since the Church is to be considered the most eminent “instrument” of the Holy 
Spirit. And in many respects Honecker indeed focuses on the relation between social 
ethics and ecclesiology, – and thereby he aims at ruling out some misunderstandings.656 
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 Martin Honecker, “Das Problem der Eigengesetzlichkeit”, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 
(1976), p.116. 
655
 This perspective may support the weight ascribed to the “burdens of judgments” in the Rawlsian 
conception. 
656
 By drawing upon the doctrine of the two kingdoms in this connection he wants to prevent certain mis-
interpretations concerning the limited mandate of the church: “In der Tat ist die Zweireichelehre heute 
unentbehrlich, wenn sich die Kirche, und zwar gerade die empirische Kirche über ihr gesellschafliches 
und politisches Wirken und Reden verständigen will. Denn die erwähnte fundamentaltheologische Bedeut-
ung der Zweireichlehre kommt auch zum Vorschein, wenn Kirche als Gemeinschaft von Menschen in der 
Gesellschaft redend und handelnd tätig wird. Allerdings muß man sich vor verschiedenen schwerwieg-
enden Mißverständnissen hüten. Einmal kann die empirische Kirche niemals mit dem Reich Christi 
identisch sein. Die empirische Kirche als menschliche Gemeinschaft repräsentiert dann nicht einfach die 
coram-deo-Relation, sonderns steht immer zugleich coram-mundo. Die Zweireichelehre ist gerade auch 
darin Theorie kirchlichen Handelns, als sie den Bezug der Kirche auf beide Relationen festhält. Sodann ist 
die „Kirche‟ nicht mit den Ämtern, Organen, Gremien der verfaßten Kirche ineinszusetzten. Kirche ist die 
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One should bear in mind that: 
 the church has to be considered in its “Doppeldimensionalität”657, which means that 
it belongs within both “realms”.  
 the church, when engaging in social ethics, is neither entirely nor primarily to be 
identified with its leadership, which would imply that the genuine Lutheran perspec-
tive on the church as a community of those believing in Christ were neglected. 
 a consensus in matters of social and political ethics is seldom achieved in the church, 
nor could it be taken as constitutive of the church as such if it were established. 
An approach from “pneumatology” in no way implies that the church should be in 
possession of a special insight or spiritual illumination, which could serve as a basis for 
ordering the political domain and for settling the institutional scheme of society rightly 
for all citizens. Honecker very clearly rules out tendencies to an “ecclesiocratic”658 
approach in matters of social ethics and politics, and avoids making the “Christen-
gemeinde” more or less directly a model for the “Bürgergemeinde”. Quite unlike Karl 
Barth, Honecker takes the “two-relations-doctrine” as a proper hermeneutic device for 
addressing matters of Christian faith and political reason. Honecker‟s approach opens up 
for a more nuanced approach to the idea of “Eigengesetzlichkeit”.659 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Gemeinschaft der Glaubenden und als solche gerade nicht soziologisch aufweisbar. Wenn auf die Ge-
meinde als Subjekt christlicher Sozialethik und gesellschaftlicher Verantwortung reflektiert wird, so kann 
dieses Subjekt gerade nicht empirisch festgestellt werden. Die Rückfrage nach dem Selbstverständnis der 
Kirche als Glaubensgemeinschaft ist nicht mit dem Verweis auf institutionelle Kompetenz zu lösen. End-
lich ist die Meinung abzuwehren, als konstituiere der sozialethische Konsensus kirchliche Gemeinschaft.” 
M. Honecker, Sozialethik zwischen Tradition und Vernunft (1977), p.238. 
657
 This is a term that Honecker has taken from Hans Scultze (“Ethik im Dialog”, 1972). Cf. M. 
Honecker, “Kriterien öffentlicher Äußerungen der Kirche”(1975), Sozialethik zwischen Tradition und 
Vernunft (1977), p.72. 
658
 I think that I can defend using the notion of “ecclesiocraty” in this setting since Honecker for his own 
part so clearly wants to stress a certain concern of the Reformation: “Die Reformation hat gegen die 
Papstkirche der damaligen Zeit die Zulässigkeit und Geltung weltlicher Herrschaftsansprüche der Kirche 
bestritten. Sie hat freilich damit den weltlichen Bereich nicht freigestellt von der Geltung des Gesetzes 
Gottes wohl aber von kirchlichen Direktiven.” M.Honecker, “Welche Legitimation haben Kirchen zu pol-
itischen Äußerungen”, Sozialethik zwischen Tradition und Vernunft (1977), p.54. And it follows from the 
very “Fundamentalunterscheidung” which Honecker employs that; “Die Unterscheidung von Gesetz und 
Evangelium beinhaltet sodann … die in der reformatorischen Zweireichelehre intendierte Entklerikali-
sierung der Gesellschaft.” Ibid., p.54. Honecker can also add that the very basis for so called “ecclesio-
cratic” approaches in political affairs are undermined as a result of the modern secularisation, which has 
decisively contributed to “die Freisetzung, die Autonomie der Lebensgebiete von klerikaler Bevor-
mundung und biblizistischer Überformung”. Cf. M. Honecker, “Das Problem der Eigengesetzlichkeit”, 
Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche (1976), p. 122.  
659
 “Aufgrund der bisherigen Überlegungen ist nunmehr ausdrücklich darauf hinzuweisen, daß die 
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Honecker's pneumatological approach allows him to avoid an understanding of “Gesetz-
lichkeit” which would make the political system a brutum factum or a closed system, 
instead of treating it as an open system to be revised in a political process, involving all 
citizens as morally responsible. The approach from the third article of faith, as sketched 
by Honecker, might not only conflict with Barthianism, but also with a Lutheran view, 
characterised by a more “static”660 understanding of the doctrine of the two kingdoms. 
Honecker's strong emphasis upon the innovative aspects
661
 in theological social ethics 
has to be taken into consideration if one shall properly understand his contribution to the 
Lutheran debate about the doctrine of the two kingdoms with its tendency to further 
“Eigengesetzlichkeit”. His “pneumatological perspective” undermines namely any pos-
sibility of theologically legitimating political institutions and structures by reference to 
some kind of creation theology, which would entail treating them as nearly sacrosanct, 
settled once and for all. Honecker can therefore underline that the most urgent task in 
facing the challenges of a complex “gesellschaftlicher Wirklichkeit ist, deren Unab-
geschlossenheit und Transcendenzbezug herauszuarbeiten”.662 
It is, however, typical of Honecker that his approach from “pneumatology” is not in-
                                                                                                                                                                          
reformatorische Unterscheidung zweier Reiche, oder genauer gesagt: zweier Fora auch hinter meiner Ana-
lyse des neuzeitlichen Phänomens der Eigengesetzlichkeit steht. …Die Zweireichelehre hält dazu an, zwei 
Bezüge , zwei Foren zu unterscheiden, nämlich die Bezüge coram deo und coram mundo. Die reforma-
torische Unterscheidung setzt freilich eine Beziehung zwischen beiden Bezügen voraus, für welche zwar 
Gott nicht ohne Welt ist, die Welt aber eben nicht göttlich ist. Nur in dieser Unterscheidung von coram 
deo und coram mundo als theologischer Fundamentalbestimmung kann die Frage nach einer theologischen 
Beurteilung der Eigengesetzlichkeit sinnvoll gestellt werden.” M. Honecker, “Das Problem der Eigen-
gesetzlichkeit”, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche (1976), p.125. 
660
 Honecker himself is very much aware of this when discussing the eschatological impact of the doctrine 
of the two kingdoms: “Mit dieser Forderung nach einer eschatologischen Orientierung der Sozialethik 
verbindet sich folgerichtig die Kritik, die lutherische Zweireichelehre habe wegen ihres uneschatolog-
ischen Characters zu einer Stabilisierung der bestehenden Verhältnisse beigetragen und sei aufgrund ihres 
Ansatzes zur theologischen Ideologie des politischen und sozialen Konservatismus geworden. Im Blick 
auf solche Kritik ist nicht zu bestreiten, daß die Zweireichelehre in ihrer Geschichte immer wieder im 
Sinne einer statischen Bereichsabscheidung und Kompetenzenverteilung verstanden wurde. Aber solchem 
Mißverständnis kann man nicht dadurch begegnen, daß man die Eschatologie als Alternative zur Be-
gründung der Sozialethik einsetzt. Vielmehr gilt es, die eschatologische Komponente in der Zweireiche-
lehre selbst zu bedenken und herauszuarbeiten. Die Relation des coram deo kann nämlich nicht anders als 
eschatologisch verstanden werden… Auch die Relation coram mundo enthält weiterhin insofern ein escha-
tologisches Moment, als die Ambivalenz des Weltverständnisses, welches Welt als gefallene Schöpfung 
begreift, eben nicht den bestehenden Weltzustand ohne weiteres zu sanktionieren und legitimieren erlaubt, 
sondern ihn als von der Sünde geprägte und entstellte Weltgestalt zu begreifen anhält. Mit der sündigen 
Entstellung der Welt kann aber eben auch christliche Sozialethik sich nicht widerstands- und wider-
spruchslos abfinden.” M. Honecker, Sozialethik zwischen Tradition und Vernunft (1977), p. 267f. 
661
 “Indem eine solche Weltanschaung sich für Neuansätze und Korrekturen offen hält, läßt sie Platz für 
das Walten des Geistes und kann innovatorische und emanzipatorische Impulse der Gesellschafts-
gestaltung freisetzen.” M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.74f. 
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compatible with respecting the worldly regiment with its different life-spheres and basic 
institutions in its relative “Eigengesetzlichkeit”. Honecker can even point “auf den Geist 
als Kraft der Unterscheidung” 663, – enabling a Christian to properly distinguish between 
a coram-deo- and a coram-mundo-perspective. It is also well worth noting that Hon-
ecker can use the term “Vernunftgesetzlichkeit” positively interchangeably with the 
notion of “Eigengesetzlichkeit”.664  
But the two “coram-perspectives” should not be confused: 
 “Eigengesetzlichkeit”, if linked with the coram-deo-perspective, would most likely 
imply that existing natural and social laws and structures were taken as settled once 
and for all according to divine instruction. This would entail a kind of fatalism (in 
Honecker‟s words: “Schicksalsglauben”) which would make it problematic to raise 
any kind of ethical criticism.. 
 “Eigengesetzlichkeit” in a coram-mundo-perspective simply means that the phenom-
ena of the worldly realm can properly be considered in their own right, and that the 
nature of the phenomena themselves is taken appropriately into account. Since 
“Eigengesetzlichkeit” in this perspective, as a merely worldly phenomenon, can only 
be relative, it will be possible to raise the genuinely ethical questions. 
Taking the relative “Eigengesetzlichkeit” of the political, social, economic and scientific 
domains into account, however, opens the way for seeking reasonable and shared 
                                                                                                                                                                          
662
 M. Honecker, “Das Problem der Eigengesetzlichkeit”, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 1976, 
p.116. 
663
 “In der Relation coram mundo hingegen werden die immanenten Sachgesetzlichkeiten – mitsamt der 
möglichen Veränderbarkeit der Ausgangsbedingungen – zu Regeln, an welche soziales, politisches, wirt-
schaftliches Handeln bei der Auswahl seinen Handlungsvorschläge gebunden ist. Diese Eigengesetzlich-
keit ist relativ, d.h. bezogen auf den jeweiligen Handlungszweck und Handlungsbereich, impliziert also 
gerade nicht eine Totalaussage über die Struktur der Wirklichkeit. Eine dieser Differenziertheit sozial-
ethischer Theoriebildung Rechnung tragende theologische Sozialethik wird nicht einäugig sein können. 
Weil Theologie freilich darum weiß, daß Geistliches und Weltliches in der faktisch vorgegebenen Realität 
miteinander vermengt sind und daß die beiden Foren coram deo und coram mundo im Gewissen des 
Menschen sich überschneiden, wird sie gerade auf Unterscheidung dringen, auf die Unterscheidung von 
Glaube und Politik, von Evangelium und Empirie, von Theologie und empirischer Wissenschaft. Sie wird 
die Wirklichkeit nicht monistisch bestimmen können, sondern das Unterscheiden lernen müssen, und 
solche Unterscheidung verweist letzlich auf den Geist als Kraft der Unterscheidung und als Macht der 
Wahrheit.” M.Honecker, “Das Problem der Eigengesetzlichkeit”, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 
(1976), p.126 
664
 “Der Begriff der Eigengesetzlichkeit kann daher im Blick auf Strukturen und Institutionen näherhin 
präzisiert werden als Vernunftgesetzlichkeit, als die den jeweiligen Strukturen der Natur der Sache nach 
immanente Sachgerechtigkeit, Sachlogik.” M.Honecker, “Das Problem der Eigengesetzlichkeit”, Zeit-
schrift für Theologie und Kirche (1976), p.122. 
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solutions in many fields based on “ein rationales Einverständnis”665 in the nature of the 
phenomenon to be considered, without excluding the moral perspective.. 
Let me briefly conclude by saying that Honecker, in my opinion, subtly distinguishes 
and connects the coram-mundo- and coram -deo-perspectives,  both of which are 
simultaneously to be complied with by the Christian. In spite of the distinction between 
the two kingdoms and in spite of the relative “Eigengesetzlichkeit” ascribed to the 
phenomena of the worldly realm, there is a dialectic between the coram-mundo and the 
coram -deo-perspective which is not to be ignored.
666
 When stressing the relative 
“Eigengesetzlichkeit” of the political (and of other life-spheres), Honecker therefore 
also emphasises that the merely relative might in itself pave the way for crucial quest-
ions about the absolute,  meaning “daß es Aufgabe christlicher Interpretation von 
Wirklichkeit, auch von gesellschaftlicher Wirklichkeit ist, deren Unabgeschlossenheit 
und Transcendenzbezug herauszuarbeiten.”667  
5.4.2. Christian influence on political values? 
I now turn specifically to the different “models”668 Honecker takes into consideration as 
possible models for distinguishing (and) relating properly between a Christian (moral) 
doctrine on the one side and political values on the other side. Since the “models” are 
not written in stone, Honecker might employ a slightly different terminology in different 
settings. When addressing the question of groundvalues for a constitutional democracy, 
Honecker takes the following four “models” into consideration: “Das Identitätsmodell”, 
“das Trennungsmodell”, “das Entsprechungsmodell”, “das Vermittlungsmodell”. The 
                                                          
665
 “Für die Institutionen, Strukturen gesellschaftlichen, wirtschaftlichen, politischen Zusammenlebens 
jedenfalls ist ein rationales Einverständnis unabdingbar. Denn diese Strukturen, Institutionen bean-
spruchen jedes Gesellschaftsmitglied, nicht etwa nur den Christen oder nur den Nichtchristen. Sie sind 
damit eben auf Legitimation durch Vernunft angewiesen. In der sozialethischen Theoriebildung der 
Gegenwart wird dies im Kriterium der Sachgemäßheit formuliert.” M. Honecker, “Das Problem der 
Eigengesetzlichkeit”, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche (1976), p.122. 
666
 This simply means that; “Eigengesetzlichkeit bedürfte in diesem Sinne der Einordnung in die über-
greifende theologische Grundentscheidung von Gesetz und Evangelium.” M. Honecker, “Das Problem der 
Eigengesetzlichkeit”, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche (1976), p.129.  
667
 M. Honecker, “Das Problem der Eigengesetzlichkeit”, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche (1976), 
p.116. And thus Honecker can also underline that “Erst in solchem eschatologischen Horizont, den die 
Gegenwart des Geistes erkennen läßt, kann Theologie aber auch die Eigengesetzlichkeit in ihrer Realität 
begreifen, nämlich sowohl in ihrem begrenzten Recht als auch in ihrer nowendigen Begrenzung … daß die 
Wirklichkeit der Gesellschaft nicht ohne Gottes Wirklichkeit in ihrer Wahrheit zu verstehen ist.” M. 
Honecker, “Das Problem der Eigengesetzlichkeit” Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche (1976), p.130. 
668
 Honecker himself uses the term “Modell” in this connection, and I am following him in this. 
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models of interpretation employed when considering the relation between Christian 
values and human rights
669
 are distinguished along the line of “Entsprechung”, “Zu-
ordnung” and “Vermittlung”.  
While concerned more generally with the question of distinguishing and relating prop-
erly, I will to some extent harmonise the model-sets employed by Honecker in his dis-
cussion of groundvalues and human rights. This means that I take my point of departure 
from the four models first mentioned. A model of “Zuordnung” as elaborated by W. 
Huber and H. E. Tödt will be discussed only in relation to Honecker‟s “Vermittlungs-
modell”, since it raises the question of why Honecker finds it at all important to distin-
guish their concern of “Zuordnung” from his concern of “Vermittlung”.  
I start with the first and the second of the four models that Honecker considers. These 
“models” are rather simple and clear-cut. Nevertheless, these two models merit a brief 
discussion here as being of considerable interest in themselves as well as serving as a 
background for understanding Honecker‟s own approach. 
Thereafter, I turn to the more complex “models”, – seeking a subtler “Entsprechung” or 
“Vermittlung”(or “Zuordnung). These models are characterised by simultaneously 
differentiating and relating moral doctrines following from Christian faith and moral 
ground-values that may be reasonably approved of by the citizens as a shared basis of 
coexistence and communication.  
From the way Honecker approaches the question of common groundvalues and, specifi-
cally, the issue of human rights, one might draw important conclusions for the general 
way in which Christian social ethics might comply with political conceptions and issues, 
                                                          
669
 I cannot here more specifically consider the issue of human rights as conceived of in Honecker‟s book 
about “Das Recht des Menschen”, but the “models” used by Honecker in his approach to the issue of 
human rights, might also apply more widely and generally. Let me, however, also add that Honecker 
draws on the so-called “Vermittlungsmodell” both when concerned with the issue of human rights and 
when concerned with the question of “ground-values” for constitutional democracies, and this model 
might obviously be taken as Honecker‟s best way of establishing a relation between Christian faith and 
political reason that makes the latter a commonplace without making the former morally irrelevant. The 
models that Honecker employs, should be sufficiently complex to comply with a simultaneity of aspects, 
although they are certainly simplified as all models are. When concerned for instance with the relation 
between Christian faith and human rights, the model drawn upon must be sufficiently nuanced to take into 
account that the issue of human rights actualises both legal, political and moral aspects in a rather complex 
way. It is not just a question of how Christian ethics and common (universal) morality should be related, 
although this is part of the whole complex. Political, legal, moral and religious aspects have to be taken 
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and, specifically, Rawls‟ idea of a strictly political “overlap. ”The models used might 
help us answer the simple question whether people can be expected to support certain 
political values because-of the Christian faith (and beliefs) they hold.  
5.4.2.1. Neither a “Trennungsmodell” nor an “Identitätsmodell” 
will do 
I. In a so called “Trennungsmodell”670 the difference between the perspective of the 
Christian doctrine and the concern for shared ground-values is stressed. At first glance it 
might therefore seem as if this model accords very well with the “Fundamental-unter-
scheidung” introduced by both Ebeling and Honecker,  or even with the idea of 
“Eigengesetzlichkeit”. It is, for instance, assumed that the domains of religious and 
political justice are to be held sharply apart and, similarly, that liberal and religious ideas 
of liberty should not be confused.
671
 There can therefore be little reason to claim that a 
certain political conception or practical social program is to be adopted because of the 
Christian belief one has. Maybe one should rather say that Christian beliefs and a politi-
cal conception are so clearly separated that they cannot really come into conflict. If the 
separation of the two domains is consequently carried out, they are rather to be con-
sidered incongruent.
672
 Thereby a possible connection between the two domains cannot 
really be reflected in this model.  
II. In contrast, it is a characteristic of an “Identitätsmodell”, that the Christian kerygma 
is supposed to provide us with the moral values required for coexistence within a 
political society. And Honecker‟s remark is very much to the point: 
“Das Identitätsmodell behauptet, Eintreten für die Verwirklichung der Grundwerte 
sei nichts anderes als Praxis des christlichen Glaubens. Dieses Modell sieht richtig 
die Bedeutung der Grundwerte auch für den Christen. Aber es beachtet nicht den 
„Überschuß‟ christlichen Glaubens.”673 
                                                                                                                                                                          
into consideration simultaneously. It may also be well worth noticing that Honecker takes human rights to 
be “Vernunftrechte”. 
670
 M. Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p. 185. 
671
 “Dieses Modell geht aus vom Unterschied zwischen christlichem Glauben und Grundwerten. Man 
wendet dann ein, „die politische Freiheit – so positiv sie im übrigen zu schätzen sein mag – ist keine Form 
der Verwirklichung der in Christus gegründeten Freiheit.” M. Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Ein-
führung in die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p.185f.  
672
 One might for instance assume that this was a widespread view among the so-called “Deutsche 
Christen”. 
673
 M. Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p. 185. 
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According to this model, just as for the previous one, there cannot really be a conflict 
between a Christian doctrine and the political values pursued. Taking a model of 
identity as one‟s point of departure therefore means that one can in principle avoid the 
question of compromising one's religious convictions for the sake of one's political 
conception, since a more principled tension does not exist.
674
 But the price may be high: 
It might be difficult to claim a qualitative difference between a merely political perspec-
tive and the transcendent scope of Christian faith. Honecker does not mention any theo-
logian who might be taken as a representative of such an approach.
675
 
My conclusion is that the first two “models” (“Das Trennungsmodell” & “Das Iden-
titätsmodell”) make it relatively easy to answer the question whether one can be ex-
pected to further certain political values because-of one's Christian faith (and beliefs). In 
the first case a sharp dualism might be established between the domain of Christian faith 
and the strictly political domain, and then it makes no sense to say that someone acts 
politically because of the religious beliefs he holds. In the second case, however, the 
moral basis of society is unreservedly identified with a Christian moral doctrine, and 
political agents can therefore rather unproblematically and directly take their political 
decisions on the basis of the Christian doctrine they hold. But neither of these models 
are adequate as instruments for dealing properly with the complexity of the relation 
between the Christian (moral) doctrine one holds and the kind of political values to be 
furthered in modern pluralist societies. 
                                                          
674
 Of course one might have to realise that the religious/political conception one holds is not (yet) fully 
realised in the real world, but that is another kind of problem. 
675
 Maybe could Richard Rothe be taken as representative of this approach. And in a Norwegian context 
one might also say that Gisle Johnson , who clearly maintains the transcendent perspective of Christian 
faith, nonetheless tends clearly towards such a model. Let me demonstrate this by turning to Johnson‟s 
perspective on the Christian state, as explained by Svein Aage Christoffersen: “På samme måte som bare 
det kristelige ekteskap er et sant ekteskap, er det bare den kristelige stat som kan tilsvare statens idé, som 
er å skape det fullkomne samfunn som forutsetning for den enkeltes fullkommenhet. Statens oppgave er 
„som et organ for Guds i Kristus aapenbarede Vilje paa den kristelige Families og det kristelige Selskaps 
Grundvold ved sin kristelige Lov og Retsorden at fremme de enkelte Statsborgeres sædelige Opdragelse 
og saaledes bidrage Sit til Guds Riges komme.‟ (Johnson 1898:280). Johnson tenker seg ikke at kirken 
skal styre staten. Men han tenker seg at kirken skal utstyre staten med den sedelighet som staten har til 
oppgave å tilføre samfunnet, fordi det i realiteten bare er kirken som kan utstyre staten med denne sedelig-
het. Dette gjør det mulig for Johnson å komme til rette med forholdet mellom de kristne og de ikke-kristne 
i det sivile samfunnet. Når staten skal tilføre det sivile samfunnet en sedelighet som den henter fra kirken, 
møter vi den kristne staten i avledet forstand. Den forutsetter ikke at alle i samfunnet er kristne, eller 
ønsker å være kristne, men er et samfunn som i sine prinsipper, lover og institusjoner lar seg beherske og 
bestemme av kristendommens ånd. En kristelig stat i denne forstand av ordet er en stat som ikke tillater 
det kristendommen forbyr, eller forbyr det kristendommen krever, sier Johnson.” S.Aa.Christoffersen, 
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5.4.2.2. Seeking an appropriate “Entsprechung” between the 
Christian doctrine and the political approach 
The third model, presented by Honecker, is referred to as “Das Entsprechungs-
modell”.676 Within this model one is seeking for “Entsprechungen” in society which are 
in accordance with divine revelation, as the source bringing ultimate insight in God‟s 
will and in the proper scheme of justice. The political line one chooses, should in a 
fundamental way accord with – and even be derived from – the Christian kerygma itself. 
What Honecker especially has in mind now is the Barthian
677
 way of establishing an 
“analogia relationis” between the Christian doctrine and the political field.678 Honecker 
tries to make clear what would be characteristic of the Barthian approach, when em-
ployed within the domain of human rights. 
“Mit Hilfe des Analogiegedankens sucht man Entsprechungen zwischen Grundaus-
sagen christlichen Glaubens und einem demokratischen Ethos und dem Menschen-
rechten aufzuzeigen. Demokratisches, rechtsstaatliches, menschenrechtsbezogenen 
Ethos soll dabei im Evangelium von Jesus Christus begründet werden und nicht aus 
nicht-christlichen, naturrechtlichen oder „nur‟ humanitären Überlegungen. Dabei ist 
das Evangelium von Jesus Christus das „Urbild‟, Kriterium, „Analogans‟ für die 
menschliche Ethik, für das menschliche Handeln, welche die Entsprechung, das 
Abbild, das Analogatum sein sollen. Im Unterschied zu einer formal biblizistischen 
Argumentation, die Bibelzitate anführt, wird Bezug genommen auf das Evangelium, 
die Botschaft von Jesus Christus, als „Mitte der Schrift‟. Dieses Evangelium wird 
beansprucht für eine Legitimation bestimmter ethischer Verhaltensweisen der 
Christen.”679 
                                                                                                                                                                          
“Guds rike som politisk mål. Gisle Johnson og det sosiale spørsmål i dag”, Arv og utfordring. Menneske 
og samfunn i den kristne moraltradisjon (1995, eds. S.Aa. Christoffersen, T.Wyller), p.238f. 
676
 M. Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p. 186. 
677
 Already the titles of the two small books written by Karl Barth, “Rechtfertigung und Recht” (1938; 
Heft 1 der Theologischen Studien) and “Christengemeinde und Bürgergemeinde” (1946/Heft 20 der 
Theologischen Studien) indicate that Barth  by taking his point of departure from within the “Recht-
fertigung” or the “Christengemeinde”  aims at the most appropriate “Entsprechung” within the political 
realm and within the domain of law. 
678
 The theologian, Eberhard Jüngel, is taken by Honecker to be representative of this view, as can be 
seen in his considerations about liberty: “Eberhard Jüngel geht zunächst aus von der Besonderheit der im 
Evangelium zugesprochenen Freiheit im Vergleich zu anderen Auffassungen von Freiheit, wie von der 
Eigenart der „Gerechtigkeit Gottes‟, wie sie Paulus verkündet als Bundestreue des Schöpfers gegenüber 
seinen ihm feindlichen Geschöpfen (z.B. Rö 1,16f.; 5,10; 2 Kor 5,18-21). Er setzt diese Freiheit und 
Gerechtigkeit Gottes aber sodann in eine „Analogia relationis‟ zur Freiheit des Menschen, „in der die im 
Glauben verstandene Freiheit als die allen Menschen zugemutete Freiheit vor Gott den Menschen unter-
einander ebenfalls Freiheit zumutet. Dabei versteht die Theologie den durch Gottes Gerechtigkeit im 
Evangelium freigesprochenen Menschen als diejenige Person, die nach menschlichem Recht ihrer ihr 
durch Gott zugesprochenen und zugewendeten Freiheit leben können muß‟. [Note 39: Eberhard Jüngel: 
Freiheitsrechte und Gerechtigkeit, in: Unterwegs zur Sache, 1972, S. 246-256, Zitat S. 253.]” M. 
Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p. 186. 
679
 Cf. M. Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p. 
129f. 
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The idea is that the gospel should be taken as the most appropriate point of departure 
when seeking direction in affairs of law, politics and social coexistence, – the gospel is 
supposed to be brought politically into play by a method of analogy. According to Karl 
Barth, the “analogia relationis” that is to be established between the Christian doctrine 
as the “Analogans”680 and a political course as the “Analogatum”, is to be clearly quali-
fied as an analogy established by faith, an “analogia fidei”.681 Since Christian faith is in 
no way generally shared, however, the Barthian approach will introduce into politics 
itself an “exclusive” aspect, which cannot easily be reasonably assessed and argumenta-
tively justified. 
Nevertheless, it would seem that a Barthian approach might accord with one of Rawls' 
main concerns in developing an overlapping consensus;  the demand for a support 
from within the (Christian) doctrine. And in fact, from a Barthian perspective one can in 
practice defend wholeheartedly the integrity of the person, vital rights and elementary 
liberties, – which are also taken by Rawls as fundamental. Barthianism has without 
doubt contributed decisively, and maybe even more than most religious groups, to a 
morally grounded opposition against totalitarian regimes.
682
 Nevertheless, Barthianism 
tends towards making the Christian doctrine the normative source of political co-
operation and the ultimate basis of legitimation for what should count as a morally 
justified political practice and a just institutional scheme for citizens.
683
 This would  as 
far as I can see  clearly be at odds with political liberalism.684 
Barthian theology is often supposed to stress the qualitative “dualism” between 
“heavenly” and “earthly”. But this does not imply that the gulf between “heaven” and 
“earth” is so deep that Christians should not be concerned about the worldly realm and 
the domain of politics. Karl Barth did even not further a “Trennungsmodell” in social 
                                                          
680
 Cf. M. Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p. 
129f. 
681
 Karl Barth could in no way approve of an “analogia entis” since it would in his opinion open up for 
“natural theology”.  
682
 The attitude that Karl Barth took in favour of elementary liberty during the period of the Nazi-regime 
should in no way be underestimated. 
683
 “„Analogia relationis‟ besagt ja nicht nur Parallelitäten, Gemeinsamkeiten, sondern ein Bezugsverhält-
nis, in dem das Analogieverhältnis erst hergestellt wird und einer biblischen Legitimation bedarf.” M. 
Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p. 186f. 
684
 I will, however, in the last part of this main-chapter discuss thoroughly how Rawls, in his latest 
writings, seeks a proper way of introducing into the public forum of modern pluralist democracies 
religious norms and values of political significance. 
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ethics. Rather, Barthianism draws certain epistemic consequences from the “dualism” 
between heavenly and earthly: Due to this “gap” there is namely, according to Barthi-
anism, just one way the will of God can be known in the world, namely by divine (self)-
revelation, which may be accepted in faith. Thereby faith gives access to God‟s will. 
Accordingly, the church/Christians should have a certain insight in the most proper kind 
of “Entsprechungen”685 between the divine order and the political order and a responsi-
bility for making this widely known: 
“Der rechte Staat muß in der rechten Kirche sein Urbild und Vorbild haben. Die 
Kirche existiere also exemplarisch, d.h. so, daß sie durch ihr einfaches Dasein und 
Sosein auch die Quelle der Erneuerung und die Kraft der Erhaltung des Staates 
ist.”686 
But even if the Church can be supposed to have a certain epistemological edge in 
matters of (social) ethics, – Barthianism also takes into consideration that “analogy” is 
not “identity”. There remains a qualitative difference between heavenly and earthly, and 
Karl Barth most certainly does not believe that the Christians (or the Churches), now 
existing in this world, have such a clear insight into God's will that it is possible for 
them to present us with a political program which completely reflects the divine order. 
The idea of establishing “Entsprechungen” cannot be extended that far, – at the most 
one can point out a main-line or a direction in reference to which it is possible to criti-
cise an actual political course. 
I find it, nonetheless, telling that Honecker classifies Barthian (social) ethics as 
“theological constructivism”.687 In doing so Honecker uses the notion of constructivism 
“um damit eine Einstellung zu kennzeichnen, die sich am einfachsten in der zunächst 
unverfänglich klingenden Formel ausdrücken läßt: „daß der Mensch die Einrichtung der 
Gesellschaft und der Kultur selbst gemacht hat und sie daher auch nach seinem Belieben 
                                                          
685
 This aspect of the Barthian approach is sketched by Honecker as follows: “Aus dem Eintreten Jesu für 
die Verlorenen folgt das Eintreten für ein Höchstmaß sozialer Gerechtigkeit, aus der Gleichheit der Ge-
tauften in der Gemeinde die politische und soziale Gleichheit. Der Verschiedenheit der Gaben, Charismen 
in der Gemeinde entspricht im politischen Bereich die Gewaltenteilung, der Öffentlickeit des Wortes Got-
tes die Absage an die Geheimdiplomatie, der Freiheit der Verkündigung des Wortes Gottes, die Mein-
ungsfreiheit, der Ökumenizität der Kirche, die Absage an Kirchturmpolitik und nationalstaatliches 
Denken. Aus der Übermacht der Gnade über den Zorn folgt, daß gewaltsame Konfliktlösungen nur ultima 
ratio sein können und der irdische Freiheit Vorrang hat.” M. Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Ein-
führung in die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p. 132. 
686
 K. Barth, Christengemeinde und Bürgergemeinde (1946; Hft. 20 der Theologischen Studien), p.41. 
687
 “Das Problem des theologischen Konstruktivismus”, Zeitschrift für evangelische Ethik, 1980, pp. 97 - 
111. 
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ändern kann‟.”688 Honecker is critical of a rational constructivist approach both in 
matters belonging within the wide domain of culture in general, “da Kultur nicht ohne 
weiteres machbar is, sondern geschichtlich wächst”689 and in matters of ethics in parti-
cular.
690
 But if Honecker is critical, one should indeed suppose that Karl Barth would be 
even more critical of any form of rational constructivism. Barth's strictly christocentric 
approach in matters of social ethics, and the exclusive starting point he takes from the 
divine (self)revelation, predictably make it impossible for him to take the scheme of 
society and its legal and social institutions as a phenomenon  subject to being rationally 
constructed by man. It might therefore seem unjustified that Honecker treats Karl Barth 
as an exponent of a kind of constructivism, – theological constructivism. The following 
statement better captures Honecker's critical position, making it clear; 
“… daß eben nicht nur die Vernunft als konstruktives Prinzip beansprucht werden 
kann, sondern in gleicher Weise auch der scheinbare Gegensatz zur Vernunft, die 
„Offenbarung‟. Der Gegensatz von Offenbarung und Vernunft ist im Blick auf den 
Irrtum des Konstruktivismus nicht grundlegend, so wichtig er in anderer Hinsicht 
sein mag. Die evangelisch-theologische Ethik hat vielmehr im Gefolge der dialekt-
ischen Theologie weithin konstruktivistisch sich auf die Christusoffenbarung be-
rufen.”691  
What Honecker criticises is the way the Christian revelation is made an epistemological 
principle in social ethics, providing us with substantially normative standards to be used 
when arranging the very structure of society. Transforming divine revelation (under-
                                                          
688
 The definition has Honecker taken from F.A.Hayek: Die Irrtümer des Konstruktivismus und die 
Grundlagen legitimer Kritik gesellschaftlicher Gebilde, 1970, p.4. 
689
 M.Honecker, “Das Problem des theologischen Konstruktivismus”, Zeitschrift für evangelische Ethik 
(1980), p.98. 
690
 How Honecker understands (and judges) constructivism in ethics gets rather obvious in the following: 
“Für die Ethik ist es eine Grundfrage, woher sie ihre Maßstäbe, Normen Bewertungen menschlichen Ver-
haltens gewinnt. Kann der Mensch diese Maßstäbe, Normen, Bewertungen selbst schaffen, rational kon-
struieren…?” Cf. “Das Problem des theologischen Konstruktivismus”, Zeitschrift für evangelische Ethik 
(1980), p.97. And Honecker adds: “Der Konstruktivismus auf dem Feld der Ethik und der Gesellschafts-
theorie stammt aus dem „Zeitalter der Vernunft‟, das vom sogenannten cartesianischen Geist beherrscht 
war (und noch ist) und für welches Voltaires Anspruch kennzeichnend ist: „Wenn ihr gute Gesetze haben 
wollt, verbrennt die, die ihr habt und macht euch neue‟. [Voltaire: Dictionaire Philosophique, p.432]. Der 
Konstruktivismus geht von der Grundannahme der Machbarkeit aller Dinge, einschließlich der Moral und 
der Gesellschaftsgestaltung, aus.” Ibid., p.98. 
691
 “Das Problem des theologischen Konstruktivismus”, Zeitschrift für evangelische Ethik, 1980, p.99. 
Honecker ascribes to the Barmer Declaration a considerable role in furthering theological constructivism: 
“So würde häufig das Theologoumenon der Königherrschaft Christi oder die 2. These der barmer Theo-
logischen Erklärung als konstruktives Prinzip theologischer Ethik benutzt. Diese „theologische Begründ-
ung” hat der deutschen evangelischen Ethik bis weit in die 60er Jahre hinein ihre besondere Prägung ge-
geben. Die Überbetonung des Offenbarungsbegriffs als Grundlegung evangelischer Theologie ist freilich 
ihrerseits Ausdruck einer problematischen Rationalisierung und einer schematischen Verkürzung theo-
logischer Grundvoraussetzungen.” “Das Problem des theologischen Konstruktivismus”, Zeitschrift für 
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stood more or less as an information about what cannot otherwise be known) into an 
epistemological and constructivist principle in the field of social ethics and politics, 
either renders theological social ethics a very exclusive affair or converts revelation into 
a rational principle, which, in either case, is not just politically but also theologically 
problematic
692
 since the most essential theological “Fundamentalunterscheidungen” are 
ignored or misinterpreted. Honecker for his part stresses that revelation, which is by its 
very nature contingent (breaking, as it does, unexpectedly into the ordinary course of 
life) must not be exploited for programmatic political purposes, – defining what can be 
expected by the parties involved in social co-operation within the institutional scheme of 
a pluralist society. 
5.4.2.3. Honecker seeking “Vermittlung” 
The fourth model is called by Honecker “Das Vermittlungsmodell”.693 This model aims 
at finding a way of “mediating” properly between Christian belief and a strictly political 
concern. The model can be taken to reflect the so called dialectic between law and 
gospel.
694
 Taking the dialectic between law and gospel as a hermeneutic key makes it 
possible for Honecker to consider the worldly realm from a genuinely theological per-
spective, avoiding sharp “dualism”, while still honouring the relative autonomy of the 
political.
695
 In so doing, Honecker's goal is just to distinguish clearly between the two 
                                                                                                                                                                          
evangelische Ethik, 1980, p.99. 
692
 I think this is the reason why Honecker can emphasise that “Das Vordringen des Offenbarungsbegriffs 
in der evangelischen Theologie, vor allem in einem theologischen Supranaturalismus., entspricht durchaus 
dem Rationalismus. Die Gegensätze von Offenbarung und Vernunft als Grundprinzipien des Wissens, 
aber auch der Handlungsorientierung sind somit feindliche Brüder. Dietrich Bonhoeffers Wort vom 
„Offenbarungspositivismus‟ kennzeichnet die Fragwürdigkeit eines solchen theologischen Ansatzes.” 
[Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Widerstand und Ergebung, Neuausgabe 1970, p.306, 359], M.Honecker, “Das 
Problem des theologischen Konstruktivismus”, Zeitschrift für evangelische Ethik, 1980, p.99. 
693
 M. Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p. 187. 
694
 What concerns the socalled “Vermittlungsmodell” Honecker can himself emphasise that: “Es beruft 
sich theologisch auf die Unterscheidung von Gesetz und Evangelium, die freilich eine Unterscheidung in 
Zuordnung ist.” M. Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik 
(1978), p. 187. 
695
 Honecker‟s view is dependent on his understanding of the theological notion of the “law”, or better, 
his understanding of the dialectic between law and gospel. He emphasises that; “Diese Beziehung der 
[politischen] Grundwerte auf das reformatorische Verständnis des Gesetzes geht aus von deren faktischem 
Gegebensein und entnimmt und gewinnt daraus deren Evidenz und Verbindlichkeit für jedermann. Ge-
fragt wird hier nicht nach Herkunft und Herleitung der Grundwerte, sondern nach ihrer Funktion, Be-
deutung für das Zusammenleben der Menschen. Ausgangspunkt ist das Phänomen und die Evidenz der 
ethischen Forderung. Martin Luther: „Nam lex iam adest, ist schon da …‟ [WA 39 I, 477,7f], das Gesetz 
ist mit dem Menschsein gegeben. Es bedarf also keiner besonderen christlichen Kundgabe oder der Ver-
kündigung des Glaubens.” M. Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische 
Sozialethik, 1978, p. 187). 
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“realms”, but also to relate them properly.  
As we have seen, Honecker is clearly critical of the Barthian approach, with its method 
of establishing Christian “Entsprechungen” within the political domain by system-
atically employing the idea of “analogia fidei”. Honecker for his part seeks for another 
possible approach, more in accordance with a Lutheran “Fundamentalunterscheidung” 
as unfolded above. But before turning more explicitly to Honecker‟s own approach, 
leaving the Barthian method of analogy behind me, I would like to mention that there 
are others too who also use “analogy” as a device for finding a proper “Zuordnung” 
between the domains of Christian faith and political reason. In the book about “Men-
schenrechte”696 written by Wolfgang Huber and Heinz Eduard Tödt, the authors seek 
analogies between the Christian doctrine and the field of political values and rights. 
However, the role that analogy is supposed to play in this model of “Zuordnung” is 
different than the one it plays within the Barthian conception. When drawing the ap-
propriate analogies of faith, Karl Barth always sets out from the kingdom of God in its 
qualitative difference to the worldly political order; conversely, Huber and Tödt take 
their point of departure from within the existing political realities. Even if Huber and 
Tödt also systematically make use of the idea of establishing (or discovering) analogies, 
one should admit that there is a qualitative difference between the “ground position” 
taken by them and a typical Barthian position. With reference to the issue of human 
rights, the two “ground positions” can be appropriately explicated in the following way: 
“Die beiden Grundpositionen … kann man – vergröbert – als einen Ansatz „von 
oben‟ und einen Ansatz „von unten‟ bezeichnen. Der Ansatz „von oben‟ geht aus 
von der Offenbarung und der Bibel als Offenbarungszeugnis und sucht von daher 
Schlußfolgerungen für das Verständnis der Meschenrechte zu gewinnen. Der Ansatz 
„von unten‟ geht aus von einer Analyse der vorfindlichen Menschenrechte und von 
der Menschenrechtsdiskussion und sucht Beziehungen zu Grundaussagen des christ-
lichen Glaubens zu gewinnen.”697 
In their book about human rights Huber and Tödt start by considering thoroughly the 
existing declarations, honouring them as widely shared (moral) achievements, brought 
about as the result of a long historical process and by the means of difficult negotiations 
within the fields of politics, law and morals. Now it is a crucial task, however, for 
                                                          
696
 W.Huber/H.E.Tödt, Menschenrechte. Perspektiven einer menschlichen Welt (1977). 
697
 M. Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p. 128. 
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Churches and Christians to interpret human rights theologically, assessing those 
political achievements in a theological (moral) perspective, and give serious con-
sideration to how these achievements are to be further explicated and unfolded, realised 
or revised, strengthened or criticised.
698
 
Human rights are not to be given a special theological legitimation or somehow to be 
derived from particular Christian doctrines.
699
 Human rights are entirely respected by 
Huber and Tödt as a shared (moral) concern.
700
 This makes them emphasise that: 
“Die Menschenrechte sind also ein Thema, das in eminentem Sinn zu einer kom-
munikativen Ethik nötigt. Kommunikativ muß diese Ethik zum einen darin sein, daß 
sie die Einsichten, die die verschiedenen Wissenschaften zu dem Problembereich 
beizutragen haben, zueinander ins Verhältnis setzt. Zum anderen muß sie, wenn sie 
Kommunikation stiften will, auf den Dialog und den möglichen Konsensus zwis-
chen Menschen verschiedenen Glaubens und unterschiedlicher Überzeugung ge-
richtet sein.”701  
In this Honecker clearly agrees with Huber and Tödt, to whom he explicitly refers when 
discussing human rights. 
There is, however, a two-fold concern within a model of “Zuordnung”, expressed in the 
very phrase “Analogie und Differenz”.702 
First: It should not be ignored that Huber and Tödt try to safeguard what they consider a 
legitimate aim in Barthian theology; – the concern for avoiding a “dualism” between 
                                                          
698
 Huber and Tödt emphasise that: “Für eine derartige theologische Interpretation bleibt die Menschen-
rechtsidee ein humaner, allgemein zugänglicher Gedanke, den man ohne die Voraussetzung des christ-
lichen Glaubens akzeptieren könnte. Dennoch kann man auf diese Weise, wie wir meinen, den Gehalt und 
Sinn des Menschenrechtsgedankens theologisch ein Stück weit entschlüsseln und so neu würdigen. Da-
durch gewinnt man Kriterien, die zur Urteilsbildung darüber beitragen, welche Tendenzen in der Men-
schenrechtsentwicklung von Christen gefördert, welche abgewiesen werden sollten.” W.Huber & H.E. 
Tödt: Menschenrechte. Perspektiven einer menschlichen Welt (1977), p.162. 
699
 It is made very clear by Huber and Tödt that ; “Die Gestalt einer „Theologie von oben‟ kann die theo-
logische Erörterung der Menschenrechte nicht annehmen. Diese Rechte sind nicht aus theologischen 
Obersätzen abzuleiten.” W.Huber/H.E.Tödt: Menschenrechte. Perspektiven einer menschlichen Welt 
(1977), p.158. 
700
 “Menschenrechte sind daher weder aus theologischen Obersätzen abzuleiten noch nachträglich christ-
lich zu legitimieren. „Damit entfallen auch die Probleme, die sich einstellen, wenn man fragt, aus welchem 
speziellen Lehrstück christlicher Dogmatik die Menschenrechte abgeleitet werden können, ob aus der 
Schöpfungslehre, der Lehre vom Bunde Gottes mit den Menschen, der Lehre von der Rechtfertigung 
allein aus Glauben oder zum Beispiel der Eschatologie.‟ [Huber /Tödt …, p.158] Hingegen ist es möglich, 
einerseits Gemeinsamkeiten zwischen Menshenrechten und Grundaussagen christlichen Glaubens aufzu-
weisen, andererseits Unterschiede und spezifische Radikalisierungen des christlichen Glaubens zu Geltung 
zu bringen.” Cf. M.Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik 
(1978), p.146f. 
701
 W.Huber, H.E. Tödt: Menschenrechte. Perspektiven einer menschlichen Welt (1977), p.159. 
702
 Cf. for instance the chapter “Analogie und Differenz – ein Grundmodell theologischen Denkens” in 
W.Huber, H.E. Tödt: Menschenrechte. Perspektiven einer menschlichen Welt (1977), pp.160-162. 
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Christian faith and political responsibility, even if a “heavenly order” cannot be taken as 
a derivative basis of a political scheme. Instead they are “scanning” the political realm 
for motives, ideas and concerns which might appropriately be considered in the light of 
similar (anthropological) motives, concerns and ideas in the Christian doctrine. Thus 
Huber and Tödt find a “structural parallelism”703 which cannot be without a decisive 
impact on those with a Christian faith, engaging in politics and social ethics. Christian 
motives, ideas and perspectives (on man for instance) may be taken into account and 
reflected when addressing political values and questions of basic justice.
704
 The fact, 
however, that Huber and Tödt take their point of departure so clearly “from below”, 
when seeking parallels to central concerns of the code of human rights within the 
Christian doctrine, distinguishes Huber and Tödt's use of analogy from a Barthian 




Second: From what I have already written, it should be clear that both Huber and Tödt, 
even if they are making systematically use of analogies, are trying to avoid making the 
gospel a “programmatic doctrine”706 for the political field. In doing so, Huber and Tödt,  
                                                          
703
 One might for instance see a parallelism (analogy) between the way respect and inviolability of human 
beings are (to be) expressed and defended in political constitutions, social arrangements and in codes of 
human rights and the way Jesus respects persons when meeting, addressing and defending them. 
704
 In this Huber and Tödt can even seek direct support in  “Karl Barths theologisches Denken… Er  
bekanntermaßen ein entschiedener Feind jeder „natürlichen Theologie‟, die den Glauben an Gott aus der 
Erkenntnis der natürlichen Welt meint entwickeln zu können  hat in den letzten Teilbänden seiner 
„Kirchlichen Dogmatik‟ die Lehre von den „ Gleichnissen des Himmelreiches‟ erneuert. Sie besagt, daß 
immer wieder in der Welt Ereignisse geschehen und Gestaltungen menschlichen Zusammenlebens ent-
worfen werden, welche gleichnishaft vorweg abbilden, was im Reich Gottes zu seiner Erfüllung und seiner 
Wahrheit kommt – oft genug zur Beschämung der christlichen Gemeinde, die um die Wahrheit weiß und 
sie doch nicht glaubwürdig und verstehbar bezeugt. Dieser Gleichnischaracter geschichtlicher Ereignisse 
und Entwürfe ist allerdings nicht von ihnen selbst her offenkundig, sondern er erschließt und erschlüsselt 
sich erst von der Wahrheit des Reiches Gottes her. In christlicher Verkündigung kommt solche Wahrheit 
zur Sprache. Etwas als Gleichnis aufzufassen, bedeutet, daß man darin auf Entsprechung und Differenz 
zugleich achten will.” W.Huber, H.E.Tödt: Menschenrechte. Perspektiven einer menschlichen Welt 
(1977), p.161f. 
705
 One might better understand the approach of Huber and Tödt if one takes as an example their ap-
proach to some essential values inherent in the human rights: “Drei unentbehrliche Sachmomente haben 
wir in der Grundfigur des Menschenrechts erkannt: das Freiheitsrecht, welches der Unverfügbarkeit der 
Person entspricht; das Gleichheitsrecht, das der Würde der Person korrespondiert, das Teilhaberecht, 
welches dem Angewisensein des Menschen aufeinander, ihrer gemeinsamen Betroffenheit von Schick-
salen und ihrer gemeinsamen Verantwortlichkeit gerecht zu werden versucht. In den Grundinhalten des 
christlichen Glaubens finden wir offenkundig Entsprechungen zu diesen Elementen des Menschenrechts-
gedankens. Doch sind sie im christlichen Glauben in spezifischer Weise radikalisiert.” W.Huber, 
H.E.Tödt: Menschenrechte. Perspektiven einer menschlichen Welt (1977), p.162f. 
706
 This is my translation of the phrase “Programmierende Doktrin”.Cf. H.E.Tödt, Lutherische Rundschau 
1974, p.517. Cf. also M. Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik 
(1978), p.146.  
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like Ebeling and Honecker, pay due attention to the “Fundamentalunterscheidung”, as 
expressed most clearly in the distinction between law and gospel (with the accompany-
ing distinction between the two kingdoms). Theological (moral) doctrines or ecclesio-
logical paradigms are not to be directly introduced and certainly not to be enforced with-
in the political domain. Huber and Tödt are not just seeking analogy between a “heaven-
ly scheme” and the political order, or between “Rechtfertigung und Recht” or between 
“Christengemeinde und Bürgergemeinde”, – they also place a great emphasis on the 
aspect of difference, which inherently belongs to the analogy as such: 
“Die Beachtung der Differenz aber wird … sich darin auswirken, daß man welt-
liches Recht nicht aus innergemeindlichen Kommunikationsstrukturen deduziert und 
es nicht durch scheinbar christliche oder humane Maximalansprüche überfordert. 
Wer auf die Differenz achtet, wird also zugeben, daß weltliches Recht zunächst ein-
mal die minimalen Regeln und Bedingungen menschlichen Zusammenlebens zu 
sichern hat, dabei freilich offenbleiben soll für zwischenmenschliche Beziehungen 
von höherer Qualität.”707  
As already suggested, Huber and Tödt come rather close to Honecker in many respects. 
It is characteristic of Honecker‟s approach that he  just like them  avoids making the 
Christian doctrine a basis of derivation and legitimation in matters of social ethics and 
in political affairs.
708
 His critique of the position taken by Huber and Tödt might there-
fore seem a bit surprising. For even if Honecker considers it a strength of a model of 
“Zuordnung” that it can fully recognise reasonable and rational achievements and sup-
port shared efforts within the political domain, he adds that this also makes the weak-
ness of this model obvious, since it remains unclear what the genuine Christian contri-
bution within the political domain should really be. And Honecker even suggests, that 
this model, which intended to pay due attention to the Barthian concern for establishing 
analogies, may instead end up furthering the kind of “dualism” that was not seldom 
associated with models taking their point of departure clearly from the doctrine of the 
                                                          
707
 W.Huber, H.E.Tödt: Menschenrechte. Perspektiven einer menschlichen Welt (1977), p.174f. 
708
 Honecker can himself clearly underline that: “Das Vermittlungsmodell teilt mit dem Zuordnungs-
modell den Verzicht auf die Legitimationsfrage und den Grundansatz. Die Legitimationsfrage lautet: Was 
berechtigt Christen und Theologie dazu, sich mit bestimmten weltlichen Phänomenen, etwa den Men-
schenrechten, der Demokratie, den humanen Grundwerten zu befassen? Nur wenn diese Legitimation 
durch Herleitung der Berechtigung aus dem christlichen Glauben erbracht werden kann, ist  nach dieser 
Fragestellung  die Beschäftigung mit derartigen Problemen theologisch unanfechtbar und zulässig.” 




 The analogy is programmatically to be drawn from the bottom up. 
Now it is urgent for Honecker to introduce another model, a model of “Vermittlung”, 
which can take us a decisive step further than a model of “Zuordnung”, as elaborated 
most clearly by Huber and Tödt. To see, however, what Honecker‟s particular concern 
is, when taking steps beyond a model of “Zuordnung”, it is necessary to determine what 
the instances are, between which he finds it necessary to “mediate” in a better way than 
Huber and Tödt have done. In Honecker‟s own words (as expressed in 1978): he seeks a 
“Vermittlung von Motivation und rationaler Evidenz”.710 In Das Recht des Menschen 
Honecker in fact signals a double concern:  
 He aims at connecting Christian faith and practical (political) reason by establishing a 
motivational bridge between them. Thereby he makes Christian faith productive for 
the political domain, without confusing the soteriological and moral perspective.  
 In doing so he simultaneously underlines that political values and (moral) standards 
of social co-operation are to be justified in terms of shared (public) reason.
711
 
Therefore he clearly stresses the aspect of “rational evidence”, – even in a conception 
of social ethics, conceived of on theological premises, 
Let me first focus on the former of these concerns, the motivational bridge, before more 
thoroughly considering the role that an idea of “rational evidence” is supposed to play 
when concerned with moral values for the worldly domain. The reason why I want to 
start with the aspect of motivation, is that it is so closely connected with the search for 
the very “proprium” of Christian ethics, and thereby to a wide extent determines the 
Christian contribution within the domain of the political. 
While representatives of a model of “Zuordnung” might consider it “für zu wenig, den 
                                                          
709
 “Die Stärke des Zuordnungsmodells ist seine Anerkennung der Eigenständigkeit humanen Ethos und 
weltlicher Phänomene. Diese Stärke kann freilich auch Ansatz für die Kritik bieten, nämlich daß die Theo-
logie keinen eigenen Beitrag leiste, also das christliche „Proprium‟, der besondere Beitrag christlichen 
Glaubens und christlicher Theologie im Verständnis und im Umgang mit den Menschenrechten undeutlich 
bleibe. Im äußersten Fall kann sich dies steigern zum geläufigen Vorwurf gegen die Zweireichelehre, dies 
führe zu einem „Dualismus‟ von Glaube und weltlicher Existenz der Christen. Man kann an diesem 
Modell schließlich die Berücksichtigung der (zureichenden) Relevanz der Christologie, der Königherr-
schaf Christi, des Herrschaftsanspruchs Christi vermissen.” M.Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. 
Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p. 148f. 
710
 M. Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p. 155. 
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Glauben und die in der Rechtfertigung geschenkte Freiheit [nur] als Motivation für die 
Verwirklichung politischer Freiheit einzusetzen”712, in many respects motivation has 
become a key-issue in Honecker‟s search for “Vermittlung” between Christian faith and 
political practice, making it possible to maintain both the relative autonomy of the pol-
itical and the Christian proprium in social and political ethics.  
It should, however, be remarked that Honecker in his latest works mostly avoids using 
the term “Motivation”. One obvious reason for this is that Honecker, when drawing 
heavily upon the motivational force of Christian faith, was often misunderstood.
713
 
When Onora O‟Neill says about the topic of motivation that “it seems to me to be 
among the most confused and uncertain domains of philosophical inquiry at present”714, 
she may well have been expressing a widely held opinion. And, admittedly, Honecker 
has not been very explicit or precise about how the notion of motivation is to be under-
stood.
715
 Nor has Honecker ever presented a thorough and well-formed theory about the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
711
 The way Honecker draws on “rational evidence” is of considerable interest when turning to Rawls‟ 
conception of a forum of public reason, as a shared domain for justifying to one another decisions of 
common interest, standards for public affairs and basic institutional arrangements. 
712
 Honecker himself refers more specifically to Heinz Eduard Tödt for this view. One should not make 
the Christian contribution in questions of political rights and social ethics merely a matter of formal motiv-
ation. Honecker himself underlines that “Tödt hält es für zu wenig, den Glauben und die in der Recht-
fertigung geschenkte Freiheit als Motivation für die Verwirklichung politischer Freiheit einzusetzen. 
Vielmehr geht es auch um die „qualitative Bestimmung der zu verwirklichenden Freiheit‟. [Heinz Eduard 
Tödt: Neue Qualität der Menschenrechte. Ein Orientierungsrahmen für kirchliches Handeln. Lutherische 
Monatsheft 13, 1974, p. 514-519, Zitat p.517].” Cf. M.Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in 
die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p. 144f. 
713
 Honecker realises this clearly, what can for instance be seen in an article recently published, where he 
once more stresses that: “Vielmehr kennzeichnet der Umgang mit Affekten die gesamte Prägung eines 
Menschen, seine Persönlichkeit” and thereafter adds: “Für diese Grundorientierung des handelnden Sub-
jekts habe ich früher gelegentlich den Begriff „Motivation‟ benutzt. Dieser Sprachgebrauch ist teilweise 
mißverstanden worden.” M. Honecker, “Vernunft, Affekt, Erfahrung” in: Fundamente der Ethik. Bilanz 
der Neuzeit (1996 Ed. A.Holderegger), p.106. 
714
 O. O‟Neill, Towards justice and virtue (1996), p.7. The very terminology might, however, to some 
extent be clarified. R.S Peters, who holds that the concept of motivation has developed from that of 
motive, tries to do so by taking his point of departure from “The Oxford English dictionary … [which] 
throws out hints about the sorts of things which have been of interest to psychologists. „Motives‟ are 
defined as  
That which „moves‟ or induces a person to act in a certain way; a desire, fear, or other emotions, or a consideration of reason, 
which influences or tends to influence a person‟s volition; also often applied to a contemplated result or object the desire of 
which tends to influence volition.  
This definition indicates well enough the directive aspect of the term „motive‟ - the „contemplated result 
or object‟ or the „consideration of reason‟ which influences volition. But it also stresses the notion of 
„moving‟ which is the etymological suggestion of the word, and its connexion with emotion and desire. 
And many would suggest that it is this connexion with emotion and movement which makes a reason a 
motive. It is an operative reason because of a causal connexion between directedness and some inner 
springs in the individual. A motive, it would be argued, is an emotively charged reason.” R.S. Peters, The 
Concept of Motivation (2
nd
 edition 1960), p.37. 
715
 In a book review of M. Honecker‟s Konzept einer sozialethischen Theorie (1971), Honecker is 
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role that motivation should play generally in understanding human action or, more 
specifically, within theological social ethics, but the term should not be given up. 
One must not overlook the affective aspects of human activity. In this connection 
Honecker appropriately focused on the irrational aspects of motivation, stressing “daß 
der Mensch eben nicht nur Vernunftwesen ist, sondern von Angst, Emotionen, irratio-
nalen Motiven geleitet und beherrscht wird. Diesen ganzen Komplex nenne ich Motiv-
ation.”716 But as far as I can see it is not the affective arousal as a psychological pheno-
menon or the more or less unconscious, irrational and shifting motives in general that 
Honecker has foremost been concerned about. 
When stressing the motivational role of Christian faith in the field of (social) ethics, 
Honecker expresses theological concerns, which should still be taken as crucial and 
characteristic of his social ethics, even after he has renounced on the very term motiva-
tion in his most recent works. It is therefore of importance to identify the theological 
concern pursued by Honecker when seeking a “Vermittlung von Motivation und ration-
aler Evidenz”. 
First of all he is, as usual, concerned about distinguishing properly. The question what 
people should do has to be distinguished from the question why people engage in some 
affairs. Accordingly he finds it necessary to introduce a distinction between motivation 
and reason, - thereby distinguishing the question of motivational force from the question 
of establishing the most reasonable substantial guidelines and criteria required in actual 
politics.
717
 The distinction made by Honecker is of importance when clarifying the role 
                                                                                                                                                                          
criticised for drawing upon the notion of motivation without providing us with the “soziologische und 
sozialpsychologische Erhärtung” that should be required. In the review Heinrich writes: “Das Proprium 
evangelischer Sozialethik aber liegt in der „Motivation‟ … Für die gesamte Konzeption H‟s tragend ist die 
begriffliche (122) Unterscheidung von „Motivation‟ und „Kriterium‟… die im Vollzug nicht zu trennen 
sind. „Motivation ist die Begründung eines Handelns in dem Sinne, daß sie darüber Auskunft gibt, warum 
man zum Handeln genötigt ist.‟ (15). „Das Sachkriterium soll dazu dienen, zu erkennen, was der Christ 
sachlich zu tun hat.‟ (122). Wenn aber Motivation und Kriterium im Vollzug nicht zu trennen ist, im-
pliziert das notwendig für die Methode und reflexive Erfassung der Begriffe eine Beschreibung dieses 
Vollzugs. Die begrüßenswerte terminologische Bestimmung der Begriffe „Motivation‟ und „Kriterium‟ 
wird depraviert durch die fehlende soziologische und sozialpsychologische Erhärtung der Beschreibung.” 
Ass. R. Heinrich in Zeitschrift für Evangelische Ethik (1972), p.56.  
716
 M. Honecker, Sozialethik zwischen Tradition und Vernunft (1977), p.207. 
717
 “Zwischen einer materialen Theorie der Ethik und der Motivation ethischen Handelns aus einer 
Grundüberzeugung, etwa religiöser Art, ist bei der ethischen Theoriebildung selbst zu differenzieren. 
Ethische Urteils- und Entscheidungsfindung ist ein mehrschichtiger Vorgang.” M. Honecker, Das Recht 
des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p. 155. This is a concern which can 
very clearly be found also in Honecker‟s Konzept einer sozialethischen Theorie from 1971: “Motivation 
ist die Begründung eines Handelns in dem Sinne, daß sie darüber Auskunft gibt warum man zum Handeln 
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of Christian faith in matters of social ethics and politics: 
“Der Glaube setzt instand, für das Rechte und Gute einzutreten. Der Vernunft fällt 
es zu, jeweils zu ermittteln, was in einer bestimmten Situation konkret das Rechte 
und Gute ist, und diese Einsicht allgemein einsichtig und kommunikabel zu machen. 
Im Gewissen geschieht die persönliche Identifikation mit diesem als richtig und 
nowendig Erkannten, die Affirmation, welche ethische Erkenntnis praktisch und 
konkret werden läßt. Der Glaube bewirkt Motivation zum Gebrauch der Vernunft 
und zum Vollzug der Affirmation des Anrufs des Gewissens.”718 
Honecker is concerned with the motivational role of Christian faith in matters of social 
and political ethics and, he is not as concerned with the affective arousal as such, which 
can be shifting, irrational and argumentatively unjustifiable.  The following two aspects 
in Honecker‟s approach to motivation may therefore be stressed: 
 Even if Honecker is obviously acquainted with different theories of motivation 
within (moral) psychology, he avoids drawing explicitly and thoroughly on psycho-
logical insights and theories when explaining the motivational
719
 role of Christian 
faith. He seeks instead for genuinely theological motives.  
 When concerned with the motivational role of Christian faith, Honecker focuses on 
the very “Grundeinstellung” which accords with faith, the basic attitude and the 
deeper affections which are by far transcending the merely “rational-kognitiven 
                                                                                                                                                                          
genötigt ist, warum man sich überhaupt zu einen Entschluß veranlaßt sieht. Motivation ist Kausalität von 
innen her gesehen (A.Schopenhauer). Von der Motivation sind die Kriterien zu unterscheiden, an denen 
sich gesellschaftliches Handeln inhaltlich orientiert. Kriterien dienen der Begründung einer Sachent-
scheidung. … Ein Kriterium hat den Zweck, zu ermitteln, was getan werden soll, und zwar unter Berück-
sichtigung dessen, das getan werden kann, also aufgrund dessen, was im Bereich des Möglichen ist. Der-
artige Kriterien gesellschaftlichen Handelns zu finden, ist Aufgabe der Vernunft. Praktische Vernunft hat 
zu prüfen, was getan werden kann und getan werden soll.”(p.15). But Honecker also adds: “Im Vollzug 
gesellschaftlicher Praxis und konkreter Theoriebildung sind sonach Motivation und Kriterien nicht ein-
deutig zu trennen. Um der methodischen Klärung willen sind bei einer grundsätzlichen Unterscheidung 
sozialethischer Theoriebildung jedoch Motivationen und Kriterien sachlich und begrifflich zu unter-
scheiden, was nicht bedeutet, ihre praktische wechselseitige Beziehung und Beeinflussung zu bestreiten.” 
Ibid.,16.  
718
 M. Honecker, “Vernunft, Gewissen, Glaube. Das spezifisch Christliche im Horizont der Ethik”, 
Evangelische Ethik. Diskussionsbeiträge zu ihrer Grundlegung, (ed. H.G.Ulrich, 1990), p.140. 
719
 Honecker can take motivation to mean “(Grund-)Einstellung”. When concerned with motivation by 
faith, he rather seeks an approach to the phenomenon of motivation which is in accordance with the nature 
of Christian faith itself. Therefore he avoids drawing explicitly on certain theories within psychology 
which might tend to make Christian faith primarily a psychological phenomenon. “Es sei deshalb an dieser 
Stelle ausdrücklich vermerkt, daß mit der Verwendung des Motivationsbegriff hier mitnichten die Über-
nahme einer spezifischen psychologischen Motivationstheorie verbunden sein soll. Ohne auf die psycho-
logische Diskussion um den Motivationsbegriff und die Einteilung der Motivationstheorien in zwei Typen 
… einzugehen, also die Frage, ob Motivation eine Kausalität oder Finalität meint, verwende ich Motiv-
ation synonym mit „Einstellung‟.” M. Honecker, Sozialethik zwischen Tradition und Vernunft (1977), 
p.211. 
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Ebene”.720 Thereby he makes it quite clear that: 
“Motivation meint allerdings nicht beliebig auswechselbare Gesinnungsimpulse, 
sondern eine Grundeinstellung. Der Glaube kann deshalb als Motivation beschrieben 
werden, weil er eine bestimmte Grundeinstellung zur gesamten Lebenswirklichkeit 
einschließt…”721 
Honecker‟s understanding of motivation, when concerned specifically with the motiva-
tional force of Christian faith within the domain of social ethics, has as far as I can see 
some similarity with the fundamental option as explained in Franz Böckle‟s book on 
Fundamental Moral Theology. Böckle (with reference to P. Fransen) underlines that the 
fundamental option is not “a fully conscious, limited act alongside the individual acts in 
mans life. It points, on the contrary, to a radical and dynamic orientation in man‟s life to 
which free consent is given in and through the individual acts in which it is realized.… 
it inspires them from within.”722 And, Böckle immediately adds, this fundamental 
option “is always completely inspired by God‟s power to attract, and it is borne up by 
his presence.”723  
Instead of drawing heavily upon specific theories within psychology when explaining 
the phenomenon of motivation by faith, Honecker draws on theological motives, as for 
instance the distinction between “„äußerlich‟ und „innerlich‟” as used by Luther724 with 
                                                          
720
 In Einführung in die Theologische Ethik, Grundlagen und Grundbegriffe (1990) Honecker focuses on 
“Das Liebesgebot, and writes that: “Liebe ist sicher mehr als rationales Kalkül. Sie ist spontan, unmittel-
bar; man sagt, Liebe sei ein „Gefühl‟, ein Affekt. Man kann Liebe auch „Motivation‟ nennen. Motivation 
meint dabei einen Grundantrieb der gesamten Person. Liebe ist als Motivation mehr als eine einzelne 
Norm; sie ist Meta-Norm‟. Der alte Begriff der Tugend als Haltung, habitus, e/(cij beschreibt ein Phäno-
men, dessen modernes psychologisches Äquivalent „Motivation‟ genannt wird. Es geht hier nicht nur um 
Reflexion auf der rational-kognitiven Ebene, sondern um Engagement auf der emotionalen Ebene, um 
eine Beeinflussung der Affekte.Diese Tiefenschicht der persönlichen Bindung kann man freilich gleich-
wohl vernünftig, rational analysieren und bedenken.” (p.152). 
721
 M. Honecker, “Vernunft, Gewissen, Glaube. Das spezifisch Christliche im Horizont der Ethik”, 
Evangelische Ethik. Diskussionsbeiträge zu ihrer Grundlegung, (ed. H.G.Ulrich, 1990), p.140. 
722
 F.Böckle, Fundamental Moral Theology (1980; originally published in German 1977), p.107. 
723
 F.Böckle, Fundamental Moral Theology (1980), p.107. 
724
 But Honecker‟s attempt to establish in this way a theological basis for a motivational proprium in 
Christian ethics is indeed very tentative: “Die Unterscheidung von Vernunft und Motivation könnte man 
als hypothetischen Versuch einer Aufnahme und Weiterführung einer Unterscheidung verstehen, die 
Luther in Rahmen seiner Zweireichelehre verwendet, nämlich der Unterscheidung von „äußerlich‟ und 
„innerlich‟. … Der Gebrauch des Begriffspaars „innerlich/äußerlich‟ ist bei Luther freilich höchst viel-
schichtig und noch nicht umfaßend untersucht worden. Ebenso fehlt es an einer Aufarbeitung der Luther 
vorgegebenen Tradition, die Ebenfalls außerordentlich verwickelt ist. Beides gilt es zu beachten. … Je 
nach Zusammenhang wechselt auch der anthropologische Sinn der Formel. Luther verwendet diese an-
thropologische Unterscheidung vor allem innerhalb des Problemkreises von Glaube, Wort und Erfahrung 
und in der Erörterung von Rechtfertigung und Erlösung.” M.Honecker, Sozialethik zwischen Tradition 
und Vernunft (1977), p.213. Let it be mentioned that Helmut Thelicke for his part also draws very clearly 
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reference to the theology of St.Paul.
725
 And this distinction between “„äußerlich‟ und 
„innerlich‟” is, according to Honecker, inseparable from another central theological 
distinction, i.e. the distinction between “Person und Werk”.726  
It is necessary to keep his fundamentally theological approach to the phenomenon of 
motivation in mind in order to understand why Honecker finds the very “proprium” of 
Christian ethics on the motivational level, distinguished from – but not sharply distinct 
from – a level of substantial values and material political criteria. It is from this context 
that Honecker claims: 
                                                                                                                                                                          
on the distinction between “innerlich/außerlich”, which he does not seem to find problematic at all. His 
approach is therefore less tentative: “Die Tatschicht ist grundsätzlich nicht geeignet, das Spezifische jenes 
Gottesgehorsams sichtbar werden zu lassen. Es gilt zwar unbedingt, daß das Wort ohne die Tat unglaub-
würdig ist. Aber ebensosehr gilt, daß die Tat ohne das Wort zweideutig ist. Dafür hat wiederum die eman-
zipierte Ethik des Säkularismus eindrückliche Belege geliefert. Deshalb kommt das spezifisch Christliche 
der Ethik nur in der Schicht der Motive heraus. Das Wort des Kolosserbriefs: „Alles, was ihr tut, das tut 
von Herzen (e)/)k yuxh¤j) als dem Herrn und nicht den Menschen‟ (3,23) bringt das prägnant zum Aus-
druck. Denn in diesem grundlegenden Imperativ christlichen Handelns ist das Handeln nicht nach der 
materiell-inhaltlichen Seite, sondern nach Grund und Ziel characterisiert: Der Grund besteht zunächst 
einmal darin, daß das Tun echt ist, d.h. daß seine Innen- und Außenseite übereinstimmt (vgl. das e/)swJen 
und e/)cwJen von Mt.23,25). Sofern ich aus dem Herzen heraus handle, ist ja das Motiv einer bloß äußeren 
Zurschaustellung ausgeschlossen. Zugleich ist damit zum Ausdruck gebracht, daß auch die letzten 
Bindungen des interior homo im Handeln wirksam sein müssen, denn nur dann kann er ja in seinem Tun 
völlig gegenwärtig sein. Da diese Bindung aber in der Gemeinschaft mit dem Herrn besteht, ist damit 
zugleich das Ziel des Handeln gesetzt: daß ich es nämlich zur Ehre des Kyrios tue.” H.Thielicke, Theo-
logische Ethik I (1972, 4.Aufl.), p.22. 
725
 It would be beyond my scope to enter more thoroughly into a debate about theological anthropology 
according to Luther or St.Paul. But let me mention that Honecker, setting out from Luther‟s theology, at 
least suggests that there are aspects within the theology of Luther (and St.Paul) that are to be considered 
more thoroughly when concerned with the motivation of faith: “Einerseits ist Luther die paulinische 
Unterscheidung von innerem und äußerem Menschen vorgegeben, die Parallelen in der platonischen 
Anthropologie hat und seit Paulus in der theologischen Anthropologie verwendet wurde. Diese Unter-
scheidung verbindet sich mit der seit Johannes Damascenus verbreiteten Unterscheidung von äußerem und 
innerem Wort und mit anderen Gegensatzpaaren wie leiblich/geistlich, sichtbar/verborgen, irdisch/-
himmlisch, alt/neu. Eine Aufarbeitung dieser Terminologie fehlt bislang.” M. Honecker, Sozialethik 
zwischen Tradition und Vernunft (1977), p.214. 
726
 Thus Honecker can emphasise that: “Die Unterscheidung von innerlich und äußerlich wird von Luther 
außer mit der Unterscheidung von Glaube und Liebe ferner mit der Unterscheidung von Person und Werk 
verknüpft. Die Luther vorgegebene anthropologische Unterscheidung von innerlich und äußerlich dient 
dazu, die Unterscheidung der verschiedenen Hinsichten von Glaube und Liebe, von Person und Werk zu 
veranschaulichen und zugleich ihre Zusammengehörigkeit festzuhalten.” M. Honecker, Sozialethik 
zwischen Tradition und Vernunft (1977), p.214. But realising that the distinction “innerlich/aüßerlich” 
very often has been closely connected with the distinction between “Leib/Seele”, Honecker continues: 
“Diese anthropologische Unterscheidung von äußerlich und innerlich läßt sich heute freilich so nicht mehr 
festhalten, allein schon deshalb, weil die für Luther (und seine Zeit) selbstverständliche Unterscheidung 
zwischen Leib und Seele hinfällig geworden ist. Im Leib-Seele-Schema lassen sich heute die verschied-
enen Aspekte des Menschseins nicht mehr begreiflich machen, da heute die Berufung auf „Seelisches‟ von 
vornherein als Legitimierung subjektivistischer Beliebigkeit mißverstanden werden kann. Deshalb wäre zu 
erwägen, ob nicht die Unterscheidung von Vernunft und Motivation den von Luther mit seiner Formel von 
äußerlich/innerlich gemeinten Sachverhalt bezeichnen könnte: Luther geht es darum, daß ein bestimmtes 
Verhalten („Liebe‟, „Werk‟) „äußerlich‟ sichtbar wird, zu dem der Mensch gleichwohl „innerlich‟ frei 
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“Den Maßstab für gesellschaftliche Konkretionen setzt, auch für den Christen, 
gesellschaftskritische, geschichtliche Vernunft. Das proprium evangelischer Sozial-
ethik ist damit zurückgenommen in die Motivation – der Christ handelt aus Glaube, 
Liebe, Hoffnung…” 727 
Thus Honecker clearly distinguishes between a level of motivation and a level of 
reason, or between the levels of “theologischer Motivation und politischer Verwirk-
lichung”.728 It seems as if there is in Christian faith both a strong motivational force, and 
also a certain vagueness concerning the substantial impact in matters of concrete social 
ethics and politics.  
In his analysis of Luther‟s notion of faith, Martin Seils raises “die Frage nach dem kog-
nitiven Character des Glaubens selbst”.729 This is a question which also applies within 
social ethics and becomes acute in the question whether one can really  on the basis of 
Christian faith  expect a “Zuwachs an ethischer Erkenntnis”.730 The way Honecker 
sometimes stresses the mere motivation as the very proprium of Christian ethics, is often 
criticised. This critique can even be found in an approach to theological ethics which in 
many respects comes close to the conception elaborated by Honecker. Arthur Rich for 
instance criticises the view that “der Glaube … bewirke nur „Motivation [und] keinen 
Zuwachs an ethischer Erkenntnis‟.”731 In regard to the motivational force of Christian 
faith, one is, however, well advised to remember that faith itself includes certain beliefs 
                                                                                                                                                                          
werden muß, nämlich als „Person‟ durch den „Glauben‟. Beides ist nicht zu vermengen, aber auch nicht zu 
trennen.” Ibid., p.214f. 
727
 M. Honecker, Konzept einer sozialethischen Theorie. Grundfragen evangelischer Sozialethik (1971), 
p.67. 
728
 M. Honecker, Sozialethik zwischen Tradition und Vernunft (1977), p.242. The transformation into 
substantial standards and concrete political manifestations is obviously taken as complex, according to 
Honecker, what has to be reflected in the very theory of social ethics: “Zwischen einer materialen Theorie 
der Ethik und der Motivation ethischen Handelns aus einer Grundüberzeugung, etwa religiöser Art, ist bei 
der ethischen Theoriebildung selbst zu differenzieren. Ethische Urteils- und Entscheidungsfindung ist ein 
mehrschichtiges Vorgang.” M. Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische 
Sozialethik (1978), p.155. 
729
 M.Seils, “Glaube”, Handbuch Systematischer Theologie, (1996, Bd. 13), p.64. 
730
 This is a phrase which is used by Honecker himself in different articles, for instance in Zeitschrift für 
Evangelische Ethik, 1990, p.138. 
731
 With reference to M. Honecker‟s “Vernunft, Gewissen, Glaube”, Arthur Rich criticises a view accord-
ing to which: “Das spezifisch Christliche im Horizont der Ethik, in: ZThK 77(1980), meint sagen zu kön-
nen, der Glaube bringe „für eine theologische Ethik keinen Zuwachs an ethischer Erkenntnis‟ (S.399). Er 
bewirke nur „Motivation zum Gebrauch der Vernunft und zum Vollzug der Affirmation des Anrufs des 
Gewissens‟ (S.341). Dagegen ist geltend zu machen, daß die Liebe des Glaubens Kriterien für die ihr ge-
mäße Humanität hat und daß man insofern auf dieser Ebene sehr wohl von einem ethischen Erkenntnis-
gewinn sprechen kann. Übrigens mildert Honecker selbst die Härte seiner These, wenn er etwas weiter 
unten präzisiert: „Motivation meint allerdings nicht beliebig auswechselbare Gesinnungsimpulse, sondern 
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about the world and about man (before God), which will substantially qualify the motiv-
ation one has. Given this, Arthur Rich‟s objection seems plausible. 
As far as I can see, however, Honecker does not take the motivational force of Christian 
faith to be just a kind of affective arousal, which is hardly substantively qualified at all. 
For even if Honecker says that Christian faith brings “keinen Zuwachs an ethischer Er-
kenntnis”, this can hardly be taken to mean that faith as such is supposed to bring abso-
lutely no kind of “cognition” capable of substantively influence the field of morals, 
social ethics and politics. Honecker underlines that; 
“Sozialethik steht zwischen den von der Soziologie aufgewiesenen gesellschaft-
lichen Gegebenheiten und Zwängen und dem Wissen um eine „andere Dimension im 
Menschsein‟, welche nicht in zweckrationalen Handlungsentwürfen bedacht wird, 
sondern aus der christlichen Überlieferung stammt. Wird diese „eigentümliche Dia-
lektik‟ ernstgenommen, so wirkt der Vorwurf einer Rücknahme der Sozialethik in 
die gläubige Person nur dann überzeugend, wenn man die eigene Prämisse, daß das 
Christentum ein Wissen um die den Menschen als Subjekt konstituierenden Fak-
toren bewahre, anderen als Fehler, ankreidet. In anderer Terminologie bezeichne ich 
nämlich dieses Wissen eben als „Motivation‟, als Grundeinstellung des Mensch-
seins.” 732 
Honecker does not really enter into the meta-ethical debate about the motivating state of 
“desires” and “beliefs”733  (as applied to theological ethics), nevertheless, he does not 
appear to open up a gap between the affective and the cognitive. 
A model of “Vermittlung” should maintain a continuity between the “Wissen”, implied 
in faith itself, and the kind of reasonable values drawn upon in the public forum. But the 
question is how this continuity should most appropriately be conceived. Honecker is 
obviously of the opinion that faith itself paves the way for an insight into the difference 
between faith and morals, between soteriology and ethics, between law and gospel. The 
most elementary “Fundamentalunterscheidung” belongs to the kind of “Wissen” which 
is implicit in faith itself. This means that faith itself motivates to the (right) use of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
eine … ganz bestimmte Grundeinstellung zur gesamten Lebenswirklichkeit‟ (S.341).” A.Rich, Wirt-
schaftsethik, Grundlagen in theologischer Perspektive (2
nd
 ed. 1985), p.170 (note 94). 
732
 M. Honecker, Sozialethik zwischen Tradition und Vernunft (1977), p.204f . (The italicisation is made 
by me).    
733
 The issues considered in this chapter might indeed actualise central meta-ethical problems about the 
“two sorts of motivating states. The general name for the first sort is „desire‟, and the general name for the 
second sort is „belief‟.” Cf. J.Dancy, Moral Reasons, 1993, p.1f. A central issue in meta-ethical discus-
sions about moral reasons is whether cognitive „beliefs‟ as such should be taken as externally motivating 
states, what means that they are just contingently motivating, while „desires‟ alone are to be taken as 
internally motivating, what would imply that the essential driving forces in ethics are of an emotional 
nature. But I cannot enter into this debate, which is not really raised by Honecker. 
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reason within the shared domain of social ethics and politics. The continuity between 
Christian faith and political reason, as conceived of in Honecker‟s model of “Vermitt-
lung”, is not adequately secured by merely taking the former as a derivative basis of the 
latter. The continuity between the different stages in Honecker‟s model of “Vermitt-
lung” might instead be marked by employing the term transformation734 which makes 
the link between the three stages within his model weaker: 
 Christian faith – with its orientation towards the Christian doctrine – provides us with 
motivation, beliefs and reasons for moral practice. 
 The moral concern, characteristic of Christian faith, requires a transformation into 
human (ground)values and public standards to be reasonably justified. Honecker can 
formulate this concern rather strongly as follows: 
“Die Motivation der christlichen Botschaft bedarf einer Umsetzung in rational über-
prüfbare Maßstäbe, Normen, Kriterien ethischen Handelns. Derartige Kriterien müs-
sen inhaltlich den Anforderungen ethischer Evidenz genügen und können nicht ein-
fach autoritär (z.B. durch Berufung auf Offenbarung) gesetzt werden.” 735 
 When moral (ground)values are to be “materialised” in applied politics and social 
life, one has to open up for reasonable judgement and a more pragmatic approach. 
As far as I can see the model of “Vermittlung” is not thoroughly elaborated by Hon-
ecker, but nonetheless there can be little doubt that he clearly utilises the motivational 
force inherent in a sincere Christian conviction
736
 when elaborating a model for social 
                                                          
734
 Honecker himself can use the terms “Vermittlung” and “Transformation” interchangeable, when 
characterising this model and avoids systematically the term “derivation”. 
735
 M. Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p. 155. 
And with special regard to the issue of human rights this concern can be formulated as follows: “Das 
Evangelium wirkt Glauben. Der Glaube enthält auch eine menschliche Grundeinstellung. Diese Grund-
einstellung bedarf jedoch der Umsetzung in zeit- und verhältnisbezogene Verhaltensregeln. … Aufgabe 
christlicher Ethik ist dann freilich nicht die Erarbeitung einer Theorie der Menschenrechte (etwa durch 
deren Herleitung aus Schrift oder Offenbarung), sondern die Einweisung in den Umgang mit den Men-
schenrechten aus der Motivation des Glaubens.” M. Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in 
die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p.154. This implies clearly that Christian values are taken to be 
justifiable in terms of shared reason. 
736
 Without entering more thoroughly into the meta-ethical debate, let me in passing add that David Copp, 
in his attempt to establish a position which is neutral between the controversy about „internalism‟ and „ex-
ternalism‟, stresses the motivating force of people‟s convictions, understood as a combination of sincere 
beliefs and a subscription to corresponding standards. The connection between “beliefs” and correspond-
ing “standards” should even not be taken as a matter of mere derivation. “In typical cases, then, where a 
person making a claim of moral obligation is sincere, she both believes the proposition she expresses and 
subscribes to the corresponding standard. In such cases, I will say, her claim expresses a „moral con-
viction‟, a combination of belief and subscription to the corresponding standard.” D.Copp, ”Moral 
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ethics. Simultaneously, however, there is a certain inconclusiveness
737
 built into the 
model of “Vermittlung”. This means that the kind of “Wissen” and beliefs738 implied in 
the Christian conviction, cannot be expected to provide us (for instance by some method 
of derivation) with specific moral prescripts for settling political issues “correctly”.  
In an earlier chapter I have discussed the argument that a Christian moral doctrine can-
not provide us with specific moral values, standards, prescripts and criteria required for 
social co-operation in modern societies, since no comprehensive doctrine can expectedly 
be recognised by all parties in pluralist societies. The argument introduced now is dif-
ferent: Due to the nature of the Christian doctrine itself and the complexity of the world, 
particular social standards and specific political values, criteria and solutions, cannot 
conclusively be specified, settled and justified by reference to a theological “Wissen” 
and a (privileged) religious insight.
739
 Once more we are face to face with a main con-
cern in Honecker‟ theological approach as such: To prevent Christian faith, from being 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Obligation and Moral Motivation”, On the Relevance of Metaethics. New Essays on Metaethics (1995, 
eds. J.Couture & K.Nielsen), p.203 
737
 According to Webster‟s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language (1994 ed.) 
inconclusiveness is characterised by “not resolving fully all doubts or questions” or by being “without 
final results”. p.721. 
738
 What Honecker especially has in mind are beliefs about the person, securing his integrity and in-
violability according to the status he has as created in the image of God.  
739
 Let me here also add that Gerald Gaus in a very interesting way employs the notion of inconclusive-
ness when more generally concerned with the question of public justification. He underlines that: “Justi-
fications are often inconclusive – they are open to doubt, not fully convincing, or not decisive because of 
the complexity of our belief systems and our limited ability to process all the information at our disposal. 
We have good grounds for forming (or rejecting) beliefs, but because so much information is available 
that cannot be adequately canvassed, we can seldom be confident that defeaters for our beliefs are not 
lurking, ready to overturn our conclusion. Victory is rare. Public debate is, I think, typically inconclusive 
in this way: The relevant information is so great that we are rational to form beliefs on the basis of what 
we have access to, but other people pick up on other information, coming to different conclusions.” 
G.F.Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism. An Essay on Epistemology and political Thought (1996), p.154. 
Theology, when concerned with social ethics and politics, should certainly take this kind of complexity 
into account when turning to substantive issues of politics and social ethics. This does not mean, however, 
that the motivating force of Christian faith in matters of social ethics is undermined. We might believe 
things with good reason, even if they cannot be settled conclusively in a way which is convincing to all 
parties. Let it now also be added that Gaus distinguishes inconclusiveness from indeterminacy: “We can, 
then, distinguish inconclusiveness from indeterminacy: The justification for accepting (or rejecting) a 
belief is inconclusive if the justification meets the minimum standards of proof for acceptance (rejection) 
but falls short of some high standard of proof for conclusiveness, certainty, knowledge, and so on. A justi-
fication for accepting (or rejecting) a belief is indeterminate if it falls short of the minimum degree of 
proof required for either justified acceptance or rejection.” Ibid., p.153. There might be a “Wissen” im-
plied in a Christian conviction which is morally significant, even if it cannot conclusively justify particular 
political choices and specific standards. Morally significant religious beliefs might be rendered politically 
relevant, provided that religious persons or churches can comply with minimum standards for public dis-
course, acceptance and justification. I will return to some of these aspects later in this chapter when dis-
cussing the burdens of judgement and the use of religiously grounded arguments within the public forum.  
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converted into a “programmierende Doktrin”740 for the social and political domain.  
As a concluding remark I would like to stress that Honecker  when elaborating his 
model of Vermittlung (transformation)  is clearly concerned about the influence of 
Christian faith within the worldly realm.
741
 But this kind of influence is not to be easily 
settled as in the different methods of derivation or in the methods drawing on the idea of 
establishing analogies, but is more open-ended, thereby opening up the political field for 
genuinely political reasoning. As far as I can see, Honecker's model of “Vermittlung”, 
seems thereby to be an appropriate response to Rawls‟ demand for reasonable arrange-
ments in matters concerning basic justice, institutional premises for political coexistence 
and morally based standards for social co-operation. 
5.5. Moral evidence – burdens of judgement. 
5.5.1. Honecker drawing on moral evidence 
It should now be clear that due to the Christian doctrine itself and the complexity of 
society as such, political solutions cannot be conclusively specified and justified by mere 
reference to a privileged (religious) insight in social ethics and the nature of society. The 
complexity of the real world has to be taken properly into account by theological social 
ethics. But let us now also reflect that the aim of a model of “transformation” was to 
establish a “Vermittlung von Motivation und rationaler Evidenz”.742 Honecker without 
doubt draws very heavily on an idea of moral evidence in his conception of social ethics. 
It might be taken for granted that there are some moral standards, virtues and attitudes 
which are well-established and widely approved of even in pluralist societies. Some 
moral intuitions and elementary norms and values are widely recognised. Gerhard 
Ebeling refers for instance to the gospel story of the Good Samaritan
743
 in order to 
                                                          
740
 Let me in this connection once more refer to H.E.Tödt, Lutherische Rundschau 1974, p.517. Cf. also 
M. Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p.146.  
741
 And he emphasises: “Sodann ist nicht strittig, daß der christliche Glaube auch das alltägliche Leben 
des Menschen betrifft, also die Lebenspraxis des Glaubenden mitprägt und mitgestaltet. Strittig ist jedoch, 
ob dieser Zusammenhang von Glaube und Lebenspraxis so eindeutig und aufweisbar ist …” M. Honecker, 
Sozialethik zwischen Tradition und Vernunft (1977), p.15. 
742
 M. Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p. 155. 
743
 Let me also mention that Rawls himself takes this story as an example of a Bible-text, which might 
easily be drawn upon in terms of public values: “… Luke, Ch. 10:29-37. It is easy to see how the Gospel 
story could be used to support the imperfect moral duty of mutual aid, as found, say, in Kant‟s fourth ex-
ample in the Grundlegung.…To formulate a suitable example in terms of political values only, consider a 
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explain what moral evidence could mean. As an answer to the question who is my 
neighbour, whom I should love, Jesus tells the story of the Good Samaritan. The priest 
and the Levite, passing by without helping the half-dead man who had fallen among 
robbers, were obviously blameworthy, while the Samaritan, who “had compassion, and 
went to him and bound up his wounds … and brought him to an inn, and took care of 
him”744 did what was morally required and proved to act like a true neighbour to the 
man who had fallen among robbers. The parable makes no reference to more compre-
hensive doctrines from which Jesus could have support. Neither is there any thorough 
interpretation of sacred texts (there is just a reference to the commandment of love). 
Jesus is neither weighing alternatives nor is he using many words in arguing for a 
certain conclusion. In this respect the story is rather wordless, a brief presentation of a 
dramatic event. There is not even an explicit appeal to principles of mercy from the half-
dead man who had fallen among robbers. The story nevertheless speaks out clearly.
745
 
This is Ebeling‟s main point. All moral and reasonable persons can obviously see what 
the situation demands from them. There is in this kind of event a built-in appeal to 




Let it now be noted that Honecker, for his part, finds it appropriate to distinguish be-
tween (at least) two kinds of “evidence”. He holds that:  
“Eine auf universale Geltung und Kommunikabilität, Mitteilbarkeit angelegte Ethik 
beruft sich auf die Evidenz des Ethischen. Sie will überzeugen durch Einsicht. Die 
                                                                                                                                                                          
variant of the difference principle or of some other analogous idea. The principle could be seen as giving a 
special concern for the poor, as in the Catholic social doctrine.” J. Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Re-
visited”, The University of Chicago Law Review (1997;3), p.786 (note 55).  
744
 Luke, 10,33f. 
745
 According to Ebeling it has to be emphasised that “Die Vorbeigehenden haben ihn [den “Ruf”] sehr 
wohl vernommen. Nur als dem Ruf sich Versagende gehören sie dazu. Der dem Ruf Gehorchende gab 
dagegen nicht nur zu erkennen, daß er verstanden habe, sondern mehr: daß er dem zum Ruf Gewordenen 
sein Einverständnis gab. Die Tat der Barmherzigkeit geschah nicht deshalb wortlos, weil sie nichtssagend 
gewesen wäre, sondern weil sie so selbstverständlich, so menschlich, so ermutigend war, ganz abgesehen 
von der faktisch gewährten ersten Hilfe. Sie war ganz und gar Wort. Sie sprach für sich.” G. Ebeling, 
Wort und Glaube II (1969), p.29. 
746
 Ebeling can especially appeal to this kind of moral evidence when faced with what might obviously 
threaten human existence: “Um in ethischer Hinsicht auf die elementaren Verstehensnötigungen zu stoßen, 
muß man sich an dem orientieren, was faktisch geschieht und notwendig zu geschehen hat. Die Notwend-
igkeit in ethischer Hinsicht wird evident an dem, was den Menschen in seiner Mitmenschlichkeit bedroht. 
Um sich dem Problem der Ethik zu stellen. muß man an den konkreten Bedrohungen der Mitmenschlich-
keit orientiert sein und ständig in Kontakt bleiben mit solchen Situationen, in denen das Problem des 
Ethischen bedrängend erfahren wird.” G. Ebeling, Wort und Glaube II (1969), p.19. 
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Evidenz des Glaubens hingegen bedarf einer Erleuchtung durch den heiligen Geist, 
so daß es zutreffend heißt, der Glaube sei nicht jedermanns Sache (2.Thess.3.2).”747  
When Honecker so strongly stresses the “evidence of the ethical”, and simultaneously 
distinguishes the two kinds of “evidence”, he once more takes his point of departure 
from the main distinctions within Lutheran theology, – not least being that between law 
and gospel
748
 and the hermeneutic distinction between the two kingdoms.
749
 Thus it can 
also be understood why Honecker uses the phrase “Evidenz des Ethischen” inter-
changeably with “Evidenz des Humanum”.750 Drawing on the fundamental theological 
distinction, Honecker can even say that “Ethik bedarf nicht mehr stringent theologische 
Herleitung”.751  
                                                          
747
 M Honecker, “Thesen zur Aporie der Zweireichelehre”, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche (1981), 
p.129. 
748
 “Ein ungelöstes Grundproblem ist die Evidenz des Ethischen, und zwar in Gestalt ethischer Normen 
oder Maßstäbe. Die reformatorische und altlutherische Theologie konnte dieses Problem dadurch beant-
worten, daß sie das Gesetz in seinem bürgerlichen Gebrauch, dem usus politicus legis, jedermann mit 
seinem Menschsein gegeben und einsichtig sein ließ und damit, zumindest tendenziell, als universal vor-
handenen voraussetzte.” M Honecker, “Thesen zur Aporie der Zweireichelehre”, Zeitschrift für Theologie 
und Kirche (1981), p.133. But Honecker also underlines that the debate about a possible moral evidence 
in a modern age is in many respects different from the debate about the evidence of moral claims in the 
age of Reformation, – even if there are parallell concerns too: “Im Vergleich zur Reformationszeit, in 
welcher der ethische Anspruch als selbstevident, in der Sprache der damaligen Zeit als „natürlich‟ gegeben 
galt, ist heute gerade das Ethische, auch seitens theologischer Sozialethik ausdrücklich zum Bewusßtsein 
zu bringen. Denn mit dem Verlust des Ethischen kommt der Theologie das Gesetz abhanden, auf das sich 
das Evangelium bezieht und mit welchem es umgeht im duplex usus legis …” M. Honecker, “Das Pro-
blem der Eigengesetzlichkeit”, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche (1976), p.128.  
749
 “Die Rückführung der Zweireichelehre auf elementare Grundfragen christlicher Existenz nötigt m.E. 
zur Unterscheidung zwischen einer Evidenz des Ethischen und der Evidenz des Glaubens. … Ethik soll 
Menschen anleiten menschlich zu leben. Und da sich das Wort menschlich sogar steigern läßt, könnte 
christliche Ethik dazu beitragen, menschlicher zu handeln, menschlicher zu werden und menschlicher zu 
sein. Sodann ist Menschlichkeit zunächst eine nicht-theologische Kategorie. Darauf verweist die Berufung 
auf die Vernunft als Maßstab einer menschlichen Ethik. Die Chiffre „Vernunft‟ soll den Menschen bei 
seiner Humanität als Gabe und Aufgabe behaften. (Der sachlichen Probleme sowhohl des Begriffs Ver-
nunft wie einer Berufung auf Vernunft bin ich mir dabei durchaus Bewußt). M Honecker, “Thesen zur 
Aporie der Zweireichelehre”, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche (1981), p.138f. 
750
 This is for instance the case when he is dealing with the challenge of fundamentalism: “Evangelische 
Ethik steht hier vor größeren Problemen [als die Katholiken], sofern sie einem biblizistischen und ex-
klusiv christozentrischen Ansatz folgt, nicht aber, wenn sie sich auf die Evidenz des Humanum beruft.” M. 
Honecker, Sozialethik Zwischen Tradtition und Vernunft (1977), p. 153.  
751
 According to Honecker “Letzter Maßstab menschlichen Handelns ist kein Trans-Humanum, sondern 
eine dem Menschen, seinem Tun und lassen immanente Verbindlichkeit, das Menschsein, das Humanum 
selbst – aber nicht, wie es sich tatsächlich verhält, sondern wie es sich sinnvollerweise verhält, wie es sich 
verhalten soll. Ist diese Feststellung richtig, so rührt die Schwierigkeit, die theologische Ethik nach dem 
Normenbestand, also anhand der Einzelforderungen und Einzelentscheidungen von einer allgemeinen, 
humanen Ethik abzugrenzen, nicht nur von einer uns vorgegebenen pluralistischen Gesellschaftsstruktur 
her, sondern sie gründet in der Anerkennung des Evidenzanspruch des Ethischen selbst. Eine lediglich auf 
das soziale Zusammenleben der Menschen bezogene Ethik bedarf nicht mehr stringent theologische Her-
leitung.” M. Honecker. “Erfahrung und Entscheidung”, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche (1978), 
p.500.  
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But this does not mean that ethics/morals as a shared phenomenon should not also be 
taken as a vital theological concern,  just as it should also be taken into account that 
there are central Christian/Biblical motives that may frequently be referred to in public 
reasoning.
752
 However, there are obviously various ways of taking the moral concern 
into consideration from the side of theology: 
“Einmal: Das Faktum des Anspruchs auf Evidenz des Ethischen Forderung seitens 
der allgemeinen Ethik läßt sich, auch durch die theologische Ethik nicht bestreiten. 
In der Theologiegeschichte ist das Recht dieses Anspruchs auch nicht bestritten 
worden, erinnert sei nur an die seit der christlichen Antike herrschenden Natur-
rechtsvorstellungen oder an Luthers Auslegung des Gesetzes, vor allem im primus 
usus legis, als menschlicher Grundgegebenheit. Auch für die sogenannte zweite 
Tafel des Dekalogs oder für das Gebot des Nächstenliebe läßt sich solche potentielle 
Evidenz für jedermann nicht übersehen. Diese Faktizität der „Evidenz des Ethis-
chen‟ ist dann aber auch im Ansatz und in der Methode seitens theologischer Ethik 
sachgerecht zu berücksichtigen. Die Fragestellung, ob es „nur‟ eine theologische 
Ethik oder „nur‟ eine allgemeine Ethik geben könne, erweist sich dann als schief und 
verfehlt. 
Zum anderen: Die grundsätzliche Infragestellung der Möglichkeit theologischer 
Ethik ist primär theologisch zu erörtern, nicht ethisch. Denn diese Infragestellung 
enthält die prinzipielle Bestreitung der Möglichkeit, Gott allgemein zu denken. Der 
Streit um die theologische Ethik entscheidet sich deswegen in und an der Gottes-
frage. Dieser Streit sprengt aber den Rahmen jeder ethischen Frage- und Aufgabe-
stellung. Er ist deshalb auch nicht innerhalb der Ethik selbst zu lösen und auszu-
tagen. Allenfalls an der Grenzen des Ethischen – den Erfahrungen von Schuld, 
Schicksal, Scheitern, Mißlingen, Tod – berühren sich theologische und ethische 
Fragestellung.… Theologie muß die Selbständigkeit der Ethik freigeben, um gerade 
zu sich selbst als Theologie zu finden. Sie hat darum zu unterscheiden zwischen der 
Evidenz der Ethischen Forderung und der Evidenz des Glaubens, zwischen der Er-
leuchtung, welche allein der Heilige Geist als Geist der Wahrheit zu gewähren ver-
mag, und der Erleuchtung aufgrund des Lichtes der Vernunft. 
Schließlich: Ein Ausgehen von konkreten ethischen Aufgaben und Fragen erweist 
die Komplexität ethischer Urteile, Motive, Beweggründe des Handelns, Wahl der 
Mittel und Orientierungen an Zielen und Zwecken bilden ein komplexes Handlungs-
gefüge, dessen Untersuchung und Bewertung eben nicht durch den Rückgriff auf ein 
einziges Prinzip zu leisten ist.
753
  
                                                          
752
 When concerned with human rights for instance one should “erkennen, wie weithin christliche Motive 
in den Menschenrechten aufgenommen waren…” This does not make it problematic that today “berufen 
sich die Menschenrechte auf die Evidenz der Vernunft, nicht auf Gottes Gebot.” M. Honecker, Sozialethik 
zwischen Tradition und Vernunft (1977), p.139. However, one should add, that Honecker usually takes a 
rather tentative approach in difficult matters of (Christian) ethics. And in the introduction to Sozialethik 
zwischen Tradition und Vernunft he holds that; “Theologische Ethik nimmt vielmehr eine Mittelstellung 
ein zwischen der allgemeinen „humanen‟ Ethik, deren Methoden und Argumentationsweisen, ihrer Beruf-
ung auf die Evidenz der Vernunft einerseits, und der christlichen Glaubenslehre und ihrer Überlieferung 
andererseits.” M. Honecker, Sozialethik zwischen Tradition und Vernunft (1977), p.7. 
753
 M. Honecker, “Das Problem des theologischen Konstruktivismus”, Zeitschrift für Theologie und 
Kirche 1980, p.108.  
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It is worth noting in this text how Honecker starts with an idea of moral evidence and 
ends up by emphasising the complexity we normally have to face when making moral 
judgements within the framework of a modern society. The very idea of moral evidence 
which Honecker draws so heavily upon in his social ethics
754
, is obviously considered 
fully compatible with an idea of complexity and even with a feeling of “Ratlosigkeit und 
Verlegenheit der von neuen Herausforderungen, neuen Situationen und neuen Auf-
gabenstellungen Betroffenen.”755 One of Honecker‟s main point is obviously that 
complexity and uncertainty require that we seek evidence through shared efforts and 
rational arguments. 
It should also be remarked that Honecker is very much aware of “die Krise der Ver-
nunft”756, – which might be a hindrance to broad agreement through public reasoning 
and not least for settling human rights which all parties can reasonably recognise.
757
 But 
Honecker nevertheless goes for the better argument in matters of social ethics and 
stresses the role of reason in political affairs and public discourse, – even if “die Krise 
der Vernunft” goes very deep and must be considered a constant source of anxiety.758 
                                                          
754
 Let it here be inserted that Honecker does not provide us with a precise philosophical explanation 
what concerns his use of the term “evidence”, neither does he specify very exactly what should count as 
proper sources of moral evidence. However, it should be sufficiently clear what he aims at, and not least 
which positions he is criticising. Let it for instance be remarked that Honecker is clearly criticising the 
Barthian position  within which he himself is theologically educated  and instead finds reason to hold 
forth “was erst ethische Einsichten gesellschaftlich relevant macht, nämlich die Bildung eines ethischen 
Konsensus durch rationale Diskussion und Verständigung aufgrund von allgemeiner Evidenz.” 
M.Honecker, Sozialethik zwischen Tradition und Vernunft (1977), p. 200. 
755
 M. Honecker, Einführung in die Theologische Ethik, Grundlagen und Grundbegriffe (1990), p. x.  
756
 Thus Honecker can clearly stress that a “geschichtsspekulativ begründete Fortschrittsoptimismus mit 
dem Glauben an den Sieg des Vernünftig-Guten in der Geschichte wurde im 20. Jahrhundert aber radikal 
erschüttert.” M.Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.2. 
757
 “Die Krise der Vernunft, ihre Reduktion auf bloß rationale Effizienz, das Ausklammern der humanen 
Orientierung, die Reduzierung auf an sich bloß technisch „vernünftige‟ rationale Verfahren hat in der 
Gegenwart Zweifel an der Tragfähigkeit der Vernunft geweckt. Solche Zweifel an der Vernunft als Mittel 
und Verständigungsgrundlage zwischen grundsätzlich allen Menschen trifft jedoch auch die Menschen-
rechte. Denn die Menschenrechte beanspruchen als universale Forderung, „vernünftig‟, einsichtig zu sein.” 
M. Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p. 163. 
758
 The role that Honecker ascribes to the “Vernunft” within the field of morals should already be 
sufficiently demonstrated. Let me, however, once more stress a main concern in Honecker‟s conception: 
“Vernünftige Diskussion und Reflexion sollen Kommunikation ermöglichen. Der vernünftige Diskurs ist 
die einzige vorstellbare Alternative zu Unterwerfung, Überredung und damit zu Gewalt oder einem 
autoritären Diktat. Anerkennung und Zustimmung können nur frei gegeben werden. Deswegen sollte 
Zustimmung vernünftig einsehbar und begründbar sein. Vernunft ist, so verstanden, nicht substantiell zu 
begreifen, nicht als Sachverhalt, Gegenstand, bestimmte Meinung oder Norm zu identifizieren. Sie soll 
lediglich Grundlage kommunikativer Verständigung sein. Vernunft kann sich deshalb nur im Gebrauch 
zeigen. Sie ist zudem nicht uniform. Am besten wäre es sogar von „Vernünften‟ im Plural zu reden und so 
geschichtliche Vernunft, technische Vernunft, praktische Vernunft, theoretische Rationalität, humane 
Vernunft differenzierend zu benennen. Der Theologe weiß schließlich auch um die Versuchungen und 
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Honecker clearly realises that even the political values and moral doctrines which some 
people consider most rational and reasonable, may be considered highly unreasonable 
and unacceptable by others
759
, and there may often be no conclusive argument, by which 
such deep disagreement can be removed. Nevertheless, Honecker observes that there is 
no way to return back to a pre-enlightened age.
760
 
The idea of moral evidence in Honecker‟s conception of social ethics in fact goes well 
together with an insight into the crisis of reason and morality. The idea of moral evi-
dence is accompanied by an insight in the very apory of morality, as elaborated in a 
well-known article by Gerhard Ebeling, which Honecker refers to.
761
 When concerned 
with ethics one might very soon realise that in “den Erfahrungen von Schuld, Schicksal, 
Scheitern, Mißlingen, Tod  berühren sich theologische und ethische Fragestellung”.762 
The idea of an Evidenz des Ethischen” is in Honecker‟s theological conception of 
ethics, just as in Ebeling‟s, accompanied by a clear awareness of the “Aporie des 
Ethischen”, which means that the phenomenon of ethics raises questions that cannot be 
answered or solved within the moral field itself. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Gefahren eines Mißbrauchs der Vernunft, um die Möglichkeit ihrer Verfehlung und Selbstverfehlung, 
darum daß Vernunft ”blind”, falsch und irrend werden kann. Die Vernunft, die Gabe Gottes ist, ist stets 
auch die Vernunft des von Gott abgefallenen Menschen, die Vernunft des Sünders. Dies veranlaßt zu 
Bescheidenheit und Demut und hält alle ethische Reflexion zu skeptischer Selbstkritik an.” M. Honecker, 
Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.xii. 
759
 That was in some respects the problem when an appropriate abortion-law for society was about to be 
settled. 
760
 “Vielmehr ist jetzt davon auszugehen, daß die Aufklärung ein epochal neues Bewußsein von der Auf-
gabe der Vernunft und von der Ausrichtung der Gesellschaft und den Regeln der Vernunft gebracht hat. 
Ein Gesellschaftsbild und eine sozialethische Theorie ist seit der Aufklärung nicht mehr in derselben 
Weise möglich, wie dies vor der Aufklärung möglich war: Staat und Gesellschaft sind einem nachauf-
geklärten Bewußtsein radikal weltlich, diesseitig, säkular geworden. Der sakrale Umschluß des mittel-
alterlichen Gesellschaftsbildes ist zerbrochen. An seine Stelle trat die vernünftige Evidenz eines humanen 
Anspruchs. … Seit der Aufklärung hat sich die Ethik verselbständigt: Sie begründet sich mit Hilfe der 
praktischen Vernunft unabhängig von Religion und besonderen Weltanschauungen und beruft sich auf die 
allgemeine rationale Evidenz des ethischen Anspruchs.” M. Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Ein-
führung in die evangelische Sozialethik, Gütersloher (1978), p. 21f. 
761
 According to Gerhard Ebeling we have now arrived at the point “wo die Scheidewand zwischen dem 
ethischen Problem und der Sache der Theologie hauchdünn wird…” G. Ebeling, Wort und Glaube II 
(1969), p.25.And he adds: “Bei der Untersuchung des Phänomens des Ethischen waren wir gelegentlich 
an eine Grenze gestoßen, über die es selbst nicht hinausführte, aber hinauswies. Zum Wesen der Ethik ge-
hört es offenbar, daß sich ihre Problematik in Dimensionen weitet, für die sie nicht zuständig ist, in Fragen 
mit denen unter ethischem Gesichtspunkt nicht fertig zu werden ist. Es ist Vorsicht geboten, daraufhin 
vom Ethischen her die Sache der Theologie ohne weiteres für legitimiert zu halten. Das Vorliegen von 
Aporien berechtigt nicht, jede sich anbietende Lösung zu akseptieren. Mit dem Aufweis religiöser Be-
dürfnisse ist die Wahrheit des Glaubens nicht eo ipso erwiesen. Es könnte ja sein, daß über das Ethische 
hinaus nichts anderes auszusagen bleibt als eine unauflösliche Aporie des Ethischen, die wir uns nicht 
durch religiöse Illusionen verschleiern dürfen.” G. Ebeling, Wort und Glaube II (1969), p.32. 
762
 M. Honecker, “Das Problem des theologischen Konstruktivismus”, Zeitschrift für Theologie und 
Kirche 1980, p.108. 
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Thus Honecker‟s idea of an “Evidenz des Ethischen” goes well together both with a 
recognition of the limits of ethics and with an insight in the apories raised within ethics 
itself and with an awareness of the uncertainty of human judgement in ethical (and pol-
itical) matters of great complexity. By stressing the idea of an “Evidenz ethischer Über-
legungen” Honecker sets a goal for public reasoning and draws on people‟s shared 
moral resources in matters of common social and political significance. In this con-
nection Honecker is critical of what he characterises as “dogmatism” in social ethics and 
politics.
763
 He considers it necessary to consider both historical, social, cultural, political 
aspects as well as essential elements of history and tradition when facing the complexity 
of modern societies. The different aspects have to be taken into account in what Hon-
ecker characterises as a “Konvergenzargumentation”.764   
The very complexity of modern societies, makes necessarily “die Begrenztheit unserer 
menschlichen Erkenntnis deutlich…”765 And so Honecker‟s idea of rational evidence 
also accords well with what one might characterise as an “epistemic humility”766 when 
questions about the better knowledge are raised. Honecker takes it for granted that vital 
problems of social ethics and politics in modern highly complex societies can only be 
solved via reasonable communication and social co-operation between all of the citizens 
involved. Christian social ethics therefore has to be essentially “dialogical” according to 
                                                          
763
 “Eine dogmatische Grundlegung der Ethik führt leicht zum Dogmatismus, zu einer axiomatischen 
Deduktion ethischer Forderungen aus theologischen Grundsätzen und Prinzipien. Ein solcher Dogma-
tismus verfehlt nicht nur allzuleicht die jeweilige reale Situation, die Empirie, sondern ist darüber hinaus 
eine Form der Immunisierung gegen die Widerlegung durch die Realität. An die Stelle der Evidenz 
ethischer Überlegungen treten in diesem Fall autoritativer Ansprüche. Eine derartige dogmatische Im-
munisierungsstrategie entzieht theologische Ethik den Einwänden einer allgemeinen kritischen Ethik. Der 
Dogmatismus kann nämlich darauf verzichten, den Geltungsanspruch des ethisch Gebotenen einer krit-
ischen Prüfung seitens der Vernunft auszusetzen.” M. Honecker, Sozialethik Zwischen Tradtition und 
Vernunft, p. 6f. His critique against “dogmatism” in social ethics, makes Honecker sceptical towards 
elaborating a substantive Christian social ethics, as is already underlined. Nevertheless he can also add 
that  “schließlich ist die Ablehnung einer besonderen materialen christlichen Sozialethik auch nicht 
dahingehend zu interpretieren, daß es überhaupt keine christliche Verhaltensweisen gebe, sondern sie 
besagt nur: Soweit es die ethischen Normen menschlichen Zusammenlebens in der Gesellschaft betrifft, 
also das, was für jedermann gilt, können diese Normen material nicht „christlich‟ gefüllt sein.” M. 
Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p. 25. 
764
 Cf. “Das Problem des theologischen Konstruktivismus”, Zeitschrift für evangelische Ethik, 1980, 
p.100. 
765
 M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.646 
766
 The term “epistemic humility” is not taken from Honecker. In the book Den politiske orden (1994, ed. 
E.O.Eriksen) Harald Grimen has written about: “Fornuftig usemje og epistemisk resignasjon”. I have 
modified Grimen‟s term “epistemic resignation”. To get a term that in my opinion fits better within Martin 
Honecker‟s conception of social ethics, I have accordingly chosen the notion “epistemic humility”which I 
find very appropriate for my purpose here. 
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Honecker.  
What I have here called an “epistemic humility” actually plays a very important role in 
most of Honecker‟s writings about social ethics, which can easily be seen. There are at 
least three theological perspectives, which makes the “limitation” of our natural judge-
ment/reasoning in matters of social ethics and substantive politics obvious. 
I. The very notion of revelation seems to imply not just that some divine truths are made 
accessible (in an extraordinary way), but also implies that something remains hidden. In 
other words, in the very act of revelation “deus revelatus” implicitly refers to “deus ab-
sconditus”. Honecker takes this into account not just as an issue of theological dogma, 
but in social ethics as well.
767
 In matters concerning social ethics, politics and the 
worldly order there are  theologically spoken  epistemic limits that even the most 
rational (or pious) human being has to respect. When trying to get full insight in the 
worldly regime of God, people will be left with the world as an opus absconditum 
dei.
768
 Churches (and Christians) respecting this, cannot behave, in the worldly realm, as 
if they had a privileged access to an infallible moral code that is exclusively and fully at 
the Church‟s own disposal. In so far as Churches and Christians are involved in politics, 
it must be understood that the positions they take are to be publicly judged, critically 
assessed
769
, and continually revised as a result of an ongoing public debate, in which 
Christians are participants alongside with non-Christian citizens. Honecker therefore 
finds it important to correct what he characterises as an “instruktionstheoretisch” ap-
proach to divine revelation which he fears could render reasons provided by Churches/-
Christians in matters of politics rather “esoteric”.770 
                                                          
767
 Very often, however, this issue is discussed – as for instance by Luther and Karl Barth – in connection 
with the doctrine of predestination. 
768
 Therefore Honecker can say: “Theologische Ethik teilt vielmehr die Ungewißheiten der Gegenwart; 
sie erfährt sie als opus absconditum dei. Gottes Handeln ist dem Menschen weithin verborgen. Ein tiefes 
Mißtrauen gegenüber allen theologischen Positionen, denen Gottes Wille manifest, eindeutig erkennbar 
und greifbar zur Verfügung steht, ist angebracht. Deswegen kann ich auch die Ethik nicht auf eine Offen-
barungstheorie stützen, erst recht nicht auf ein positivistisches Verständnis von Offenbarung. Ist der Re-
kurs auf ein absolutes Offenbarungswissen nicht möglich, dann bleibt aber nur der Weg, mit ethischen 
Fragen „vernünftig und verständig‟ umzugehen.” M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p. xi. 
769
 “Christliche Anschauung weltlicher Wirklichkeit ist verbesserungsfähig und kritikwürdig. Eine mit 
dem christlichen Glauben vereinbare Weltanschauung kann keinen totalitären Anspruch erheben. Sie muß 
die Freiheit der Wahrheitssuche zulassen. Damit wird sie unausweichlich pluralistisch, tolerant und rela-
tiv.” M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.74. 
770
 “In der Neuzeit wird Offenbarung zunächst instruktionstheoretisch verstanden: Offenbarung wird  
supranaturalistisch  zur Information über unbekannte Heilstatsachen oder Wahrheiten. Die Haltung des 
Menschen gegenüber solcher Offenbarung ist dann die des Gehorsams, die Anerkennung göttlicher 
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According to Honecker, decisions taken by the churches, the Christians or the theo-
logians in questions of politics and social ethics can in no way be taken as the “in-
disputable”, “absolute” results of a revelationary insight. Honecker makes it quite clear 
that “…jeder Form von autoritärer Moralvermittlung sehe ich kritisch.”771 The Church 
itself should have special reasons for being sceptical towards definitive solutions and 
ultimate “Letztbegründungen” in questions of social ethics. 
“Den Beitrag theologischer Ethik sehe ich nicht in der Verkündigung letzter Heils-
wahrheiten, sondern in einer Anleitung zur eigenständigen Urteilsbildung. Dialog 
und Beratung prägen daher den Stil ethischer Argumentation.”772 
The complexity of society as well as the limits on our judgement and capacity for rea-
soning, are clearly taken into account by Honecker as well as by Rawls. It is charac-
teristic of Honecker that he continually emphasises that “unsere Einsicht ist immer nur 
bruchstückhaft”, not least when we are engaging in politics and social co-operation.773 
II. A theological insight into the limitations on human reason might supposedly also be 
underpinned by arguments taken from hamartiology. Human beings are endowed by 
their Creator with the gift of reason which helps them manage life, but human reason is 
simultaneously to be considered the ratio of a sinner.
774
 From this perspective one might 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Autorität. Zugleich beansprucht solches Offenbarungsverständnis im Sinne einer Mitteilung von bislang 
unbekannten göttlichen Wahrheiten eine spezifische Rationalität. Daraus folgt ein Dualismus von natür-
licher Erkenntnis und Offenbarungswahrheit. Offenbarung wird als besondere Weise der Erkenntnis ver-
standen. Die Glaubwürdigkeit solcher übernatürlicher Offenbarungswahrheiten muß apologetisch bewisen 
werden.” M.Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.73 
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 M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p. ix 
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 M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p. x. 
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 According to Honecker one has to conclude as follows: “… daß die theologische Erkenntnis Einblick 
in eine besondere Tiefendimesion der Gesellschaft gewähren kann, ist nicht nachzuweisen. Auch profane 
Vernunft kann Entfremdung, Repression und Unmenschlichkeit, die durch gesellschaftliche Strukturen, 
soziale Verhältnisse und inhumanes Handeln verursacht sind, aufzeigen. Dazu bedarf es nicht eines be-
sonderen theologischen Tiefenblicks, der dämonische Mächte am Werk sieht. Theologische Sozialethik 
wird sich freilich auch dessen bewusst sein, daß die Realität komplexer und vielfältiger ist als unsere Vor-
stellungen von ihr. Aber die Korrekturbedürftigkeit gesellschaftlicher Erkenntnis ist kein Alibi für theo-
logische Weltfremdheit; die Theologie kann allenfalls vor dem sozialphilosophischen Traum warnen, man 
könne das Ganze der Gesellschaft verstehen und interpretieren. … Das Ganze, die Totalität zu verstehen, 
kann nur uneinlösbare Aufgabe, aber niemals gelungenes Resultat sein. Daher spreche ich nur von Grund-
tendenzen der pluralistischen, industriellen und aufgeklärten Gesellschaft, um die Unabgeschlossenheit 
des gesellschaftlichen Prozesses und noch mehr des Verständnisses dieses Prozesses zum Ausdruck zu 
bringen. Unsere Einsicht ist immer nur bruchstückhaft, weil die Geschichte selbst ein Feld offener Mög-
lichkeiten ist. Aber auch die Erkenntnis von Fragmenten reicht für eine im allgemeinen zureichende 
Bestimmung des gesellschaftlichen Standorts aus.” M.Honecker, Konzept einer sozialethischen Theorie. 
Grundfragen evangelischer Sozialethik (1971), p.10f. 
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 “Die Vernunft, die Gabe Gottes ist, ist stets auch die Vernunft des von Gott abgefallenen Menschen, 
die Vernunft des Sünders. Dies veranlaßt zu Bescheidenheit und Demut und hält alle ethische Reflexion 
zu skeptischer Selbstkritik an.” M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik 1995, p.xii. What concerns the 
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take the “insufficiency” of our reasoning as stemming from bias, from evil-mindedness 
and from permanent defects in the human capacity for moral reasoning. However, in this 
connection we are especially concerned with the shortcoming and limitations of reason 
when it is at its best, i.e. when it is properly exercised  within the domain of its un-
disputed competence – in questions of politics and social coexistence. And in this per-
spective should theology not deny or ignore the competence of reason.
775
 
III. Honecker‟s theological treatment of the limitation on ratio and our capacity of 
moral reasoning in matters of political and social ethics is not primarily dependent upon 
a doctrine of hamartiology. It is to a wide extent rather eschatologically motivated, al-
though not in the sense that Christian eschatology is converted into a “programmatic 
doctrine” for social ethics, but in the sense that there are “limitations” characterising the 
scheme of this “ai)w/n” that should not (and cannot) be removed by political means. In 
an eschatological perspective the difference between a perfect knowledge sub specie 
aeternitatis and the insight gained by ordinary (political) reasoning and examination 
becomes clear. In an eschatological perspective it seems clear that “our gifts of know-
ledge and of inspired messages are only partial; but [first] when what is perfect comes, 
then what is partial will disappear.” (1.Cor.13,9f.). The church does well to heed the 
eschatological difference, simultaneously taking into account the difference between the 
church as an eschatological communio sanctorum and as an empirical association in 
society with conflicts, considerable diversity and widespread uncertainty about issues of 
social ethics.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
notion of sin  in a perspective of ethics  cf. also M. Honecker, Einführung in die Theologische Ethik, 
Grundlagen und Grundbegriffe (1990), pp.50-59. 
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 Wilfried Joest underlines for instance that Luther himself can stress positively the proper role both of 
“sensus und ratio” in matters of civil justice and ordinary affairs. This is an essential aspect of Luther‟s 
theological conception of man that is underlined by Joest as follows: “Ratio kann speziell das formal-
logische Schlußverfahren bezeichnen, aber auch allgemeiner die praktische Urteilskraft in Bezug auf das 
bonum temporale (z.B. die Rechtsordnung und ihre iustitia civilis); und schließlich überhaupt die Fähig-
keit des Menschen, die Weltgegebenheiten in ihrem innerweltlichen Aspekt zu erfassen. Sensus bezeich-
net natürlich zunächst das sinnliche Wahrnehmungsvermögen im engeren Sinn, aber oft auch allgemeiner 
das sich auf Wahrnehmung und rationale Verarbeitung gründende „Meinen‟ des Menschen; sogar das 
Meinen und Schließen des Menschen über seinen eigenen geistlichen Lebensstand auf Grund des in seel-
ischer Wahrnehmung Gefühlten (worin für Luther freilich bereits eine Grenzüberschreitung des sensus 
geschieht). In den jeweils allgemeineren Bedeutungsnuancen tendieren beide Begriffe dahin, zusammen-
zufallen.… Die Formel „sensus et ratio‟ gewinnt dann den mehr technischen Sinn: die Potenz des Men-
schen zum Weltwissen in den beiden speziellen modi von dessen Zustandekommen. Diesen Sinn dürfte sie 
vor allem dort haben, wo das Erkennen durch sensus und ratio formell dem Erkennen des Glaubens aus 
dem Wort gegenüberstellt wird.” W. Joest, Ontologie der Person bei Luther (1967), p.102f. Discussing 
Luther‟s conception of man more thoroughly would be beyond the scope of my thesis. But it may never-
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5.5.2. Rawls stressing the “burdens of judgment” 
Honecker stresses the limits of human reason, but might nevertheless be taken as repre-
sentative of a reasonable theological approach to social ethics and the question of the 
value formation of society.  
And as already emphasised, Rawls for his part makes it clear that the comprehensive 
doctrines, existing in modern pluralist societies, as well as the persons holding them, 
should be reasonable when addressing questions of basic justice and premises for social 
co-operation. This is a precondition for arriving at shared moral premises for coexist-
ence that can widely be recognised as fair.
776
 Thus Rawls unquestionably and quite 
strongly assumes the reasonableness of comprehensive doctrines and places trusts in 
public reason in matters of shared political interest, but it has to be added that he simul-
taneously demonstrates a fundamental insight in the limits of reason, and tries to draw 
the necessary consequences from this insight. As a result, Rawls approach does not 
differ significantly from that of the theologian Martin Honecker. 
Before undertaking an analysis of Rawls conception of public reason, a fairly extensive 
discussion of Rawls‟ elaboration and use of the burdens of judgement is in order. This 
phenomenon was previously touched upon when I considered pluralism, but now I have 
to take some further steps and discuss some aspects more thoroughly. Let me first pre-
sent an abridged summary of the kind of “burdens” which according to Rawls are neces-
sarily incumbent upon our (moral) judgement: 
1. Reality is complex and conflicting data might be hard to assess.  
2. We may consider the same aspects relevant, but disagree about their weight. 
3. Our moral and political concepts are often vague, and need interpretation. 
4. When assessing evidence, we are influenced by our total experience. 
5. There might be different kinds of normative considerations of varying force. 
6. All systems of social institutions have a limited social space. All that is valuable, 
cannot be realised simultaneously, and we have to set priorities. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
theless be of some interest to suggest (with support from W. Joest) that Luther in affairs concerning the 
„iustitia civilis‟ could draw decisively on the „sensu et ratio‟ of natural man.   
776
 Let me, however, recall that Rawls differs from Kant and Locke in so far as he will avoid claiming the 
reasonableness of Christianity (or religion more generally) on premises that are in themselves philosophi-
cally comprehensive and doctrinaire.  
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Some of these aspects may also be found in Honecker‟s thoughts. But it is in no way 
obvious that all of the different factors which comprise the list of “burdens of judgment” 
 as set forth by Rawls  should be assumed from a theological point of view. And an 
acceptance of these burdens of judgement may perhaps further relativism (and even 
advance scepticism). Recognising these kinds of burdens on our judgement means that 
we have to accept that people can plausibly be expected to disagree upon vital issues, 
even when they are being rational, and even when they are being most reasonable and 
honest. 
I have already suggested that the disagreement between people which follows from such 
“burdens”, should not be explained as stemming from evil-mindedness or (temporarily) 
defects in people‟s capacity of reasoning and making inferences. One simply has to take 
into account that even people who are perfectly reasonable and highly moral will most 
likely end up with religious views, moral doctrines and conceptions of the good that 
differ radically. Thus it can easily be understood why it is so difficult for people to 
arrive at the truth in matters of religion, politics and morals. Rawls even takes one 
further step such that the insight in – and recognition of – the burdens of judgement is 
itself taken as a constitutive part of what it means to be reasonable. 
In Ethics Leif Wenar recently delivered “An Internal Critique” of Rawlsian political 
liberalism.
777
 Among other things in his article, Wenar specifically discusses the way 
Rawls conceives of “the burdens of judgment”, and he finds it very unlikely that the 
majority of religious persons, groups and churches should ever be ready to accept a 
“fallibilist” view like the one which is presented to us by Rawls. 
Wenar's essay tentatively takes a Catholic perspective in its approach to Rawls
778
, but 
his argument is, in principle, intended to apply more generally. Thus Wenar emphasises 
“that Catholic doctrine is only cited here as a particularly clear exemplar of religious 
doctrine.”779 If Rawls really claims  as Wenar assumes  that religious citizens, as for 
instance those belonging to the Catholic church, must acknowledge (or at least not deny) 
“the burdens of judgment” before they can count as reasonable persons capable of 
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 Cf. L. Wenar, “Political Liberalism: An Internal Critique”, Ethics (1995, vol. 106, No. 1), p.32-62. 
778
 This is made an integrated part of his internal critique. 
779
 L. Wenar, “Political Liberalism: An Internal Critique”, Ethics (1995, vol. 106, No. 1), p.46. 
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joining into a broader consensus about a common framework for society, there is  
according to Wenar  good reason to believe that an “overlap” should never gain the 
necessary support.  
Moreover, citizens belonging to the Catholic Church should not be expected to support 
such an overlap, nor is there any reason to believe that people holding other religious or 
philosophical or moral comprehensive doctrines as we know them, should be eager to 
support a liberal view conceived of in accordance with the “relativist” attitude inherent 
in the very idea of the burdens of judgement sketched out by Rawls. Wenar for his own 
part makes it therefore quite clear that; 
“…the burdens of judgment are at best unnecessary for endorsing the content of a 
liberal view. But the burdens of judgment are more than unnecessary. By insisting 
that they be part of the characterization of the reasonable person, Rawls excludes 
many who could otherwise join a liberal consensus. The burdens of judgment ex-
clude many with sincere religious beliefs. This conclusion is unavoidable once we 
view the burdens of judgment from a perspective both liberal and firmly religious. 
Were we pressing a liberal perfectionist line in which social institutions are designed 
to favor autonomy and experimentation over stultifying superstition these points of 
view should be ignored. But Rawls‟s theory claims to be tenable by members of all 
the main historical faiths (and this without scepticism or hesitancy). So we must 
examine the theory from the viewpoint of religious believers even if we do not our-
selves believe. When we do, we will see why many sincere believers will balk at the 
burdens of judgment. The difficulty is that religious doctrines typically deny that the 
burdens of judgment obtain. This, on reflection, should not be surprising. The bur-
dens of judgment are meant to explain (among other pluralisms) why some people 
believe in one faith, while others believe in other faiths, and still others are agnostics 
and atheists. The explanation essentially says that questions about religion  about 
which is the true faith, if any have truth at all  are hard to think through even under 
the best conditions, and that people answer these questions differently because of 
their particular life experience (because of their ethnicity, class, place in the division 
of labor etc.). By contrast, a religious doctrine  as a purportedly authoritative guide 
to moral requirements and/or salvation  characteristically presents itself as univers-
ally accessible to clear minds and open hearts. When a religious doctrine addresses 
the diversity and lack of religious belief, it is most unlikely to ground its explanation 
in the difficulty of the issues and the limited perspectives of both believers and non-
believers. For this would suggest the likelihood of error on both sides. Rather, her-
esy and infidelity are due to worldly temptation, demonic intervention, divine pre-
destination, and so on  forces within the horizon of the religious doctrine‟s sure 
scheme of value and fact.
780
 … To ask Catholics and other believers, to accept the 
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 And here Wenar refers to the “Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation”, art 6, in The Documents 
of Vatican II, ed. Walter M. Abbot, New York: Herder & Herder, 1966: “This sacred Synod affirms, 
„God, the beginning and end of all things, can be known with certainty from created reality by the light of 
human reason.‟ (see Rom. 1:20), but the Synod teaches that it is through His revelation „that those 
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burdens of judgment is to ask them to abandon unnecessarily fundamental aspects of 
their faith and their attitude toward it. This is unnecessary because the Catholic 
church, like other established churches, now endorses a political view sympathetic to 
(and sometimes indistinguishable from) the content of justice as fairness.”781 
According to Wenar the idea of the burdens of judgement, as described by Rawls; 
 should in fact exclude many with sincere religious beliefs, since it in fact demands 
from them that they abandon fundamental aspects of their faith,
782
 
 should not be required for the sake of upholding the fundamental idea of toleration in 
society, 
 should not be reckoned as an inherent part of a conception of political liberalism that 
aims at being widely approved of.
783
  
Let me start with the latter of these objections: According to Wenar “the burdens of 
judgment” are considered an accidental and unnecessary part of political liberalism, 
which adds nothing essential to the presentation of justice as fairness. This would also 
mean that a recognition of these “burdens” is not taken to be required to maintain liberal 
constitutional principles as for instance liberty of conscience and freedom of thought, 
which are so closely connected with the idea of justice as fairness. And it might very 
well be possible to accept an idea of reasonable coexistence and fair co-operation with-
out simultaneously recognising the burdens of judgement as a precondition to realising 
                                                                                                                                                                          
religious truths which are by their nature accessible to human reason can be known by all men with ease, 
with solid certitude, and with no trace of error, even in the present state of the human race.” 
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 L. Wenar, “Political Liberalism: An Internal Critique”, Ethics (1995, vol. 106, No. 1), pp.43-45. 
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 Although Rawls makes ideal theory  it would be a crucial objection to his proposal for consensus if 
many representatives of the main historical religions in fact considered the Rawlsian “overlap” to be so 
conceived of that they felt excluded (and accordingly would deny support). In such a case I think that 
Rawls had to revise his theory. Wenar takes, as mentioned, his point of departure from a particular com-
prehensive religious doctrine, namely the Catholic one. Since Rawls himself has made an endorsement 
from the perspective of different religious, moral and philosophical doctrines an integrated part of his own 
theory, the kind of critique against Rawls‟ conception, set fort by Wenar on the basis of a very influential 
church-perspective, should have considerable weight, and might in fact also be considered a critique held 
within the “internal” framework of Rawls‟ own conception. What Wenar, however, is not doing, is to dis-
cuss the theological platform from which he himself criticises Rawls‟ conception. Is it really so that relig-
ious persons  when accepting the burdens of judgement  have to “abandon fundamental aspects of their 
faith”, as Wenar writes? Of course it may be sufficient for Wenar‟s argument that many Christians in fact 
have this opinion. But in order to answer such questions theologically adequately, it is necessary to go be-
yond a mainly  “internal” perspective. 
783
 This critique might also be considered “internal”, since Wenar obviously means that Rawls – by 
bringing into his theory controversial epistemological doctrines as expressed in the “burdens”, in fact 
undermines his own intention of developing a conception of political liberalism that is so undoctrinairily 
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this idea. According to Wenar it would be better to remove the idea of the burdens of 
judgements, with its sceptical implications, from a political liberalism, which goal is a 
broad overlapping consensus about a shared framework for coexistence in pluralist 
democratic societies. The idea of the “the burdens of judgment” is in fact to be con-
sidered a serious obstacle for establishing an overlapping consensus, since the relativist 
assumptions cannot be widely accepted. But since the idea of the burdens of judgement 
 according to Wenar  does not essentially and necessarily belong to political liberal-
ism, these epistemological assumptions can be removed without undermining the es-
sential concerns of political liberalism as such. Political liberalism should according to 
Wenar rather be strengthened and be made far more endorsable if these “burdens” are 
not considered as an integral part of a political conception. 
Wenar also holds that there is nothing incoherent in rejecting the idea of “the burdens of 
judgment” while continuing to defend the principles of toleration and the liberty of 
conscience, as many Christians have done. Toleration might perfectly well be defended 
on the basis of the dignity, integrity and freedom that Christians ascribe to human beings 
as created in the image of God. The “relativist” assumptions manifested in the burdens 
of judgement are therefore not to be taken as a necessary prerequisite for developing an 
attitude of toleration. 
Let me conclude this as follows: If the “burdens” are maintained, the result would  
according to Wenar  be a doctrinaire liberalism which would be unnecessarily com-
prehensive , relativist and sceptical, and could most likely never be taken as an appro-
priate basis for an overlapping consensus. 
The critical view, held by Wenar, is quite different from the point of view taken by 
Harald Grimen.
784
 In an English summary following an article on the issue of political 
stability and the burdens of judgement
785
 Grimen emphasises that his intention has been; 
“… to analyse the part played by John Rawls‟ analysis of „the burdens of judgement‟ 
in his idea of how a political conception of justice can gain support by overlapping 
                                                                                                                                                                          
conceived of that it might gain the support from citizens holding very different religious, moral and 
philosophical doctrines.  
784
 Cf. H. Grimen: “Fornuftig usemje og epistemisk resignasjon”, Den politiske orden, Ed. Erik Oddvar 
Eriksen, Tano 1994, p. 70 - 123  and 
785
 H. Grimen: “Politisk stabilitet og „The burdens of judgement‟”, Norsk Statsvitenskapelig Tidsskrift 
(1994, no.2, pp.133 - 152). 
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consensus in a constitutional regime. [And he adds that:] It is argued that, for several 
reasons, the analysis of „the burdens of judgement‟ is the most central aspect of 
Rawls way of dealing with stability.”786  
I shall not in detail discuss Grimen‟s essay, but limit myself to pointing out some of the 
arguments he uses for considering the burdens of judgement an essential and integrated 
part of a Rawlsian political liberalism: 
First: Insight into “the burdens of judgement” is closely connected to the distinction 
between reasonable and unreasonable disagreement that is a characteristic of Rawls‟ 
theory of political liberalism. According to Rawls (and to Grimen) insight in the burdens 
of judgement is in itself a distinctive mark of a reasonable person. And therefore there 
can be no doubt that Rawls himself takes an acceptance of these “burdens” to be char-
acteristic of a liberal society. And the very idea cannot so easily be removed from pol-
itical liberalism.  
Second: Grimen also seems to agree with Rawls that an insight in the burdens of judge-
ment will most likely support and strengthen the disposition for toleration in modern 
societies.
787
 It is supposed to be a close connection between accepting the burdens of 
judgement and tolerating a reasonable disagreement in society. Persons without an in-
sight in the burdens of judgement are more likely to explain disagreement as a result of 
bad will, errors, short-sightedness, self-interest and/or egoism
788
, while an acceptance of 
the burdens of judgement should provide us with prima facie reasons for respecting 
kinds of disagreement,  and especially when disagreement cannot be argumentatively 
removed, – even by the most serious attempts made by the most reasonable persons. 
I agree with Grimen that there can be little doubt that Rawls himself
789
 considers the 
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 Norsk Statsvitenskapelig Tidsskrift, Universitetsforlaget 1994, p.152. Grimen says that the very idea of 
„the burdens of judgement‟ as presented by Rawls, may be characterised as “viktigaste ideén i hans syn på 
grunnlaget for støtte og stabilitet for ei politisk oppfatting om rettferd i eit demokratisk samfunn.” Ibid, 
p.133.  
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 This does not exclude additional reasons for maintaining toleration.  
788
 This seems to be confirmed also by Wenar, when he for instance writes: “Catholic doctrine seems to 
imply that evil forces had a role in the Reformation and subsequent religious fragmentation, although 
members of separated churches now are guilty of no more than being descended of those who were mis-
led. The progress of human reason under free institutions does not enter into the Catholic version of the 
rise of pluralism, since a Catholic may well see this as „progress‟ away from the truth. And why should 
one not see reasonable pluralism as at least unfortunate – even if one is not a Catholic? … Could one not 
reasonably see modern history as the intensification of tragic conflicts of value?” L. Wenar, “Political 
Liberalism: An Internal Critique”, Ethics (1995,vol. 106, No. 1), p.47f. 
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 I don‟t think Wenar would disagree in this. Both Wenar and Grimen may be right, at least in one 
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idea of the “burdens” an integral part of political liberalism and takes the recognition of 
them as an essential aspect of being reasonable: 
“The first aspect of the reasonable, then, is the willingness to propose fair terms of 
cooperation and to abide by them provided others do. The second basic aspect, as I 
review now, is the willingness to recognize the burdens of judgment and to accept 
their consequences for the use of public reason in directing legitimate exercise of 
political power in a constitutional regime.”790 
The “burdens”, as listed by Rawls, should to a wide extent serve as an appropriate 
reminder for those who wonder why disagreement and pluralism develop even among 
people who are considered reasonable and honest. A genuine insight in the “burdens” 
might in my opinion have two important consequences, as also shown by Grimen:  
 One should not hastily take disagreement as an expression of bad will, short-sighted-
ness and self-interest. 
 One should not be too optimistic about the possibility of removing value-
disagreement argumentatively (On the other hand: removing it by the means of 
coercive power would be an illiberal solution). 
One might very well understand why the idea of the burdens of judgement is taken as an 
essential aspect of political liberalism. It can at least plausibly be assumed that an ac-
ceptance of “the burdens of judgment” should further an attitude of toleration among all 
citizens and thereby most likely strengthen fair coexistence.
791
 
As shown there can be little doubt that Rawls himself takes the recognition of the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
respect: The idea of “the burdens of judgment” are central to Rawls. But Wenar for his own part considers 
the idea of “the burdens of judgment” to be misplaced and neither necessary for upholding political 
liberalism as such nor required for maintaining the idea of toleration. Wenar is trying to correct and 
improve the theory as conceived of by Rawls in an essential point. 
790
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.54. 
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 Grimen takes the “fundamentalist” as the typical example of a person not recognising the burdens of 
judgement: “For å ha eit omgrep om rimelig fornuftig usemje må ein person kunne forstå synspunkt som 
rimeleg fornuftige, som, på trass av argumentasjon, avvik frå hans eigne. Elles kan han ikkje forklåre 
usemje slik at dei som er usamde, resonnerer og opptrår rimeleg fornuftig. Held han eigne synspunkt som 
rimeleg fornuftige, utan å rå over eit omgrep om rimeleg fornuftig usemje, må han i så fall vise til at andre 
resonnerer og opptrår ufornuftig, for å forklare usemja. Han må vise til interesser, manglende viten, falskt 
medvit, mistak, perspektivblindhet, o.l. Ein slik person er fundamentalist, på grunn av det han ikkje ser. 
Han ser ikkje at data kan vera samansette og motstridande, og at, sjølv om vi er samde om relevante syns-
punkt, kan vi vera usamde om vekting. Han ser ikkje at omgrep er vage og at røynsler formar vurdering. 
Han ser ikkje at det ofte, når verdiar er tema, finst synspunkt av ulik type på alle sider, som må vegast utan 
klåre reglar, og at institusjonar berre kan realisera visse verdiar, slik at vi må velge utan eintydige kri-
terier. Fundamentalistar kan ha eit skilje mellom sant og falskt, fornuftig og ufornuftig. Men dei manglar 
 306 
“burdens of judgment” to be of vital importance. It appears to me that his intention was 
just to present us with some relatively uncontroversial insights taken from epistemology, 
semantics and hermeneutics, that reasonable persons should better have in mind when 
faced with the difficulty of weighing norms, assessing values, explaining diversity and 
arguing fairly in complex matters within modern societies characterised by deep plural-
ism. Rawls has given an account of some essential limitations on our judgement, which 
should be taken into consideration by co-operative citizens representing a diversity of 
comprehensive doctrines. Let it then also be said that;  




 this list of “burdens” might be further specified and completed,  
But the idea itself, that there are essential burdens of judgement and limitations on our 
reasoning which have to be taken into account by people engaged in social co-operation, 
political work and public reasoning, seems plausible.   
But the question of Wenar‟s objection to Rawls remains; – that conceiving of an “over-
lapping consensus” in a way which implies that the parties have to recognise the bur-
dens of judgement, would exclude many with sincere religious beliefs, since what is 
demanded from them in reality is tantamount to an abandonment of fundamental aspects 
of their own faith. If this is the case, Rawls would thereby undermine his own idea of an 
overlapping consensus. For the overlapping consensus is conceived of to be fully ap-




Wenar foresees that the result of making the idea of the burdens of judgement an essen-
tial premise of an overlapping consensus about the very basics of society, would render 
                                                                                                                                                                          
den type reflektert distanse til eigne synspunkt som innsikt i „the burdens of judgement‟ gjev.”H. Grimen, 
Norsk Statsvitenskapelig Tidsskrift (1994), p. 138. 
792
 Charles Larmore, for instance, ascribes a special weight to the fourth of the “burdens” listed by Rawls, 
holding that when assessing evidence and taking norms and values into consideration, we are inevitably 
influenced by our total life-experience. This alone would be sufficient to explain why people arrive at 
different standpoints in matters of value and belief.  
793
 Let me recall that Wenar  at least for the sake of the argument  takes a religious point of departure: 
“…Rawls‟s theory claims to be tenable by members of all the main historical faiths (and this without 
scepticism or hesitancy). So we must examine the theory from the viewpoint of religious believers even if 
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society as such “a community of the uncertain, a society of the unsure.”794 How could 
one really expect citizens, strongly concerned about the role of religion in society, to 
endorse an “overlap” or a liberal conception, which might be supposed to promote both 
uncertainty, hesitancy, indifferentism and scepticism about the religious values and 
moral standards they are most strongly committed to? A liberal approach, drawing so 
strongly on the burdens of judgement as Rawls does, seems to be quite insensitive to 
citizens most sincere and devout religious and moral convictions, according to Wenar. 
There might even be a risk that many faithful believers should ultimately be excluded 
from the class of reasonable citizens in a Rawlsian liberal society, just because they are 
so strongly committed to an uncompromising religious truth. And it might therefore 
properly be asked: Why should religious persons endorse a liberal conception, if they 
have really good reason to fear that it is in fact based on epistemological premises that 
might in the long run undermine fundamental aspects of their own faith by promoting a 
relativist attitude and maybe even a widespread indifference in matters of religious and 
moral significance? 
Wenar admits that Rawls himself sees no danger that an insight in the burdens of judge-
ment might further uncertainty, hesitancy and scepticism about the truth of religion as 
such or of any moral or philosophical comprehensive doctrine.
795
 Nevertheless, Wenar 
maintains his objection: “I think it is clear that they do imply these things.”796  
It is, however, very important to keep in mind that Rawls‟ explicitly intends “to bypass 
religion and philosophy‟s profoundest controversies”797, when concerned with the 
strictly political task of how institutional premises for social co-operation among the 
citizens can fairly be settled and maintained. Society's most fundamental diversity in 
value-commitments as well as its deep conflicts concerning ultimate truth cannot be 
resolved with the most reasonable (political) arguments. Neither can political conflicts 
                                                                                                                                                                          
we do not ourselves believe.” L. Wenar, “Political Liberalism: An Internal Critique”, Ethics (1995, vol. 
106, No. 1), p. 43. 
794
 L. Wenar, “Political Liberalism: An Internal Critique”, Ethics (1995, vol. 106, No. 1), p.48. 
795
 In Political Liberalism Rawls comments on “the scepticism that may seem to be suggested by the 
account of the burdens of judgment. Since scepticism must be avoided if an overlapping consensus of 
reasonable doctrines is to be possible, the account of those burdens must not proceed as a sceptical 
argument.” J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.62f. But in spite of this intention Wenar obviously 
means that Rawls cannot avoid furthering scepticism and relativism, when claiming accept for the 
“burdens”. 
796
 L. Wenar, “Political Liberalism: An Internal Critique”, Ethics (1995, vol. 106, No. 1), p. 46. 
797
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p. 152. 
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in modern pluralist societies be removed by appeal to religious authority. Stressing this, 
Rawls may find support in Honecker‟s theological approach and the way he uses the 
doctrine of the two realms as a hermeneutic key to open up the worldly kingdom as a 
realm of reason
798, simultaneously, however, clearly avoiding a practical “divination” of 
reason. One might draw on an elementary insight into the “burdens” as far as matters of 
the worldly realm are concerned, without thereby “relativising” religious faith as such. 
As far as I can see, there are good reasons for paying due attention to the Rawlsian use 
of the “burdens”:  
I. The burdens of judgement presented by Rawls allow him to provide a plausible ex-
planation for some important aspects of the limitation and difficulties we actually face 
with when reasoning with one another about (political) values and standards. By intro-
ducing the “burdens” Rawls tries to explain in the most plausible way why people, even 
if most of them are reasonable and honest, might nevertheless come to very different 
judgements in matters concerning religious truth, moral values and conceptions of the 
(common) good. Accepting that a diversity of interests and life-plans a well as value-
conflicts and religious diversity should be taken as normal even among moral and 
reasonable persons (and do not depend on evil-mindedness), might be an important 
precondition for arriving at some reasonable political principles for fair coexistence and 
social co-operation (without invoking the coercive powers of the state). The idea that 
there are some elementary burdens of judgement that have to be taken into account by 
people involved in political affairs, social co-operation and matters of social ethics, 
seems plausible in its own right, irrespective of the particular role the “burdens” play in 
political liberalism, – even if it should also be admitted that the different “burdens”, 
listed by Rawls, may not be as uncontroversial as he seems to assume.  
II. Rawls (and Grimen) considers a recognition of the burdens of judgement a prerequi-
site for furthering toleration in society, making it possible to accept that fully reasonable 
persons can disagree in matters concerning vital moral, religious and philosophical 
values. Since an insight into the “burdens” helps us understand that pluralism might be 
both reasonable and argumentatively irremovable, it seems plausible to assume that this 
                                                          
798
Honecker will not deny that “… auch im weltlichen Berecih steht der Glaubende verborgen unter dem 
Anspruch und der Herrschaft Gottes. Er kann nur nicht mit diesem Anspruch politisch argumentieren. 
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insight might also contribute to increasing mutual respect, thereby furthering toleration, 
as Rawls believes. But this does not rule out the possibility that some Christians might 
take their premises for toleration and fair co-operation mainly from the Christian 
(moral) doctrine, or at least from a Biblical perspective on man, as created in the image 
of God. I don‟t think Rawls would really object to this. He accepts that there might be 
(at least) two mutually supportive ideas of toleration. One is purely political while; “The 
other is not purely political but expressed from within a religious or a nonreligious 
doctrine…”799 
However, I think that Wenar has plausibly shown that an insight in these burdens of 
judgement is not strictly necessary for maintaining an idea of toleration. But an insight 
in the “burdens” might nevertheless, as far as I can see, further an attitude of toleration 
in society. In this I think Rawls makes an important and highly plausible point. 
Let us now, at the end of this chapter, conclude by returning to the theological perspec-
tive. In my opinion Honecker came very close to recognising essential “burdens” on our 
judgements in matters of politics,  on theological premises. In so far he might to a wide 
extent be supportive of Rawls‟ idea of the “burdens”. And I think that Honecker has 
argued strongly and plausibly for the view that Churches and Christians are not in a 
privileged epistemic position and have no special book of answers nor a substantive 
insight into worldly things that others cannot likewise be expected to have. Taken as a 
special source of knowledge and a code of instruction in matters of shared politics and 
social ethics the Christian “revelation” might very easily be overtaxed and misused. 
Instead, Christians and churches, who share in the task of upholding a fair scheme of 
society and securing basic justice for all, have to accept the need to establish “evidence” 
by argumentative means, – thereby seeking reconciliation with co-citizens in common 
political affairs through public reasoning. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Luther hat darum sehr wohl bedacht, warum er den Bereich politischen Handelns ein Vernunftreich 
nannte.” M. Honecker, Sozialethik zwischen Tradition und Vernunft (1977), p.55. 
799
 J. Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited (manuscript 1997), p.17. 
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5.6. Reconciliation by public reason?800 
5.6.1. From common sense to public reason 
Although pluralism might be considered radical in modern societies and the chances of 
overcoming it by public reasoning limited, Honecker stresses the idea of ethical evi-
dence, making political discourse and even a certain value-consensus possible. One 
might even say that Honecker, when introducing a theological “Fundamentalunter-
scheidung” between the evidence of faith and the evidence of (public) reason, secures 
for the latter the most proper place, which it should have in its own right, within the 
worldly realm.  
Rawls for his part thoroughly discusses the role of public reason in fostering mutual 
understanding among citizens and a shared basis for social co-operation. Although 
Rawls  by stressing the burdens of judgement  argues that pluralism has to be taken as 
a normal and permanent feature of modern democratic societies, he nevertheless draws 
upon the shared ideas/ideals inherent in his own political culture. When striving for a 
morally grounded agreement on a required minimum for coexistence and social co-
operation, Rawls utilises citizens‟ moral resources and draws on common reason. It is 
therefore quite appropriate for Kent Greenawalt to state: 
“Although its elaboration is complex, the basic idea of Rawls‟ approach is simple. It 
is that the fundamentals of political life should be more or less agreed upon, and set 
outside ordinary political wrangling. A corollary of this „setting outside‟ of basic 
fundamentals is that when people must determine the implications of the funda-
mentals, they should do so according to a common reason that does not involve 
disputed comprehensive views.”801   
People can be supposed to have some common resources which enables them to coexist 
and co-operate as morally responsible citizens of society. The possibility of reaching a 
stable consensus and arriving at shared standards of coexistence depends to a very wide 
                                                          
800
 Even if I here use a phrase taken from Rawls, it should be remarked that Rawls for his part is very 
much aware of “the limits of reconciliation by public reason. There are three main kinds of conflicts: those 
deriving from citizens‟ conflicting comprehensive doctrines, those from their different status, class pos-
ition, and occupation, or from their ethnicity, gender, and race; and finally, those resulting from the bur-
dens of judgment.” Cf. J. Rawls, “Introduction to the Paperback Edition”, Political Liberalism (1996). p. 
lx. 
801
 In this way Kent Greenawalt summarises the view of Rawls in the book Private Consciences and 
Public Reasons (1995), p.106. Although Greenawalt does not make it quite clear what “fundamentals” 
really mean, it should at least be as obvious for him as for Rawls that there cannot be an agreement in 
pluralist societies on the ultimate religious or philosophical grounds that different citizens might have.  
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extent on the force of common reason, people‟s sense of justice and their moral prepar-
edness to comply with agreed terms of social co-operation as are manifested by citizens‟ 
readiness to honour common civic duties. 
When I considered the idea of sensus communis from a moral point of view (in chapter 
4), I concluded that Rawls to a certain extent could draw on aspects of a common-sense-
morality. Common sense, common reason and morality, not least as it is demonstrated 
by the virtue of the reasonable, is considered essential for building and upholding a co-
operative society, and for reaching a morally based consensus.  
In the excursus on common-sense-morality in chapter 4 ) I also suggested, however, that 
Immanuel Kant
802
 found much of what is said about sensus communis to be rather 
vulgar
803
, especially if tending towards the mere “applause” of conventional opinion. 
But Kant himself, nevertheless, utilises certain aspects of an idea of sensus communis, – 
pointing to its close connection with the notion of the public.
804
 One might even say that 
Kant transforms the idea of “sensus communis” into an idea of “public sense”. It might 
therefore be profitable to consider certain crucial aspects of Kant‟s idea of a “public 
sense” before turning specifically to Rawls‟ idea of public reason. 
At first glance it might be difficult to see how Kant‟s interpretation of “sensus com-
munis” has a specific public orientation. 
 For the first part of the sensus communis consists – according to Kant – in the maxim 
to think for oneself. 
805
 This is opposed to a thinking that is mechanically relying on 
external authorities. 
                                                          
802
 Rawls himself without doubt leans heavily on the philosophy of Kant. As we shall see, there is, how-
ever, considerable differences too. 
803
 Let me recall what Kant more precisely has in mind here: “Der gemeine Menschenverstand… hat 
daher auch die kränkende Ehre, mit dem Namen des Gemeinsinnes (sensus communis) belegt zu werden; 
und zwar so, daß man unter dem Worte gemein (nicht bloß in userer Sprache, die hierin wirklich eine 
Zweideutigkeit enthält, sondern auch in mancher andern) so viel als das vulgare, was man allenthalben 
antrifft, versteht ….” Cf. I.Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft,(§ 40), 1790, (WBG, 1968,Vol.8), p. 389. 
804
 The notion of the public is according to Onora O‟Neill defined by Kant primarily “in terms of the 
audience [Publikum] whom an act of communication may reach.” O. O‟Neill, Constructions of Reason. 
Explorations of Kant‟s Practical Philosophy (1989), p. 32. When Kant takes “common sense” to mean 
“public sense”, he draws upon a term that has got a special weight from the age of Enlightenment and was 
discussed very thoroughly in the time following. 
805
 Kant characterises this as a “Selbstdenken” that results in “die Maxime einer niemals passiven Ver-
nunft” Cf. I.Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft (§ 40), 1790, (WBG1968,Vol.8), p. 390. Typical of “passive 
reason” is superstition, biased and merely obeying reason, and all kinds of reasoning that have to be 
characterised as entirely “von anderen geleitet” Ibid. p.391. 
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 The second part of the sensus communis, however, is the maxim “… to think from 
the standpoint of everyone else” 806 as opposed both to merely private807 ways of 
reasoning and to a mere mirroring of the general opinion. 
 And the third part of the Kantian sensus communis consists in the maxim to think 
consistently as opposed to an “undisciplined” thinking. An inconsistency of beliefs 
would for instance make it impossible to trace out their implications properly.
808
  
The maxims to think for oneself and to think from the standpoint of everyone else, 
which are the two first sensus-communis-based maxims according to Kant, are not at 
odds with one another. The maxim to think for oneself is, in effect, supposed to have a 
highly public significance: it is considered an essential prerequisite for participating in 
reasoning, communication and community. “Those who suppress their own voices do 
not reason; but are merely voiceless echoes, whose parroted words cannot be taken as 
expression of judgement or as acts of communication.”809 And, it follows, that to think 
from the standpoint of everyone else cannot mean that persons should mirror the general 
opinion, but that a perspective of universalisation is to be made an integrated part of 
one‟s own thinking. “The supreme principle of reason is merely the principle of thinking 
and acting on principles that can … hold for all.”810 According to Kant's understanding 
of public sense people are capable of reflecting critically upon their own judgement by 
taking a universal perspective. 
When addressing the world at large, the arguments and reasons employed should have 
                                                          
806
 The formulation here – that I find very much to the point – is taken from Onora O‟Neill. O. O‟Neill, 
Constructions of Reason. Explorations of Kant‟s Practical Philosophy (1989), p.26. Kant himself 
characterises the maxim that follows from the second aspect of sensus communis as “An der Stelle jedes 
andern denken”. Cf. Kritik der Urteilskraft,(§ 40), 1790, (WBG,1968,Vol.8), p. 390. And Kant adds that 
this is characteristic of “… einen Mann von erweiterter Denkungsart …, wenn er sich über die subjektiven 
Privatbedingungen des Urteils, wozwischen so viele andere wie eingeklammert sind, wegsetzen, und aus 
einem allgemeinen Standpunkte (den er dadurch nur bestimmen kann, daß er sich in den Standpunkt 
anderer versetzt) über sein eigenes Urteil reflektiert.” Ibid. p.391. The reflexive aspect is obvious. 
807
 It might be a bit surprising that Kant can take the notion of the private in the following two ways: first 
it is taken to characterise what is strictly personal, and then it characterises what is made in the name of 
some external authority. The consequence following from this view seems to be that soldiers for instance, 
when executing orders, or clergymen, when acting in office as the ministers of the church, should 
appropriately be considered representatives of “private reason”. 
808
 Kant characterises this as “Jederzeit mit sich selbst einstimmig denken” and adds that “Die dritte 
Maxime, nämlich die der konsequenten Denkungsart, ist am schwersten zu ereichen, und kann nur durch 
die Verbindung beider ersten, und nach einer zur Fertigkeit gewordenen öfteren Befolgung derselben, 
erreicht werden.” Cf. Kritik der Urteilskraft (§ 40), 1790, (WBG,1968,Vol.8), p. 391. 
809
 O. O‟Neill, Constructions of Reason. Explorations of Kant‟s Practical Philosophy (1989), p. 25f. 
810
 O. O‟Neill, Constructions of Reason. Explorations of Kant‟s Practical Philosophy (1989), p. 59.. 
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the quality of being publicisable.
811
 Reasoned communication is not automatically 
guaranteed, but depends upon people‟s readiness to comply with rules that can be 
reasonably understood and lived up to by all. Thus all rules that apply within the public 
forum, either formal or substantial, should be widely interpretable, commonly under-
standable and reasonably “accessible”. The public use of reason is indeed the most 
significant common characteristic of human beings as coexistent beings. 
But the subordination of thinking and practice to heteronomous authorities like the state, 
the church or external experts, would, according to Kant, be inconsistent with the very 
nature of reason.
 812
 It would for instance be considered unreasonable for public debate 
to be cut off by the mere appeal to external (religious) authorities, recognised only by 
some citizens or authorised by those in charge of the coercive powers of the state. A 
basic freedom in matters of practical reason is fundamental for the understanding of 
public reason according to Kant.
813
 But simultaneously it must be emphasised that the 
practice of public discourse requires a disciplining of thought, reason and judgement. 
The third aspect of sensus communis therefore requires “consistency”. A certain 
disciplining is necessary in public reasoning. 
5.6.2. The publicity condition according to Rawls 
The publicity condition requires that citizens involved in social co-operation should give 
reasons to one another for the standpoints they take  thereby avoiding non-accessible 
grounds  when affairs of shared interest and decisions affecting the common good are 
concerned.
814
 This is emphasised by Rawls as strongly as by Kant. The publicity con-
                                                          
811
 It is obviously not sufficient for public arguments that they are expressed in a public forum. 
812
 That reason, in all its forms, has to be purified from heteronomous elements according to Immanuel 
Kant, might be well worth mentioning in this connection: “Reason, the discipline of all disciplines, can 
only be and must be self-disciplined: The subordination of thinking and practice to other supposed 
authorities (state, church, experts, personal preferences) is not reason, but the abrogation of reason. 
Reason‟s discipline cannot be alien; it must be autonomous.” O. O‟Neill, Constructions of Reason. 
Explorations of Kant‟s Practical Philosophy (1989), p. 57. 
813
 His ideas of sensus communis are entirely in accordance with his practical philosophy as a whole, as 
gets manifest in his emphasis on human freedom. One might in this connection also refer to the principle 
of universalisation, essentially built into the categorical imperative. 
814
 I think that Gerald F. Gaus gives a brief and good account of an essential aspect of the publicity con-
dition when setting out from the fact that “most people have difficulty constructing objections to their own 
proposals.… It is a Herculean task, quite beyond our cognitive capacity, to scan even our own system of 
beliefs for all inconsistencies or defeaters; even Hercules would flinch at the task of scanning the systems 
of everyone else as well. The only accessible way to have reasonable confidence that a proposal is pub-
licly justified is to put it forward and invite specific challenges from others. … Again, the evidence 
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dition which is implied in Rawls‟ conception of justice as fairness is articulated on three 
levels that shall be sketched very briefly: 
 The principles of justice, by which society is regulated, must in themselves be public. 
This means for instance that:  
“Principles are to be rejected that might work quite well provided they were not 
publicly acknowledged, or provided the general facts upon which they are founded 
are not commonly known or believed.”815 
 The general beliefs (about man and the scheme of coexistence for example), in the 
light of which the first principles of justice are to be weighed, assessed and accepted, 
must also be publicly known. Complying with the publicity condition therefore im-
plies: 
“… that the parties must reason only from general beliefs shared by citizens gene-
rally, as part of their public knowledge.”816 
 The public conception of justice is fully justifiable in its own terms. This means that: 
“if citizens wish to, the full justification is present in the public culture, reflected in 
its system of law and political institutions, and in the main historical traditions of 
their interpretation.”817  
For citizens involved in social co-operation within the framework of a constitutional 
democracy the publicity condition “means that in their public political life nothing need 
                                                                                                                                                                          
strongly suggests that the generation of challenges and replies is a scarce social resource, and only by 
taking advantage of the social division of argumentative labor  by actually putting forward proposals in 
the public forum, and so inviting challenges and replies  can one have reasonable confidence that one‟s 
proposal is publicly justified. Public justification, then, is public not only in the sense that it must show 
that each has a sufficient reason to accept the justification but, in additionally, in the sense that it must 
meet the publicity condition.” G.F.Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism. An Essay on Epistemology and 
Political Theory (1996), p.148. 
815
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.69. 
816
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.69. Rawls himself can explain this second point more 
specifically as follows: “The second level of publicity concerns the general beliefs in the light of which 
first principles of justice themselves can be accepted, that is, the general beliefs about human nature and 
the way political and social institutions generally work, and indeed all such beliefs relevant to political 
justice. Citizens in a well-ordered society roughly agree on these beliefs because they can be supported (as 
at the first level) by publicly shared methods of inquiry and forms of reasoning.…I assume these methods 
to be familiar from common sense and to include the procedures and conclusions of science and social 
thought, when these are well established and not controversial. It is precisely these general beliefs, 
reflecting the current public views in a well-ordered society, that we  that is, you and I who are setting up 
justice as fairness  ascribe to the parties in the original position.” Ibid., p.67. 
817
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.67. 
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be hidden.”818 But as I understand Rawls the publicity condition is even more de-
manding, it says that all parties have a moral obligation to justify their activities to one 
another, to give a public account of their aims and explain the reasons for their public 
conduct openly in terms accessible to all 
But the condition of publicity also means  taken negatively  that there have to be 
certain constraints upon what can be “allowed” from the different parties engaging in 
public reasoning. Some of these constraints are obviously of a formal kind, implying 
that the parties cannot be allowed to ignore common principles of inference, standard 
rules of evidence and general criteria of justification. But there are also further con-
straints with more substantial implications. For example, citizens engaged in public 
discourse are expected to accept that there might be situations “not allowing them to 
take into account all true beliefs”819 The publicity condition applies when we are con-
cerned with questions about the fair institutional scheme of coexistence and issues of 
basic justice.  
5.6.3. The orientation of public reason 
From what is already said, it should be clear enough that public reason has an inherent 
orientation towards a shared conception of justice. Only a strictly political conception of 
justice, not identical with a particular conception of justice as conceived of within any 
particular comprehensive doctrine existing in society, can be a public mark of orien-
tation and serve as “a fund of implicitly shared ideas and principles”820 which all parties 
can refer to and draw upon in matters of public interest.
821
 Thus Rawls holds that; 
                                                          
818
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.68. Rawls is, however, immediately explaining this strong 
claim as follows: “The text does not say that nothing is hidden but only that nothing need be hidden, We 
cannot guarantee that nothing is hidden, for there is always much we do not and perhaps cannot know, and 
many ways in which we can be misled by institutional appearances. But perhaps we can make sure that 
nothing need be hidden; in a free society that all correctly recognize as just there is no need for the illus-
ions and delusions of ideology for society to work properly and for citizens to accept it willingly. In this 
sense a well-ordered society may lack ideological, or false, consciousness.” Ibid. p.68f.  
819
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.218. The phrase “take into account” might be very vague. The 
difficult question is whether people, when entering into the strictly public forum, should “reason only from 
general beliefs shared by citizens as part of public knowledge.” (Ibid., p.70) This would dramatically limit 
their reference to religious “truths” in public affairs. I will be concerned with the problem raised here both 
in this chapter and in the next. 
820
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.14. 
821
 I recall that a political conception is defined by Rawls as: a moral conception worked out for the basic 
structure of society; a free-standing conception not derived from any comprehensive doctrine; a concept-
ion taking its content from the shared political culture of democratic society. 
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 “…citizens are to conduct their fundamental discussions within the framework of 
what each regards as a political conception of justice based on values that the others 
can reasonably be expected to endorse ... This means that each of us must have, and 
be ready to explain, a criterion of what principles and guidelines we think other 
citizens (who are also free and equal) may reasonably be expected to endorse along 
with us.”822  
The orientation towards a political conception of justice affords public reason with the 
required content by;  
 specifying certain basic rights, liberties, and opportunities,  
 assigning a special priority to these rights, liberties, and opportunities, 




On this basis, public reason serves to constrain and discipline arguments, reasoning, 
discourse and co-operation in matters concerning our equal citizenship and our living 
together in society. Thus public reason limits the way citizens can “fairly” explain and 
justify their standpoints and arguments to one another when fundamental issues of com-
mon interest are at stake.
824
 One might plausibly assume, as Rawls does, that there has 
                                                          
822
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.226. I think that Rawls‟ idea here is not far from that of Kant 
whose concern was that one should use such reasons and arguments in the public forum, which can be 
widely accepted. If the reasons are for the moment in fact not accepted by all, is therefore not decisive. 
We should employ reasons that other citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse along with us. 
823
 Cf. J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.223. In The Idea of Public Reason Revisited (1997) the 
content is specified as follows by Rawls: “Thus the content of public reason is given by a family of 
political conceptions of justice, and not by a single one. There are many liberalisms and related views… 
Three main features characterize these conceptions: First, a list of certain basic rights, liberties and 
opportunities (such as those familiar from constitutional regimes);  Second, an assignment of special 
priority to those rights, liberties and opportunities, especially with respect to the claims of the general 
good and perfectionist values; and  Third, measures ensuring for all citizens adequate all-purpose means 
to make effective use of their freedoms. Each of these liberalisms endorses the underlying ideas of citizens 
as free and equal persons and of society as a fair system of cooperation over time. Yet since these ideas 
can be interpreted in various ways, we get different formulations of the principles of justice and different 
contents of public reason.” J. Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, The University of Chicago 
Law Review (1997;3), p.773f. 
824
 Such “fundamental issues” often involves the exercise of power. However, it may plausibly be held 
that there is a certain difference what concerns the way citizens should justify to one another their de-
cisions and the way the authorities of society can be expected to justify their decisions publicly, in matters 
involving the exercise of power. The authorities of society are normally assumed to have a mandate to ex-
ercise power, which individual citizens lack. The problem of justifying the exercise of power, is, however, 
rather complicated, since in a democracy should political power, which is always in some respect coercive 
power, be considered the power of the public, what means that it is the power of free and equal citizens 
taken as a collective body. Questions about the exercise of political power by the political authorities can 
therefore be transformed into a question how citizens should properly exercise and justify their use of co-
ercive political power over one another when fundamental issues of basic justice are at stake. The crucial 
question is therefore: “…in the light of what principles and ideals must we exercise that power if our 
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to be a shared basis of political values, which citizens as free and equal parties, holding 
highly different comprehensive views, might appeal to and refer to when discussing and 
seeking justification for their standpoints and decisions in strictly public affairs. And the 
common point of reference for the arguing parties within the public forum
825
 should be a 
political conception of justice, or more in accordance with Rawls‟ latest view: a family 
of such conceptions, characterised by being “broadly liberal”.826 Thus reasoning within 
the public forum should make it possible for citizens to justify to one another the stand-
points and the decisions they take in public affairs
827
 by invoking vital political values 
as expressed in some shared conception of justice,  liberal in scope. 
5.6.4. Public and non-public reasons 
The orientation of public reason towards a strictly political conception of justice, serves 
to underline the difference between public reason and the many kinds of so called non-
public reasons, which also play decisive roles in society. 
“There are many nonpublic reasons and but one public reason. Among the nonpublic 
reasons are those of associations of all kinds: churches and universities, scientific 
societies and professional groups.” 828 
In Political Liberalism Rawls obviously wishes to discipline citizens‟ reasoning within 
the public forum while simultaneously paying due attention to the role that non-public 
                                                                                                                                                                          
doing so is to be justifiable to others as free and equal? To this question political liberalism replies: our 
exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a 
constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of 
principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational. This is the liberal principle of legi-
timacy.” J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p. 217. 
825
 I find the notion “public forum” very appropriate, although it should be added that Rawls “does not 
regard the political and the nonpolitical domains as two separate, disconnected spaces, each governed 
solely by its own distinct principles.” J. Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, The University of 
Chicago Law Review (1997;3), p.791.   
826
 Let me recall that according to Rawls, especially as we meet him in his latest writings, it is not neces-
sary that persons and groups share exactly the same principles of justice. A family of liberal conceptions 
will obviously do,  a certain latitude is to be accepted concerning the conceptions of justice that can 
serve as a public criterion. And Rawls characterises the class of acceptable conceptions of justice as 
“broadly liberal”. This content [of public reason] is formulated by what I have called a „political con-
ception of justice‟, which I assume is broadly liberal in character.” J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), 
p.223. 
827
 “Public reasoning aims for public justification. We appeal to political conceptions of justice, and to 
ascertainable evidence and facts open to public view, in order to reach conclusions about what we think 
are the most reasonable political institutions and policies. Public justification is not simply valid reason-
ing, but argument addressed to others: it proceeds correctly from premises we accept and think others 
could reasonably accept to conclusions we think they could also reasonably accept.” J. Rawls, “The Idea 
of Public Reason Revisited”, The University of Chicago Law Review (1997;3), p.786. 
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reasons play in society. 
However, let it be stressed that Rawls‟ distinction between public and non-public is not 
identical with a distinction between public and private. The notion of the “public” 
within political liberalism is not to be contrasted to the “private”.829 Rawls takes pains 
to make it perfectly clear that; 
“The public vs. nonpublic distinction is not the distinction between public and 
private. This latter I ignore: there is no such thing as private reason. There is social 
reason  the many reasons of associations in society which make up the background 
culture; there is also, let us say, domestic reason  the reason of families as small 
groups in society  and this contrasts both with public and social reason. As citizens, 
we participate in all these kinds of reason and have the rights of equal citizens when 
we do so.”830 
The category of “nonpublic reasons” can accordingly be assumed to comprise the dif-
ferent kinds of reasons that belong within the diverse spheres of civil society. There are 
for instance the kind of reasons which properly apply within the social setting of the 
family or within the religious communities of churches or within other associations and 
social groups. These non-public reasons are not “private”. Even if non-public reasons 
cannot directly be taken as reasons within the strict public forum characterised by the 
discourse of governmental officials, judges (and legislators) and candidates for public 
office
831
, they might have an unquestionable social impact,  not just within closed 
communities, but also within the wider civil society,  characterised by considerable 
diversity.  
Thus Rawls in fact makes an important distinction between the forum of public reason 
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 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.220. 
829
 Therefore I think that the way the Dutch professor, Gerrit Manenschijn, draws parallels between the 
distinction between the “public” and the “private” as supposedly found in Rawls‟ liberal conception and 
the Lutheran doctrine of the two kingdoms is not just to the point. “In my inaugural lecture I called Rawls‟ 
distinction between the private and the public a reversed secularized version of the doctrine of the Two 
Kingdoms: from a secularized vision of the world it is argued that faith should not play a role in public 
life. (G. Manenschijn: “Response to Karl-Wilhelm Dahm‟s Paper”, A Just Europe. The Churches‟ Re-
sponse to the Ethical Implications of the New Europe, Eds. D. Hedin and V. Mortensen (1992), p.73 
(Note 4). 
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 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.220 [Note 7] 
831
 In fact Rawls sets very narrow limits for the public forum, emphasising that “This forum might be 
divided into three parts: the discourse of judges in their decisions, and especially of the judges of a 
supreme court; the discourse of government officials, especially chief executives and legislators; and 
finally, the discourse of candidates for public office and their campaign managers, especially in their 
public oratory, party platforms, and political statements. We need this three-part division because, as I 
note later, the idea of public reason does not apply in the same way in these three cases and elsewhere.” J. 
Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, The University of Chicago Law Review (1997;3), p.767f. 
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and the wider field of society‟s background culture.832 And he assumes that different 
kinds of non-public reasons, e.g., the reasons of churches and diverse associations, may 
have a significant influence on the “background culture”, thereby contributing decisively 
to the moral debate and the value-formation of civil society as a whole.
833
 
One should bear in mind that Rawls‟ appeal to public reason is clearly focused and that 
the Rawlsian public forum is very limited. It is limited in respect to issues which are to 
be discussed and handled.
834
 And it seems also to be limited in the way that it applies 
primarily to citizens in the execution of particular official duties. In his reply to Jürgen 
Habermas Rawls very much desires to keep public reason strictly focused, concentrating 
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 Rawls makes it clear that: “Distinct and separate from this three-part public political forum is what I 
call the background culture. This is the culture of civil society. In a democracy, this culture is not, of 
course, guided by any one central idea or principle, whether political or religious. Its many and diverse 
agencies and associations with their internal life reside within a framework of law that ensures the familiar 
liberties of thought and speech, and the right of free association. The idea of public reason does not apply 
to the background culture with its many forms of nonpublic reason nor to media of any kind.” J. Rawls, 
“The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, The University of Chicago Law Review (1997;3), p.768. And this 
is further explained in a footnote to the text quoted: “The background culture includes, then, the culture of 
churches and associations of all kinds, and institutions of learning at all levels, especially universities and 
professional schools, scientific and other societies. In addition, the nonpublic political culture mediates 
between the public political culture and the background culture.” Ibid. 768.  
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 I think this is what the German Bundeskanzler, Helmuth Schmidt, clearly realised. Churches as well as 
other associations have a mandate of their own and a clear obligation to contribute to the value-formation 
of the civil society, within which they participate. In this connection Rawls first stresses that political 
liberalism leaves untouched all kinds of religious doctrines (provided they are reasonable), and he criti-
cises Habermas for not showing the same kind of “respect”: “The central idea is that political liberalism 
moves within the category of the political and leaves philosophy as it is. It leaves untouched all kinds of 
doctrines, religious, metaphysical, and moral, with their long traditions of development and interpretation. 
Political liberalism proceeds apart from all such doctrines, and presents itself in its own terms as free-
standing. Hence, it cannot argue its case by invoking any comprehensive doctrine, or by criticizing or 
rejecting them, so long of course as those doctrines are reasonable politically speaking. …Habermas 
position, on the other hand, is a comprehensive doctrine and covers many things far beyond political 
philosophy. …It rejects naturalism and emotivism in moral argument and aims to give a full defence of 
both theoretical and practical reason. Moreover, he often criticizes religious and metaphysical views. 
Habermas does not take much time to argue against them in detail; rather, he lays them aside, or occasio-
nally dismisses them, as unusable and without credible independent merit in view of his philosophical 
analysis of the presuppositions of rational discourse and communicative action.” J.Rawls, “Reply to 
Habermas”, The Journal of Philosophy (1995), p. 134f. 
834
 In Political Liberalism it is clearly underlined that: “… the limits imposed by public reason do not ap-
ply to all political questions but only to those involving what we may call „constitutional essentials‟ and 
questions of basic justice. This means that political values alone are to settle such fundamental questions 
as: who has the right to vote, or what religions can be tolerated, or who is to be assured fair equality of op-
portunity, or to hold property. These and similar questions are the special subject of public reason. Many 
if not most political questions do not concern those fundamental matters …” J. Rawls, Political Liberal-
ism (1993), p.214 But then he continues: “Some will ask: Why not say that all questions in regard to 
which citizens exercise their final and coercive political power over one another are subject to public 
reason? Why would it ever be admissible to go outside the range of political values? To answer: My aim 
is to consider first the strongest case where the political questions concern the most fundamental matters. 
If we should not honor the limits of public reason here, it would seem we need not honor them anywhere.” 
Ibid. p.215. 
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mainly on the reasons that are to be given by official executives, as for instance legi-
slators and judges. Rawls indicates his difference with Habermas as follows: 
“The public reason of political liberalism may be confused with Habermas‟s public 
sphere but they are not the same. Public reason in PL [Political Liberalism] is the 
reasoning of legislators, executives (presidents, for example), and judges (especially 
those of a supreme court, if there is one). … As for Habermas‟s public sphere, since 
it is much the same as what I called in PL (14) the background culture, public reason 
with its duty of civility does not apply.
835
 
But even if the strictly public forum is more limited in Rawls‟ political liberalism than it 
is in Habermas‟ conception, they both agree that citizens, engaged in public reasoning 
and activity, must accept some constraints on the way they can appropriately pursue and 
justify their standpoints. And let it also be added that Rawls also holds that all citizens 
concerned with political affairs can be expected to act more or less in analogy with those 
who are primarily subjected to the constraints of public reason.
836
  
And citizens should, according to Rawls, clearly “realize that they cannot reach agree-
ment or even approach mutual understanding on the basis of their irreconcilable com-
prehensive doctrines. In view of this, they need to consider what kinds of reasons they 
may reasonably give one another when fundamental political questions are at stake.”837 
This is a crucial ground-assumption in Rawls‟ elaboration of the idea of public reason. 
Thus there can be little doubt that what Rawls characterises as comprehensive doctrines 
or “transcendent values” (as for instance the values closely connected to salvation and 
eternal life), cannot be made part of strictly public reasoning, although the reasons given 
in comprehensive doctrines might play a considerable role within the wider field of civil 
society.  
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 J.Rawls, “Reply to Habermas”, The Journal of Philosophy (1995), p.140. (Note 13) 
836
 In his article on The Idea of Public Reason Revisited (1997) Rawls considers the question “How 
though is the ideal of public reason realized by citizens who are not government officials? In a represent-
ative government citizens vote for representatives  chief executives, legislatives, and the like  and not 
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of themselves as if they were legislators and ask themselves what statutes, supported by what reasons, sat-
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officials and candidates for public office who violate public reason, is one of the political and social roots 
of democracy, and is vital for its enduring strength and vigor.” J. Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason 
Revisited”, The University of Chicago Law Review (1997;3), p.769. From the idea of public reason Rawls 
obviously derives some ideals that are also supposed to apply rather widely and generally. 
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 J. Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, The University of Chicago Law Review (1997;3), 
p.766.. 
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Let me now, however, take it somewhat further: Even if the ground orientation in 
Rawls‟ political philosophy remains much the same as in 1971, one can clearly see that 
there are now some new accents in Rawls‟ understanding of the relation between public 
and non-public reasons, as indicated by his more recent writings. In his latest writings, 
including Political Liberalism, one observes a certain reorientation in Rawls‟ view 
concerning the role that he ascribes to churches, religious associations and persons of 
faith in contributing to the value-formation of society, and even to the public discussion 
about basic justice and fundamental rights. And there is in Rawls‟ philosophy also a 
certain reorientation concerning the question of how the constraints required by public 
reason should best be defined and applied. In his discussion about “The Limits of Public 
Reason” in Political Liberalism Rawls distinguishes between two approaches to the pro-
blem that arise when relating public reason to the many reasons appropriately used with-
in religion and different associations. 
 First there is the exclusive approach, saying that “on fundamental political matters, 
reasons given explicitly in terms of comprehensive doctrines are never to be intro-
duced into public reason.”838 
 Then there is the inclusive view, “allowing citizens, in certain situations, to present 
what they regard as the deeper (religious) reasons they have for holding certain po-
litical values, provided they do this in ways that strengthen the ideal of public reason 
itself.”839  
Rawls admits that he was at first most inclined to hold the first of these views, but that 
he was persuaded through many discussions that the exclusive approach was too restric-
tive. There were many practical cases and examples, which indicated that the exclusive 
view failed in dealing properly with the complex relation between religious faith and 
public reason. During recent years Rawls has therefore become more and more inclined 
to defend the second view, which is further explicated and reflected in his most recent 
writings, – especially in The Idea of public reason Revisited (1997). 
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 And he immediately continues: “The public reasons such a doctrine supports may, of course, be given 
but not the supporting doctrine itself.” J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.247. 
839
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p. 247. Thus it might be possible to pay due attention to the 
close connection there might be between political values and citizens‟ comprehensive doctrines. 
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5.6.5. The paradox of public reason 
Even if one might plausibly distinguish more or less sharply between public reason and 
the many non-public reasons, it cannot be denied that citizens‟ commitment to religious 
truth or moral doctrines and the specific religious reasons they have might be strong 
enough to provide them with a basic motivation for engaging in matters of political 
justice and social ethics. It therefore seems “paradoxical” to try to strengthen the strictly 
political concern by reducing the religious impact in the public forum, – since there is a 
considerable risk that the strongest possible motivation for a moral commitment within 
the political domain will thereby be undermined and weakened. The dilemma is seen by 
Rawls. 
“I now turn to what to many is a basic difficulty with the idea of public reason, one 
that makes it seem paradoxical. They ask: why should citizens in discussing and vot-
ing on the most fundamental political questions honor the limits of public reason? 
How can it be either reasonable or rational, when basic matters are at stake, for citiz-
ens to appeal only to a public conception of justice and not to the whole truth as they 
see it? Surely, the most fundamental questions should be settled by appealing to the 
most important truths, yes these may far transcend public reason!”840 
If one really understands the nature of (the Christian) religion, one can hardly claim that 
religious obligations should ever be set in brackets. It seems therefore odd if citizens  
in loyalty towards some political values  should practically ignore their deepest relig-
ious (and moral) commitment when contemplating the most fundamental moral and 
political issues to be used in determining the basic structure of society and the very 
scheme of coexistence, within which individuals, communities and churches are to live 
and co-operate.  
Rawls is, as already suggested, very much aware of the problems raised by imposing 
such heavy restraints on people with a religious commitment. This problem is taken 
directly into account by Rawls both in Political Liberalism and in later writings. And 
Rawls obviously realises that the problem might seem “paradoxical”: For even if both 
public reason and a morality grounded on Christian faith might be convergent in many 
cases, this does not solve the more principled problem;  that the moral commitment 
inherent in Christian faith might be suspended when matters of basic justice and con-
stitutional essentials are at stake and debated within the forum of strictly public affairs.  
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 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.216. 
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In recent time Rawls is attempting a considerable lessening of the contrast between 
public and non-public reasons, even if it may seem as if he is still doing so by reducing 
the direct impact of religions within the strictly public forum. Therefore one might ask 
whether the so called “paradox of public reason”841 still remains, – even if Rawls has 
moved from an “exclusive” to a more “inclusive” approach”. For it is still the case that 
people, according to Rawls, are not expected to invoke reasons directly taken from their 
comprehensive doctrines when decisive institutional premises for coexistence and issues 
of basic justice are handled out. 
One might certainly ask, as Rawls himself does: “What is the reason for limiting the 
parties in this way and not allowing them to take into account all true beliefs?” 842 
That there has to be a shared basis of justification for equal citizens concerned with 
matters of constitutional essentials, basic justice and the handling of strictly public 
affairs, seems plausible enough. Therefore a solution to the “paradox of public reason” 
cannot consist in cancelling entirely the constraints on citizens‟ public reasoning, which 
are considered necessary for them to co-operate and coexist within a shared and fair 
institutional framework. But this does not necessarily mean that it can be considered 
reasonable to expect from “those of faith” that they entirely avoid referring to their 
religious views in matters of public interest. Can it plausibly be expected that religious 
persons should be ready to accept that “it is often perfectly reasonable to forswear the 
whole truth.”843  
In my opinion it can still be asked why it would not be better for people to introduce 
their different religious reasons openly within the strictly public forum just as within the 
different spheres of civil society. Even if many citizens would not accept the particular 
reasons given by others, it may nonetheless be most fair to openly give an account of the 
religious reasons one draws upon, simultaneously hoping that there is still sufficient 
common ground, shared premises and mutual trust for bringing about the required basis 
for social co-operation. Of course I take it for granted that the explanation given by the 
diverse parties can be clearly understood by all citizens, even if it cannot be accepted by 
all of them.  
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 This is Rawls‟ own terminology. Cf. J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p. 218. 
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 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.71. 
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It follows from what I have said so far that the “exclusive view” is fundamentally pro–
blematic, – for how can an exclusive approach guarantee that political values “are not 
puppets manipulated from behind the scenes by comprehensive doctrines.”844 The 
deeper religious reasons might after all be quite decisive,  even if citizens are present-
ing non-religious reasons within a public forum. An “inclusive view” can better cope 
with the high correlation there is between the comprehensive doctrines people hold and 
the political conception of justice they subscribe to. 
But even if one takes an inclusive approach, as Rawls in his most recent writings is 
doing, the so called “paradox” is not automatically removed. It still seems as if there has 
to be considerable constraint upon the explicit use of religious reasons within the public 
forum, even if it is simultaneously taken for granted that a religious conviction might 
provide us with the strongest motivational force for pursuing vital political values and 
advance basic justice. 
5.6.6. The Rawlsian proviso 
In recent works Rawls admits, as suggested, that the inclusive view might be considered 
most appropriate.
845
 And in fact he now draws some consequences from this view that 
might seem surprising. He emphasises that the constraints inherent in public reason 
should not prevent us from openly introducing reasons stemming from the compre-
hensive (religious) doctrines we honour into the public political discussion
846
, - “pro-
vided that, in due course, we give properly public reasons to support the principles and 
policies our comprehensive doctrine is said to support.”847 This is the Rawlsian “pro-
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 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.219. 
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 J. Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, The University of Chicago Law Review (1997;3), 
p.777. 
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 “The answer turns on which view best encourages citizens to honor the ideal of public reason and 
secures its social conditions in the longer run in a well-ordered society. Accepting this, the inclusive view 
seems the correct one.” J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.248 
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nal appraisal, or evidentially supportable. Whether they are or not is a matter to be decided by those pre-
senting them, and how they want what they say to be taken.” J. Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Re-
visited”, The University of Chicago Law Review (1997;3), p.784. 
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 J. Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, The University of Chicago Law Review (1997;3), 
p.776. 
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viso”.848 But Rawls does not present us with any detailed formula for how and when the 
proviso is to be satisfied. Instead he underlines that this “calls for good sense and under-
standing.”849  
The reason why Rawls introduces the so called proviso, is not that he now  reluctantly 
and with considerable reservation  accepts that it is after all the better solution to intro-
duce religious reasons into the public forum. By openly introducing religious (an other 
comprehensive) reasons in the public political debate, in accordance with the so called 
proviso, Rawls suppose that one might positively contribute to the development of civic 
friendship and a co-operative society. And therefore he can conclude that: 
“These benefits of the mutual knowledge of citizens‟ recognizing one another‟s 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines bring out a positive ground for introducing such 
doctrines, which is not merely a defensive ground, as if their intrusion into public 
discussion were inevitable in any case.”850 
And Rawls seeks for good examples. He can take Martin Luther King as an example of 
a person letting his Christian faith decisively influence his public “mission” in matters 
concerning citizens‟ most fundamental civil rights. In King‟s case there was without 
doubt a high correlation between his basic religious beliefs and the arguments he pre-
sented publicly. His public engagement for equal civil rights must clearly be taken as 
“consecutive” to the comprehensive view he honoured, – consecutive not just in the 
sense that his Christian faith and his religious conviction  might be considered an under-
lying driving force, however hidden from public exposure. The comprehensive reasons 
that Martin Luther King quite openly drew upon, strengthened without doubt the “mis-
sion” of the civil rights movement. The Christian faith of Martin Luther King could in 
no way be enclosed in brackets, but was manifest in his struggle to have fundamental 
civil rights extended to all as citizens.
 
But King's persuasive constitutional arguments 
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 In The Idea of Public Reason Revisited Rawls makes it clear “that reasonable comprehensive doc-
trines, religious or nonreligious, may be introduced in public political discussion at any time, provided 
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p.784. But he is giving several examples, referring for instance both to the Abolitionists and to the Civil 
Rights Movement. 
850
 J. Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, The University of Chicago Law Review (1997;3), 
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were nevertheless political arguments, and as such they might reasonably have been 
appreciated and accepted by people irrespective of their differing comprehensive views. 
Most likely even King himself did not have a method for systematically reflecting and 
properly satisfying a Rawlsian proviso when proceeding from his Christian convictions 
to his public engagement for justice. Nevertheless it seems as if Rawls can take Martin 
Luther King as an example of a political agent satisfying the so called proviso: 
“I do not know either the Abolitionists and King thought of themselves as fulfilling 
the purpose of the proviso. But whether they did or not, they could have. And had 
they known and accepted the idea of public reason, they would have.”851 
I cannot discuss the case of Martin Luther King in any greater detail, however, I think 
that the King example indicates that: 
 There might be a high correlation between the religious (Christian) beliefs people 
hold (for instance concerning the dignity of man as created by God) and their com-
mitment in public affairs. The inclusive view takes this correlation into account. 
 A Rawlsian proviso should be taken as a regulative idea by the different parties 
when they are invoking comprehensive (religious) grounds in public reasoning.
852
  
But it cannot be denied that situations might occur when it is impossible for citizens, 
motivated by a comprehensive doctrine, to express their grounds in terms of public 
reason. And one might without great difficulties imagine that the public culture in 
King‟s own time had been such that it would have been impossible for him to make the 
strongest reasons he had consistent with the kind of proviso proposed by Rawls. Martin 
Luther King‟s message, his political concern and not least his basic theological view, 
could very well have been taken as highly unreasonable by most “reasonable” citizens at 
his time, – and it could even have been considered a threat to sound public reasoning. 
The Rawlsian proviso might nevertheless, as far as I can see, normally be taken as a 
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 Even if Martin Luther King most likely never had a formula or a method for satisfying the proviso-
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sider also the Abolitionists and those in the Civil Rights Movement. The proviso was fulfilled in their case 
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basic constitutional values – as they themselves asserted – and so supported reasonable conceptions of 
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proper guideline for coexistent citizens, holding diverse comprehensive doctrines, in 
their attempt to establish the mutual understanding required for fair social co-operation. 
But let it also be remarked that the Rawlsian proviso seems to imply that one should still 
be careful in making directly use of beliefs and reasons taken from comprehensive 
views when arguing publicly in matters concerning basic justice and the very structure 
of society.
853
 The proviso clearly subjects citizens‟ reasoning within the public forum to 
formal discipline and put restrictions on the way they may invoke religious grounds. 
This does not, however, imply that citizens, at any moment in which they fail to argue 
for their fundamental convictions within widely held constraints of public reason, 
should be accused of holding comprehensive doctrines which have proved themselves 
unreasonable. Public reason is absolutely not to be taken as infallible or fixed once and 
for all.  
5.6.7. The reciprocity criterion 
As made clear: public reasoning requires that the parties accept some constraints on 
their use of “private” arguments. This means that the parties may freely make use of 
reasons taken from their comprehensive doctrines within the public forum, provided 
they are also prepared to explain the particular grounds they have in terms of public 
reason. This is required for bringing about a mutual understanding among citizens. In 
fact the Rawlsian conception of public reason, with its built-in proviso, rests on a prin-
ciple of reciprocity, which citizens, as reasonable persons, can be expected to honour. 
“Citizens are reasonable when, viewing one another as free and equal in a system of 
social cooperation over generations, they are prepared to offer one another fair terms 
of social cooperation (defined by principles and ideals) and they agree to act on 
those terms, even on the cost of their own interests in particular situations, provided 
that others also accept those terms. For these terms to be fair terms, citizens offering 
them must reasonably think that those citizens to whom such terms are offered 
might also reasonably accept them. Note that „reasonably‟ occurs at both ends in this 
formulation: in offering fair terms we must reasonably think that citizens offered 
them might also reasonably accept them. And they must be able to do this as free 
and equal, and not as dominated or manipulated, or under the pressure of an inferior 
political or social position. I refer to this as the criterion of reciprocity…”854 
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Making a criterion of reciprocity, an integrated part of public reason accords in my 
opinion with the ground idea of justice as fairness as elaborated from the very begin-
ning. As far as I can see, however, the idea of reciprocity is stressed even more ex-
plicitly and frequently in Rawls‟ most recent writings. This can be observed in Political 
Liberalism (1993) and especially in the Introduction to the Paperback Edition of 
Political Liberalism (1996) as well as in the essay about The Idea of Public Reason 
Revisited (1997). The moral-political question, especially actualised in modern demo-
cratic societies, is how coexistent persons, as free and equal citizens, with an equal right 
of participating in the rule and the power of a democratic society, should most properly 
exercise political power over one another, when taking into account that citizens have an 
obligation to justify to one another the steps they take in matters of shared interest and 
basic justice. According to Rawls, citizens engaged in public political affairs should 
sincerely believe that the public reasons they offer in political matters may also be taken 
by others as a reasonable justification of a political decision.
855
 
Let it now also be mentioned that the reciprocity-criterion as such can be expected to 
have considerable weight not just in the Rawlsian conception, but in theological (social) 
ethics as well. The principle of reciprocity is introduced through the golden rule, as 
expressed for instance in Matt. 7,12.
856
 In his article on the golden rule in Theologische 
                                                                                                                                                                          
worth noticing that Rawls holds that: “The criterion of reciprocity is normally violated whenever basic 
liberties are denied. For what reasons can both satisfy the criterion of reciprocity and justify holding some 
as slaves, or imposing a property qualification on the right to vote, or denying the right of suffrage to 
women?” Ibid., p.li. 
855
 “The answer is given by the criterion of reciprocity: our exercise of political power is proper only 
when we sincerely believe that the reasons we offer for our political action may reasonably be accepted by 
other citizens as a justification of those actions.” J. Rawls, “Introduction to the Paperback Edition”, 
Political Liberalism (1996), p.xlvi.  
856
It is quite clearly concluded by Heinz-Horst Shrey in an article about the golden rule that: “Wir haben 
bei der philosophischen Erörterungen der goldenen Regel festgestellt, daß es bei dieser um das Prinzip der 
Gegenseitigkeit geht. Dieses kann definiert werden als „allgemeinste Prinzip des sozialen Handelns, das 
auf der Erwartung einer adäquaten Gegenleistung beruht.‟ (Mühlmann 328).” Heinz-Horst Shrey, 
“Goldene Regel III, Theologische Realenzyklopädie, Vol.XIII (Studienasugabe 1993),  p.581. Let it, 
however, also be remarked that the role of the golden rule is very much discussed within theological ethics 
and exegesis. Rudolph Bultmann could for instance characterise the golden rule as ”die Moral eines 
naiven Egoismus.” R.Bultmann, Geschichte der synoptischen Tradition, p.107. But others ascribed to the 
golden rule a greater significance: “Indem das Christentum die Goldene Regel dem Liebesgebot gleich-
stellte und in ihr die Summe der göttlichen Forderungen enthalten sah (Mt 7,12), indem es die Goldene 
Regel zu einem Element seiner Bekehrungstradition machen konnte (Act 15,20.29), räumte es der natür-
lichen Evidenzerfahrung in der Ethik einen herausragenden Platz ein. Die christliche Ethik gewann so eine 
allen Menschen direkt einsichtige Grundlage, die von der Empirie des Alltäglichen ausgeht (vgl. Justin, 
dial.92,3f; Photius, in Matth. 7,12 …). Der Wert der Goldenen Regel liegt darin, daß sie an die Erfahrung 
des natürlichen Menschen anknüpft und diesem damit die Möglichkeit bietet, einen direkten Zugang zu 
einem christlichen Wertsystem zu gewinnen.” Roman Heiligenthal, “Goldene Regel II, Theologische 
Realenzyklopädie, Vol.XIII (Studienasugabe 1993),  p.575. 
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Realenzyclopädie  Heinz-Horst Schrey makes it clear that he finds much the same con-
cern in the golden rule as in Rawls‟ idea of justice as fairness: 
“Die Sache, um die es bei der goldenen Regel geht, das prinzip der Gegenseitigkeit, 
steht im Mittelpunkt der Gerechtigkeitslehre von J.Rawls. Dieser versteht Gerechtig-
keit als Fairness, die wechselseitige Anerkennung der Prinzipien erfordert, auf denen 
das Handeln beruht. Ansprüche, die gegen das Gerechtigkeitsprinzip verstossen, 
sind damit ausgeschloßen. Rawls versteht Gerechtigkeit als Konkretisierung des 
Urzustandes, von dem gilt, das jedermann gleiches Recht auf das umfangreiche 
System gleicher Grundfreiheiten hat, das mit dem gleichen System für alle anderen 
verträglich ist.”857 
Even if the criterion of reciprocity is a subject for discussion in theological ethics and 
cannot unproblematically be made the crucial guideline for reasoning in theological 
social ethics, the reciprocity-criterion as such  especially as it is used within the 
Rawlsian conception of justice as fairness  seems unavoidable in social ethics. It is a 
principle which is already widely recognised. From a Christian perspective it might also 
be added that the reciprocity-principle is in itself obviously referring to “einen für 
Christen und Nichtchristen evidenten Kern”.858 It might be taken as a vital moral prin-
ciple furthering mutual understanding and respect among all parties involved in social 
co-operation 
5.6.8. Consensus through public reasoning? 
One might agree with Rawls that public debate, when guided by the reciprocity-
criterion, might increase the mutual understanding among citizens, thereby paving the 
way for a fundamental “reconciliation by public reason”. But if a reconciliation by 
public reason should mean that citizens, just by reasoning within a public forum, might 
be supposed to end up with some agreed conception about what is basically just and 
which scheme of society is most fair, one should be prepared for disappointment. 
Honecker for instance very convincingly points out that “ratio” will neither provide us 
with very much in the way of concrete guidance nor remove the plurality of doctrines. 
And Rawls for his part finds it necessary; 
                                                          
857
 Heinz-Horst Shrey, “Goldene Regel III, Theologische Realenzyklopädie, Vol.XIII (Studienasugabe 
1993),  p.580. 
858
 Heinz-Horst Schrey seems right when stressing that: “Insofern enthält das in der goldenen Regel aus-
gesprochene Prinzip der Gegenseitigkeit einen für Christen und Nichtchristen evidenten Kern, als es in der 
dieser Grundbeziehung auf die gegenseitige Anerkennung des Rechts auf Dasein sowie dessen Erhaltung 
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“… to stress that the ideal of public reason does not often lead to general agreement 
of views, nor should it. [But he nonetheless adds:] Citizens learn and profit from 
conflict and argument, and when their arguments follow public reason, they instruct 
and deepen society‟s public culture.”859 
The relation of public reason to the Rawlsian overlapping consensus is complex and 
might be stated as follows: For public reason to function well, there already has to be in 
society an overlapping consensus about the most essential aspects within a conception 
of justice (or within a family of related conceptions). This is required for the orientation 
of public reason, since public reasoning and public justification presupposes some 
shared referential basis. And Rawls has for his part (by a rather complicated procedure 
discussed in chapter 4) elaborated the conception of justice as fairness as a proposed 
basis to be referred to by the different parties involved in public reasoning/justification.  
But beside this it has to be stressed that an overlapping consensus cannot be worked out 
and maintained independently of public reason itself. The overlap will reflect the values 
and ideas of the political culture, as comprised in public reason.  
Thus public reason requires the “overlap” for its own orientation, and, when practised in 
accordance with the reciprocity-criterion, it will also further social co-operation, streng-
then “civic friendship”860 and advance coexistent values, and thereby secure the funda-
mental “overlap”. 
In order to avoid misunderstandings, let it now also be added that one need not expect 
that public reasoning should more or less remove pluralism and lead citizens to sub-
stantive agreement in most matters of morality and politics. Even the content of public 
reason as such cannot be taken as fixed and settled once and for all.
861
 Let it also be 
                                                                                                                                                                          
und Förderung ankommt.” Heinz-Horst Shrey, “Goldene Regel III, Theologische Realenzyklopädie, 
Vol.XIII (Studienasugabe 1993), p.582. 
859
 J. Rawls, “Introduction to the Paperback Edition”, Political Liberalism (1996), p.lvii.  
860
 Let me once more turn to the role of the criterion of reciprocity: “To make more explicit the role of the 
criterion of reciprocity as expressed in public reason, I note that its role is to specify the nature of the pol-
itical relation in a constitutional democratic regime as one of civic friendship. For this criterion, when 
citizens follow it in their public reasoning, shapes the form of their fundamental institutions. For example 
 I cite easy cases  if we argue that the religious liberty of some citizens is to be denied, we must give 
them reasons they can not only understand  as Servetus could understand why Calvin wanted to burn him 
at the stake  but reasons we might reasonably expect that they as free and equal might reasonably also 
accept.” J. Rawls, “Introduction to the Paperback Edition”, Political Liberalism (1996), p.li.   
861
 Rawls even reminds us that “The content of public reason is not fixed, any more than it is defined by 
any one reasonable political conception.” J. Rawls, “Introduction to the Paperback Edition”, Political 
Liberalism (1996), p.liii. 
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added that the content of public reason might turn out differently in different cultures.
862
 
But there is, nevertheless, in public reason a built-in idea that some constraints have to 
be imposed on the kind of reasons to be invoked in public reasoning. I have already 
pointed out how this may actualise the “paradox” of public reason. By constraining 
religious grounds one simultaneously runs the risk of weakening the deepest and 
strongest moral motivation people have for engaging in public affairs. But now Rawls 
takes a further step: In the end there is just one way the paradox can be dissolved 
according to Rawls: If citizens really accept the most reasonable constraints, built into 
the very idea of public reason, as an integrated part of their own deepest (religiously 
grounded) moral commitment, the paradox of public reason will loose its paralysing 
force. And Rawls indeed foresees a solutions where: 
“Citizens affirm the ideal of public reason, not as a result of political compromise, 
as in the modus vivendi, but from within their own reasonable doctrines.”863 
This is the secret of the overlapping consensus, for it means that the so called paradox 
can only be supposed to disappear when public reason, with its orientation towards the 
common good, is endorsed by an overlapping consensus of the reasonable comprehen-
sive doctrines themselves. Thereby the constraints implicit in public reason are turned 
into a kind of self-restraint,  to be endorsed from within the comprehensive doctrine 
one is honouring. Rawls clearly realises that (religious) comprehensive doctrines are not 
to be considered solely a source of irreconcilable conflict in society,  it is now fully 
realised by Rawls that comprehensive moral doctrines might in themselves encourage 
citizens to honour the ideals of public reason. We will leave a further discussion of the 
specific duties imposed by the requirement of public reasoning and the conflicts that 
might result from complying with the so called duty of civility until the next chapter. 
5.7. Some concluding remarks 
Before concluding this chapter, which has mostly focused on different aspects of moral 
and political reason, I would like to summarise some crucial aspects of Rawls‟ idea of 
public reason, analysed in the last part of the chapter.
 
According to Rawls public reason 
                                                          
862
 Most likely this will also imply that a world-wide “overlapping consensus” cannot easily be achieved, 
even if focusing on the most essential moral-political values. 
863
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.218 
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has a definite structure, consisting of five central facets: 
 It applies mainly when strictly political questions concerning basic justice and shared 
institutional conditions for coexistence and social co-operation are at stake. 
 It applies primarily to those holding governmental office, to citizens aiming at public 
office and to judges, but the ideals inherent in public reason might also be given a 
wider application; per analogy these ideals are relevant also for citizens when dealing 
with ordinary political matters of shared interest.  
 It takes its orientation from a political conception of justice (or from a family of 
liberal conceptions), – about which there should be an overlapping consensus even in 
pluralist societies.  
 Shared principles of justice are to be applied above all to questions concerning the 
legitimate institutional use of power (within a framework of law). 
 Last but not least, in matters of public reason, our guiding principles should satisfy 
the test of reciprocity. 
As already suggested, there has been a certain evolution in Rawls‟ thinking about public 
reason,  from a rather exclusive to an inclusive view. From a theological point of view 
this development within the Rawlsian conception, by which he can mitigate the “para-
dox” of public reason should be viewed positively. But of course one should have in 
mind that Rawlsian political liberalism still imposes considerable constraints on the 
kind of reasons that can be invoked within the strictly political forum,  as can be seen 
in the role Rawls ascribes to the so called “proviso”.  
Let me now conclude this chapter by considering in a theological perspective some 
aspects connected with the constraint of public reason in particular and with our 
reasoning about basic moral-political questions more generally. 
a) It may be of some importance to notice first that Honecker does not distinguish be-
tween a strictly public forum and the wider forum of civil society with its background 
culture in the way Rawls does. The domain of the public comprises both domains and is 
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broadly conceived of in Honecker‟s thought.864  
b) From a liberal political point of view the public discourse and the maintenance of a 
public forum have usually been taken to be of vital importance for controlling those in 
power and for advancing justice and truth.
865
 Even if citizens in pluralist societies may 
not be supposed to arrive at the most vital truths or reach broad and deep agreement, 
public reasoning is in itself to be guided by an idea of consensus.
866
 
c) The maintenance of a public forum may be of the greatest importance for focusing on 
the elementary political liberties, rights and opportunities which are to be guaranteed for 
individual citizens,  as well as for Churches867 and for other associations participating 
in public life. But as one of many associations the church has no privileged position in 
this political perspective, but an equal right.
868
 
                                                          
864
 The wide understanding of the public might be usual in theological social ethics. Cf. for instance the 
latest book written by Ivar Asheim where he directly comments on Rawls‟ narrow understanding of the 
notion of the public: “Rawls forsøker altså å sortere problemene ut ved å skjelne mellom „public‟ og „non-
public reason‟ og tilsvarende fora. Er denne terminologien heldig? For egen del opererer Rawls med et 
meget trangt offentlighetsbegrep, som refererer til sammenhenger som aktualiserer juridisk-politisk 
tvangsmakt. Dermed skjærer han klar av konflikter mellom „comprehensive doctrines‟, men legger sam-
tidig opp til misforståelser og misbruk av sitt konsept ved å anvende et offentlighetsbegrep som avviker 
sterkt fra det vanlige. Habermas‟ offentlighetsbegrep ligger mer på linje med alminnelig språkbruk idet det 
refererer til samfunnsmessig opinionsdannelse i interessekonflikter i sin alminnelighet.” I.Asheim, Hva 
betyr holdninger. Studier i dydsetikk (1997), p.187f. I don‟t think it is a problem that Rawls uses the 
notion of “the public” in a rather narrow sense. But it might be a problem if one is confusing the different 
approaches of Rawls and Habermas. 
865
 “Die aufgeklärte liberale Auffassung vertraute auf Öffentlichkeit als Garanten von Wahrheit und Ge-
rechtigkeit. Die öffentliche Diskussion sollte Wahrheit und Gerechtigkeit in Erscheinung treten lassen. 
Darum war für sie die Forderung nach Meinungs- und Pressefreiheit so wichtig.” M. Honecker, “Öffent-
lichkeit”, Theologische Realenzyklopädie, Vol.XXV (1995), p.21. Let it, however, be added once more 
that Rawls for his part is not as optimistic about the possibility of establishing moral or political truth 
through public reasoning. 
866
 “Kategorien der Öffentlichkeit sind dabei: Autonomie des kommunikativen Handelns, Freiheit und 
Selbstbestimmung der Teilnehmer und Transparenz der kommunikativen Organisation. Das demokrat-
ische Verständnis von Öffentlichkeit beruht darauf, daß Menschen zur politischen Verantwortung bereit 
sind und daß in der freien, uneingeschränkten Diskussion ermittelt werden soll, was dem öffentlichen, 
Wohl, dem Gemeinwohl am besten entspricht. Das Ziel des Diskurses ist also Konsens…” M. Honecker, 
Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.632. 
867
 “Jede Partizipation der Kirche am Prozess der Willensbildung in der Öffentlichkeit ist abhängig von 
einer Reihe von Faktoren. Dazu zählen … die Struktur der Öffentlichkeit. In einer freiheitlichen, plural-
istischen Demokratie hat die Kirche einen anderen Zugang zu Öffentlichkeit als in einem totalitären 
Regime, in einer Diktatur. Die Achtung der Grundrechte, der Meinungsfreiheit, der Pressefreiheit der 
Zugang zu Massemedien sind dabei bedeutsam.…” M.Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p. 
637f. 
868
 Honecker makes this quite clear when discussing the “Öffentlichkeitsauftrag” of the church. “Die 
Anerkennung eines Öffentlichkeitsauftrags gibt der Kirche keine spezifische Rechtsposition. Aus der 
Formel läßt sich also keine besondere priviligierte Stellung der Kirche in der Öffentlichkeit ableiten. … 
Eine Sonderstellung und Begünstigung der Kirche gegenüber anderen Verbänden wäre mit dem Ver-
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d) I think that Honecker may be right in emphasising that the publicity condition is 
normally to be honoured not just by political liberalism, but by Churches and Christians 
as well: “Die Evidenz der Dinge liegt in ihrer öffentlichen Manifestation begründet.”869 
Political schemes, decisions in matters of basic justice and moral claims of common 
interest have to be tested and defended “coram publico”.870 And when churches engage 
in public affairs and raise questions of basic justice, they have to justify the standpoints 
they take in terms of public reason and argue reasonably for them,  thereby respecting 
certain public constraints, as for instance, the Rawlsian proviso. 
e) Even if the Rawlsian proviso opens up for invoking religious reasons within the 
public forum, it does so provided that one can “translate” the religious reasons to fit 
within the terms of public reason. Unless we postulate, however, that standards set by 
public reason can mostly be expected to be fundamentally incompatible with God‟s law 
(seen in the perspective of an usus politicus legis), the Rawlsian proviso should nor-
mally be satisfied. I think Honecker (like Rawls) successfully argues that we need 
usually not postulate such an incompatibility in matters of social ethics.
871
 
f) The domain of the public has different characteristics,  and I think Honecker does 
right in focusing especially on the phenomenon of “Transparenz”. The parties should be 
ready to explain and to justify to one another openly their standpoints in public affairs 
by invoking common reason and shared premises. Let it also be added that “transpar-
ency” may be an ideal to be practised, as far as possible, not just in the strictly public 
forum but in churches as well.
872
. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
fassungsrecht eines säkularen Staates nicht zu vereinbaren. Der Staat hat der Kirche nur den Freiraum für 
ihr Handeln in Verkündigung und Diakonie einzuräumen und ihr in derselben Weise Zugang zu den Mas-
senmedien zu gewähren wie anderen Verbänden und Organisationen auch. Die Berufung auf einen Öffent-
lichkeitsauftrag der Kirche ist eine Formulierung evangelischer Juristen.” M. Honecker, “Öffentlichkeit”, 
Theologische Realenzyklopädie, Vol.XXV (1995), p.24. 
869
 M. Honecker, “Öffentlichkeit”, Theologische Realenzyklopädie, Vol.XXV (1995), p.18. 
870
 The notion “coram publico” is taken from Honecker. M. Honecker, “Öffentlichkeit”, Theologische 
Realenzyklopädie, Vol.XXV (1995), p.19. 
871
 Rawls for his part even suggests that “In endorsing a constitutional democratic regime, a religious 
doctrine may say that such are the limits God sets to our liberty…” J. Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason 
Revisited”, The University of Chicago Law Review (1997;3), p.782. 
872
 There might be many reasons for this. Honecker refers especially to the fact that: “Kirche is … eben-
falls Teil der Öffentlichkeit. Sie hat sich deren öffentlicher Kritik als gesellschaftlicher Verband auszu-
setzen: Die Forderung nach Transparenz richtet sich dann auch an die Kirche. Die Kirche steht dann nicht 
der Öffentlichkeit gegenüber, sondern sie steht in ihr.” M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), 
p.637. 
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g) From a theological perspective, however, it should primarily be stressed that the 
gospel is “public”. This is reflected in the “publice docere” of Confessio Augustana. 
(CA XIV). Postulating an “Öffentlichkeits-anspruch” for the gospel  which cannot, 
however, be substantially susceptible to public or rational opinion  means that the 
kerygma itself has the widest possible address.
873
 The Christian kerygma can, according 
to its own nature, in no way be reduced to a kind of strictly “esoteric” knowledge or 
made a merely “private” affair.874  
h) Moreover, Honecker, like Rawls, takes for granted that religious views and religious 
reasons should play an important moral role, contributing both to the value-formation of 
civil society and even to the public debate (provided the proviso is satisfied). And both 
of them pay due attention to the elementary fact that most people cannot be expected to 
distinguish sharply between public reasons and the reasons stemming from their com-
prehensive doctrines, even if the way of relating them might be rather complex, as can 
especially be seen in Honecker‟s model of “Vermittlung”.  
I have now focused mainly on “the public”. I will make some additional remarks also on 
the use of reason, moral reason, when concerned with matters of basic justice and a 
shared political framework of social co-operation. I have employed the theological 
distinction between law and gospel, and foremost the doctrine of the two kingdoms as 
hermeneutic keys that might properly open up the domain of the political as a shared 
                                                          
873
 “Die Mission der christlichen Gemeinde richtet sich an die Welt (Mt 28,20). Darum hat die Kirche 
notwendig einen öffentlichen Auftrag. Jesu Rede ergeht frei und offen vor aller Welt (Joh 18,20). Jesu 
Jünger schulden jedermann Verantwortung (1. Petr 3,15). Die Gemeinde ist Stadt auf dem Berge, Licht in 
der Welt (Mt 5,14f.). Öffentlich zu werden ist daher konstitutiv für die christliche Gemeinde. Gottes-
dienst, Predigt, Unterweisung geschehen öffentlich. Es ist daher durchaus sinnvoll und theologisch 
begründet, wenn man von einem „Öffentlichkeitsauftrag der Kirche, von „öffentlicher Verantwortung‟ 
spricht.” M. Honecker, “Öffentlichkeit”, Theologische Realenzyklopädie, Vol.XXV (1995), p.21. 
874
 “Öffentlichkeitsauftrag und Anspruch der Kirche bedeutet dann: freier Zugang der Kirche zur 
Öffentlichkeit, keine Verabannung ins Ghetto im Unterschied zu der Sicht, Religion sei „Privat-sache‟.” 
M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.637. And Honecker criticises the Kantian distinction 
between public and private, the result of which was that the preaching of a minister in the church should 
most appropriately be considered a strictly “private” affair, – since he is acting on clearly “heteronomous” 
premises, bound by external authorities. The Kantian view of the “public” is considered earlier in this 
chapter. But let me here just add that Kant can say that: “Der Gebrauch also, den ein angestellter Lehrer 
von seiner Vernunft vor seiner Gemeinde macht, ist bloß ein Privatgebrauch, weil diese immer nur eine 
häusliche, obzwar noch so große, Versammlung ist; und in Ansehung dessen ist er als Priester, nicht frei, 
und darf es auch nicht sein, weil er einen fremden Auftrag ausrichtet.” I.Kant, Beantwortung der Frage: 
Was ist Aufklärung, , 1783, (WBG, 1979,Vol.9), p.57. Again it has to be underlined that preaching in the 
church is no private activity, it is widely addressed, open to the “publicum” and it can be criticised freely 
and might at least have a considerable influence on the value-formation of (civil) society. I think that 
Honecker as well as Rawls would avoid drawing on the Kantian distinction between private and public. 
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concern. I have thoroughly analysed Rawls idea of the reasonable, which is so essential 
for his idea of an overlapping consensus. Simultaneously, however, I have tried not to 
ignore the deep pluralism characteristic of modern societies. Most of this chapter has 
been concerned with different aspects of the reasonable, public reason and moral reason-
ing. Of course my perspective on moral reason is not theologically unproblematic. 
One might theologically degrade reason, stressing instead its limitation or its insuf-
ficiency or the apories it is often provoking. And there are theological arguments that 
could even be taken as an occasion for suspending the role of common reason or for 
rejecting entirely public reason, – relying instead on particular “reasons” or an exclusive 
kind of revelation or an “esoteric” or privileged insight. I think, however, that Honecker 
is right in his claim that this way of defeating (public) reason, might in the end turn out 
to be a Pyrric-victory rendering any reasoned discourse or consensus impossible, making 
the church an ally of irrationalism and obscurantism
875
, and simultaneously undermining 
the premises for a public forum. 
To avoid misunderstanding, let me recall that Honecker‟s social ethics do not contain 
any practical “deification” of reason.876 He himself clearly stresses that substantially and 
ontologically “ratio” can neither provide us with any catalogue of moral norms nor with 
very much of specific and authoritative guidance in matters of social ethics.
877
 Argu-
mentative or communicative reason  which may even be supposed to have a moral 
orientation towards the “humanum”  is nonetheless urgently required.878 This 
                                                          
875
 “Sodann ist es theologisch fragwürdig, die Aporien der Vernunft zum Erweis der Notwendigkeit von 
Offenbarung, Glaube und Kirche zu benutzen. Die Selbstkritik der Vernunft legitimiert nicht schon die 
Erfordernis einer Offenbarung,  auch nicht für die theologische Ethik. Denn das Bedürfnis nach Oient-
ierung, das die Vernunft anscheinend nicht decken kann, bürgt nicht für die Wahrheit und Authentizität 
der Offenbarung überhaupt. Wenn eine Wendung zum Offenbarungsglauben allein auf der Verzweiflung 
an der ratio beruhen müßte, wird christlicher Glaube überführt in Irrationalismus, wenn nicht Obskurant-
imus, d.h. in Aberglaube. Ein Irrationalismus des Offenbarungsglaubens ist ein auf Kosten der Wahrheit 
erfochtener Pyrrhussieg.” M.Honecker, “Vernunft, Gewissen, Glaube. Das spezifisch Christliche im 
Horizont der Ethik”, Evangelische Ethik. Diskussionsbeiträge zu ihrer Grundlegung, ed. H. G.Ulrich 
(1990), p.131. 
876
 Honecker says it directly as follows. “Sie werden meinen Überlegungen zur Ethik entnommen haben, 
daß ich keine direkte „Theologisierung‟ der Vernunft anstrebe und insofern für eine autonome Ethik 
eintrete.” M. Honecker, “Erfahrung und Entscheidung”, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche (1978), 
p.499. 
877
 “Zunächst ist das Mißverständnis zu vermeiden, als sei Vernunft substantiell oder ontologisch zu 
verstehen.” M.Honecker, “Vernunft, Gewissen, Glaube. Das spezifisch Christliche im Horizont der 
Ethik”, published in Evangelische Ethik. Diskussionsbeiträge zu ihrer Grundlegung, ed. H. G.Ulrich 
(1990) p.127.  
878
 Honecker underlines that: “Vor dieser Notwendigkeit, sich der Vernunft als Argumentationsprinzip 
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communicative reason sets an agenda for discursive processes, for disciplined arguing 
and explanation, for justifying common standards and assessing diverse standpoints 
within the public forum.
879
  
I have already stressed that “transparency” is an ideal, which is closely connected with 
the openness required by public reason. But this ideal of “Transparenz” cannot and 
should not always be pursued, what Honecker clearly realises. There may be practical 
reasons for that.
880
 But here are also deeper theological reasons for saying so, grounded 
in Christian faith itself. Faith gets manifest, in the Christian church as a congregation of 
those believing in God, and it gets manifest in the wider forum of the public. At the 
same time, however, faith belongs genuinely within the forum internum, the individual 
conscience, and as such it cannot and should in no way be made fully transparent in 
terms of public reason.
881
 Respecting the nature of faith, as something that cannot be 
definitely explained and need not be entirely justified within the forum externum of the 
public, means to respect the very integrity and privacy of the person and prevents what 
Honecker can also characterise as the “Tyrannei des Öffentlichen”.882 If extended to 
                                                                                                                                                                          
auszusetzen, ist aber auch christliche Überlieferung und christliche Ethik gestellt.” M.Honecker, “Ver-
nunft, Gewissen, Glaube. Das spezifisch Christliche im Horizont der Ethik”, Evangelische Ethik. Dis-
kussionsbeiträge zu ihrer Grundlegung, ed. H. G.Ulrich (1990), p.129. 
879
 Honecker underlines: “Kritik sets voraus eine freie Argumentationsgemeinschaft, in der alle Argu-
mente zugelassen werden müssen, damit diese Argumente kritisch geprüft werden können. Nur in ihrem 
Gebrauch kann nämlich Vernunft geprüft und kritisiert werden.” M.Honecker, “Vernunft, Gewissen, 
Glaube. Das spezifisch Christliche im Horizont der Ethik”, Evangelische Ethik. Diskussionsbeiträge zu 
ihrer Grundlegung, ed. H. G.Ulrich (1990), p.128. 
880
 “Transparenz von Entscheidungsprozessen in Staat und gesellschaftlichen Institutionen und Organisa-
tionen ist gar nicht überall realisierbar und stößt auf Grenzen. Sofern es nicht nur um passive Öffentlich-
keit, sondern um aktive Öffentlichkeit geht, werden Mitbestimmung, Partizipation (z.T. in Form formal 
nicht geregelter Partizipation) intendiert. Dadurch können jedoch Kompetenzen und Verantwortlichkeiten 
undeutlich werden. Auch kann die Öffentlichkeit von Entsceidungsprozessen die Sachdiskussion ver-
kürzen („Fensterreden‟); oder Entscheidungen verlagern sich in nichtöffentliche Gremien. Genau das 
Gegenteil von Transparenz wird dann faktisch erreicht. Deshalb ist es sinnvoll, zwischen öffentlichen und 
nichtöffentlichen Phasen eines Entscheidungsprozesses zu differenzieren.” M. Honecker, Grundriß der 
Sozialethik (1995), p.635f. 
881
 Honecker himself makes this quite clear: “Das Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Kirche und Öffentlich-
keit ist im Wesen christlichen Glaubens verwurzelt. Die Kirche ist keine civitas Platonica. Sie ist in der 
Öffentlichkeit der Welt erkennbar an ihren äußeren Kennzeichen, an den notae externa ecclesiae; sie ist 
insofern sichtbar. Die Kirche ist auch nicht Trägerin einer Geheimreligion und will keine weltflüchtige 
Sekte sein. Sie ist jedoch unsichtbar, verborgen als societas fidei et spiritus sancti in cordibus (Apol. CA 
VII: BSLK 234,29f.). Der Glaube herrscht inwendig im Herzen. Es gibt zwar Äußerungen des Glaubens 
(Bekenntnis, Zeugnis), die öffentlich sind; aber der Glaube selbst bleibt innerlich im Herzen verborgen. 
Diese Nichtprüfbarkeit des Glaubens macht es unmöglich, alles kirchliche Handeln öffentlich zu machen. 
Das Gebet wird von Jesus aus der Öffentlichkeit in die Verborgenheit der Kammer verwiesen.” M. Hon-
ecker, “Öffentlichkeit”, Theologische Realenzyklopädie, Vol.XXV (1995), p.24. 
882
 “Die Unverfügbarkeit und Innerlichkeit des Glaubens ist jedoch zugleich auch Zeichen und Schutz der 
Unaufweisbarkeit der Person. Die theologische Erkenntnis Gottes als Geheimnis der Wirklichkeit und der 
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religion and matters of conscience, “public opinion” would exert a very strong pressure 
towards conformity. From a theological point of view  but also in a political perspec-
tive  it is in this context of crucial importance to maintain one of the most fundamental 
distinctions used all the way by Honecker:  
“Mit der Unterscheidung von dem was coram deo, vor Gott, gilt und deshalb nicht 
öffentlich sein kann, und dem, was coram publico geschieht und geshehen muß, 
wird die Unterscheidung von Glaube und Werk, von Wirken Gottes und Handeln 
des Menschen im Blick auf das Verständnis von Öffentlichkeit ausgelegt.”883 
I think that Rawls, while clearly limiting the strictly public domain, can genuinely 
respect that there are vital aspects of life that cannot and need not be politically orga-
nised or fully justified in terms of public reason. This is the advantage of a “narrow” 
approach to the domain of the political and the public. And this also means that Rawls' 
proviso does not necessarily apply to all aspects of religious conduct which takes place 
within a democratic society. I think that this insight provides an important premise for 
the kind of toleration that must be guaranteed within modern pluralist (and liberal) 
societies.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
dieser Gotteserkenntnis entsprechende Glaube bieten deshalb auch einen Schutz gegen einen Totalitäts-
anspruch von Öffentlichkeit. Völlige Transparenz macht den Menschen schutzlos und verfügbar. Mithilfe 
des Drucks der Öffentlichkeit können Gewissen manipuliert und verführt werden. So gesehen befreit der 
Glaube von der Tyrannei des Öffentlichen und schafft einen Freiraum individueller Gewissensentscheid-
ung.” M. Honecker, “Öffentlichkeit”, Theologische Realenzyklopädie, Vol.XXV (1995), p.25. 
883
 M. Honecker, “Öffentlichkeit”, Theologische Realenzyklopädie, Vol.XXV (1995), p.25. 
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6. CITIZENSHIP, DISCIPLESHIP AND THE DUTY 
OF CIVILITY 
6.1. Tensions, constraints and costs. 
Honecker, like G. Ebeling, treats the doctrine of the two kingdoms as, above all, an 
appropriate key to understanding the so called “forum-situation” of man as standing 
simultaneously “coram deo” and “coram mundo”.884 The doctrine of the two kingdoms 
 as far as it relates to this situation  is most properly characterised as a “two-relation-
doctrine” rather than a “two spheres-doctrine”. But if the ground-situation of man is 
characterised by his living both “coram deo” and “coram mundo”885, then a fundamental 
tension is built into his existence in the world, as being simultaneously “Christperson” 
and “Weltperson.886  
Rawls for his part, also focuses on the kind of problems which arise from viewing man 
as simultaneously “Weltperson” and “Christperson”. As persons holding a political con-
ception and simultaneously honouring a comprehensive (religious) doctrine, citizens can 
be supposed to strive to make their most sincere concerns cohere. Rawls awareness of 
simultaneity is clearly evidenced by the following reformulation of one of the main 
questions raised in Political Liberalism,  
“How is it possible for those affirming a religious doctrine that is based on religious 
authority, for example, the church or the Bible, also to hold a reasonable political 
conception that supports a just democratic regime? … How is it possible for citizens 
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 Distinctions like these are more thoroughly considered in chapter 5. 
885
 Let it here, however, be inserted that the theological notion of the “world” , when applied to the pol-
itical domain, may be ambigious in itself: “Die Beurteilung der politischen Welt ist ein Sonderfall der 
neutestamentlichen Bewertung von „Welt‟ (Kosmos). „Welt‟ wird im NT ambivalent gesehen. Welt ist 
einerseits Schöpfung Gottes, andererseits Inbegriff der gottfeindlichen Macht. Die neutestamentlichen 
Texte zum Verhalten der Christen gegenüber der politischen Macht sind Ausdruck dieser Zweideutigkeit 
in der Einschätzung von Welt (vgl. Markus 12,13-17 par, Römer 13,1-7 sowie 1. Petrus 2,13-17; 
1.Timotheus 2,2 einerseits, Johannesoffenbarung 13 andererseits).” M. Honecker, “Der Auftrag der 
Kirche und die Aufgabe des Staates”, Essener Gespräche zum Thema Staat und Kirche (1991), p.77.  
886
 “Solche Beschreibung der Grundsituation des Menschseins mit Hilfe der Zweireichelehre verweist auf 
eine unaufgebbare Spannung , eine Spannung, die sehr verschieden bestimmt werden kann, als Unter-
scheidung  zweier Relationen coram deo/coram mundo, zweier Gerechtigkeiten (iustitia spiritualis/civilis), 
als Unterscheidung von Person und Werk, Glaube und Liebe, Christperson und Weltperson. Konstitutiv 
ist für die Zweireichlehere diese Spannung. … Die Grundvoraussetzung der Zweireichlehere ist, daß die 
gesamte Wirklichkeit von Grundgegensätzen bestimmt wird, in deren Schnittpunkt sich der Mensch 
vorfindet und die ihn dazu nötigen, sich in ihnen zu orientieren und Orientierungspunkte, Relationen zu 
unterscheiden.” M. Honecker, Sozialethik zwischen Tradition und Vernunft (1977), p.183f. 
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of faith to be wholehearted members of a democratic society …?”887 
Of course Rawls does not treat the simultaneity as a theological problem, but as a pol-
itical problem closely connected to his idea of citizenship.  
As Christians people have a primary loyalty in all things as is made clear in Acts 5,29: 
“We must obey God rather than man.” As members of society, citizens have moral 
duties. Public reason, which comprises the ideas to be drawn upon in an “overlapping 
consensus”, gives rise to an ideal of citizenship. Endorsing an overlapping consensus as 
a common basis for public commitment and social co-operation implies that we  as 
citizens  are ready to accept certain “limitations on our freedom, impositions on our 
will which must be discharged regardless of our inclinations”888 and regardless of the 
“private” and more specific aims that we might have. 
The fact that certain duties (and constraints) follow from one's participation in social co-
operation within an ordered society was previously stressed by Thomas Hobbes who 
clearly recognised that human beings  after having willingly left behind them the state 
of nature  had to give up something in order to attain something that they considered 
most required. People, it was supposed, were by and large willing to accept very strong 
constraints on their freedom, if they could thereby get an effective protection against an 
absolute and arbitrary “freedom” of others in return. Thus Hobbes supposed that people 
were willing to pay a rather high price for safety, peace and protection.
889
 
According to Rawls, the government has a monopoly on the use of the coercive powers 
of society. But Rawls (like John Locke
890
) draws the conclusion that the people might 
also withdraw their consent, thereby rendering a government illegitimate. The monopoly 
of power ascribed to the sovereign or the state-authorities is, therefore,  ultimately based 
on the consent of those governed. Rawls main perspective is that: 
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 J. Rawls, “Introduction to the Paperback Edition”, Political Liberalism (1996), p. xxxixf. 
888
 A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, Princeton - New Jersey 1981, p.7 
889
 According to Hobbes people should be expected to be willing to accept heavy constraints on their 
freedom for the sake of internal peace and self-preservation. They could be supposed to “sacrifice” to a 
very wide extent the liberty that they had in the state of nature, willingly handing over their original rights 
rather unconditionally to the sovereign. As long as a sovereign does not in the most tyrannical way forfeit 
his most eminent task of preserving  citizens‟ lives, his ordering of society should be accepted.  
890
 I recall that according to Locke it can never be easy for the citizens to withdraw their consent, on 
which the actual government is based. Cf. J.Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1689/1993), p. 201. 
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“In a constitutional regime the special feature of the political relation is that political 
power is ultimately the power of the public, that is, the power of free and equal 
citizens as a collective body. This power is regularly imposed on citizens as individ-
uals and as members of associations, some of whom may not accept the reasons 
widely said to justify the general structure of political authority  the constitution  
or when they do accept that structure, they may not regard as justified many of the 
statutes enacted by the legislature to which they are subject.”891 
By stressing that the power of society ultimately remains with the citizens as free and 
equal partners, Rawls very clearly takes the citizens,  as a collective body  to be the 
real sovereign of society. If the citizens  taken as a collective body  are considered the 
ultimate source of political sovereignty, it follows that citizens in fact have to impose on 
themselves the constraints that are required to make society function as a common enter-
prise, i.e. as a fair, coexistent and well-ordered society for all its members. In a demo-
cratic society this is the ultimate perspective on the exercise of final political and coer-
cive power. But this makes it even more necessary for citizens to find or establish a 
shared basis for enacting laws and distributing common resources and justifying to one 
another the most crucial decisions in a shared forum of public reason. Simply put, 
citizens  as members of society  have a duty to justify and to explain to one another 
the reasons they have for taking certain standpoints and making certain decisions in 
matters of shared political interest. And it is this, which might also render reference to 
particular reasons, called by Rawls “comprehensive reasons” within the framework of 
the public, so problematic. 
So the title, “constraints and costs” is chosen to indicate that all citizens in democratic 
and modern liberal societies are somehow expected to pay a tribute to the “project” of 
upholding a required minimum of shared standards and complying with certain civic 
duties in their roles as citizens. According to Rawls persons, parties and groups in plu-
ralist societies are supposed to be ready to accept certain constraints on their conduct in 
order to make society function as a fair system of co-operation. Modern societies impose 
a co-operative need to stick to common rules, widely acceptable principles and reason-
able procedures in cases of public interest. A corresponding coexistent attitude seems to 
be required for the sake of internal peace and social co-operation within a common insti-
tutional framework, which the parties can accept as just. 
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 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.136 
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The question remains nonetheless, what price should we be willing to pay for main-
taining society as a system of co-operation, consisting of citizens that have obviously 
very diverse religious and moral convictions. The “costs” following from accepting 
public constraints, for instance by sticking strictly to public reason, instead of advancing 
one‟s comprehensive reasons unrestrictedly, might seem rather heavy. Someone might 
for instance fear that imposing such constraints might imply;  
 a ”devaluation” of Christian values and moral standards in the public field,  if 
Christians are to a considerable extent abstaining from explicit reference to their 
religious convictions. 
 an increase of intra-personal conflicts,  if religious convictions are really out-
weighed by political values which are “not easily overridden”.892 
At first glance it seems as though the required constraints most clearly benefit liberalism 
in terms of furthering its political values while potentially imposing considerable costs 
in terms of the comprehensive view one might have. 
However, instead of just regretting the costs of accepting some constraints in public 
affairs as an integral part of the political obligation one has as a citizen, it is also 
necessary to consider the costs of sticking to “non-shared” and  “private” reasons in 
matters where equal citizenship is at stake. For what is really the alternative to all parties 
accepting certain limitations on their private and non-public activity in order to make a 
pluralist society function as a fair institutionalised system of co-operation? Without 
doubt the costs following from an unrestrained attitude in matters of common interest 
                                                          
892
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.218. Even in liberal societies Rawls presupposes that political 
values “under the reasonably favorable conditions that make democracy possible, normally outweigh 
whatever other values are likely to conflict with them….” Ibid. p.156. The result can, however, be con-
siderable problems of conscience,  although I think that Rawls takes for granted that this kind of conflict 
will most likely not occur very often in liberal societies. However, there is  as I will make clear  many 
suggestions in Rawls‟ own works that indicate that even within clearly liberal societies cannot the tension 
between comprehensive doctrines and political conceptions be easily mitigated or removed. Let me add 
that a distinction between intrapersonal and interpersonal conflicts might be helpful in this connection. It 
is also used by Joachim Wiebering: “Bisher ging es in den genannten Erfahrungsfeldern um „interperson-
ale Konflikte‟, die zwischen verschiedenen Menschen oder sozialen Gruppen aufbrechen. Daneben stehen 
noch die „intrapersonalen Konflikte‟, die sich in einem Menschen abspielen, der von einander wider-
sprechenden Forderungen hin und her gerissen wird und zu keiner eindeutigen Entscheidung findet. 
Solche Konflikte betreffen die Ebene der Gewissensentscheidung des einzelnen...”, Cf Joachim Wieb-
ering,“Kompromiß als christliche Kategorie”, Zeitschrift für evangelische Ethik, 1978,4; S.298. It can 
hardly be avoided that intrapersonal conflicts might arise because widely recognized political obligations 
are not at all seen by some groups and individuals as compatible with duties imposed by religious and 
moral comprehensive views. 
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and equal citizenship might also be very high.
893
 An unwillingness by Christians to seek 
a common basis might be met with a similar attitude from other groups as well,  the 
result of which might be a relapse into a “state of nature” with all of the risks implied in 
the exercise of an unframed and unlimited “freedom”. The point I am stressing here is 
that every group in a society has to realise that: “A choice for or against restraint, sacri-
fices something of value.”894 And it is impossible to tally the costs of social co-ope-
ration without also taking into consideration the gains that citizens will have from hon-
ouring a duty of civility, practising common virtues of citizenship, and establishing 




It is the consideration of gains as against costs in his political calculations that leads 
John Locke to conclude that all citizens would gain decisively by leaving the state of 
nature with its “perfect liberty” and instead submit willingly to a common scheme of a 
well-ordered political society (grounded on consent), with its inherent constraints on the 
liberty of individuals and groups. For it is not so much the costs as the advantages that 
focus one‟s attention when assessing life within the politically ordered society,  
“If man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said; if he be absolute lord of his 
own person and possession, equal to the greatest, and subject to nobody, why will he 
part with his freedom? Why will he give up this empire, and subject himself to the 
dominion and control of any other power? To which „tis obvious to answer, that 
though in the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very 
uncertain, and constantly exposed to the invasion of others. For all being kings as 
much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict observer of equity and 
justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very in-
secure. This makes him willing to quit this condition, which however free, is full of 
fears and continual dangers: and „tis not without reason, that he seeks out, and is 
willing to join in society with others who are already united, or have a mind to unite 
for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the 
general name property.”896 
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 According to Rawls “The virtues of political cooperation that make a constitutional regime possible 
are, then, very great virtues.” J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.157). And one such political virtue 
is obviously the readiness “to meet others halfway...” (Ibid, p.157). Citizens are expected to take an active 
interest in coming to reasonable interpersonal arrangements with others and  in public affairs  to play 
by common rules and honour principles, which can be considered commonly acceptable in democratic 
societies. 
894
 K. Greenawalt, Private Consciences and Public Reasons, (1995), p.133. 
895
 In this it is also presupposed that an acceptable consensus has to incorporate certain standards of 
fairness. If Plato‟s Republic could for instance also be supposed to rest on some kind of consensus, it 
should hardly be a consensus based on Rawlsian ideas of fairness. 
896
 J. Locke: Two Treatises of Government (1689/1993), p.178. 
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The “gains” following from all parties consenting to some vital constraints on their 
liberty might be; 
 a society, which can be upheld as an institutionalised common enterprise for mutual 
preservation of life, social goods and (religious) liberty.
897
 
 a society with a basic structure that allows for an individual liberty only as far as it is 
compatible with a similar liberty for others.
898
 
 a society with a sufficient political power to secure elementary rights and effective 
justice for the diverse citizens and groups. 
However, political arrangements would appear to be of a highly conditional nature when 
considered from a Christian perspective. It seems as if the recognition of shared ideals 
of equal citizenship, vital co-operative duties and political values might be possible only 
with some essential reservations from a Christian point of view. As is made clear for 
instance in St. Augustine‟s City of God, Christians enjoy what might be termed “dual 
citizenship”.899 They belong within two “kingdoms” and the duties of citizenship which 
they have should always be balanced against the obligation inherent in the “citizenship” 
which they simultaneously have within the commonwealth of God.  As stated in the 
“Letter to the Philippians”:  
“But our commonwealth900 is in heaven, and from it we await a Savior, the Lord 
Jesus Christ…” (Phil.3,20) 
As already suggested, Rawls is very much aware of the dilemma arising from the fact 
that citizens might have a dual loyalty. This is at least taken into account when he dis-
tinguishes between the two ground-perspectives that all citizens should normally be 
presupposed to have, namely a political view and a comprehensive doctrine: 
“For we always assume that citizens have two views, a comprehensive and a 
political view, and that their overall view can be divided into two parts, suitably 
related. We hope that by doing this we can in working political practice ground the 
constitutional essentials and basic institutions of justice solely in those political 
values, with these values understood as the basis of public reason and justifi-
                                                          
897
 Expressed in a Lockean way this would be the alternative to a society taken as an aggregate of indi-
viduals, each with their unconstrained “perfect liberty”. 
898
 Let it here be underlined that according to Rawls can human liberty only be limited for the sake of 
liberty itself. And that is just what is taking place when  people leave the state of nature. 
899
 They can be considered “pilgrims” within the civitas terrena.  
900
 In Greek: “h(mw=n ga\r to\ poli/teuma e)n ou)ranoi=j u(pa/rxei.” 
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cation.”901  
It seems obvious that questions about discipleship, and the duties of citizenship might 
be considered from theological, philosophical and political perspectives. While I will, 
when discussing problems of citizenship and religious commitment in this chapter, 
mainly take a theological perspective, I nonetheless intend to contribute to a wider 
debate and dialogue. The question about the proper relation between citizenship and 
discipleship is in many respects of common interest and cannot be ignored when taking 
a Rawlsian point of departure. In this chapter I will therefore pay particular attention to 
Rawls‟ ideal of citizenship, following from the idea of public reason and citizens‟ readi-
ness to comply with the most vital conditions for achieving an “overlapping consensus”. 
In this context, the relation between the duty of citizenship and the moral duty which 
follows from one‟s religious and moral comprehensive view must be addressed.  
6.2. Can a Christian be a good citizen? 
6.2.1. Citizenship  morally laden?  
Let us now turn to the notion of citizenship which plays a central role in Rawlsian 
thought. It may be said that Rawls, when elaborating his liberal conception of justice, 
especially in the theory of justice presented in 1971 but also in Political Liberalism, 
cannot entirely avoid comprehensiveness himself. Rawls answers this critique by ad-
mitting that A Theory of Justice may in some respect be characterised as a comprehen-
sive (and controversial) theory.
902
 One might for instance find particular assumptions 
about man in his theory, which are unlikely to be widely shared. In Political Liberalism, 
however, he aims at a political conception that is compatible with modern pluralism 
and, as such, is non-comprehensive in aim.
903
 This also means that Rawls‟ perspective 
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 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p. 140. 
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 It is admitted by Rawls that “the argument in Theory relies on a premise the realization of which its 
principles of justice rule out. This is the premise that in the well-ordered society of justice as fairness, 
citizens hold the same comprehensive doctrine, and this includes aspects of Kant‟s comprehensive liberal-
ism, to which the principles of justice as fairness might belong. But given the fact of reasonable pluralism 
this comprehensive view is not held by citizens generally, any more than a religious doctrine, or some 
form of utilitarianism.“ J. Rawls, “Introduction to the Paperback Edition”, Political Liberalism (1996), 
p.xlii. 
903
 Let it be noticed that the term “comprehensive” should not be taken as synonymous with “substantial”. 
Rawls‟ conception is not broad and deep, neither is it aiming at some kind of “Letzbegründung” or “ulti-
mate truth”. He sets out for a conception that is political and reasonable. But of course the conception he 
elaborates is not without substantial elements. “Justice as fairness is substantive … in the sense that it 
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on man has to some extent changed.
904
: 
“In political philosophy one role of ideas about our nature has been to think of 
people in a standard, or canonical, fashion so that they might all accept the same 
kind of reasons. In political liberalism, however, we try to avoid natural or psy-
chological views of this kind, as well as theological or secular doctrines. Accounts 
of human nature we put aside and rely on a political conception of persons as 
citizens instead.”905 
Rawls will now clearly avoid elaborating a comprehensive doctrine of man in general. 
Employing instead the notion of the citizen fits well with his strictly political approach. 
Through the revitalisation of the idea of citizenship Rawls hopes to concentrate on the 
strictly political and moral aspects of social coexistence within the framework of so-
ciety. Citizenship relates to the basic structure of society and the essential institutions of 
the state. And implied in citizenship are certain civic duties.  
A brief digression is in order to clarify the notion of citizenship, drawing from the third 
book of Politics in which Aristotle uses the phenomenon of seamanship to explain some 
essential aspects of citizenship: A crew working together on a ship has different tasks 
(as navigators, mates etc…). There is a special task for each of them, and accordingly 
there is a particular virtue (a)reth/) corresponding with the individual responsibility each 
one has. But there is also a common virtue of seamanship valid for all the seamen, as a 
co-operating crew with the shared aim of bringing the ship to its destination. This way 
of thinking about seamanship is in a vital respect analogous to the way one should think 
about citizenship, according to Aristotle. Even if citizens have individual tasks and 
particular duties to fulfil, there is also a virtue, which should be the same for all the 
coexistent citizens,  it might just be called the “virtue of citizenship”. According to 
Aristotle the virtue of citizenship has its inherent meaning in the “salvation” of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
springs from and belongs to the tradition of liberal thought and the larger community of political culture 
of democratic societies.” J.Rawls, “Reply to Habermas”, The Journal of Philosophy (1995), p. 179. 
904
 However, there is hardly a radical shift in Rawls‟ assumptions about man. In the introduction to the 
paperback edition of Political Liberalism he still emphasises: “We must start with the assumption that a 
reasonably political society is possible, and for it to be possible, human beings must have a moral nature, 
not of course a perfect such nature, yet one that can understand, act on, and be sufficiently moved by a 
reasonable political conception of right and justice to support a society guided by its ideals and principles. 
Theory and PL try to sketch what the more reasonable conceptions of justice for a democratic regime are 
and to present a candidate for the most reasonable. They also consider how citizens need to be conceived 
to construct those more reasonable conceptions …” J. Rawls, “Introduction to the Paperback Edition”, 
Political Liberalism (1996), p.lxii. 
905






Let me  by taking my point of departure from the illustration given by Aristotle  just 
underline that characterising somebody as a citizen is to ascribe to him certain moral 
obligations towards the “polis” and the co-citizens.907 
Aristotelian society also contained groups of people (me/toikoi) and slaves (dou/loi) who 
were non-citizens and thereby excluded from the full participation in society. As we can 
see in Aristotle‟s Politics, citizenship was a rather exclusive affair. What characterised 
citizens, according to Aristotle, was their full participation in the political and judiciary 
power of the polis. The virtue of citizenship got its orientation from this participation in 
the affairs of polis. Thus a citizen in the strict sense of the word is – according to 
Aristotle  a man who has the right and the duty to participate in the administration of 
justice and the holding of office in the city-state.
908
 And according to Aristotle there 
should most appropriately be a system of regular turnover in the holding of public 
offices in society.
909
 Rulers should not hold office permanently. A ruler should know 
what it is like both to be ruled and to rule. Thereby citizens might (at different times) 
have different tasks and duties within the city-state, which demonstrates that in principle 
citizenship is to be based on a fundamental equality.
910
 And as far as the ruler governs 
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 Cf. Aristotle‟s: Politiken (Politics, Greek/Swedish edition 1993) III, 1276b;28-31, where Aristotle 
concentrates on “h( swthri/a th\s koinwni/aj” and emphasises that “koinwni/a d’e)sti\n h( politei/a dio`th\n a)reth\n 
a)nagkai¤on eiÅnai tou= poli/tou pro\s th\n politei/an “. 
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 According to Bill Jordan this Aristotelian concern could not be maintained in modern time. Referring 
to “the great revolution in moral thinking which occurred in the eighteenth century” Jordan adds: “With 
this change, the notion of citizenship, while still defining what members of society had in common, came 
to be quite separate from the idea of morality; and instead of trying to ensure that citizens had an interest 
in the common good, the state was mainly concerned with allowing them to pursue competitive advantage. 
The result was that citizenship lost its connections with both morality and self-interest, and came to be 
exclusively concerned, in liberal theory at least, with the relationship between individual liberty and pol-
itical authority.” B. Jordan, The Common Good, Citizenship, Morality and Self-Interest (1989), p. 68. I 
think that Jordan has pointed to an important feature of a modern understanding of citizenship, but I will 
nonetheless also add that a liberal conception of citizenship does not necessarily imply that citizenship 
looses its moral basis. I think that Rawls‟ conception of political liberalism demonstrates that this need not 
be the case. 
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 More precisely: “ti\j me\n ouån e)stin o( poli/thj, e)k tou/twn fanero/n: %Å ga\r e)cousi/a koinwnei=n a)rxh=j 
bouleutikh=j kai\ kritikh=j, poli/thn h)/dh le/gomen eiånai tau/thj t=j po/lewj …” Aristotle, Politiken (Politics, 
Greek/Swedish edition 1993), Book III, 1275b;17-20. 
909
 This kind of “turnover” is clearly presupposed by Aristotle when saying: “dio\ kai\ ta\j politika\j arxa/j, 
o(/tan $Å kat` i)so/thta tw=n politw=n sunesthkui=a kai kaq` o(moio/thta, kata\ me/roj a)ciou=sin a)/rxein,…”Cf. 
Politiken (Politics, Greek/Swedish edition 1993), Book III, 1279a, 8-10). 
910
 This equality was  as we saw  the very reason for the kind of “turnover” in holding public offices 
that was proposed by Aristotle: Cf. Politics, Book III, 1279a, 8-10). And Aritotle holds that “h( de\ po/lij 
koinwni/a ti/j e)sti tw=n o(moi/wn, ….” Aristotle, Politiken (Politics, Greek/Swedish edition 1993), Book VII, 
1328a, 35-36) 
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other citizens, he should also be very well aware of the fact that he is ruling over free 
men. For according to Aristotle citizens were supposed to be free men. Slaves, metoikoi 
and also women were not citizens, although they all played roles that the city-state could 
not do without.
911
 The notion of citizenship within the Aristotelian polis was indeed ex-
clusive. But the important thing to underline here is that citizenship implied certain 
virtues, which were related to the common good, the “salvation” of polis, as the shared 
home-place.
912
 And Aristotle distinguishes the question about the virtues that are needed 
to be a good citizen from the question about the virtues that are required for a human 
being to be morally good. (Although the two issues cannot be kept completely apart). 
Citizenship implies certain duties, but also certain privileges and rights in relation to the 
city-state.  
It is well-known how St. Paul, according to the Acts of the Apostles, effectively appealed 
to his status as a citizen of Rome when he was arrested for preaching the gospel. 
“But when they had tied him up with the thongs, Paul said to the centurion who was 
standing by, „is it lawful for you to scourge a man who is a Roman citizen, and un-
condemned?‟ When the centurion heard that, he went to the tribune and said to him: 
„What are you about to do? For this man is a Roman citizen.‟ So the tribune came 
and said to him, „Tell me, are you a Roman citizen?‟ And he said, „Yes‟. The tribune 
answered,, „I bought this citizenship for a large sum.‟ Paul said, „But I was born a 
citizen.‟ So those who were about to examine him withdrew from him instantly; and 
the tribune also was afraid, for he realized that Paul was a Roman citizen and that he 
had bound him.” (Acta 22,25-29.)  
Others, who did not have the same protection, might be treated far more brutally after 
having confessed openly their belief in Jesus Christ,  as we can for instance see in a 
Letter from Pliny the Younger to Trajan:  
“This is the course that I have adopted in the case of those brought before me as 
Christians. I ask them if they are Christians. If they admit it I repeat the question a 
second and a third time, threatening capital punishment; if they persist, I sentence 
them to death. For I do not doubt that, whatever kind of crime it may be to which 
they have confessed, their pertinacity and inflexible obstinacy should certainly be 
punished. There were others who displayed a like madness and whom I reserved to 
be sent to Rome, since they were Roman citizens.”913 
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 Aristotle makes it quite clear that “tou=to ga\r a)lhqe/j, w(j ou) pa/ntas qete/on poli/taj w(=n a)/neu ou)k a)/n 
ei)/h po/lij…”, Aristotle, Politiken (Politics, Greek/Swedish edition 1993), Book III, 1278a, 2-3. 
912
 Let me, however, remark that Aristotle takes the proper administration of the state to be advantageous 
not just for citizens in the strict sense, but also for slaves, metoikoi and other non-citizens. (Cf. Politics, 
Book III, 1279a) 
913
 Documents of the Christian Church, Selected by Henry Bettenson (1963), p.4. 
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It might be assumed that most ordinary members of the Christian church in the first 
century belonged to the lower classes, and there is also good reason to suppose that a 
considerable number of slaves belonged to the church as well. They obviously did not 
have the same rights and protection as it is told that Paul  as a citizen  enjoyed.914 In 
fact it seems as if the author of the Acts of the Apostles had a considerable reverence for 
Roman citizenship, although the duties implied in citizenship had to be relegated when 
in conflict with the loyalty towards the gospel, as made clear in Acta 5,29, which is re-
ferred to in Confessio Augustana XVI: “De rebus civilibus”.  
As far as I can see both the Greek and the Roman Stoics contributed likewise to a cer-
tain relativising of the weight of citizenship,  by considering people primarily as 
human beings, who in addition were citizens of a particular “polis” (or empire) with its 
system of official duties and rights. The “polis” is still important, but seems not to 
provide the ultimate framework for defining the most basic virtues. The perspective has 
got more universal. “Cosmos” has to be considered our common home-place. What 
unifies people as human beings is now most decisive. 
According to Maximilian Forschner it was typical of influential Stoic philosophers to 
regard social morality as a phenomenon to be applied in concentric circles. Normally 
they found it appropriate to start with the love that human beings naturally had for them-
selves (self-preservation) and also for their children and relatives. Then the moral per-
spective could be extended to friends, co-citizens, those belonging to the same people/-
culture, and at last they ended up with the overarching universal perspective, including 
all people, as human beings.
915
 One might naturally expect a stronger moral concern 
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 And the text quoted indicates that citizenship of the Roman Empire might be bought and sold (while it 
is assumed that St. Paul had got his citizenship by birth). 
915
 “Die ausführlichste Quelle zur stoischen Lehre vom menschlichen Sozialtrieb bietet Cicero. Der erste 
von ihm angeführte Punkt ist die natürliche Liebe der Eltern zu ihren Kindern. Diese hat der Mensch mit 
den Tieren gemein. Daß er mit einigen Tieren auch noch den Herdentrieb bzw. den Trieb zur Gemein-
schaftsbildung teilt, ist der zweite Gedanke. Für beide Triebe gilt, daß das einzelne Lebewesen hier von 
Natur aus zu Tätigkeiten tendiert, die auf etwas abzielen, was sich von dem für das tätige Individuum je-
weils Nützlichen unterscheidet bzw. dieses übersteigt. Dies kann bis zum Einsatz des eigenen Lebens für 
die Nachkommen bzw. die Gemeinschaft gehen. Dann schlägt Cicero einen gewaltigen Bogen mit dem 
nur auf den Menschen zutreffenden Satz: hieraus erwächst eine natürliche Wohlgeneightheit (commend-
atio = oi)kei/wsij) zwischen allen Menschen, derart, daß der Mensch dem Menschen gerade deshalb, weil er 
Mensch ist, nicht als etwas Fremdes erscheinen sollte. … die Lücke zwischen Elternliebe, Herdentrieb und 
universaler Oikeiosis schließen zeitlich später zu datierende stoische oder von der Stoa beeinflußte Texte 
mit dem Gedanken einer allmählichen konzentrischen Ausweitung des Gegenstandes naturwüchsiger 
Zuneigung vom Selbst zu den Eltern bzw. Kindern, Verwandten, Freunden, Mitbürgern, Volksgenossen 
bis hin zur Menschheit insgesamt.” M. Forschner, Die stoische Ethik (1995), p.157f.  
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within the inner circles, but this renders it even more important to strengthen the 
universal perspective of morality. And the universal perspective might to some extent 
even relativise a more limited perspective of citizenship, which is so clearly defined by 
the role citizens play within the framework of the city-state. The status as a human 
being should in essential moral respects be considered primary to being a citizen. 
In modern democracies the notion of citizenship has changed in many respects.
916
  
Having largely lost its moral significance and weight, it seems as if it was just taken as a 
terminus technicus within the domain of law. Nowadays most inhabitants in modern 
democracies are normally to be reckoned as citizens,  although there might still be 
within modern states a difference between “citizens” and other “metoikoi”  such as 
immigrants, asylum-applicants etc. 
According to John Rawls there are, however, three things that should be taken as quite 
essential of modern citizenship:  
First: Citizenship is radically democratised, it is made far more inclusive. The notion of 
citizenship is nowadays most appropriately used to express what is normally the case 
within democratic societies,  namely, that nearly all persons are recognised as fully co-
operating members of the nation-state with all the basic political rights, duties and re-
sponsibilities that follows from the status of citizenship. And accordingly, public offices 
are, unlike the case in the “polis” of Aristotle, open to all members of society. The ex-
clusivity of the notion of citizenship is radically broken. 
Second: The idea of equal citizenship is essential. This means for instance that some 
citizens cannot be allowed to enforce upon co-citizens, sharing an equal citizenship, 
rules, doctrines and duties that just a group of citizens consider the best for society as a 
whole. Therefore Rawls would clearly consider a comprehensive doctrine “unreason-
able” if; 
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 Already when I considered more thoroughly the contractarian tradition I touched upon issues within 
the early liberal tradition closely related to the issues I now consider. Thomas Hobbes for instance took 
the basic contract to express the will of all the individual citizens, although he considered the state  when 
first established  as nearly absolute. The rights of citizens were clearly limited. And even within the early 
liberal stage, the notion of citizenship was still relatively exclusive. It might for instance be linked up to 
the condition of having property in society. This was the case with John Locke. A criterion of ownership, 
rendering “citizenship” a rather exclusive phenomenon, made it impossible for a lot of people to hope to 
achieve the status of a citizen. 
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“… it proposed to use the public's political power  a power in which citizens have 
an equal share  to enforce a view bearing on constitutional essentials about which 
citizens as reasonable persons are bound to differ uncompromisingly.”917 
Third: The idea that citizens are to be free, as far as their liberty is compatible with an 
equal liberty for the other members of society, remains a basic idea. There are according 
to Rawls three fundamental aspects of such a freedom, assumed to belong essentially to 
citizens. 
 citizens are to be considered self-authenticating sources of valid claims, what means 
that they can regard themselves as entitled to advance their own conception of the 
good, and can expect that the freedom required to pursue a conception of the good is 
supported by society and the public institutions. 
 citizens are also regarded as free in the sense that they can be held responsible for the 
ends they are pursuing.
918
 
 citizens are free not just to have, but also to revise and even freely reject a particular 
conception of the good or a religious belief.
919
 
Crucial within the Rawlsian conception is the idea of free and equal citizenship
920
, 
                                                          
917
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p. 138. And Rawls makes it quite clear that: “There is no reason 
why any citizen, or association of citizens, should have the right to use state power to decide constitutional 
essentials as that person's, or that association's comprehensive doctrine directs.” Ibid., p 226. 
918
 In other words “citizens think of themselves as free in three respects: first, as having the moral power 
to form, revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of the good; second, as being self-authenticating 
sources of valid claims; and third, as capable of taking responsibility for their ends. Being free in these 
respects enables citizens to be rationally and fully autonomous.” J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), 
p..72. 
919
 Citizens are supposed to have some higher-order interests, what means that they can be “regarded as 
having at any given time a determinate conception of the good, that is, a conception specified by certain 
definite final ends, attachments, and loyalties to particular persons and institutions, and interpreted in the 
light of some comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine.” J. Rawls, Political Liberalism 
(1993), p.74. But they cannot be expected to have one and the same conception of the good. I shall not 
once more touch upon the issue of the common good, discussed in chapter 2, but let it just be recalled that 
Rawls obviously takes it to be necessary that citizens  even in pluralist societies  share an essential 
common political aim;  the realising of an idea of justice: “…in the well-ordered society of justice as 
fairness, citizens share a common aim, and one that has high priority: namely, the aim of insuring that 
political and social institutions are just, and of giving justice to persons generally, as what citizens need 
for themselves and want for one another. It is not true, then, that in a liberal view citizens have no funda-
mental common aims ….” J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p..146.  
920
 This idea is inseparable from Rawls‟ conception of justice as fairness. The scheme of society can only 
be considered fair if there is a built-in respect of equal citizenship and a basic support of each citizen‟s 
freedom. Therefore Rawls himself starts “… with a first fundamental question about political justice in a 
democratic society, namely what is the most appropriate conception of justice for specifying the fair terms 
of social cooperation between citizens regarded as free and equal, and as fully cooperating members of 
society over a complete life, from one generation to the next?” J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.3. 
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based on the idea of citizens having the two moral capacities, i.e. a moral capacity for 
pursuing a conception of the good and a capacity for a sense of justice.
921
 It can easily 
be seen that the ability to act from a sense of justice  at least “to the requisite de-
gree”922  is essential for social co-operation.  
The idea of social co-operation is also closely linked to an understanding of “citizens as 
reasonable and rational, as well as free and equal, and so addressed to their public 
reason.”923 As reasonable persons (who are also rational)924 people are able of being 
fully co-operating members of society as a joint venture. 
So far it seems clear that the notion of citizenship is a very central (and frequently used) 
term within the Rawlsian political conception of liberalism, and there can be no doubt 
that the notion of citizenship is a morally laden term. This is even further emphasised by 
the way the idea of citizenship is taken to give rise to certain duties. 
A distinction is sometimes drawn between two aspects of citizenship, “that of rights or 
status, so called passive citizenship, and that of active citizenship which carries respon-
sibilities, duties and the idea of sharing in world-making possibilities with others.”925 
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 “The basic idea is that in virtue of their two moral powers (a capacity for a sense of justice and for a 
conception of the good) and the powers of reason (of judgements, thought, and inference connected with 
these powers), persons are free. Their having these powers to the requisite minimum degree to be fully 
cooperating members of society makes persons equal.” J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p.19f. In the 
Rawlsian society “Citizens act willingly so as to give one another justice over time.” Ibid., p.143. 
922
 According to Rawls “the members of society are citizens regarded as free and equal in virtue of their 
possessing these two moral powers to the requisite degree…”And he adds immediately that: “This is the 
basis of equality. The moral agent here is the free and equal citizen as a member of society, not the moral 
agent in general.” J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.109). 
923
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.143. That their nature as reasonable (implying also rationality) 
has also a clear significance for their co-operative ability can be seen in Political Liberalism: “The pol-
itical values of a constitutional democracy are, however, seen as distinctive in the sense that they can be 
worked out using the fundamental idea of society as a fair system of cooperation between free and equal 
citizens as reasonable and rational.” (Ibid, p.126) 
924
 In an earlier chapter I thoroughly discussed the relation between “the rational and the reasonable”. Let 
me just recall two things now. First: While the rational is mainly calculating , the notion of the reasonable 
is  according to Rawls  clearly morally laden. It may be interesting to see that the philosopher Georg 
Henrik von Wright distinguishes in much the same way between “the rational” and “the reasonable”. Cf 
Vitenskapen og fornuften (Norwegian edition), Cappelens upopulære skrifter, Oslo, 1991, p.22f. Second: 
By drawing so heavily on the notion of the idea of the reasonable Rawls will avoid making (strong) state-
ments about truth within the domain of the political: “The advantage of staying within the reasonable is 
that there can be but one true comprehensive doctrine, though as we have seen, many reasonable ones. 
Once we accept the fact that reasonable pluralism is a permanent condition of public culture under free 
institutions, the idea of the reasonable is more suitable as part of the basis of public justification for a 
constitutional regime than the idea of moral truth. Holding a political conception as true, and for that 
reason alone the one suitable basis of public reason, is exclusive, even sectarian, and so likely to foster 
political division.” J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.128f. 
925
 P. B. Clarke in Dictionary of Ethics, Theology and Society (1996), p. 140f. 
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Citizenship implies  according to Rawls  that there are certain rights and duties that 
citizens have as members of society. The emphasis in this chapter will be put on the 
moral duty implied in citizenship and on the constraints that persons are assumed to 
comply with as citizens. When I discussed the idea of public reason in the previous 
chapter, I clearly suggested that there is an ideal of citizenship inherent in the idea of 
public reason itself.  Rawls very clearly stresses that; 
“…the ideal of citizenship imposes a moral, not a legal, duty, the duty of civility  to 
be able to explain to one another on those fundamental questions how the principles 
and policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the political values of 
public reason. This duty also involves a willingness to listen to others and a fair-
mindedness in deciding when accommodations to their views should reasonably be 
made.”926 
I will be concerned with different theoretical and practical aspects of Rawls‟ “duty of 
civility” throughout the rest of this chapter, but the most obvious aspects of a “civic 
duty” should very briefly be pointed to already now: 
 The duty of civility requires from citizens a willingness to justify and to explain to 
their co-citizens the reasons they have for the standpoints they take in matters of 
public interest by reference to shared principles of justice.  
 The duty of civility requires from citizens a readiness to listen frankly to the reasons 
of co-citizens, who should likewise have access to the forum of public reasoning 
without being hindered by any kind of oppressive means.  
 The duty of civility requires an elementary fairmindedness from the citizens, im-
plying a preparedness to revise and adjust their standpoints in the light of reasonable 
arguments given by co-citizens in matters of common interest. 
These three points might, at first glance, seem rather uncontroversial. However, it can 
also be understood from them that the duty of civility imposes certain “constraints” on 
public reasoning and conduct, which might after all not be so uncontroversial. For it 
seems as though the duty of civility requires from us that we stick to common reason 
(public reason) in matters of public interest, even if there might be good reasons  from 
the perspective of the comprehensive doctrine we honour  to pursue particular aims 
and interests that can perhaps not so easily be publicly justified or fit within an over-
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 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p. 217. There is a vital disciplining associated with the very idea 
of public reason (what was also the case in Kant‟s conception), expressed in an ideal of public reason. 
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lapping consensus. It appears that persons with a deep attachment to a particular doc-
trine such as a strong religious commitment, might in fact be expected to give up some-
thing of value in order to be fully co-operative members of a liberal society.  
6.2.2. Politics  in the horizon of the kingdom of God? How co-
operative should moral theology be? 
Several times I have stressed that Rawls expects from the Christian  as well as from the 
other doctrines existing in pluralist societies  that they be reasonable. And he expects 
Christian citizens to behave reasonably in matter of public interest, thereby contributing 
to the kind of fairness, which can be the basis for the stability of society. 
But due to the built-in eschatological perspective the Christian doctrine should perhaps 
not so easily be supposed to provide us with guidelines serving the ordering and stabili-
sation of political society. An eschatological approach could just as well be supposed to 
cause a radical destabilisation of society.
927
 These issues have been intensively discus-
sed throughout church history and cannot be thoroughly considered now. Let it, how-
ever, be mentioned that the Church-father, St Augustine  even in the work where he 
most consequently contrasts civitas terrena to civitas dei  stresses that the former 
should be honoured and its laws respected, since it provides all citizens, irrespective of 
their faith, with great goods, as for instance an ordered (internal) peace: 
“So also the earthly city, whose life is not based on faith, aims at an earthly peace, 
and it limits the harmonious agreement of citizens concerning the giving and obey-
ing of orders to the establishment of a kind of compromise between human wills 
about things relevant to mortal life. In contrast, the Heavenly City  or rather that 
part of it which is on pilgrimage in this condition of mortality, and which lives on 
the basis of faith  must needs make use of this peace also, until this mortal state, for 
which this kind of peace is essential, passes away. And therefore, it leads what we 
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 According to Jürgen Moltmann Christians might play the most important political role in society, 
when contributing to the destabilisation of society: “Sollte der Gott, der sie [die Christen] ins Leben 
gerufen hat, etwas anderes von ihnen erwarten, als was die moderne Industriegeselleschaft von ihnen 
erwartet und ihnen zumutet, so muß die Christenheit den Exodus wagen und ihre gesellschaftlichen Rollen 
als neue babylonische Gefangenschaft ansehen. Nur wo sie gesellschaftlich als nicht voll anpassungs-
fähige Gruppe erscheint und die moderne Integration aller mit allen an ihr nicht gelingt, tritt sie in eine 
konfliktgeladene, aber fruchtbare Partnerschaft zu dieser Gesellschaft. Nur wo ihr Widerstand sie als eine 
nicht-assimilierbare und nicht-arrivierbare Gruppe zeigt, kann sie dieser Gesellschaft ihre eigene Hoff-
nung vermitteln, die durch nichts beschwichtigt und zur Ruhe des Angepaßtseins gebracht werden kann. 
Es ist dabei heute weniger ihre Aufgabe, der ideologischen Glorifizierung der Verhältnisse, als vielmehr 
der institutionellen Stabilisierung der Verhältnisse zu widerstehen und durch das „Aufwerfen der Sinn-
frage‟ diese zu Verunsichern, sie beweglich und elastisch im Prozess der Geschichte zu machen.” J. Molt-
mann, Theologie der Hoffnung. Untersuchungen zur Begründung und zu den Konsequenzen einer chris-
tlichen Eschatologie (1968/7.Aufl), p.299. 
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may call a life of captivity in this earthly city as in a foreign land, although it has 
already received the promise of redemption, and the gift of the Spirit as a kind of 
pledge of it; and yet it does not hesitate to obey the laws of the earthly city by which 
those things which are designed for the support of this mortal life are regulated; and 
the purpose of this obedience is that, since this mortal condition is shared by both 
cities, a harmony may be preserved between them in things that are relevant to this 
condition.”928 
But Augustine leaves us with no reason to doubt that Christians, while living in the 
“earthly city”, have their primary loyalty and orientation towards the “Heavenly City”. 
The proclamation of the kingdom of heaven by Jesus from Nazareth most likely gave 
rise to very different thoughts among those listening to him. Some expected that a pol-
itical theocracy was about to be realised. Others expected a full realising of the prin-
ciples of the mosaic law. And sometimes it was the apocalyptic visions, the cosmic 
dimensions of the coming of the kingdom of God, that were focused upon,  a radically 
new “aion” was about to come,  brought forth by a direct intervention by God himself. 
In a nation well aquatinted with the “messianic” visions it cannot come as a surprise that 
the proclamation of the kingdom of God should give rise to political and national hope. 
Peace, justice, national freedom and material abundance should come. But there was 
nonetheless in the preaching of Jesus something transcending all this.
929
 Jesus himself, 
the story of his life, his death and resurrection, the promises he brought, his authority to 
forgive sins and his healing of people, were the constitutive (and extraordinary) events 
most characteristic of the “kingdom of heaven” as presented by Jesus. And according to 
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 St. Augustine, City of God (413-426/1984), Book XIX, 17 (p.877). Let it also be added that St 
Augustine considered it an appropriate task for Christians to pray for the “earthly city”, not least for the 
sake of internal peace. Therefore he reminds the Christians that “…the Apostle instructs the Church to 
pray for the kings of that city and those in high positions, adding these words: „that we may lead a quiet 
and peaceful life with all devotion and love‟ [1.Tim.2,2]. And when the prophet Jeremiah predicted to the 
ancient People of God the coming captivity, and bade them, by God‟s inspiration, to go obediently to 
Babylon, serving God even by their patient endurance, he added his own advice that prayers should be 
offered for Babylon, „because in her peace is your peace‟ [Jer.29,7]  meaning, of course, the temporal 
peace of the meantime, which is shared by good and bad alike.” Ibid., Book XIX, 17. 
929
 This is in a very appropriate way underlined by the Tübinger professor, Walter Kasper: “Jesus sagt uns 
nirgends ausdrücklich, was diese Gottesherrschaft ist. Er sagt nur, daß sie nahe ist. Er setzt offensichtlich 
bei seinen Hörern ein Vorverständnis und eine Erwartung voraus, die für uns heute nicht mehr ohne 
weiteres gegeben ist. Aber auch damals erwartete man unter der Gottesherrschaft recht Verschiedenes. Die 
Pharisäer stellten sich darunter die vollkommene Erfüllung der Thora vor, die Zeloten verstanden darunter 
eine politische Theokratie, die sie mit Waffengewalt herbeizuführen trachteten, die Apokalyptiker er-
hofften das Kommen des neuen Äon, des neuen Himmels und der neuen Erde. Jesus läßt sich nicht ein-
deutig einer dieser Gruppen zuweisen. Sein Sprechen von der Gottesherrschaft ist merkwürdig offen.” W. 
Kasper, “Die soziale Relevanz der Reich-Gottes-Botschaft”, Grundfragen des menschlichen Zusammen-
lebens in christlicher Sicht. Einfürhung in die christliche Gesellschaftslehre mit systematischer Textaus-
wahl, Ed. J. Schwartz (1977), p.79.  
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the gospel of St. John, Jesus himself stressed that “my kingship is not of this world” 
(John 18,36). It seems problematic to take the kerygma of the kingdom of God, as a 
source for elaborating a political program or giving concrete substantive guidelines 
concerning the duties that people may have as citizens in this world. 
Martin Honecker takes it for granted that the Christian kerygma might indeed be a 
strong motivating force
930
 and have a decisive impact on people‟s lives and conduct 
within the domain of the political, but the kerygma about the kingdom of God cannot 
directly provide us with the required standards for assessing the institutional framework 
of our society politically, or concretely tell us what the duty of civility requires. For 
although “near”, God‟s kingdom remains transcendent and different. Taking this into 
account, one cannot easily use the kerygma about the kingdom of God directly as a basis 
for political activity at different times in different societies, - or as a key to substantive 
political decision-making. 
 The kingdom of God lacks the required material specificity for providing us with 
direct criteria for social practice and for ordering of the political field.
931
 
 The kerygma of the kingdom of God has to be understood first of all as divine 
promissio.
932
 The hope and the symbols
933
 characteristic of the kerygma of the king-
dom transcends by far what can be taken as a merely political “telos”. 
 The kingdom of God should be considered the kingdom of God. Its realisation would 
mean the end of secular history, not a relative improvement of it, not even a revolu-
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 “Die Hoffnung auf das Reich Gottes kann jedoch den universalen Horizont christlichen Glaubens auf-
zeigen, sie kann Motivation christlicher Existenz, auch gesellschaftlicher Existenz sein.”, M. Honecker, 
Konzept einer sozialethischen Theorie. Grundfragen evangelischer Sozialethik (1971), p.5. 
931
 “Die Hoffnung auf das Reich Gottes kann in gleichem Sinne zwar Motivation, aber nicht theoretisches 
Kriterium sein. … Das Reich Gottes kann jedoch nicht Kriterien sozialethischer Praxis geben, weil die 
Hoffnung auf das Reich keine inhaltlichen Angaben über die Gestaltung gesellschaftlicher Verhältnisse 
macht. Die Vielfalt sozialethischer Konzeptionen, welche sich auf das Reich Gottes als gesellschaftlich 
wirksam werdende Gestaltung des Gotteswillens berufen haben, zeigt, daß die Reich-Gottes-Hoffnung 
selbst inhaltlich unbestimmt ist und keine Maßstäbe zur Beurteilung gesellschaftlicher Verhältnisse und 
damit der sozialethischen Praxis enthält.”, M. Honecker, Konzept einer sozialethischen Theorie. Grund-
fragen evangelischer Sozialethik (1971), p.122f. 
932
 “Die Botschaft vom Reiche Gottes ist in diesem Sinne Verheißung, nicht sozialethische Theorie. Die 
Verheißung ist freilich eine Ermöglichung christlichen Handelns in der Welt; denn sie macht frei. … In 
der Nachfolge Jesu wird schließlich das Reich Gottes schon jetzt präsent, nicht als sozialethisches Ziel, 
Telos, sondern als Ermöglichungsgrund wahrhaft menschlichen Lebens.” M. Honecker, Konzept einer 
sozialethischen Theorie. Grundfragen evangelischer Sozialethik (1971), p.126. 
933
 In the apocalyptic literature there is a frequent use of esoteric symbols, the full meaning of which can 
be understood only by those having the “code” to the secrets. 
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tionary change of it.
934
 The strictly eschatological perspective transcends all other 
kingdoms, all schemes of society that are established by man, and all models elabo-
rated within different kinds of social ethics.
935
 
One reason why Honecker is so thoroughly considering the issue of Christian eschatol-
ogy within political and social ethics, is obviously that he is very critical of the way 
Christian eschatology is in fact utilised in much of present theology,  for instance in the 
works of Jürgen Moltmann. Introducing a strictly eschatological perspective in the dis-
cussion about social and political ethics renders the theological approach to social ethics 
rather exclusive. And it is not quite clear either how this theological perspective is as-
sumed to guide our political conduct as citizens within the political society (either an-
cient or modern). The idea of the “kingdom of God” or a “theology of hope” taking its 
point of departure exclusively from Christian eschatology, cannot be made a derivative 
basis for answering central questions that might be raised in the political society, as for 
instance which moral constraints should most fairly be imposed by the institutions of 
democratic societies, or the question which consequentialist considerations citizens 
should make before “maximising” their ideal moral values in non-ideal situations, or the 
more general question how citizens, with highly different beliefs, can co-operate fairly 
so as to strengthen one another‟s moral dispositions, thereby contributing to the internal 
peace. These questions demonstrate that the theological and moral approach to political 
ethics and to the duty of citizenship has to be rather complex. And in this respect Hon-
                                                          
934
 Thomas Münzer is one of many examples of a “revolutionary” interpretation and application of the 
Christian eschatological kerygma. Cf. for instance E. Bloch, Thomas Münzer als Theologe der Revolution 
(1972/originally published 1962). For the “Rebell in Christo Thomas Münzer”(p.15) the eschatological 
proclamation of Jesus was a direct motivation for what Ernst Bloch characterises as a “bäuerlich-prole-
tarisch-chiliastische Revolution”. (p.36). Let it, however, in this connection also be added that not seldom 
could an eschatological approach instead further a rather disinterested attitude what concerned questions 
of politics. 
935
 Once more Honecker uses this perspective to stress that all political and social-ethical systems,  
including political conceptions of justice, are to be relativised and should be considered revisable: “Alle 
sozialethischen Modelle, wie immer sie auch begründet werden, sind, weil sie relativ sind, revisionsfähig 
und -bedürftig. Zur Relativität gesellschaftlicher Gerechtigkeit gehört auch, daß sie in einem geschicht-
lichen Prozess erweitert und verbessert werden können. Der Prozess der Verwirklichung gesellschaftlicher 
Gerechtigkeit kommt innerweltlich zu keinem Ziel. Das Reich der vollkommenen Gerechtigkeit, des völ-
ligen Friedens, einer durch nichts mehr beeinträchtigten Humanität und Freiheit wird niemals auf Erden 
errichtet werden können. Von der dem Menschen zur Realisierung aufgetragenen besseren irdischen Ge-
rechtigkeit, der iustitia civilis externa, in der Sprache der Reformation, ist die Gerechtigkeit des Reiches 
Gottes, die iustitia spiritualis interna zu unterscheiden. Die Gerechtigkeit des Reiches Gottes kann nicht 
im geschichtlichen Vollzug erkämpft werden, sie bleibt Gabe. … Die Gabe ist für den Christen Motiva-
tion der Aufgabe, da sie ihn zum Handeln ermächtigt und zum Gebrauch kritischer Vernunft freisetzt.”, 
M. Honecker, Konzept einer sozialethischen Theorie. Grundfragen evangelischer Sozialethik (1971), 
p.124f. 
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ecker is, as far as I can see, right: A theology of hope, taking its point of departure ex-
clusively from Christian eschatology cannot in itself contribute very much to the kind of 
co-operative virtue required by citizens in modern democratic and pluralist societies, 
and neither can it provide us with a theological basis for coping adequately with the 
complexity of modern society. 
In order to avoid misunderstandings it should be added that Honecker does not on his 
part present us with an uneschatological theological approach to social and political 
ethics. Instead he distinguishes two kinds of eschatology: 
First: Eschatology might be conceived of as a more or less complete system of theo-
logical doctrines , a theological “fund”, from which (radical social) directives for pol-
itical and social institutions and actions can be derived. This is called “explicit eschato-
logy”.936 But according to Honecker one cannot derive concrete prescripts that can be 
transformed into socio-political standards or programs for modern societies, directly 
from Christian and Biblical eschatology.
937
 Elaborating an explicit eschatology to be 
used “instruktionstheoretisch” in political affairs, would entail a confusion of the funda-
mental distinction between law and gospel. 
Second: There is within all theological doctrines, ideas and beliefs, nevertheless, an 
inherent aspect of eschatology. Honecker characterises this as an “implicit eschato-
logy”.938 This is, however, not sufficient for elaborating a program for the political 
domain. Instead implicit eschatology provides us with a perspective on all our theology, 
                                                          
936
 This is a kind of eschatology that “…Erkenntnisse über die Zukunft der Welt vermittelt. Aus diesen 
Erkenntnissen lassen sich sodann Zielvorstellungen und Handlungsanweisungen entnehmen. Eine derartig 
lehrhaft formulierte oder formulierbare Eschatologie kann man explizite Eschatologie nennen.” M. 
Honecker, Konzept einer sozialethischen Theorie. Grundfragen evangelischer Sozialethik (1971), p.3. 
937
 “Die Hoffnung auf das Reich Gottes kann jedoch den universalen Horizont christlichen Glaubens auf-
zeigen, sie kann Motivation christlicher Existenz, auch gesellschaftlicher Existenz sein. Aber einen all-
gemein evident zu machenden Maßstab der Sozialethik, ein Leitbild sozialethischer Praxis gibt sie nicht 
her.” M. Honecker, Konzept einer sozialethischen Theorie. Grundfragen evangelischer Sozialethik 
(1971), p.5. 
938
 “Von der Problematik einer expliziten Eschatologie zu unterscheiden ist eine implizite Eschatologie. 
Implizite Eschatologie meint, daß die Eschatologie nicht selbständiges theologisches Thema als Lehraus-
sage ist, sondern eine Perspektive jeder theologischen Aussage.… In der Gotteslehre hält implizite Escha-
tologie Gottes Wesen und Handeln für neue Auslegungen frei, so daß Gott selbst und seine Offenbarung 
noch eine Zukunft haben und Gottes Verborgensein von der Verheißung seiner Herrlichkeit und seines 
Offenbarwerdens überholt wird. In der Christologie zeigt sich implizite Eschatologie in dem Bekenntnis 
zu der noch verborgenen Herrschaft Christi… …Nur solange Eschatologie als der allenthalben mit-
wandernde Horizont der Theologie vollkommen offenbleibt, kann sie auch das theologische Denken  
einschließlich der Sozialethik  offenhalten.” M. Honecker, Konzept einer sozialethischen Theorie. 
Grundfragen evangelischer Sozialethik (1971), p.3f. 
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political and moral activity and permanently reminds the Christian of the decisive dif-
ference between political society and the kingdom of God, thus making it obvious that 
all political schemes and decisions can still be criticised and improved. This means that 
the deepest eschatological perspective should never be ignored, even when people are 
concerned with matters of politics and public affairs.  
The conduct of Christians  as citizens  within the settled scheme of political society 
might, however, primarily be seen by Honecker as consecutive to the justification by 
faith. Thus he appeals to what is considered, not least within the Lutheran church
939
, the 
very “articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiae”, namely the theological doctrine of justifi-
cation, when conceiving of theological social ethics and proper political conduct. Fore-




 Neither political activity nor actions of mercy and love, directed towards other human 
beings, can be drawn upon in forum justificationis. Political and moral activity is 
therefore to be performed entirely for the sake of one‟s co-citizens or neighbours. 
 Within the locus justificationis the freedom of God has to be taken as a decisive 
theological premise.
941




 There is a dialectic inherent in the theological idea of freedom. The free person is  
                                                          
939
 “Die Wirkung der Reformation und besonders Martin Luthers auf die Ethik ist nicht primär in Einzel-
inhalten und Normen aufweisbar…Die „Neubau der Sittlichkeit‟ (Karl Holl) auf Grund von Luthers 
Rechtfertigungsverständnis besteht nicht in einer neuen materialen Ethik, in neuen Normen, sondern in 
einem neuen Umgang mit dem Leben, in der Unbefangenheit und Selbständigkeit, in die hinein er das 
Handeln des Christen entläßt. Reformatorischer Rechtfertigungsglaube ermächtigt zu Taten der Liebe und 
ist insofern befreiend für die Ethik.” M. Honecker, Einführung in die Theologische Ethik, Grundlagen 
und Grundbegriffe (1990), p.288f. 
940
 Honecker obviously wishes to follow Luther when saying that: “Der Ansatz der Ethik Luthers er-
wächst aus dem Verständnis der Rechtfertigung und der darin gewährten Freiheit eines Christenmenschen. 
Den Schlüssel zu einer Ethik bietet das reformatorische Freiheitsverständnis. Das Handeln des Christen in 
der Welt ist Erweis christlicher Freiheit; es geschieht aus Dankbarkeit für die geschenkte Gnade. Diese 
theologische Zuordnung von Rechtfertigung und Ethik hat Konsequenzen für die Einschätzung der Guten 
Werke.” M. Honecker, Einführung in die Theologische Ethik, Grundlagen und Grundbegriffe (1990), 
p.285 
941
 This also corresponds with the way Confessio Augustana, Article V, emphasises that the faith is given 
by the “spiritus sanctus … ubi et quando visum est Deo…”, Die Bekenntnisschriften der evangelisch-
lutherischen Kirche (6.Aufl.;1967), p.58.  
942
 Coercive state force (as well as ecclesiastical power) is misplaced in this setting. 
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in a coram hominibus-perspective  morally free to be a servant.943 Realising the 
commandment of love becomes an essential manifestation of justification by faith. 
Setting out from the justification by faith  as Honecker does in accordance with Luther 
 paves the way for a genuine “Weltfrömmigkeit”.944 Honecker sees the “world-scene”; 
state, society, family, labour etc. as fields where morality as well as human reason, 
really apply. In accordance with Confessio Augustana; Honecker clearly realises that it 
is required “in talibus ordinationibus exercere caritatem”.945 But within a worldly frame-
work such aspects as social change, historicity, the limits of reason and the provisional 
character of the political as such cannot be neglected.
946
 A morality, reflecting Christian 
freedom, might therefore very appropriately take the shape of “… einen altruistischen 
Utilitarismus”.947 
“Der Mensch ist vor Gott als Mensch allein durch die Verheißung bestimmt. Allein 
das Wort macht Gewissen und Seele frei; kein äußeres Werk vermag solche Freiheit 
zu gewähren. Die innerliche Freiheit äußert sich dann in guten Werken. Maßstab des 
guten Werken ist der Nutzen des Mitmenschen, nicht die Vergewisserung der 
eigenen Seligkeit und Frömmigkeit.”948 
Then Honecker, referring to St. Paul, makes it quite clear that an eschatological (rela-
tivising) perspective on the political domain and on the duties we have as citizens “er-
laubt bei Paulus keine Vernachlässigung und Mißachtung der Bürgerpflichten.”949 
Christians can be supposed to be co-operating members of society with an orientation 
towards “der Nutzen des Mitmenschen.” Honecker is, however, aware of the fact that 
the Lutheran church might rightly have been accused of furthering a certain political 
                                                          
943
 This dialectic is made obvious by Luther in the two sentences so frequently quoted: “Ein Christen-
mensch ist ein freier Herr über alle Dinge und niemand untertan. Ein Christenmensch ist ein dienstbarer 
Knecht aller Dinge und jedermann untertan.” Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen (1520), (Calwer 
Luther-Ausgabe; Band 4; 1965), p.162. 
944
 What concerns the term “Weltfrömmigkeit” cf. M. Honecker, Einführung in die Theologische Ethik, 
Grundlagen und Grundbegriffe (1990), p. 286. 
945
 Die Bekenntnisschriften der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche (6.Aufl.;1967), p. 71. (CA. XVI). 
946
 “Die reformatorische Orientierung der Ethik an Vernunft und Humanität, am primus usus legis, ver-
pflichtet andererseits das Ethos zur Sachlichkeit und Nüchternheit und ermöglicht es, die Geschicht-
lichkeit der Welt und damit auch die Wandlungen von Sitte und Kultur anzunehmen. Die theologische 
Ethik kann dann mit gutem Gewissen pragmatisch und offen verfahren.” M. Honecker, Einführung in die 
Theologische Ethik, Grundlagen und Grundbegriffe (1990), p. 287. 
947
 M. Honecker, Einführung in die Theologische Ethik, Grundlagen und Grundbegriffe (1990), p.285. 
948
 M. Honecker, Einführung in die Theologische Ethik, Grundlagen und Grundbegriffe (1990), p.285. 
Honecker can also emphasise that the freedom of Christians will be transformed into a ”kommunikative 
Freiheit”. Ibid. 
949
 M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.307f. 
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“quietism” and even of promoting a general aversion against social change. And he ad-
mits that sometimes one might find an affinity towards double-morality within Lutheran 
political ethics as a result of separating too sharply between religious faith and political 
reason.
950
 This might also contribute to a more general loosening of the ties between 
politics and morality. Honecker is fully aware of the great problems that a separation 
between religious moral doctrines and merely political and rational ideas has caused.
951
 
There is certainly no moral-free domain, but the moral commitment may nonetheless be 
articulated differently within different frameworks, since the constraints on human act-
ivity cannot be the same in all roles and within all domains.
952
 
Even if an eschatological perspective should not be turned into a “programmatic doc-
trine” for the political domain, it cannot be ignored when Christian citizens are engaging 
in matters of social ethics and politics. The existence of a tension between the divine 
eschaton and realistic political ends, may well cause people to feel a deep uneasiness 
                                                          
950
 “Gegen Luthers Ethik und vor allem gegen das Luthertum wird der Vorwurf des Quietismus, des Kon-
servatismus und der Doppelmoral erhoben. Besonders Ernst Troeltsch (in den “Soziallehren”) und, seine 
Argumente aufnehmend, Karl Barth haben das Luthertum kritisiert…”, M. Honecker, Einführung in die 
Theologische Ethik, Grundlagen und Grundbegriffe (1990), p.287. 
951
 “Die Trennung von Glaube und Politik ließ überdies zu, den neuzeitlichen Macht- und Gewaltstaat zu 
legitimieren. Der Preis einer „Weltfrömmigkeit‟ ist dann eine Verinnerlichung des Ethos, welche nur noch 
ein persönliches Gewissen, aber keine allgemeine, öffentliche Moral mehr kennt.” M. Honecker, Ein-
führung in die Theologische Ethik, Grundlagen und Grundbegriffe (1990), p. 287. 
952
 In 1526 Luther wrote a book that might be of some interest for the subject I am considering now: Ob 
Kriegsleute auch in seligem Stande sein können, Band 4 der Calwer Luther-Asugabe (1965). (Cf. WA 
Band 19, p623ff). At this time the threat from the Islamic world, represented by the Turks, was immense. 
But even more it seemed as if the rebellion of the peasants in Germany in 1525 troubled Luther. Could 
Christians who were bound to love their neighbours and even their enemies, take part in the war against 
the Turks or even in the rebellion against unjust electoral princes? Luther solved this problem, at least 
partly, by distinguishing between “Amt und Person”, and between two kinds of justice: “Erstens ist der 
Unterschied ins Auge zu fassen, daß Amt und Person (oder: Werk und Täter) zweierlei ist. Denn es kann 
wohl ein Amt oder Werk gut und recht sein, wenn man es für sich selbst nimmt, und doch ist es böse und 
unrecht, wenn die Person oder der Täter nicht gut oder recht ist oder es nicht recht ausführt. Ein Richter-
amt ist ein köstliches, göttliches Amt, gleichviel, ob es sich um den Richter mit dem Mund handelt oder 
um den Richter mit der Faust, den man den Scharfrichter heißt. ... Ebenso ist es auch mit dem Kriegsstand, 
- Amt oder -Werk: für sich selbst genommen ist es recht und göttlich; aber es ist darauf zu sehen, daß die 
Person es auch ist, die dazu gehören und rechtschaffen sein soll ... Zweitens mache ich hier den Vorbehalt, 
daß ich diesmal nicht von der Gerechtigkeit rede, welche die Person vor Gott rechtschaffen macht. Das tut 
ja allein der Glaube an Jesus Christus, der ohn all unser Werk und Verdienst aus lauter Gottesgnade ge-
schenkt und gegeben wird, wie ich das sonst schon so oft und manchmal geschrieben und gelehrt habe. 
Vielmehr rede ich hier von der äußerlichen Gerechtigkeit, die in den Ämtern und Werken steht und geht. 
D.h., um es ganz deutlich zu sagen: Ich handle hier von der Frage: Kann es der christliche Glaube, um 
dessentwillen wir von Gott für gerecht angesehen werden, auch neben sich ertragen, daß ich ein Kriegs-
mann bin, Krieg führe, würge und steche, raube und brenne, wie man dem Feind in Kriegsläuften nach 
Kriegsrecht tut? Ist dieses Werk auch Sünde oder Unrecht, worüber man sich vor Gott ein Gewissen 
machen muß? Oder darf ein Christ keins von diesen Werken  tun, sondern allein wohltun, lieben, niemand 
würgen oder in Schaden bringen?” Calwer Luther-Ausgabe (Band 4,1965), p.62f. According to Luther a 
Christian could be a soldier, but he was not allowed to participate in the revolt against state-authorities. 
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when concerned with public affairs and raises the question of how to harmonise ones‟ 
multiple loyalties. Even if the problem should expectedly be less acute in liberal so-
cieties, with their greater emphasis on citizens' freedom of conscience and their personal 
liberty, it cannot entirely be removed. In Rawlsian terminology the tension depends on 
the fact that citizens are supposed to affirm simultaneously both a comprehensive 
doctrine and a focal political conception. And this has to be taken properly into account 
even when aiming for an overlapping consensus.
953
 
6.2.3. Christian confession in political affairs 
In a liberal society the comprehensive doctrine one honours and the political conception 
one has should be “somehow related” 954, which, according to Rawls, implies that a 
comprehensive doctrine can normally be assumed to be reasonably co-operative and 
tolerant. As already suggested, however, it might be objected that this attempt to har-
monise  comprehensive Christian doctrines with a conception of political liberalism 
largely ignores the eschatological perspective which throws the very scheme of this 
world into relief. This objection is also raised against Protestant churches in Germany, 
which have interfered in public reasoning by the means of so called “Denkschriften”,  
with their implicit assumptions about the public role of the churches:  
“Der Einwand gegen diese Auffassung des Verhältnisses von Kirche und Öffent-
lichkeit lautet, sie bringe das christliche Bekenntnis in der Welt nicht zureichend zur 
Geltung und sei zu sehr auf Verständigungsmöglichkeiten zwischen Kirche und 
Gesellschaft bedacht, statt die eschatologische, prinzipielle Differenz zwischen 
Kirche und Welt zu betonen. Statt eine vernünftige pragmatische Kommunikation 
mit der Gesellschaft anzustreben, sollten Kirche und Christen vielmehr ein prophet-
isches Mandat wahrnehmen. In dieser Debatte steht also die Zuordnung von christ-
lichem Bekenntnis und allgemeiner sittlicher Vernunft in Frage.”955 
This gives Honecker an occasion to discuss the proper place of the Christian confession 
within the forum of the public,  in matters of politics and social ethics. Even if he 
might be personally critical of the way the church has interfered in the public debate 
through “Denkschriften”, the objection referred to above might also apply to Honecker‟s 
own theories, since he too finds a reasonable and pragmatic approach in matters of pol-
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 Thus it is underlined by Rawls “that, in an ideal overlapping consensus, each citizen affirms both a 
comprehensive doctrine and the focal political conception, somehow related.” J. Rawls, Political 
Liberalism (1993), p.xix. 
954
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.xix. 
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itics and social ethics largely recommendable. But sometimes a reasonable and prag-
matic attitude seems impossible. This may be the case if a liberal society opens up for a 
practice which appears to be at odds with central moral principles in the comprehensive 
doctrine one honours. The problem was clearly manifested in the debate over the liberal-
isation of the abortion law (especially in the ninety seventies). Many Christians and 
churches massively opposed the liberalisation of the law since they were of the opinion 
that the unborn child was being deprived of a protection by law that the state authorities 
should provide. In this connection I find it appropriate to consider two questions that 
Honecker himself raises: 
 Can political and social-ethical issues bring Christians into a status confessionis? 
 How can eventually political decisions properly be characterised as heretical? 
It seems as if there are certain moral and political issues, which might bring Christians 
into a “status confessionis”, forcing them to stand up against lawmakers and majority-
decisions in questions of the utmost importance. Social and political peace and co-
operation obviously has its limits. And this raised the question of status confessionis in 
matters of the greatest moral (and political) significance. 
By making a political and moral question an issue of status confessionis the church 
demonstrates that there are elementary norms and fundamental values which are so 
closely connected to the Christian perspective on God, world and man, that one cannot 
submit to the moral judgement of influential groups or political authorities. Making 
something a matter of status confessionis is to use “die schärfste Alarmglocke”956, 
which can be used by the church.  
As far as I can see Honecker does not entirely rule out the possibility that the Church 
might consider a moral-political issue a matter of status confessionis, but he never-
theless concentrates mainly on the many good reasons for not choosing this course. 
 The phrase “status confessionis” give in itself the impression that it refers to some-
thing extraordinary.
957
 But confessing Christ should be the normal state of a Chris-
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 M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.662. 
956
 The phrase, which is taken from Bishop Lohse, is quoted by Honecker; Grundriß der Sozialethik 
(1995), p.663. 
957
 By quoting Martin Schloemann (“Der besondere Bekenntnisfall: Politik als Glaubenssache?”. Ed. E. 
Lorenz, Erlangen 1983, pp.48-98), Honecker “schlüsselt die Vielfalt der Möglichkeiten, den status con-
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tian, in modern societies as well as in ancient societies. Confession in a theological 
perspective should most properly be used about the praising of God,  foremost in 
the services of the church. 
 One might, nevertheless, appropriately distinguish between the normal state of 
making one‟s faith publicly known and the more extraordinary cases, sometimes 
characterised by Honecker as “casus confessionis”.958 In times characterised by per-
secution, when the temptation to deny Christ is near at hand, it is quite clear what is 
to be confessed,  and what the costs are.959 
 One reason why one should normally not make political issues a matter of “status 
confessionis” or a “casus confessionis”, is that political situations are seldom very 
clear but often extremely  ambiguous and complex.
960
 
 There is a fundamental distinction to be made in this context: From a theological 
                                                                                                                                                                          
fessionis zu verstehen, auf: „Zustand des Bekennens  Zustand, der Bekenntnis fordert  Notstand des 
Bekennens  Situation oder Zeit der Entscheidung (z.B. über Verrat oder Verlust des Glaubens, über 
Abbruch der Kirchengemeinschaft)  Verteidungsstellung (hinter die man dogmatisch oder kirchen-
politisch nicht zurück kann)  status quo, (der besser ist als mögliche Änderungen)  kritischer Punkt, an 
dem man Stellung beziehen muß  der Punkt, an dem man zeigen muß, wo man steht  die Stellungnahme 
selbst  der in bestimmten Situationen eingenommene Standpunkt  der Glaubensstandpunkt, an dem, die 
Toleranz ihre Grenze findet  der zentrale Punkt, mit dem alles steht oder fällt  die „Sollbruchstelle‟  
das kompromißlose Eintreten für eine Position, die die Substanz des Glaubens berührt  der Punkt, da 
man widerstehen muß  der Vollzug des Widerstandes selbst  der Punkt, wo man für jemanden etwas 
einstehen muß  der Vollzug des Einstehens selbst  das Abstandnehmen von jemand/etwas (Aufkünd-
igung oder Versagen von Gemeinschaft)  das persönlich/gemeinschaftliche Gestelltsein  das Feststehen 
im Glauben  das Stehen in (letzter) Verantwortung  der besondere Stand eines zum Bekennen beruf-
enen  der Bewußtseinszustand dessen, der bekennt (auf den man schaut, der möglicherweise oder mit 
Sicherheit ein Martyrium erwartet)  das Bestehen einer Situation, in der man in letzter Hinsicht auf die 
Probe gestellt ist (in der man das Heil verlieren kann) usw.‟” M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik 
(1995), p.669f 
958
 This is defined by Honecker as :”‟Besonderes Bekenntnisfall‟. Casus confessionis  ein außergewöhn-
licher, extra-ordinärer Bekenntnisfall, die Ausnahmesituation.” M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik 
(1995), p.664. The phrase “casus confessionis” is according to Honecker used for the first time in the 
Formula Concordiae (Ep. X) in connection with the discussion of the problem of “adiaphora”. “Im Adia-
phoristischen Streit forderte der Gnesiolutheraner Matthias Flacius „nil est adiaphoron in casu confes-
sionis et scandali‟”. Cf. M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.664. 
959
 What Honecker especially has in mind “… ist der Fall besonderen Bekennens, nämlich in Situationen 
der Verfolgung und der Gefährdung der Eindeutigkeit des Evangeliums.” M. Honecker, Grundriß der 
Sozialethik (1995), p.670. But the question still remains: “Kann man den status confessionis auf ethische 
Fragen beziehen? Ethisches Versagen ist zweifellos Sünde, Unrecht. Aber ist Sünde zugleich auch Ver-
leugnung des Bekenntnisses? The way Honecker asks, suggests that he is sceptical of making political or 
ethical issues a question of confession.  
960
 The nature of the political has a complexity which should even not be removed by mere confession. 
This would mean to introduce a perspective of unambiguity that is often at odds with the nature of the 
political. However, there might also be some moral-political issues that are quite clear, when seen in a 
Christian perspective. Bonhoeffer for instance stressed that the church, from the moment when mission 
among the Jews was forbidden, found itself “in statu confessionis”. Cf. D.Bonhoeffer, “Die Kirche vor der 
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perspective it is necessary to distinguish between “opus dei” and “opus hominis”, 
thereby stressing that faith is entirely borne by an “opus dei”. What characterises the 
“opus hominis”, in its ambiguity, is that it can “nur ein indirektes Bekenntnis zu Gott 
und ein Zeugnis und Zeichen des Glaubens sein, der durch Handeln nicht eindeutig 
auszuweisen ist.”961 
 Theological social ethics cannot ignore the fact that an appeal to an indisputable obli-
gation which raises a status confessionis  without an attempt to meet the Rawlsian 
proviso – would most likely undermine the shared basis for political coexistence and 
social co-operation. 
 Political authorities can at least expect from the Church that it is very careful making 
a political case a “casus confessionis”, thereby imposing on persons a very strong 
obligation to adopt particular social-ethical standpoints or resist certain political de-
cisions. On the other side can the church expect from liberal societies that they as far 
as possible avoid provoking the kind of dilemma that might lead citizens into a 
“status confessionis”. 
 Just as the Church should be careful in defining a case as a “casus confessionis”, 
according to Honecker, it should normally also avoid characterising decisions in 
matters of politics or social ethics as “heretical”, thereby making the gospel an un-
ambiguous criterion for right political practice. It would be politically very prob-
lematic, just as it would normally be theologically dubious if one made political 
practice a decisive criterion of right faith, thereby testing citizens‟ willingness to 
abide by the truth of the gospel. It is necessary to have in mind that “Häretiker 
leugnet keine beliebige, sondern eine fundamentale Glaubenswharheit, und zwar 
hartnäckig („pertinaciter‟), nach Belehrung. Bei diesen Merkmalen geht es um der 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Judenfrage” (15.April 1933, Gesammelte Schriften II, 1959, p.44-53). 
961
 “Das Christusbekenntnis ist ein Glaubensbekenntnis. … Dabei gilt es, die reformatorische Unter-
scheidung von Glaube ind Werken, vom Bekenntnis zur Tat Gottes als Heilstat (opus dei) und dem 
Einstehen von Christen für das Gerechte in der Welt, also die Wahrnehmung ethischer Verantwortung 
(opus hominis) zu unterscheiden. Das Bekenntnis des Glaubens ist Grundvoraussetzung allen Tuns der 
Christen und damit auch christlicher Ethik. Dieses Bekenntnis geschieht aber zunächst in der Kirche; es 
hat ekklesiologische Relevanz und stiftet Gemeinschaft in der Kirche. Diese Gemeinschaft hat feilich dann 
Folgen für den „Lebensgottesdienst‟. Aber der Lebensgottesdienst ist nicht einfach unmittelbare, direkte 
Anwendung des Glaubens, sondern er hat sich eigenständig, mit Hilfe der Vernunft, am Nutzen und Be-
dürfnis der Mitmenschen auszurichten. Dies besagt auch die Unterscheidung von Gesetz und Evangel-
ium.” M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p. 675f. From this also follows that Honecker can 
be very critical of the ecumenical “Programmsatz „Die Lehre trenn, das Dienen eint‟.” Cf. M. Honecker, 
Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.674.  
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Heil.”962 This is a crucial insight. 
As far as I can see this does not mean that one can entirely exclude the possibility that 
certain political decisions and social arrangements within modern liberal societies can 
bring the church into a genuine status confessionis. There might be extreme-situations 
where political decisions, basic issues of humanity and religious concerns cannot and 
should not be kept apart,  as in the case where mission among Jews were forbidden by 
the Nazi-authorities. Thus a church should always be prepared to deal adequately with 
such extreme-cases.
963
 But for normal cases Honecker‟s conclusion seems plausible: 
“Die Vielschichtigkeit des Bekenntnisverständisses, die Mehrdeutigkeit der Formel 
status confessionis und die Problematik des Begriffes „ethische Häresie‟ lassen es 
nicht ratsam erscheinen, zwischen Bekenntnis und Ethik einen unmittelbaren 
Zusammenhang zu sehen. Die Berufung auf das Bekenntnis bei politischen und 
ethischen Urteilen trägt die Gefahr ideologischer Legitimation in sich. Ethische 
Entscheidungen und Urteile sind in der Regel vernünftig, nach Kriterien des Sach-
gerechten, zu begründen; sie setzten Sitationsanalysen voraus und sind nur in Grenz-
fällen Glaubensentscheidungen, Gewissensentscheidungen aus letzter Bindung an 
Gott.”964 
Let me conclude as follows: Christian faith opens up for a genuine “Weltfrömmig-
keit”.965 The confession to God in Christ can be assumed to have a strong motivating 
                                                          
962
 One might say that it is the essential “ground-consensus” of the church, which is endangered in heresy. 
But “Kirchengemeinschaft setzt nicht notwendig den politisch-ethischen Konsensus voraus. „Ethische 
Häresie‟ beim Wort genommen, würde heißen: Der politisch Andersdenkende, auch der Irrende wird in 
der Kriche nicht mehr geduldet. Der Häresievorwurf enthält damit eine ideologische Verurteilung und 
zieht eine schroffe ekklesiologische Konsequenz aus bedingungsloser Parteilichkeit.” M. Honecker, 
Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.677. Let it also be added here that one should distinguish between 
heresy and apostasy. A liberal society must fully respect individuals‟ right to leave their church and their 
confession freely, while they should simultaneously respect the right of churches to protect themselves 
(with acceptable means) from heresy. 
963
 This presupposes within the church and among Christians a clarity about the premises for their partici-
pation in political, social and co-operative ventures within the framework of modern society. Rawls seems 
to take for granted that there is within churches and among religious citizens such a self-consciousness, 
when he sets out for an overlapping consensus that can be endorsed “from within” different reasonable 
(religious) doctrines. 
964
 M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.677. 
965
 Once more I refer to the term “Weltfrömmigkeit”, used by M. Honecker (Einführung in die Theolog-
ische Ethik, Grundlagen und Grundbegriffe ,1990, p. 286) which is more thoroughly explained by Hon-
ecker as follows: “Aus Luthers theologischen Neuansatz folgt ein bestimmter Lebensstil. Die Einstellung 
zur Welt kann man “Weltfrömmigkeit” nennen. Der Glaube ermöglicht einen unbefangenen Umgang mit 
der Welt. Die Einzelanweisungen Luthers zu ethischen Fragen seiner Zeit waren zeitbezogen. Luther war 
kein Theoretiker der Ethik, sondern weithin ein seelsorgerlich bestimmter Ratgeber. Deshalb sind auch 
seine konkreten Empfehlungen kontextabhängig. Dies ist zu beücksichtigen im Blick auf seine z.T. sehr 
problematischen Stellungnahmen und Äußerungen zu politischen und sozialen Problemen (z.B. zum 
Bauernkrieg, zur Toleranz, über die Juden) wie auch auf die individualethischen Ratschläge, vor allem 
zum Verhalten in der Ehe und Sexualität. Auch die sogenannte Zweireichelehre enthielt kein geschlos-
senes sozialethisches Prinzip. Die Weltlichkeit des reformatorischen Ethos prägt gleichwohl das bürger-
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force towards responsible participation in social co-operation.” Participation in the 
domain of the political and in the forum of the public, requires a certain discipline, a 
willingness to comply with certain constraints. 
There is a way of disciplining thoughts, arguments, reasoning and actions following 
from our living together within the shared institutional scheme of (a constitutional 
democratic and liberal) society. While the constraints on social co-operation and pol-
itical coexistence within the modern liberal society might differ in essential respects 
from the kind of restraints imposed by the societies within which St.Paul or Luther 
lived, some constraints are in any case required in any and all societies. The liberty of 
individuals might be limited, even by the use of state-power,  for the sake of the liberty 
of their co-citizens. There is, for example, no freedom to oppress others. And, moreover, 
as we have already suggested, public reason (debate) requires that the public arguments 
one advances be subject to a certain disciplined structuring;  They should be such that 
they can be understood and in principle justified  to every reasonable person (although 
not necessarily accepted by them). This also means that one should  for theological as 
well as political reasons  be careful striking “die schärfste Alarmglocke” in public 
affairs of great complexity
966
, thereby provoking the most irreconcilable conflict. 
6.3. A matter of self-restraint? 
It is not theologically problematic to assume that human beings, as coexisting social 
beings within the framework of a political society, have to accept certain constraints on 
their “freedom” set by legitimate state-authorities. One finds this central idea already 
stressed in Rom.13,1-7. And it is implied in the theological understanding of an “usus 
politicus legis”.   
In modern liberal democracies, however, the necessity of imposing on the members of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
liche Leben. Politik und Wirtschaft werden von klerikaler Bevormundung freigesetzt.” Two things are 
well worth noticing here: 1) Luther (as well as Honecker) makes it quite clear that one can do without a 
casuistry very  much elaborated and imposed by the clergy, 2) The risk of making mistakes cannot be 
removed in ethics (cf. the Rawlsian idea of the “the burdens of judgment”). But Honecker also reminds us 
of the elementary point of departure which Luther has taken in matters of social ethics: “Der Mensch kann 
in der Welt Mitarbeiter Gottes, cooperator dei sein. Die zweite Tafel des Dekalogs enthält Maßstäbe, 
Kriterien für die Gestaltung des menschlichen Zusammmenleben.” Ibid. p.286. 
966
 As mentioned Honecker makes use of this phrase which I find very appropriate in this connection. 
Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.663. Striking “die schärfste Alarmglocke” in political affairs might be 
considered especially problematic in liberal democracies if it is not argumentatively backed up or publicly 
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society certain “constraints” on their freedom, is  as already suggested  turned into an 
idea of free and equal citizens imposing on themselves certain restraints as part of a duty 
of civility. Self-restraint means to impose on one-self certain restrictions required by all 
parties participating in public reasoning and social co-operation on terms which can be 
widely approvable, taking into account that they have an obligation to justify their deci-
sions to one another. Thus the notion of self-restraint used as a political virtue implies a 
readiness to meet the demands of public reason and avoid direct reference to compre-
hensive reasons based on an insight that is not similarly accessible to all parties. Con-
verting the idea of required political constraints into an idea of “self-restraint” as part of 
a duty of civility is, however, not unproblematic.  
The idea of practising the required self-restraint for the sake of social co-operation with-
in the shared institutional scheme of a democratic society, and the readiness to justify to 
others the standpoints one takes in matters of public interest, presuppose that there is an 
agreed basis for the justification of political standpoints and for social co-operation. In 
other words: there has to be an “overlapping consensus” providing us with a shared 
platform for public reasoning and setting the premises for complying with our duty of 
civility. 
A kind of “self-discipline”, which is morally motivated through an idea of fair social co-
operation, can hardly be avoided by responsible persons in modern pluralist societies, 
where people have to find reasonable ways of coexisting. If social co-operation shall 
succeed, one cannot allow competing interests, private ends and endless disagreement to 
take an upper hand when concerned with the very terms of coexistence. (That would be 
a relapse into a Hobbesian state of nature).Thus self-restraint seems to some extent 
recommendable in pluralist societies, although there might be a certain price following 
from introducing standards of social co-operation, since some individual ideals, private 
goals, controversial standpoints, and particular doctrines cannot be stressed and may 
even be modified and adjusted in the light of shared values, common standards and 
widely acceptable interests. For instance the forum of the public can never serve as a 
platform for advancing “esoteric reasons” and strictly private interests. Instead citizens 
are expected to avoid to a wide extent reference to non-shared premises, non-accessible 
                                                                                                                                                                          
justified, as is required in the Rawlsian proviso and presupposed by the idea of public reason inherent in 
political liberalism. 
 369 
grounds and merely private convictions,  at least when common issues of basic justice, 
constitutional essentials and public welfare are at the stake. The problem is, however, 
that the kind of self-limitation that liberals like Rawls seem to presuppose in matters of 
public interest, might very soon imply that people are expected to give up something 
that is essential to them. 
The American professor of law, Kent Greenawalt, has clearly shown that serious con-
flicts between religious convictions and the claim for self-restraint inherent in a duty of 
civility, might arise even in modern liberal societies. Liberal societies should normally 
be supposed to provide the best framework for people to conduct their lives both as 
good citizens and as loyal Christians. Toleration and respect for elementary (religious) 
rights and fundamental liberties should namely be taken as essential values within this 
kind of societies. Greenawalt provides, however, an in depth and subtle discussion of 
the dilemmas that might nevertheless occur. In this respect one might refer to his two 
books: 
“Religious Convictions and Political Choice” (1988) 
“Private Consciences and Public Reasons” (1995) 
According to Greenawalt it seems plausible to assume that there must at least be a mini-
mum of conformity between a person‟s deepest moral convictions and conceptions of 
the good on the one hand and the standpoints and activity required by a political duty of 
citizenship on the other hand.
967
 Greenawalt is somewhat critical of drawing a hard and 
fast distinction between non-public religious reasons and public reason
968
, thus he asks: 
“What grounds are proper for people making political decisions and arguments with-
in a liberal democracy? Should public reasons be more limited than all that properly 
counts in private conscience? Should officials, and even ordinary citizens, restrain 
themselves from relying in public politics on some grounds that appropriately influ-
ence them in their private lives and within their nonpublic associations? Do fairness, 
cohesiveness, and stability suggest that such self- restraint is desirable?”969  
Even if Rawls, as we meet him in Political Liberalism, just as Greenawalt, emphasises 
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 I suppose that it follows from this that Greenawalt could not approve of the most radical ways of 
separating theologically between two “regiments”. 
968
 It seems as if Greenawalt fears that the idea of public reason, as originally unfolded by Rawls, should 
in fact tend to rule out all grounds resting on particular comprehensive views. Religious grounds might 
then per definitionem be taken as “excluded grounds”. 
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that non-public reasons cannot be allowed to undermine public reason, in matters con-
cerning basic justice and the institutional premises for coexistence, there are still some 
great problems to be clarified. Let it be admitted that the greater the shared political 
problems of society are, the more urgent it seems for the citizens to maintain a funda-
mental commitment to common reason as a shared basis of communication, justifi-
cation and co-operation. For Christians and for churches this obviously means that one 
has to undertake the effort of making one‟s own arguments publicly accessible (although 
not necessarily acceptable). There can be no doubt that Kent Greenawalt accepts that a 
principle of self-restraint  as inherent in the idea of a civic duty970  should be consid-
ered a vital part of citizenship within liberal societies, where people have to find reason-
able ways of coexisting in spite of radical diversity. The main-problem for Greenawalt, 
however, is how radical this kind of self-restraint should appropriately be and to what 
extent such self-restraint might cause conflicts of loyalty that seriously threaten a per-
sons sense of moral integrity. And therefore he asks: “Can someone engage in such self-
restraint and remain true to his or her larger conceptions of how we should live?” 971 
The answer to these questions depends on what “self-restraint” is supposed to imply 
within the public forum of modern pluralist democracies. I will therefore start with a 
paraphrase of the kinds of recommended restraints, that according to Greenawalt might 
be considered appropriate in modern (liberal) democracies
972
: 
a) First there are recommendations concerning the kinds of grounds which citizens 
should most properly employ when entering the forum of public reason.
973
 Normally 
                                                                                                                                                                          
969
 K.Greenawalt, Private Consciences and Public Reasons (1995), p.4. 
970
 I take Greenawalt‟s term “civic duty” and Rawls‟ term “duty of civility” to be interchangeable. 
971
 K.Greenawalt, Private Consciences and Public Reasons (1995), p.4. Already the title of Greenawalt‟s 
book from 1995 indicates that the problem for Greenawalt is the rather sharp distinction between “public” 
and “private”, a distinction which he means to find in the (former) conception of Rawls. Greenawalt does 
not intend to give a broad philosophical analysis of the distinction as such, neither does he aim at solving 
the problem theologically, but through many examples he shows that the public and the private (or more in 
accordance with Rawls: the non-public) are intertwined in many ways, both on a principled level and in 
practice. The two are related in complex patterns on many different levels. And Greenawalt aims at a 
reasonable way of meeting this complex problem adequately. However, the main question can sometimes 
even be formulated in a very principled way by Greenawalt: “Is political truth intricately related to relig-
ious truth or does it have some independent place?”. Ibid., p.121. 
972
 Let me insert that I am not treating the different kinds of recommended restraints in the same order as 
Greenawalt. 
973
 Rawls for his part is concerned not just with discourse as such when entering the public forum. 
Reasons (which might be considered correct or incorrect) are to be given, decisions have to be taken, laws 
settled, political and social institutions justified. Rawls makes it clear that: “We are concerned with 
reason, not simply with discourse. A way of reasoning, then, must incorporate the fundamental concepts 
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citizens cannot expect to draw exclusively on so called non-accessible grounds, i.e. 
grounds derived from comprehensive views, or particular religious sources, or private 
ideas of the good, or some combination of these.  
b) It is, however, still a question to what extent reliance on so called non-accessible 
grounds should be avoided. As I have already made clear Rawls has more recently taken 
a more inclusive attitude in strictly public affairs than he did before, provided the 
“Rawlsian proviso” is fulfilled. And Greenawalt can stress that particular religious 
grounds might sometimes permissibly influence and strengthen other arguments within 
the forum of public reason. As far as I can see, Greenawalt and Rawls have in fact come 
closer to one another in recent time. 
c) It also seems plausible to claim that the significance of practising self-restraint will 
depend on the proper ranging of the subjects to be considered. The greater the public 
significance of an issue, and the greater the shared interest in society as a whole, the 
more important is it to avoid drawing heavily on merely “esoteric” grounds or strictly 
private reasons. This is the reason why the issue of self-restraint is so clearly stressed 
when questions of fundamental justice and constitutional essentials are at stake.
974
 In 
this I see no great difference between Greenawalt and Rawls. 
d) In addition it is important to underline that persons in different social roles and 
settings might be differently affected by a duty of self-restraint. Very often, however, 
Greenawalt concentrates on both “officials and (ordinary) citizens”, thereby signalling 
that he is concerned both with the kind of self-restraint implied in citizenship more 
generally, and with the special problems of officials (judges, legislators etc.), who may 
have a strong religious/moral commitment. But primarily Greenawalt is concerned with 
the latter perspective. The persons who should be especially careful using (or relying on) 
“non-accessible reasons” include first of all judges, legislators and executive state-
servants,  when acting officially. In a weaker sense, however, citizens can generally 
also be expected to practice self-restraint when taking part in common political life and 
engaging in different social fora. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
and principles of reason, and include standards of correctness and criteria of justification.” J. Rawls, 
Political Liberalism (1993), p.220. 
974
 Let me recall that according to Rawls there is in civil society as such no reason to introduce a strong 
self-restraint what concerns reference to non-public arguments. There are a lot of issues where religious or 
ideological perspectives should be considered very relevant and should freely be referred to. 
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e) It might also be a question which kinds of activity should be covered by a duty of 
civility. Is it the argument itself within a strictly public forum that has to be restricted? 
Or is it the reliance on religious or other “nonpublic” grounds that should better be ruled 
out when decisions are to be made in matters concerning basic justice and constitutional 
essentials?  It seems obvious that it would violate a duty of civility in modern demo-
cratic and pluralist societies if, for example, a judge in such a society attempted to legi-
timate his court rulings solely by appeals to Sharia, or if a parliamentarian were to take 
divine revelation of the Bible as exclusive and decisive source for settling legislative 
issues. 
Usually self-restraint means that one deliberately limits the reference to so-called non-
accessible grounds in the forum of public reason. But as can be seen in the 5
th
 bullet-
point above, self-restraint might also be more radical, implying that one should not rely 
on  non-accessible reasons, which are thereby in fact converted into “excluded grounds”. 
A society demanding radical self-restraint not just in the use of religious grounds but 
also concerning the reliance on religious grounds in matters of public interest might 
easily turn out to be illiberal, interfering in the forum of conscience. This might ad-
mittedly be a difficult issue. Rawls  and Honecker as well  very much accept that 
citizens are relying on the comprehensive doctrine they honour, in so far as they are 
decisively motivated by it when entering the public forum, and not least when sticking 
by an overlapping consensus. But in so far as public affairs are substantially interpreted 
and influenced  at least for a great part  by the comprehensive doctrine one honours, 
religious grounds may be openly introduced, provided the Rawlsian proviso is to be 
satisfied. Opportunism might be the result if the arguments used publicly are others than 
the comprehensive grounds upon which we are really relying. And as far as I can see 
this is to a wide extent taken into account by Rawls too, at least in his recent writings, 
both in the so-called “proviso”, and in the idea of an overlapping consensus supported 
from within the different comprehensive doctrines. A from within-principle as elabo-
rated by Rawls is required if one shall escape both an ignoring of religious grounds and 
a tactical rationalising of them.  
An ideal of self-restraint in public affairs, is in itself supposed to be morally supported 
by the religious doctrine people are honouring, provided the doctrine is reasonable. This 
means that citizens can be expected to practise a duty of citizenship not so much in spite 
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of their religious conviction as because of it. That such an approach should be possible, 
is Rawls‟ main assumption and hope, clearly expressed in his recent writings. It seems 
as if Rawls now, much in accordance with Greenawalt, very decisively takes into ac-
count that there are bonds between people‟s deeper (religious) commitment and the pol-
itical conceptions they go for that it is better not to disguise for tactical or for similar 
reasons. 
If “self-restraint”, among other things, really means to abstain from appeals to reasons 
and justificatory arguments that invoke a knowledge (and a religious insight) that other 
citizens do not have or cannot reasonably acquire, then the principle of self-restraint 
should be taken as an essential part of the Rawlsian fairness-argument. Society, seen as 
a fair system of co-operation based on equal citizenship, has as underlined, to be 
grounded on elementary principles of reciprocity, while suspending the reciprocal per-
spective might pave the way for some privileged groups to impose on society as a whole 
their own particular values (for instance by the means of the coercive state-powers). The 
reciprocity-argument should therefore be considered the core of all principles of reason-
able self-restraint. As made clear in the previous chapter, this is a perspective on self-
restraint that may be considered plausible from the Christian comprehensive view too,  
with its acceptance of the reciprocity-principle manifested in the golden rule.  
A principle of self-restraint concerning the use of private or non-public reasons has to be 
applied differently in different contexts. The tension between public obligation and per-
sonal (private)conviction, focused upon by Greenawalt, is resolved very differently in 
different contexts. When acting on behalf of legal authorities, or representing the state, 
or concerned with matters of fundamental justice, questions of constitutional essentials, 
and the organising of the basic structure of society, a principle of self-restraint should be 
rather strongly pursued. But there is, as suggested, obviously different settings where the 
principle of self-restraint might be taken to apply in a much weaker sense.
975
 
As emphasised, political liberalism restricts the invocation of religious grounds to those 
public instances where the Rawlsian proviso strictly applies. The duty of civility is 
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 In addition Greenawalt also mentions a semi-public domain, where people are not strictly representing 
public authorities, but are nevertheless aiming at having the greatest possible public influence. In this con-
nection Greenawalt uses the notion “quasi-public”. Journalists, editors and perhaps representatives of dif-
ferent churches belong to this group together with for instance parent‟s associations in school, private 
citizens speaking at a town-meeting etc. 
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therefore also given a rather narrow application. Neither Rawls nor Greenawalt would 
deny, however, that in a weaker sense citizens can more generally be expected to 
practice a certain self-restraint also in terms of the way they introduce and draw upon 
religious grounds and privileged insight in common affairs. Principles of reciprocity and 
fairness, as expressed in the proviso, also apply within the wider framework of civil 
society, in common reasoning and in matters of shared interest. Civil society does not 
merely open up for groups and associations, each with their internal reasons, but also 
provides us with common arenas of discourse and co-operation.  
Nevertheless I think that it is very important to follow Rawls in so far as he also avoids 
making the duty of civility, as a virtue closely connected with public reason, a general 
key-norm within the field of social-ethics generally.
976
 There are a lot of political and 
social life-situations where it is better that citizens explain openly and unhindered to one 
another what their religious belief requires from them in matters of social ethics, al-
though there might still be good reasons, not just political but also theological reasons, 
for practising to some extent a Rawlsian proviso in a reasonable way in all matters of 
shared political interest.  
There can be little doubt that the Church, (not least the Lutheran church) has usually 
considered it legitimate, normal and important that Christians in a reasonable way par-
ticipate in politics and fulfil their civil duties, as is for instance clearly emphasised in 
Confessio Augustana, Article XVI “De rebus civilibus”.977 Christians are expected to 
comply with the political scheme, standards of public reason and the political duties 
which are required for upholding external justice and peace. With the support of 
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 Instead he underlines that: “It is imperative to realize that the idea of public reason does not apply in 
all political discussion of fundamental questions, but only to discussions of those questions in what I refer 
to as the public political forum.” J. Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, The University of 
Chicago Law Review (1997;3), p.767. The narrow approach is reflected also in the ideal of public reason 
which is the duty of civility: “Finally, distinct from the idea of public reason … is the ideal of public 
reason. This ideal is realized, or satisfied, whenever judges, legislators, chief executives and other gov-
ernment officials, as well as candidates for public office, act from and follow the idea of public reason and 
explain to other citizens their reasons for supporting fundamental political questions in terms of the politi-
cal conception of justice that they regard as the most reasonable. In this way they fulfil what I shall call 
their duty of civility to one another and to other citizens.” Ibid., p.768f. 
977
 This is even underlined in a very rough way: “De rebus civilibus docent, quod legitimae ordinationes 
civiles sint bona opera Dei, quod christianis liceat gerere magistratus, exercere iudicia, iudicare res ex 
imperatoriis et aliis praesentibus legibus, supplicia iure constituere, iure bellare, militare, lege contrahere, 
tenere proprium, iurare postulantibus magistratibus, ducere uxorem, nubere. Damnant Anabaptistas, qui 
interdicunt haec civilia officia christianis”. Cf. “Confessio Augustana”, Die Bekenntnisschriften der evan-
gelisch-lutherischen Kirche (6. Aufl.; 1967), p.70f. 
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Luther‟s Disputatio de homine (1536) Martin Honecker therefore states that “In der 
Verantwortung vor der Welt ist die Vernunft das höchste Vermögen und die edelste 
Gabe.”978 But due to the fundamental limitations of reason, the existing plurality of 
values and the different kinds of situations we are facing, it might often be difficult to 
see what a duty of citizenship exactly requires. 
Rawls is, however, obviously very much aware of the strong commitment inherent in 
religious faith and in people‟s personal convictions. In a Rawlsian society, therefore, the 
comprehensive doctrines are not supposed to come into play beside  but through public 
reason. This premise is fundamental for even the idea of an overlapping consensus 
based on the “from-within-principle”. It is crucial, from a political point of view, that a 
political and a genuinely religious perspective are distinguished, but I think that even 
Rawls clearly realises that the two perspectives are also to be clearly held together,  not 
least when the question of fundamental political values is raised. 
Discipleship and citizenship have to be held together in some coherent way. And 
Greenawalt seems in fact to confirm this standpoint when touching upon the question 
whether the justifying reasons given within the public field are to be supported by citi-
zens deepest beliefs. 
“Rawls‟s discussion leaves a bit uncertainty on one subject that is critical to the 
relation between actual grounds of decision and public justification  whether the 
proponent of a position must himself believe in the public justification he offers.” 
[But Greenawalt adds:] ... “I believe that Rawls has in mind a sincere justification, 
one which the speaker actually credits.”979 
Proponents of a position may believe that their public argument is a good one irrespec-
tive of the religious conviction they have. An argument is good in its own right. Or they 
may believe it is good only insofar as it accords with their religious view. In both cases 
citizens really believe in the public justification they offer. Or the argument set forth 
publicly is not really a serious and decisive argument at all, it is nothing but a vicarious 
argument set forth solely in order to defend a conclusion mandated by religious reasons 
which cannot really be presented in terms of shared reason. In this case the argument 
cannot really be considered serious in the sense that the proponents themselves really 
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believe in it. Rawls should avoid the latter position when claiming that religious 
grounds in matters of basic justice and constitutional essentials should be expressed in 
terms of public reason, as specifically required by the duty of civility. 
The main idea behind the duty of civility seems  at least at the first glance  plausible 
enough and even relatively unproblematic from a theological point of view: Given the 
fact of pluralism, the scheme of a well-ordered co-operative society can be maintained 
only if all citizens, involved in social co-operation, are ready to practice certain political 
virtues in public argument and conduct, showing an elementary fairness, and a willing-
ness to explain and to listen unprejudicedly to other citizens. Thomas Pogge provides us 
with the following insightful explanation of Rawls‟ duty of civility. 
“Im Falle einer politischen Gerechtigkeitskonzeption wie der Rawlsschen kommt 
noch hinzu, daß Bürger ganz verschiedene umfassendere Konzeptionen des Guten, 
also auch persönliche Werte haben, die der gerechten Entscheidung zuwider sein 
können. Angesichts dieser Tatsachen setzt eine wohlgeordnete Gesellschaft be-
stimmte politische Tugenden voraus: In ihren politischen Auseinandersetzungen 
wollen Bürger fair miteinander umgehen, sachbezogen argumentieren und auf die 
Argumente anderer eingehen. Sie wollen einander Vertrauen, Respekt und Toleranz 
entgegenbringen, und bereit sein, einander ein Stück entgegenzukommen. Sie 
wollen alles daransetzen, die Behebung vermeintlicher Ungerechtigkeiten im 
Rahmen der politischen Spielregeln zu verfolgen. In einer durch eine politische 
Gerechtigkeitskonzeption wohlgeordneten Gesellschaft nehmen diese Tugenden 
einen besonderen Character an durch ihre Verbindung mit der Pflicht zur Kulanz 
unter Bürgern. Der Inhalt dieser Pflicht wiederum wird bestimmt von der Idee des 
öffentlichen Vernunftgebrauchs…”980 
Pogge further provides us with an example to illustrate the dilemmas that might follow 
from practising “self-restraint” in accordance with the duty of civility. He refers to the 
way the governor of New York, Mario Cuomo, has complied with the duty of civility. 
As a Christian, belonging to the Catholic Church, Cuomo obviously shares the very 
restrictive approach to abortus provocatus launched by the Catholic Church, while he  
as a governor  simultaneously avoids recurring to those religiously motivated reasons 
when being in charge of his political office,  thus complying officially with a liberal 
abortion-law which is in all political respects correctly settled. Now he is loyal to a 
legitimately enacted law of abortion, even if it paves the way for a practice that is very 
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liberal and which cannot be approved of by his own church or by himself.
 981
  
I refer to this example, just because I think that this kind of public conduct can be taken 
as an example of what practising of a duty of civility might very well entail. Pogge does 
not really take a standpoint on the difficult dilemma posed in the specific case of 
Cuomo. I think, however, that Pogge has nevertheless shown that Rawls‟ idea of a duty 
of civility may after all not be considered uncontroversial, and that a “Vermittlung” be-
tween citizens‟ religious and political commitment may sometimes be very problematic. 
It seems as if Cuomo has clearly come into conflict with the principle stressed in Acta 
5,29: “We must obey God rather than men.”982 If a very serious conflict should arise be-
tween the two kinds of obligation that Christians have, thereby bringing them into the 
state characterised by Honecker as a “casus confessionis”, it appears that there should be 
little doubt about how to set the priorities from a Christian point of view: Religious 
obligations can normally be expected to outweigh the merely political values that are 
likely to conflict with them.
983
 
But this seems not to be so obvious in the Cuomo-example. He seems to consider it an 
inherent part of a duty of civility that citizens, and especially those holding govern-
mental offices, should avoid sabotaging decisions, laws and rights, which are fairly 
settled according to agreed rules, procedures and principles, even if these decisions and 
laws turn out differently from what one could morally approve of oneself.
984
 This seems 
to be a plausible standpoint. But Pogge nevertheless suggests that the practising of a 
Rawlsian duty of civility might sometimes lead to kinds of behaviour that should cert-
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ainly be considered untenable when considered in the perspective of most compre-
hensive doctrines, and should most likely be rejected by most citizens as deeply un-
reasonable.
985
 At least a great deal of reflection is required if one shall see the reason-
ableness and also the theological legitimacy of practising a duty of civility which might 
end up as in the example of Cuomo, setting the deepest moral commitment one has in 
brackets. I shall, however, not try to solve the Cuomo-case. But I shall nevertheless, as a 
last part of this chapter, consider some further aspects of the case of abortion, which has 
in many cases so clearly strained the ideal of a duty of civility within modern and largely 
liberal societies. 
6.4. The really hard cases 
6.4.1. Two footnotes on abortion 
Greenawalt agrees with Rawls that it is important to distinguish “between constitutional 
essentials and basic issues of justice, on the one hand, and ordinary political issues, on 
the other”.986 People can hardly be supposed to avoid all kinds of comprehensive and 
religious grounds when discussing most ordinary questions of politics and social justice. 
But even if Greenawalt means that Rawls manages fairly well to give plausible reasons 
and criteria for distinguishing between basic issues of justice and ordinary political 
issues, he appropriately adds that “troublesome borderline cases will be inevitable.”987 
And Greenawalt himself takes as an example of such a case the problem of abortion. 
Has the unborn child a right to be protected by law against abortion? Or should a right to 
abortion rather be taken as a constitutional essential for women? And how to comply 
with a law of abortion when passed in accordance with settled procedures? If the issue 
of abortion is considered a question of basic justice  or even belongs to the so-called 
constitutional essentials  are religious values then to be disqualified?  
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I cannot thoroughly discuss the problem of abortion as such, but shall concentrate on 
problems related to the idea of public reason and the practising of a duty of civility. 
There is in Rawls‟ works no thorough analysis of the problem of abortion. It is, how-
ever, referred to in Political Liberalism, and I will start by quoting in extenso a footnote 
that has been commented and discussed upon: 
“As an illustration, consider the troubled question of abortion. Suppose first that the 
society in question is well-ordered and that we are dealing with the normal case of 
mature adult women. It is best to be clear about this idealized case first; for once we 
are clear about it, we have a guide that helps us to think about other cases, which 
force us to consider exceptional circumstances. Suppose further that we consider the 
question in terms of these three important political values; the due respect of human 
life, the ordered reproduction of political society over time, including the family in 
some form, and finally the equality of women as equal citizens. (There are, of 
course, other important political values besides these). Now I believe any reasonable 
balance of these three values will give a woman a duly qualified right to decide 
whether or not to end her pregnancy during the first trimester. The reason for this is 
that at this early stage of pregnancy the political value of equality of women is over-
riding, and this right is required to give it substance and force. Other political values, 
if tallied in, would not, I think, affect this conclusion. A reasonable balance may 
allow her such a right beyond this, at least in certain circumstances. However, I do 
not discuss the question in general here, as I simply want to illustrate the point of the 
text by saying that any comprehensive doctrine that leads to a balance of political 
values excluding that duly qualified right in the first trimester, is to that extent un-
reasonable; and depending on details of its formulation, it may also be cruel and 
oppressive; for example, if it denied the right altogether except in the case of rape 
and incest. Thus, assuming that this question is either a constitutional essential or a 
matter of basic justice, we should go against the ideal of public reason if we voted 
from a comprehensive doctrine that denied this right. However, a comprehensive 
doctrine is not unreasonable because it leads to an unreasonable conclusion in one or 
even in several cases. It may still be reasonable most of the time.”988   
Rawls for his part assumes that the case of abortion should be considered a question of 
basic justice,  maybe even a matter of essential constitutional significance. (“Thus, as-
suming that this question is either a constitutional essential or a matter of basic justice 
…”). 
And thereby he also suggests that it is a case where the ideal of public reason applies, 
what means that citizens should feel bound to behave according to the duty of civility. 
(“…we should go against the ideal of public reason if we voted from a comprehensive 
doctrine that denied this right.”)  
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This means that the parties involved should comply with the constraints of public reason 
when passing laws in matters of abortion. 
And it also means that the duty of citizenship sets limits to how one should deal with the 
law, when it has become legally valid, after being correctly settled according to constitu-
tional procedures. 
These aspects are of importance, especially for citizens holding public office, but also 
for citizens in general and for churches and other associations with a strong moral 
commitment in moral-political issues like this. There might, however, be many parties 
wishing to behave reasonably. And it may not be easy to see why it can reasonably be 
claimed by Rawls “that any comprehensive doctrine that leads to a balance of political 
values excluding that duly qualified right in the first trimester, is to that extent un-
reasonable …” 
Now it is important to notice that the context within which Rawls presents us with the 
problem of abortion is in a discussion of some apparent difficulties with public reason. 
And one such problem is that some issues are obviously so difficult that “public reason 
fails to resolve the question.”989  Someone might then consider it reasonable that 
citizens utilise non-political values and invoke the ultimate principles provided by their 
comprehensive views.
990
 But this, Rawls claims, is not a proper solution when there is 
deep disagreement in matters of basic justice and constitutional essentials. It would in 
fact imply suspending public reason entirely
991
 since we would give up the crucial 
premise that public reasoning has to be based on “values everyone can reasonably be 
expected to endorse.”992 The greatest threat to society as a joint venture of fair social co-
operation is, according to Rawls, not that there may be radical disagreement and even 
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essential issues that cannot clearly be solved by appealing to public reason. The greatest 
threat is that diverse groups and individuals in society might feel fully justified in in-
voking merely internal, associational, comprehensive and private reasons when matters 
of fair coexistence, constitutional essentials and basic justice are at stake. Or that they 
should render the appeal to political values insincere each time things get really diffi-
cult, since they can always invoke “better” and deeper values trumping them. According 
to Rawls one should: 
 ascribe to public reason and the ideal it prescribes the highest possible weight in all 
matters of constitutional essentials and basic justice, 
 take public reason to be suitably complete, in so far as it gives a sufficient platform 
for settling the essential issues, 
 leave it to public reason to express a reasonable combination and balance of political 
values,  even in hard cases.  
Certainly, the institutional arrangements and laws following from the use of public 
reason may be imperfect. And many citizens, holding different comprehensive views, 
will often find that some important reasons are unhappily left out. A political decision or 
a settled law might, however, be revised, altered and even replaced, if new and better 
reasons are given. But still it is the principle of public reason that has to be complied 
with, meaning “that citizens be able to explain their vote to one another in terms of a 
reasonable balance of public political values.”993  
Let it also be added that Rawls is of the opinion that most comprehensive doctrines are 
entirely consistent with the conditions of public reason and capable of giving the es-
sential political values of constitutional democracies further backing. At least this will 
be the case for the reasonable comprehensive doctrines in society. But he also adds that: 
“The only comprehensive doctrines that run afoul of public reason are those that 
cannot support a reasonable balance of political values.”994 
And this is just the place were Rawls inserts the footnote on abortion, quoted above, 
where he stresses that: 
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 the values referred to should be (formulated as) political values. 
 there should be a reasonable balance of those values. 
As we saw; in the case of abortion Rawls is pointing out three relevant values (there 
might be more): 1) a due respect for human life, 2) an ordered reproduction of political 
society (involving family-values), 3) the equality of women as citizens. There is no need 
now to discuss in detail the values introduced by Rawls. Let it just be stated that all of 
them can be supposed to be widely acceptable political (and moral) values.
995
 
The second point is, however, most central and problematic. What is it to make a 
reasonable balance of those values? Due to people‟s social background, their value-
traditions and their religious attachment one might expect that there will be considerable 
differences concerning what is to be defined as a reasonable or unreasonable balancing 
of values. Why should it for instance be considered unreasonable, if one sincerely ba-
lances differently from Rawls, taking the first of the three political values as most 
decisive? Let it be that an argument from the idea of citizen‟s equality weighs very 
heavily in an overall balancing of values, but one might also reasonably claim that the 
“due respect for human life” has to be taken as a crucial key-value for all political 
values.
996
 This should imply that a decisive weight has to be given to the first of the 
three values mentioned by Rawls. And the conclusion should therefore be altered. By 
stressing that all premises, which count within the forum of public reason, have to be 
properly balanced, Rawls himself opens up for a weighing of all relevant values that 
might end up with a conclusion that is different from the one he seems inclined to hold 
in the case of abortion. Why should it not be fully reasonable to claim the protection of 
the foetus by law during the first trimester? In fact I don‟t think that Rawls contributes 
very much what concerns the question what the most reasonable law of abortion should 
be like in a modern society. And I don‟t think that is Rawls‟ main concern either. In 
later writings he even wants to modify the impression that he has recommended a very 
liberal attitude concerning the question of securing by law an unlimited right to abort-
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ion. Let me therefore now turn to the other footnote that I announced: 
“Some have quite naturally read the footnote in Rawls, Political Liberalism, lecture 
VI, § 7.2 at 243-244 (cited in note 1), as an argument for the right to abortion in the 
first trimester. I do not intend it to be one. (It does express my opinion, but my opin-
ion is not an argument.) I was in error in leaving it in doubt whether the aim of the 
footnote was only to illustrate and confirm the following statement in the text to 
which the footnote is attached: „The only comprehensive doctrines that run afoul of 
public reason are those that cannot support a reasonable balance [or ordering] of 
political values [on the issue].‟ To try to explain what I meant, I used three political 
values (of course, there are more) for the troubled issue of the right to abortion to 
which it might seem improbable that political values could apply at all. I believe a 
more detailed interpretation of those values may, when properly developed in public 
reason, yield a reasonable argument. I don‟t say the most reasonable or decisive 
argument; I don‟t know what that would be, or even if it exists.  … Suppose now, 
for purposes of illustration, that there is a reasonable argument in public reason for 
the right of abortion but there is no equally reasonable balance, or ordering, of the 
political values in public reason that argues for the denial of that right. Then in this 
case, but only in this kind of case, does a comprehensive doctrine denying the right 
of abortion run afoul of public reason. However, if it can satisfy the proviso of the 
wide public reason better, or at least as well as other views, it has made its case in 
public reason. Of course, a comprehensive doctrine can be unreasonable on one or 
several issues without being simply unreasonable.”997 
Rawls is now much clearer about many aspects concerning the use of public reason and 
the commitment to a duty of civility in difficult boarder-line-cases , as for instance, the 
issue of establishing proper and fair abortion laws. 
a) He is now much clearer about what would cause comprehensive doctrines, denying 
the right of abortion, to “run afoul of public reason”. Comprehensive doctrines can be 
said to run afoul of public reason only if they fail to provide us with any reasonable 
balancing or ordering of the political values which are relevant. But balancing of values 
 especially in complex matters  might yield different conclusions. And Rawls does 
not aim at giving us a comprehensive overview of the question of abortion as such, 
ending up with a recommended solution. His concern is much more how coexisting 
citizens  within the limits of public reason and in accordance with a duty of civility  
can cope with those hot questions, which are so difficult and also so important in 
modern societies. And therefore he stresses that political liberalism does not hold that an 
ideal of public reason should always lead to a general agreement of views. Complying 
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fairly with the terms of public reason, however, might in itself contribute to a deeper 
understanding between the parties even if agreement is not to be attained. 
b) Even when agreement cannot be reached, and even if the results attained by fol-
lowing an ideal of public reason might turn out to be imperfect, citizens can at least be 
expected to vote sincerely on the subject. And the outcome of honest reasoning and 
deliberation may be taken as “reasonable and legitimate law, and binding on citizens by 
the majority principle.”998 There is hardly a fair alternative to this way of proceeding. 
c) Moreover, a law has to be passed,  by a majority decision (which might be highly 
imperfect). There are groups that would reject some laws settled by majority decision. 
Rawls refers to the Roman Catholic Church. The Catholic church has tried to argue by 
the use of public reason, but has in most Western democracies failed in winning the 
majority for its view. Now Rawls expects the Church to recognise the right to abortion, 
not as a morally approvable or morally correct, but at least as a right legitimately estab-
lished by law. And resistance by using force against those making use of the law or 
against institutions practising the law would be unreasonable. Rawls also finds reason to 
add that nobody need make use of the right to abortion for themselves and may freely 
continue to argue against the law in order to have it changed:  
“Certainly Catholics may, in line with public reason, continue to argue against the 
right of abortion. Reasoning is not closed once and for all in public reason any more 
than it is closed in any form of reasoning. Moreover, that the Catholic Church‟s non-
public reason requires its members to follow its doctrine is perfectly consistent with 
their also honoring public reason.”999 
Obviously Rawls considers it highly recommendable that citizens and associations 
continue their arguing and striving for a revision of a law which they find unjust and 
unreasonable. And he even seems to take for granted that people, by entering freely into 
churches (or other associations), have an obligation to respect the moral comprehensive 
doctrines advanced by their churches. Members of the Catholic church, for instance, 
have the full legal right to have an abortion, but it might nevertheless be a moral duty 
not to exercise this right (even if they cannot deprive their future selves of this right 
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which is secured by law).
1000
  
d) I think it will be impossible to entirely avoid serious conflicts in some difficult 
(“borderline-”)cases, which involve matters considered especially important by some of 
the parties in society. It should be noticed here, however, that Rawls ends both of the 
footnotes quoted in this chapter, by stressing that “a comprehensive doctrine can be 
unreasonable on one or several issues without being simply unreasonable.”1001 Thereby 
Rawls in fact considers the “borderline-conflicts” that might arise between different 
parties in society, and also between religious groups and legislators, in hot questions like 
the abortion case as punctual conflicts. Thus he can maintain his principled main per-
spective which is central to political liberalism; namely that citizens are supposed to 
affirm simultaneously a comprehensive doctrine and a political conception which can 
normally be expected to cohere, without bringing citizens into a permanent state of 
double morality or into a status confessionis ending up with insoluble loyalty- conflicts. 
The case of abortion has indeed been a hot question. Ronald Dworkin even underlines 
that “the war over abortion seems fiercer and more violent in America than anywhere 
else. Why? Part of the reason lies in the peculiar paradox of America‟s ambivalence 
toward religion. … the United States is nevertheless among the most religious of 
modern Western countries and, in the tone of some of its most powerful religious 
groups, by far the most fundamentalist.”1002 Dworkin might be right about the intensity 
of “the war over abortion” in the United States, but it seems as if this is a very hot 
question in most European nations as well, even if fundamentalism may be weaker here.  
Martin Honecker, who very much makes social-ethics and politics a domain of human 
reason and common morality, takes in one of his most recent book a theological ap-
proach to “abortus provocatus” which is at the very outset clear enough: 
“Menschliches Leben ist von seinem Beginn an ein Prozess mit verschiedenen 
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Stadien. Für die ethische Frage nach dem Schutz ungeborenen Lebens verbinden 
sich hierbei Tatsachenfragen (was ist biologisch feststellbar?) und Wertungsfragen 
(auf welchen Schutz hat ungeborenes Leben moralisch Anspruch, wie ist das je-
weilige Stadium der Menschwerdung ethisch zu bewerten?) unauflöslich mitein-
ander. Die entscheidende Frage lautet dann: Kann nur die sittliche, vernünftige 
Person Subjekt von Rechten und Träger der Menschenwürde sein, oder ist jedes 
Leben, auch das ungeborene menschliche Leben, von einer dignitas aliena, einer 
Unverfügbarkeit bestimmt, die ihm Gott verleiht und die deshalb zu schützen ist. … 
Das Kriterium für eine theologische Beurteilung lautet aber: Der Mensch ist nicht 
nur „Geist‟, Bewußtsein, sondern leib-seelische Ganzheit; er ist Geschöpf in der 
Totalität, Einheit von Geist, Leib und Seele. Das schließt den Schutz der leiblichen 
Natur (schon in ihrer Potentialität) ein. Das werdende Leben hat außerdem vor Gott 
Würde, dignitas, vor aller eigenen menschlichen Leistung, auch vor aller geistigen 
Leistung.”1003 
Let me now briefly point at some aspects which might be of importance from the per-
spective I have chosen. 
a) The debate about an abortion law in Germany has obviously been as complicated as 
in most of the western democracies.
1004
 And churches as well as individual Christians 
have participated intensively in this very hot debate. Although his principled view is 
clear enough, Honecker is rather careful what concerns substantial conclusions. But at 
least he finds it urgent that the public debate steers clear of two extremes: a self-de-
termination reflected in the slogan “Mein Bauch gehört mir”1005 and an attitude entirely 
based on the view that “Abtreibung ist Mord”1006  
b) Honecker reminds us that churches and individual Christians have in fact taken 
different standpoints and have also behaved rather differently when the question of a 
liberalisation of the abortion law came up. This reflects a certain plurality within the 
churches. It is not difficult, however, to observe that there is a greater unanimity within 
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 M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.93.  
1004
 I cannot here go in details about the German debate. The background is as follows: “Die 
sozialliberale Koalition beschloß 1974 eine Reform des §218 und 219 des Strafgesetzbuchs auf Grundlage 
der Fristenlösung. Die Voraussetzung der Fristenlösung war eine Beratung der Schwangeren vor dem Ein-
griff; nach einer Beratung hat die Frau das Recht, die Durchführung des Eingriffs vom Arzt zu Verlangen 
und Straffrei zu bleiben. Das Bundesverfassungsgericht hob am 25. Februar 1975 das Gesetz auf, mit der 
Begründung, auch ungeborenes Leben sei vom Grundgesetz geschützt. Seitdem ist eine weit angelegte In-
dikationslösung Praxis. (Gesetz von 1976).” M.Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.97. I should 
like to add that public reason as it has got manifest in the decision of the “Bundesverfassungsgericht”, dif-
fers from what is considered most reasonable in other contexts and countries, what just serves to illustrate 
that public reason in itself might take different courses.  
1005
 M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.94. 
1006




 than within the Protestant churches in respect of  the attitude 
towards the problem of (settling a law of) abortion.
1008
 
c) But, nevertheless, in a historical overview in Grundriß der Sozialethik it seems as if 
Honecker himself sees the issue of abortus provocatus as a case which naturally belongs 
within the problem-sphere of the fifth commandment.
1009
. 
d) And he obviously sees a need for establishing theological criteria for approaching the 
problem of abortion and the issue of a just abortion-law. Honecker ascribes to the un-
born child a “dignitas aliena”, i.e. a dignity grounded not in its own physical or mental 
capacities, but mainly in God‟s esteem. In this way the elementary inviolability of the 
foetus is established. In Grundriß der Sozialethik it seems not quite clear, however, how 
Honecker imagines that this concern should be brought into the public discourse, or how 
he imagines that one can secure for an unborn child some elementary rights
1010
, giving it 
law protection during the first trimester. It seems as if Honecker in this debate with-
draws to the “grounding reasons” alone, without really providing us with a view to be 
argued and justified publicly.  
I think there may be practical reasons for Honecker‟s somewhat reserved approach. The 
reason for this may very well be that he himself has been concerned with the problem as 
a member of political commissions and wishes to listen and reason openly before con-
cluding. Let it here be inserted that somebody may think that we should always present 
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 “Die katholische Kirche hat in der Enzyklika „Castri connubii‟ …betont, der Grundsatz: „Du sollst 
nicht töten‟ gelte unbedingt. Schwangerschaftsabbruch ist absolut verboten und in sich böse und Sünde 
(malum intrinsece).… Diese Überzeugung wird in einer Erklärung der vatikanischen Glaubenskongre-
gation von 1974, ebenso in der Erklärung der deutschen Bischöfe vom 26. Januar 1976 „Zur Neuregelung 
des § 218‟ erneut betont. Entschieden wird vor allem die soziale Indikation abgelehnt.” M. Honecker, 
Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.97. 
1008
 “Die Spannweite der Positionen, die in der evangelischen Kirche vertreten wurden, reicht sehr weit: 
Manche Stimmen vertreten wie die katholische Kirche eine eindeutige und rigorose Ablehnung jeden 
Abbruchs. Andere Stimmen vertreten die Fristenlösung unter Betonung des Selbstbestimmungsrecht der 
Frau.” M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.97 But he adds that: “Die Fristenlösung wird 
vom Rat der EKD als Konfliktlösung abgelehnt, weil sie die Tür zu grundsätzlichen Freigabe des 
Schwangerschaftsabbruchs öffnet. Bei der Indikationslösung ist jeder Einzelfall sorgfältig zu prüfen. Nur 
unter dieser Bedingung kann bei einem Abbruch der Schwangerschaft Straffreiheit eingeräumt werden.” 
Ibid., p.98. 
1009
 “Die Bibel bekennt: Der Mensch ist bereits im Mutterleib ein von Gott gebildetes und beanspruchtes 
Ich (Hi 10,10-12; Ps. 139,13; Jer 1,5). Der Lebensschutz auch des Ungeborenen fällt deswegen unter den 
Schutz des 5. Gebotes.” M. Honecker, Grundriß der Sozialethik (1995), p.95. 
1010
 He is not very specific about how far this protection should reach. 
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merely the “grounding reasons”1011 for the public standpoints we take. I don‟t think that 
Honecker‟s intention is just to give an account of what he holds as objectively right 
from the perspective of the comprehensive doctrine he honours, thereby avoiding the 
practical “balancing”. Introducing the deeper reasons may be appropriate, but cannot 
take the place of public reason when public reasoning about concrete decisions gets 
hard. I think Rawls‟, in his approach to the problem of abortion, has made it clear that 
this is not a recommendable course of action. Simultaneously, however, he has under-
lined that public decisions, and the laws enacted, may be imperfect. But the main con-
cern may not be to establish truth or the objectively right as seen from the perspective of 
a particular comprehensive doctrine. Public reasoning requires that the aim of truth may 
be replaced by an idea of the politically reasonable, making it possible to maintain in 
pluralist societies a shared platform of political reasoning and to justify institutions and 
laws. Let it also be mentioned that Rawls takes this idea of public reason to be “fully 
compatible with the many non-public reasons.”1012 As far as I can see churches would 
make it far to easy on themselves, if they avoided arguing in accordance with the terms 
of public reason when engaging publicly in matters of law, basic justice and funda-
mental rights. The very concern one has will suffer if one ignores the Rawlsian proviso. 
But perhaps the debate about an abortion law has demonstrated that the Rawlsian pro-
viso is not as easily practised in such sensitive cases, where the penetrating power of our 
comprehensive reasons and our ultimate grounds is so strong. On the other side, in such 
morally sensitive cases it should be particularly important to make efforts to satisfy the 
Rawlsian proviso, since these cases might very soon cause the greatest conflicts. And I 
think Honecker  in accordance with his theological concern  should very much ap-
prove of this. 
6.4.2. Different addressees  different statements 
The view taken by Honecker with regard to abortus provocatus and a law of abortion 
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 The term “grounding reason” I have taken from Rawls, who uses the term for the comprehensive 
reasons that are backing up or underlying public reason: “I use the term „grounding reasons‟ since many 
who might appeal to those reasons view them as the proper grounds, or the true basis, religious or philo-
sophical or moral, of the ideals and principles of public reasons and political conceptions of justice.” J. 
Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, The University of Chicago Law Review (1997;3), p.797. 
1012
 J. Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, The University of Chicago Law Review (1997;3), 
p.800. 
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should be considered reasonable and not untypical of most Protestant churches. Let me 
now, however, more thoroughly examine also how the Norwegian Church engaged in 
the discussion about a liberalisation of the abortion law in the nineteen seventies, since 
the church in Norway appears to have decisively opposed the law for religious reasons. 
In 1975 a liberalisation of the abortion law was introduced in Norway.
1013
 On the 29
th
 of 
May 1975, immediately after a new liberal law was passed, one of the church‟s bishops, 
Per Lönning, resigned from his office. He found the law to be fundamentally at odds 
with norms central to the Church. And in a state-church like the Norwegian Church, the 
tension also increased between state and church. The rest of the bishops had throughout 
the debate also taken a restrictive standpoint in the case of abortion, and they also 
judged the actual liberalisation of the abortion law which took place in 1975, in much 
the same way as Per Lönning, whom they supported. 
a) The bishops issued  immediately after Lönning‟s resignation  a public declaration, 
stressing the gravity of the situation created by the legislators‟ passage of a law on 
abortion which, according to the Church, violated fundamental Christian norms. And it 
was underlined that the church had warned the legislative authorities for many years 
against taking a decision like this. Even if the law, passed in 1975, was formally in 
accordance with the principles of our legal system, it would according to the bishops 
legalise and pave the way for a practice which was in conflict with the law of God and 
with the unanimous vote of the entire Christian church.
1014
 
The weight here is on an expected practice in conflict with the commandment of God. 
And this aspect was accordingly stressed in newspapers and in media after the decla-
ration had been given. The addressees of the bishops were obviously not just the legi-
slators, but the members of civil society as a whole. 
                                                          
1013
 I cannot go in details about the new law as such, but should just say that the law still maintained 
certain specified, but wide criteria  for having an abortion during the first trimester. 
1014
 Cf. “UTTALELSE FRA NI BISKOPER AV 29. MAI 1975 i forbindelse med biskop Lønning‟s fra-
treden fra sitt embete.” The first point of this declaration is as follows: “1. Når biskop Per Lønning har 
søkt avskjed fra sitt embete understreker det alvoret i den situasjon som er oppstått ved at Stortinget har 
vedtatt en lov om abort som etter kirkens syn krenker grunnleggende kristne normer. Et entydig votum fra 
kirken både ved dens lovfestede og frivillige organer har advart våre myndigheter mot dette. Det har ikke 
kunnet hindre vedtak av en lov som setter skiftende sosiale vilkår eller en vanskelig livssituasjon opp mot 
retten til liv. Derved blir det rettsvern som også det ufødte barn har krav på, faktisk opphevet. Selv om 
loven formelt er i samsvar med prinsippene i vår rettspleie og ikke innfører retten til å ta liv ved selv-
bestemt abort, legaliserer og muliggjør den en praksis som er i strid med Guds lov og den samlede kristne 
kirkes ord i denne sak.” Quoted from Kirkelige abortuttalelser 1971 - 1977 (1978), p.27. 
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One would hardly expect bishops to avoid making references to the commandment of 
God. Indeed, it should have been more surprising if they had not referred to the norma-
tive basis of the church, even in a statement with a wide address. And I think that Rawls, 
as he argues in The Idea of Public Reason Revisited would defend, not just the right of 
churches to order freely their inner life
1015
, but also their right to address the wider so-
ciety and the state-authorities in this way.
1016
 But there is nevertheless more to be said 
about this: 
If a law of abortion really affects constitutional essentials, and both Rawls and Nor-
wegian church-leaders seem to agree that it does, then it may be expected that the 
church-leaders should also strive to satisfy the Rawlsian proviso, which they did not 
really try to do in May 1975. The declaration ends instead with an urgent advice to the 
ministers and other fellow-workers in the (state-)church to stay in their offices and to 
continue preaching the commandment of God to the people and to its leaders. And the 
bishops indeed came very close to making the abortion-case a “casus confessionis”, 
which calls upon extraordinary steps.
1017
 
By the strong commitment and the terminology they used, the church-leaders stressed, 
in a way that could hardly be misunderstood, the gravity of the situation. In this mo-
ment, when the law was settled, they found no time for arguing strictly in accordance 
with the constraints of public reason.  
b) The bishops had already on the 20
th
 of February the same year, before the law was 
settled, given an official “expert opinion” to a draft bill sent them from the department. 
Their statements concerning the first paragraph are of great interest. The first objection 
of the bishops refers to the formulation that “a pregnant woman has a right to abortion”. 
The bishops are of the opinion that this is a very unfortunate formulation, which might 
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 Rawls underlines that “the principles of political justice do not apply to the internal life of a church, 
nor is it desirable, or consistent with liberty of conscience, or freedom of association, that they should.” J. 
Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, The University of Chicago Law Review (1997;3), p.788. 
1016
 “Of course there are no restrictions or requirements on how religious or secular doctrines are them-
selves to be expressed. … They will normally have practical reasons for wanting to make their views ac-
ceptable to a broader audience.” J. Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, The University of 
Chicago Law Review (1997;3), p.784. 
1017
 “Vi ber våre prester og andre medarbeidere i kirken om å bli i sitt kall. Mer enn noensinne er det 
nødvendig å kjempe for menneskeverdet og forkynne Guds Bud for folket og for dets ledere. Kirkens 
budskap kan ikke endres sammen med statens skiftende syn. Sammen er vi kalt til å stå vakt om den 
sannhet som vi er forpliktet på. I alle situasjoner må vi være beredt til å lyde Gud mer enn mennesker.” 
Quoted from Kirkelige abortuttalelser 1971 - 1977 (1978), p.28. 
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even have a great influence on the general value-formation in society. Abortion should 
be considered a matter of emergency, to be used in cases where a lesser evil is preferable 
to a greater evil. But the difficult situation of weighing “evils” against one another is, 
according to the bishops, veiled if abortion is turned into a “right”, thereby converting it 
to something positive, a “good”. And the bishops consider it especially unfortunate that 
the right to abortion is made a sort of eye catcher for the whole law.
1018
 When the notion 
of “right” is introduced, it should instead be used in order to protect life. Now it was due 
time to stress that: “The right to live is the most fundamental human right.”1019 
The way the bishops argue when addressing the legislators directly (in February 1975), 
giving an internal “expert opinion” regarding a new abortion-law, is very different from 
the way they later argued when addressing a wider publicum immediately after bishop 
Lönning had resigned after the liberal law had been enacted.
1020
 
In the utterance given in February it seems as if they intend to argue entirely within the 
limits of public reason. They don‟t draw explicitly on widely held principles of justice, 
but there is in their utterance clear allusions to the most widely recognised human rights. 
And they avoid systematically reference to particular religious motives, although they 
very briefly refer to their own statements throughout the previous years.  
At this stage the bishops demonstrate very clearly that they consider their concern justi-
fiable in terms of public reason, and that they want to argue within a shared framework 
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 The bishops write: “…Vår første innsigelse gjelder formuleringen: „En svanger kvinne har rett til 
svangerskapsavbrudd …‟ Vi mener at denne uttrykksmåten er meget uheldig med sikte på den videre 
opinionsutvikling i samfunnet. I en abortkonflikt dreier det seg, etisk vurdert, om en nødvergesituasjon der 
det i foreliggende tilfelle er spørsmål om å avveie et større onde mot et mindre. Denne smertefylte avvein-
ingskonflikt blir tilslørt dersom man gir det inntrykk av at det her dreier seg om „rett‟ dvs. om rettigheter, 
om et positivt gode som et menneske har krav på på linje med andre rettigheter. At denne formulering 
kommer til å innlede loven og dermed blir stående som en slags blikkfanger, anser vi som særlig be-
tenkelig.” Utkast til lov om adgang til svangerskapsavbrudd ( Høringsuttalese av 20.02.1975 fra Den 
norske Kirkes biskoper til departementet), p.1. 
1019
 Utkast til lov om adgang til svangerskapsavbrudd ( Høringsuttalese av 20.02.1975 fra Den norske 
Kirkes biskoper til departementet), p.2. 
1020
 Let it here also be mentioned that Lönning himself clearly states: 1) Christian norms should never be 
enforced by law 2) the laws of a society should to some extend correlate with most citizens sense of 
justice, 3) the ultimate responsibility for abortion can never be lifted away from those most concerned, the 
parents. But he adds: “I vår foreliggende situasjon ser jeg imidlertid ikke at disse overveielser ville være 
tilstrekkelig til å rettferdiggjøre „selvbestemt abort‟ som lovprinsipp. Når jeg skal gjøre meg til talsmann 
for en heller restriktiv lovgivning, er det ikke for å tvinge særskilt kristne prinsipper på et pluralistisk sam-
funn. Det er for å mane til beskyttelse av et menneskeliv og menneskeverd i samsvar med den gamle lege-
etikk fra Hippokrates fram til idag, og med selve idéen om naturgitte menenskerettigheter, selve grunn-
laget for hele vår vesterlandske bevissthet om lov.” P.Lönning, “Abortproblemet  et spørsmål om sosial-
etisk bevisstgjøring”, Derfor. Dokumentasjoner omkring abortdebatten og en embetsnedleggesle (1975), 
p.60. 
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and are ready to explain in reasonable terms their view. And of course the bishops take 
for granted that threats, pressure
1021
 or oppressive means are in no way to be used. They 
behaved reasonably as required by the duty of civility. 
The approach of the bishops in February should not be taken as mainly tactically motiv-
ated, but may as well be an approach entirely in accordance with the principles given in 
the doctrine of the two realms: The mandate of enacting laws belongs to the legitimate 
legislators, but a right to influence and criticise the laws belongs to citizens as well as 
associations as participants in the public forum of a democratic society. 
c) But after the liberal law was settled, and after the first reaction was given, the quest-
ion soon came up: How to cope with the new law practically? And now it may be of 
interest to focus on how the bishops in 1975 addressed Christian citizens who could be 
supposed to practice the new law as doctors, nurses, social workers etc.  
Starting with those working in church institutions the bishops emphasised that their 
Christian attitude should always be made clear, but then it is immediately stressed that 
clients should not be set under pressure, they should be properly informed about what 




For those who are not working in church-institutions and may directly be involved in the 
practising of the law in public institutions, it is of importance to be conscious and honest 
about the moral dilemmas they are facing. And situations might even occur where it 
could be right to resign in accordance with Acta 4,19. But the bishops are nevertheless 
underlining that it would not be right to require of anybody directly involved in practis-
ing the law that he resigns.
1023
 But simultaneously it is also stressed how important it is 
that state authorities do not strain the conscience of doctors, nurses and others who are 
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 Of course it represents in itself a “pressure” when those opposing the liberalisation of the law could 
hand over lists with hundreds of thousand of signatures to the governmental authorities. But this is a kind 
of pressure which is normal and legitimate in a democracy. (The broad movement was not initiated by the 
bishops).  
1022
 Cf. “ Bispemøtets uttalelse 1975. den nye abortloven - et ord til rådgivere og helsepersonell”, Kirke-
lige abortuttalelser 1971 - 1977 (1978), p.29. 
1023
 For leger, helsepersonell og sosialarbeidere som ikke har sitt virke i tilknytning til kirkelige institu-
sjoner, og som ønsker å legge kristne prinsipper til grunn for sin gjerning, er det klart at loven til dels 
skaper en mer enn vanskelig situasjon. I sine tilfelle vil vanskelighetene være av en slik art at det blir aktu-
elt å minne om prinsippet: Vi skal lyde Gud mer enn mennesker  (Ap.gj. 4,19). Kirkelige abortuttalelser 
1971 - 1977 (1978), p.30. 
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directly involved, but grant them a fair right of personal reservation
1024
, even if this 
might create some practical complications. 
And the bishops further underline that in all cases is it important to avoid moralising, 
thereby leaving the client as the guilty party. Thus the bishops take an attitude that ex-
cludes entirely threats, pressure, use of force and other oppressive means against clients 
or institutions practising the law according to rules, principles and procedures that are 
constitutionally secured and democratically settled. But simultaneously the bishops 
obviously deny setting the question of abortion off the public agenda, rather it should 
remain a hot question on the political agenda (as well as in the moral considerations of 
individuals) in the years to come.
1025
  
The kind of advice that the bishops are giving in a very difficult case, just a few months 
after the abortion-law was settled, indicates as far as I can see that they are very uneasy 
about the problems of conscience that the law creates. But one might ask if they are not 
in fact also strengthening the elementary duty of civility. It is obviously very important 
to play by the agreed rules of a constitutional democracy, thereby respecting in practice 
that the law is correctly passed. And as underlined they avoid legitimating any kind of 
force and pressure. The freedom of patients and clients and their right to be fully in-
formed about the law and to make use of it without hindrance is clearly respected. 
It seems as if the bishops are quite clearly not ready to make the question of abortion a 
part of a church crusade against a society which is taken to be in conflict with central 
Christian principles and commandment, at the risk of provoking thereby a constitutional 
crisis.
1026
 From my point of view it seems as if the bishops in this situation are exerting 
themselves to play by constitutional rules, respecting (at least after the first confront-
ation) clearly the value and limits of public reason. But the leaders of the church without 
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 “Når det videre gjelder legers og helsepersonells adgang til å nekte å medvirke ved abortoperasjoner, 
har vi merket oss at det nå legges opp til en organisert ordning med slikt fritak. Imidlertid gjør det seg 
gjeldende en viss uro i forbindelse med det system for registrering av samvitttighetsnektere som foreslås. 
…Det må være maktpåliggende at våre helsemyndigheter snarest fjerner engstelsen på dette punkt” 
Quoted from Kirkelige abortuttalelser 1971 - 1977 (1978), p.31. 
1025
 Let it, however, be mentioned that the abortion law of 1975 represented a short “interregnum”. A 
couple of years later it was succeeded by a new law, based on entire self-determination from the side of 
the pregnant woman herself within the first trimester.  
1026
 Let me here refer to Rawls‟ view that “The constitution is, as it were, honored as a pact to maintain 
civil peace.” J. Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, The University of Chicago Law Review 
(1997;3), p.781. 
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doubt very strongly felt that public authorities themselves had now violated central 
human standards and had thereby themselves “run afoul of public reason”1027 being 
incapable of balancing moral (and political) values properly. But like Rawls church-
leaders are obviously considering the issue a serious, but punctual conflict. 
6.4.3. A conclusion: Hard cases  low cost solution? 
Political liberalism sets out from the idea of society as a scheme of fair co-operation 
between free and equal citizens. As shown, a liberal scheme of society cannot avoid 
producing some moral dilemmas. In the case of abortion one might say that a liberal 
approach might in itself rather strengthen this kind of dilemma. Even if one stresses the 
aspect that every-one is free to deny making use of a liberal abortion law, the straining 
of individual choice in a case like this seems insufficient. The law sets a framework for 
co-operation and individual choice, it is a manifestation of the will and values of so-
ciety, it contributes in itself to the very value-formation. By straining the aspect of 
individual choice in matters which Rawls could himself consider an issue of basic 
justice or a matter belonging to the constitutional essentials, one might contribute to in-
creasing both interpersonal and intrapersonal moral problems. Greenawalt seems, how-
ever, right when writing that: “Rawls does not deny that people may sometimes face 
conflicts between their own comprehensive views and public reasons, and that they must 
resolve these conflicts in light of their own comprehensive views.”1028 But it may 
plausibly be assumed that liberalism, by the way it faces the fact of pluralism and simul-
taneously stresses individual liberty and personal freedom of conscience might in fact 
tend to generate the kind of conflicts actualised in the case of abortion.  
The main concern of political liberalism, however, is that decisions concerning basic 
premises for social co-operation and coexistence, are to be taken with reference to 
shared principles of justice and widely acceptable procedures of fairness. But these 
things cannot secure an unquestionable truth, guarantee a perfect outcome or even a 
persisting agreement, as is for instance very clearly demonstrated in the case of abortion. 
A shared platform regarding some essential premises for coexistence is obviously not 
specific enough to solve many hard cases, yielding practical political (moral) solutions 
that can be accepted by all parties. An overlapping consensus as conceived of within 
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 For the phrase cf.. J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.243. 
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political liberalism will certainly not remove disagreement from the public arena, but 
can nevertheless provide for a reasonable way of complying with disagreement within 
the limits set by public reason. The unconstrained “freedom” is thereby to be institutio-
nally framed. The question is how far such constraints are supposed to be required. 
A society where individual (religious) consciences are normally strongly constrained, 
controlled and overruled by governmental authorities, which are often forbidding people 
 under the threat of using force against them  to honour certain views, to live by them 
themselves and to express them publicly, has what I will call “a high-cost-profile” In 
such a society state-authorities are to a wide extent ready to use coercive force in order 




A society where individual (religious) consciences are seldom overruled in this way, has 
what we will call “a low-cost-profile”.1030 But a society with a “low-cost-profile” cannot 
be a society without constraints. Even a strong concern for individual freedom has to be 
balanced against a similar liberty for others, including the weakest and least advantaged, 
which means that the behaviour of individuals must be restrained if leading to a pract-
ice, which involves offence, violence or unseemly pressure towards others.  
A society in accordance with political liberalism should most likely belong within the 
second category.
1031
 Rawls nevertheless assumes that certain restraints, reflecting the 
principle of reciprocity, are to be recognised by the different parties. When such con-
straints, however, are willingly accepted by the parties themselves as implied in an over-
lapping consensus, they should most appropriately be characterised with the term “self-
restraint”, as discussed by Greenawalt. And a “high-cost-model” is thereby turned into a 
“low-cost-model”, and “private consciences” are normally not to be overruled.  
But let it also be emphasised that the very practising of self-restraint as a part of a duty 
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 K. Greenawalt, Private Consciences and Public Reasons, p.117. 
1029
 Cf. To this problem Confessio Augustana XXVIII. 
1030
 Such a profile might also be found in societies, where the cultural traditions are very homogeneous 
and the pluralism not very radical at the outset, so that an overlap is easily established According to 
Greenawalt the Dutch and the Scandinavian societies are societies of this kind. This observation might 
however be empirically controversial.  
1031
 This seems clear even Rawls holds “that under reasonably favourable conditions that make demo-
cracy possible, political values normally outweigh whatever non-political values conflict with them.” J. 
Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.146 
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of civility presupposes that there is at least a minimum of shared premises among the 
citizens, that all of them can willingly approve of. That is what has to be secured by the 
parties by endorsing an overlapping consensus, as a referential basis for public reason-
ing, and as a basis for social co-operation and as a framework for fair coexistence and as 
a way “to maintain civil peace”.1032 Rawls can plausibly hope, I think, that Christians, 
engaged in social and political co-operation, may avoid invoking exclusive religious 
motives in public affairs and restrain their pursuit of particular religious interests if they 
are expected to be to the disadvantage of other groups, and play by constitutional rules 
and agreed principles of fairness when shared political values, matters of basic justice 
and the issue of constitutional essentials are at stake. 
This would require from all parties a genuine willingness to strengthen the public forum, 
with the limitations and with the terms which apply here. Churches as well as Christians 
should for theological reasons accept that standards for the public political domain can 
in no way be set merely by reference to privileged insights in social ethics.
1033
 The 
Rawlsian proviso is normally to be satisfied, which does not imply that Christian faith is 
undermined, but certainly it means that there is a theological “Fundamentalunter-
scheidung” to be respected at the very outset when entering the shared public forum.  
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 J. Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, The University of Chicago Law Review (1997;3), 
p.781. 
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 Cf M.Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p.155. 
 397 
7. CONCLUSION 
7.1. Towards a morally grounded  consensus 
7.1.1. A mere acquiescence? 
According to Rawls a society requires a common institutional framework for social co-
operation, regulated by a political conception of justice, which can also serve as a 
shared justificatory platform in public reasoning. The requisite political conception of 
justice should be such that it can be the focus of an overlapping consensus. In Political 
Liberalism Rawls accordingly underlines that: 
“… three conditions seem to be sufficient for society to be a fair and stable system 
of cooperation between free and equal citizens who are deeply divided by the reas-
onable comprehensive doctrines they affirm. First, the basic structure of society is 
regulated by a political conception of justice; second, this political conception is the 
focus of an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines; and third, 
public discussion, when constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice are at 
stake, is conducted of the political conception of justice.”1034 
Since citizens in modern constitutional democracies are deeply divided by the reason-
able comprehensive doctrines they affirm, it seems impossible for them to reach any 
kind of “thick” agreement. And Nicolas Rescher even asserts that “the burdens that con-
sensus is asked to bear is more than can justifiably be laid upon it”.1035  
Thereby Rescher challenges the validity of Rawls‟ (as well as Habermas‟) fundamental 
assumption that a certain political (value-)consensus is required for the sake of societal 
coexistence. Rescher admits that a basic consensus has usually been considered a con-
dition for social co-operation, communication and progress.
1036
 And he realises that a 
demand for a basic agreement in elementary matters of value might still be considered 
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 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.44. 
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 N. Rescher, Pluralism. Against the Demand for Consensus (1993), p.3. 
1036
 “For much of the history of Western philosophy, consensus  uniformity of belief and evaluation  
has been viewed as a desideratum whose ultimate realization can be taken as assured. Aquinas, in the 
Middle Ages, regarded consensus on fundamentals as a condition assured by God; Kant, in the eighteenth 
century, considered it as something rooted in the very nature of Reason; Hegel , in the nineteenth century, 
saw it as guaranteed by the spirit of cultivation working through the march of history ever enlarging its 
hold on human Society; Habermas in the twentieth century sees it as inherent in the very nature of Com-
munication as an indispensable social practice. Throughout much of the tradition consensus was viewed 
not just as something to be desired, but as something whose eventual actualization is effectively assured 
by some principle deep-rooted in the nature of things as we humans confront them in this world.” N. 
Rescher, Pluralism. Against the Demand for Consensus (1993), p. 1. 
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urgent and necessary by influential “partisans of consensus”. That said, Rescher views 
any attempt to establish an agreement within the evaluative/axiological domain of a 
modern pluralistic society as a utopian project. The normative diversity of modern 
societies is simply too deep and requires from us that we take “a more realistic and 
pragmatic line.”1037  
Rescher therefore uses the less demanding notion of acquiescence for the co-operative 
attitude required in pluralist societies, a notion that in my opinion comes rather close to 
that of tacit consent, since it presupposes at least that some shared premises for peaceful 
coexistence are generally taken for granted. But according to Rescher we should simply;  
“avoid letting our differences become a casus belli between us. … The crucial fact 
about acquiescence is that it is generally rooted not in [active] agreement with others 
but rather in a preparedness to get on without it. What makes good practical and 
theoretical sense is the step of (on occasion) accepting something without agreeing 
with it  of „going along‟ despite disagreement  an acquiescence of diversity 
grounded in a resigned toleration of the discordant views of others.”1038  
Rescher admits that having some shared ideals may be of great importance in so-
ciety.
1039
 But the idealisation of consensus as a premise for social coexistence should 
nonetheless be considered a utopian venture in the true sense of the word.
1040
 The same 
problem arises when trying to convert an “idealised” consensus into a “real” one in 
modern societies. Idealisation entails the overestimation of the individual's moral 
resources, while setting out for a real consensus underestimates the inherent realities of 
pluralism. 
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 N. Rescher, Pluralism. Against the Demand for Consensus (1993), p.3. 
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 N. Rescher, Pluralism. Against the Demand for Consensus (1993), pp.164; 166. 
1039
 “Like „liberty, equality, and fraternity‟, an ideal represents a state of affairs whose pursuit in practice 
is to be regarded as pre-eminently „a good thing‟. By its very nature as such, an ideal is something towards 
whose realization right-thinking people would deem it appropriate to strive.” N. Rescher, Pluralism. 
Against the Demand for Consensus (1993), p. 1. 
1040
 Utopia is here taken in its literal sense about that, for which there is no place (ou=) to/poj) in the real 
world. Let it be underlined that Rescher distinguishes an idealisation from a mere ideal: “An idealization 
… involves the projection of a hypothesis that removes some limit or limitation of the real (a perfectly 
elastic body, for example, or a utopia comprised only of sensible and honest people). An idealization is 
accordingly a thought-instrument  a hypothetical state of things that it may be profitable to think about, 
but towards whose actual realization in practice it may be altogether senseless to work for. And so, while 
idealization can prove helpful in theoretical matters, in practical matters it can often do damage. Ideals, in 
sum, are constructively action-guiding while idealizations need by no means be so. … This distinction be-
tween ideals and idealizations bears directly and informatively on the status and standing of consensus. 
For there is no doubt that consensus is merely an idealization  and neither a sensible goal nor a plausible 
guide for action, seeing that it prescinds from the variety, diversity, and dissonance that inevitably charact-
erizes the beliefs, opinions, goals, and values of any sizable human community.” N. Rescher, Pluralism. 
Against the Demand for Consensus (1993), p. 196. 
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Rawls for his part nevertheless hopes for more than just a mere acquiescence and a more 
or less arbitrary “convergence of interests”.1041 He holds that the moral resources re-
quired for bringing about a consensus even in pluralist societies are at hand. To make 
his own approach plausible he proceeds in several steps: 
Rawls first demonstrates how people, involved in endless strife made efforts to establish 
a workable modus vivendi that all parties could realistically stick to, in order to avoid 
destructive clash of interests. As a central historical example he can refer to the way the 
religious wars  following the Reformation  were brought to an end by the best achiev-
able balance of competing interests and power.
1042
  
But even a modus vivendi involves some tendency to recognise coexistent (liberal) 
values.  Once having achieved a foothold in the political institutions of society “might 
liberal principles of justice gain allegiance to themselves.”1043 Thus Rawls finds it plau-
sible that citizens, when first acquainted with these liberal principles, will also tend to 
accept basic principles of a liberal constitution. A consensus on constitutional essentials 
should therefore be in sight.
1044
 
Rawls assumes, however, that since a constitutional consensus will only cover a very 
limited part of the vital political issues in society, there will also be a need for 
broadening the liberal approach “covering the basic structure as a whole.”1045 And in 
doing so it will be necessary for citizens to more deeply explain and justify to one 
another the basic principles of justice they act from and the reasons they have for taking 
certain positions or making certain decisions in matter of shared interest. This will bring 
persons out of their narrow circles, thereby increasing mutual understanding, making it 
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 Rescher also emphasises that; “It is a highly important and positive aspect of social life that people 
can and do co-operate with one another from the most diverse of motives” but he adds: “agreement need 
not enter into it all. What is needed for co-operation is not consensus but something quite different - a 
convergence of interests.” N.Rescher, Pluralism. Against the Demand for Consensus (1993), p. 180. 
1042
 “Suppose that at a certain time, because of various historical events and contingencies, certain liberal 
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principle of toleration came about as a modus vivendi following the Reformation: first reluctantly, but 
nevertheless as providing the only workable alternative to endless and destructive civil strife.” J. Rawls, 
Political Liberalism (1993), p.159. 
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 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.160f. Let it be added that Rawls also employs arguments 
from moral psychology to support the plausibility of the assumption that liberal principles of justice, when 
first introduced, will gain allegiance to themselves. Cf. Political Liberalism (1993), p.163. 
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 A consensus on constitutional essentials was more thoroughly considered in chapter 4 of my thesis. 
1045
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.167. 
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more likely that some shared standards can be agreed upon. The idea of a genuine over-
lapping consensus should not be considered a utopian project.  
“I have outlined in this and the previous section how an initial acquiescence in a 
liberal conception of justice as a mere modus vivendi could change over time first 
into a constitutional consensus and then into an overlapping consensus. In this pro-
cess I have supposed that the comprehensive doctrines of most people are not fully 
comprehensive, and this allows scope for the development of an independent allegi-
ance to the political conception that helps to bring about a consensus. This independ-
ent allegiance in turn leads people to act with evident intention in accordance with 
constitutional arrangements, since they have reasonable assurance (based on past 
experience) that others will also comply. Gradually, as the success of political co-
operation continues, citizens gain increasing trust and confidence in one another. 
This is all we need to say in reply to the objection that the idea of overlapping con-
sensus is utopian.”1046  
Even if it seems as if Rawls takes an approach very different from Rescher‟s, one can 
hardly avoid seeing that Rawls in some respects also comes rather close to Rescher. He 
avoids as far as possible comprehensiveness, thereby taking the fact of pluralism into 
account. And he is concerned about avoiding “thick” projects of idealised consensus. 
But Rawls strongly focuses on “the willingness to co-operate with others on political 
terms that everyone can publicly accept.”1047 He is concerned about the very terms of 
co-operation, which can voluntarily and deliberately be recognised. The Rawlsian ap-
proach is therefore far more demanding than, for instance, the approach that we find in 
Rescher‟s attempt to reduce such active consensus to mere acquiescence.  
7.1.2. Lazy compromises or binding standards?  
The very idea of founding social co-operation on an overlapping consensus requires a 
co-operative attitude from the different parties. Liberal institutions presuppose and pro-
mote a co-operative and compromising spirit. 
“The basic institutions enjoined by such a conception [of liberalism], and its con-
ception of free public reason  when effectively working over time  encourage the 
cooperative virtues of political life: the virtue of reasonableness and a sense of fair-
ness, a spirit of compromise and a readiness to meet others halfway, all of which are 
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 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (paperback edition 1996), p.168. It may also be interesting to see that 
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 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.163. 
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connected with the willingness if not the desire to cooperate with others on political 
terms that everyone can publicly accept consistent with mutual respect.”1048 
Like Honecker, Rawls has no place for absolutism in politics and seeks reasonableness 
rather than ultimate truth. Treating political inquiry as a search for reasonableness, al-
lows one to pursue the relatively best and find the most workable political solutions. A 
readiness for dialogue and for reasonable solutions and a willingness to meet others 
halfway in matters of politics in order to make society work as a co-operative and fair 
venture, may also be justified from the standpoint of theological social ethics as con-
ceived of by Martin Honecker. In applied political ethics  at least  he takes a prag-
matic approach.
1049
 While he warns against “lazy compromises”1050, Honecker considers 
a readiness to meet others halfway within the domain of politics an unavoidable neces-
sity both from a political and from a theological point of view.
1051
  
 In a political perspective, it might be morally legitimate to aim for the most reason-
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 J.Rawls, “The idea of an overlapping consensus”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (1987; vol.7; no 
1), p.21. 
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 This aspect of Honecker‟s pragmatic approach is more thoroughly discussed in chapter 5. 
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 One should avoid “die faulen Kompromiße”, Cf. Einführung in die Theologische Ethik (1990). 
p.236. 
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 It seems as if Martin Honecker is trying to find his own way between well-known positions. Helmuth 
Thielicke, one of the theologians with a reputation within the field of theological ethics, has developed “a 
theology of compromise” in Theologische Ethik II/1, 1965 (third edition), p.56-201. In “conflict-situa-
tions” compromises are unavoidable. Simultaneously the compromise is characterized by Thielicke as a 
sign of the fallen world. In this world man has to live without any possibility of avoiding non-ideal 
solutions and escaping personal guilt. The necessity of compromising is in a way ontologically given. 
Even God has accommodated his will to the given structure of a fallen world, by admitting for “a 
noachitic order”, what means that God himself takes into account that sin, egoism and conflict have to be 
taken account of in all institutional arrangements of this world. Cf. Matt.19,3ff., which demonstrates an 
appropriate accommodation of the will of God to the structure and reality of the fallen world. But the 
problem with the approach taken by Thielicke, is that it will be almost impossible to qualify any merely 
political standards as absolutely binding. Any merely political decision seems in the end to be just a more 
or less reluctant tribute or accommodation to the existing empirical circumstances, human weakness and 
the condition of a world, fallen from God. Wolfgang Trillhaas, also a German professor of ethics, has 
chosen a quite different approach to the ethical question of compromising. First of all the problem is theo-
logically differently located within his conception, as an issue belonging to the ethics of democracy. “Da-
her handelt er den Kompromiß unter der Überschrift „Ethik der Demokratie‟ ab. Das Ethos der Demo-
kratie folgt dem Grundsatz: „Wir wollen und müssen miteinander und füreinander leben.‟ Kompromiß 
bedeutet hier im Wortsinn: Übereinkunft, Ausgleich, Vergleich.”, (Quoted from M.Honecker, Einführung 
in die Theologische Ethik. p.239.) This is after all a more limited approach. Meeting others halfway and 
compromising in matters of politics is seen in the perspective of consensus-building, what might even 
render a renunciation on particular interests in order to achieve a greater common good for all citizens 
highly reasonable. “Kompromiß ist eine freie Vereinbarung unter gegenseitigem Verzicht auf bestimmte 
Interessen, um dadurch ein höheres gemeinsames Gut zu sichern.” Evangelische Staatslexikon, (1966 first 
edition, column1414). And one of the greatest common goods is, according to Trillhaas, (internal) peace. 
And democracy should be recognised as a peace-maintaining method. Therefore democratic societies 
should provide the best institutional conditions required for all groups to participate fairly in political 
discourse and activity. 
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able political arrangements and the relative best within a limited range of possibili-
ties.  
 Then there is the deeper theological perspective. Existing disintegration, conflicting 
perspectives and different interests,  all these things have to be taken as an indi-
cation of a world deeply in conflict with the original will and plan of the Creator. 
And compromising can in itself be seen as a necessary adjustment to the prevailing 
conditions of this world,  and bears witness of the existence of the Christian as 
“simul peccator et iustus”.1052 
Martin Honecker, as a theologian, is willing to go to a considerable length in meeting 
others halfway in order to secure a shared platform for social co-operation. In matters of 
social ethics and politics Honecker therefore will avoid, as already asserted, a kind of 
approach, which might best be characterised as “instruktionstheoretisch”, what means 
that divine revelation is introduced as an exclusive and indisputable source for settling 
political aims and ordering social institutions. According to Honecker one cannot make 
“revelation” an exclusive constructivist principle for establishing shared moral standards 
and a common institutional framework. Neither politics nor social ethics should be made 
a matter of privileged (religious) insight.
1053
 One cannot solve the decisive normative 
problems in modern pluralist societies by taking the approach exclusively from a speci-
fic religious or theological version of political ethics. (Or as Rawls would say it: from a 
particular comprehensive moral doctrine). What citizens really have in common are pro-
blems, uncertainty and immense challenges according to Honecker. Therefore he under-
lines that: 
“Keine Ethik verfügt nämlich über einen Vorrat an abrufbaren Einsichten für alle 
Lebenslagen. Sie teilt vielmehr die Ratlosigkeit und Verlegenheit der von neuen 
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Herausfordrungen, neuen Situationen und neuen Aufgabenstellungen Betroffenen. 
Sie kann allenfalls versuchen zu klären wie man mit derartigen Verlegenheiten und 
Ratlosigkeiten umgehen kann. Versteht man die Aufgabe der Ethik als die eines 
Dialogpartners im Orientierungsprozess der Gesellschft, so besteht allerding in der 
Tat ein echter Bedarf an Ethik.”1054 
But sharing the “Ratlosigkeit und Verlegenheit” of societies characterised by complexity 
and diversity still does not provide us with any standards for coexistence and fair co-
operation, even if a co-operative attitude and a search for shared solutions and proper 
compromises should in many respects be taken as a decisive step in that direction. 
Upon examination, we find that Rawls for his part seldom draws heavily upon the idea 
of compromise as such, even if the willingness to meet others halfway and a co-opera-
tive attitude is clearly taken by him as a prerequisite for social coexistence. But the cate-
gory of compromise seems largely to be ignored,  maybe because it should lead us to 
think of the required agreement as a modus vivendi. Standards of fairness, incorporated 
in the very basic structure of society are, according to Rawls, to be settled by the parties, 
voluntarily binding themselves. As thoroughly discussed in chapter 4, Rawls used the 
“device” of a hypothetically constructed original position, which does not provide for 
any kind of compromising or bargaining, to make an initial agreement on acceptable 
principles of justice possible and plausible. The required moral premises and constraints 
were actually built into the very structure of a fairly constructed original position, there-
by securing an essentially moral outcome. This is the way Rawls tries to solve the norm-
ativity problem and avoid a mere modus vivendi,  by making the parties bind them-
selves and thereby one another through an active agreement
1055
 brought about under fair 
conditions which are hypotethical,  but with a real and reasonable argumentative force 
in public reasoning. The basic standards defining the fair institutional scheme of co-
existence are settled by Rawls in a way which does not render them a subject of perma-
nent and ongoing bargaining and compromising. 
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 For a more thorough discussion of the different aspects of a basic agreement I refer to chapter 4. Let 
me also refer to footnote 301, where I cited from a book, recently written by Gerald F.Gaus, where he 
stresses that “the facts of disagreement and agreement alike are intelligible only against a background of 
massive agreement.” Gerald F. Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism (1996), p.49.  
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7.1.3. The very idea of endorsing an overlapping consensus is 
demanding 
Standards of fair co-operation are not just to be imposed on citizens by some external 
authority supposed to have an absolute power, but are to be endorsed by the co-operat-
ing parties themselves. I have already underlined that to endorse a proposition is to 
accept it actively, deliberately and voluntarily. Rawls has obviously chosen a strong 
term for contributing to a basic agreement  much stronger than the comparatively 
passive acquiescence proposed by Rescher. An endorsement could, for instance, mean 
to acknowledge some kind of document by deliberately placing one‟s signature on it. 
The Lutheran World Federation‟s (LWF‟s) stance towards the Declaration(s) of Human 
Rights might be considered a paradigmatic example of a Rawlsian endorsement. When 
addressing matters of human rights, LWF sets out by explicitly recognising the efforts 
“stemming not only from the churches but also from governments and non-govern-
mental organisations within the framework of the UN, from voluntary action groups and 
other bodies.”1056 Thereby LWF supports efforts already made by “foreign” instances 
and underwrites (not literally) documents already conceived of by others. 
Endorsement can never be carried out in a vacuum, there is a history leading up to it, as 
in the case with the Lutheran World Federation and the foregoing efforts of the United 
Nations in elaborating declarations of human rights. One accepts that propositions and 
conceptions that may not (directly) be “stemming” from theological sources or churches, 
might nevertheless be recognised by the churches as expressing essential concerns, very 
much in accordance with genuinely theological (moral) concerns. One is faced with 
something which is historically and politically mediated. By recognising a proposition, 
however, one takes an active interest in it. There are ideas, principles, conceptions, 
shared cultural achievements and vital decisions already made, which Christians (and 
churches) might find it well worth supporting on theological premises (as for instance 
the idea of toleration).  
Endorsing an overlapping consensus in a Rawlsian sense would imply that citizens 
intentionally, deliberately and voluntarily join into an agreement about premises for a 
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 Theological perspectives on human rights. Report on an LWF consultation on human rights, Geneva, 
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 405 




7.1.4. What is to be endorsed? 
A crucial question now, however, is what should be endorsed. In  accordance with what 
I have written earlier,  let me consider two possibilities: 
I. A conception of justice, or at least certain principles of justice established in the most 
fair way, are taken by Rawls as a focal point for an overlapping consensus and thereby 
also as a shared referential basis for citizens‟ public reasoning. Therefore it seems most 
plausible to say that a conception of justice is what should be endorsed. Of course one 
might discuss how specific an endorsable conception of justice should be. Rawls 
himself holds that one might aim for shared principles of justice on three different 
“levels”:  
a) On a first level one might say that pursuing justice is a matter of establishing consti-
tutional essentials which people of a society can accept as fair. Recall that constitutional 
rules should; 
 regulate the governmental structure and the powers of the legislature, executive and 
judiciary, as well as provide procedures for political election, practising of the ma-
jority-principle and for handling issues democratically, and guidelines for assessing 
evidence and for conducting public inquiry etc. There is a clear emphasis on the pro-
cedural aspects.  
 single out the basic rights and liberties in a society which should be permanently 
guaranteed and be removed from the agenda, so to speak, of daily political struggle. 
Thus, the constitutional essentials define and settle the guidelines and rules which are 
most essential for fair coexistence in a society. A fair constitution, incorporating these 
essentials, is characterised by Rawls “as a pact to maintain civil peace.”1058 
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 When employing the idea of the original position as a hypothetical device for settling these terms, 
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 I refer once more to: J. Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, The University of Chicago 
Law Review (1997;3), p.781. 
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In terms of the basic rights and liberties which should be permanently guaranteed in so-
ciety, one will find that they are provided for in the first principle of justice set forth by 
Rawls: 
“Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and 
liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in this 
scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed 
their fair value.” 1059 
It would, however, be possible also to consider the merely procedural aspects of a con-
stitutional scheme  to a certain extent  from the perspective of Rawls‟ second prin-
ciple of justice, which is divided into the so called difference-principle and the fair-
opportunity-principle: 
“Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be 
attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged 
members of society.”1060  
As far as I can see, the way society regulates the governmental structure and the powers 
of the legislature, the executive and the judiciary etc. will determine whether social and 
political positions are equally open to all and may have a decisive impact on its citizens' 
chances of satisfying elementary social needs. 
b) But it might easily be seen that Rawls‟ second principle transcends what can be 
covered by mere constitutional essentials even when concerned with the most funda-
mental liberties and rights, and therefore paves the way for more complex questions of 
justice. These more complex issues, concerned with “the principles covering the social 
and economic inequalities”1061 in society, should be considered matters of basic justice, 
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and are also to be provided for by the very basic structure of society.
1062
 
For a society to be well-ordered and sufficiently just there must necessarily be principles 
both guaranteeing the fundamental liberties and rights, and there must be principles 
providing effectively for a fair regulation of more complex social and economic affairs 
(concerning the difficult issues of social equality and inequality). Most matters of social 
and economic justice (beyond an elementary level of securing elementary needs) are 
very complex, which makes it unlikely that agreement will as easily be attained  as 
Rawls hopes. 
“Whether the constitutional essentials covering the basic freedoms are satisfied is 
more or less visible on the face of constitutional arrangements and how these can be 
seen to work in practice. But whether the aims of the principles covering social and 
economic inequalities are realized is far more difficult to ascertain. These matters 
are nearly always open to wide differences of reasonable opinion; they rest on 
complicated inferences and intuitive judgments that require us to assess complex 
social and economic information about topics poorly understood. Thus although 
questions of both kinds are to be discussed in terms of political values, we can 
expect more agreement about whether the principles for the basic rights and liberties 
are realized than about whether the principles for social and economic justice are 
realized. This is not a difference about what are the correct principles but simply a 
difference in the difficulty of seeing whether the principles are achieved.”1063 
In spite of these difficulties, Rawls obviously sees an urgent need for an institutional 
scheme, fairly regulating also rather complex matters of basic justice, concerned with 
social and economic inequality. A conception of justice, concerned with a fair scheme of 
society which is strictly egalitarian in the way Rawls‟ conception is, cannot avoid ad-
dressing these complex socio-economic issues. 
c) There is also a third “level”, consisting of all the other issues that might involve 
questions of justice. Such questions arise for instance, when people are concerned with 
educational problems, matters of ecology, even traffic control, etc., the discussion of 
which exceeds the scope of this dissertation. 
                                                          
1062
 Some of these principles should nevertheless be reckoned as constitutional essentials (of the second 
kind): “But while some principle of opportunity is surely such an essential, for example, a principle re-
quiring at least freedom of movement and free choice of occupation, fair equality of opportunity (as I have 
specified it) goes beyond that and is not such an essential. Similarly, though a social minimum providing 
for the basic needs of all citizens is also an essential, what I have called the „difference principle‟ is more 
demanding and is not.” J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.228f. 
1063
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.229f. 
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It should be underlined that Rawls is directly concerned with the two first “levels”. 
Simultaneously, Rawls appears to realise that his conception of justice as fairness can 
hardly be taken by all as the appropriate basis for coexistence, social co-operation and 
public reasoning in modern pluralist societies. Rawls encounters serious difficulties at 
the moment he attempts to step from seeking an agreement on a mere constitutional 
framework to seeking a morally grounded consensus that has a wider aim and is more 
substantial and in some way also deeper.  
If the basic structure of society is to be regulated by a conception of justice as fairness 
which covers more complex issues of social justice than merely constitutional principles 
can deal with, and also draws on some deeper moral ideas, then the very “overlap” 
might in the end be deeper and broader than one should first suppose, and accordingly 
also more problematic to bring about and maintain. When seeking a consensus also 
beyond the level of mere constitutional essentials, Rawls is faced with rather complex 
issues of justice. He is without doubt aware of these problems.  
As made clear in chapter 4, Rawls tries to meet the problem by seeking for a “possibility 
that is more realistic and more likely to be realized” 1064 than that of an agreement on 
strictly defined premises of justice, elaborated by a specific procedure. Instead, Rawls 
admits that the focus of an overlapping consensus need not be absolutely sharp. There is 
a whole family of interrelated conceptions of justice that might play a vital role in rend-
ering modern democratic societies well-ordered and fair. I therefore feel justified in 
saying that what is to be endorsed, is not exactly the conception of justice as elaborated 
by Rawls in A Theory of Justice (1971), although one should have in mind that the con-
ception of justice as fairness is still to be considered the standard example of a liberal 
conception of justice. It is supposed to have some paradigmatic role,  in spite of the 
latitude that Rawls now allows. 
II. In his book about Rawls, Thomas W. Pogge points to some vital problems, widely 
recognised by Rawls himself, which arise when taking one particular conception of 
justice as the agreed basis of the institutional scheme of society. I will now quote rather 
extensively from Pogges' discussion on the question of whether a society might ex-
pectedly be fairly well ordered by Rawls' conception of justice as fairness. There can be 
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J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p. 164. 
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little doubt that Pogge has thereby arrived at a critical point in determining how a 
Rawlsian idea of an overlapping consensus could eventually be supported. 
“Das größte Problem für Rawls‟ wohlgeordnete gesellschaft stellt sich mit der Frage, 
ob wir realistischerweise auf eine Gesellschaft hoffen dürfen, in der nur eine einzige 
Gerechtigkeitskonzeption vertreten wird. Warum sollte der von Rawls beschworene 
Wertepluralismus in freiheitlichen Gesellschaften ausgerechnet vor den für die Ge-
staltung der Grundordnung wesentlichen politischen Werten halt machen? … Es 
wird immer Lehren geben, die wenigstens einige von seiner Konzeption postulierten 
Grundrechte und Grundfreiheiten nicht anerkennen und, wo möglich, abschaffen 
wollen würden (PL 65). Außerdem: „Es ist unvermeidlich und oft wünschenswert, 
daß Bürger hinsichtlich der angemessensten politischen Konzeptionen unterschied-
licher Meinung sind; denn die öffentliche politische Kultur wird verschiedene funda-
mentale Ideen enthalten, die sich auf verschiedene Weisen entwickeln lassen. Durch 
einen ordentlichen Wettbewerb zwischen diesen Konzeptionen läßt sich mit der Zeit 
zuverlässig herausfinden, welche von ihnen, wenn überhaupt eine, die vernünftigste 
ist.‟ (PL 227) Diese Äußerung scheint zu implizieren, daß eine (selbst durch Rawls‟ 
Konzeption) wohlgeordnete Gesellschaft unmöglich und vielleicht gar nicht einmal 
wünschenswert ist.  
Im selben Zusammenhang skizziert er eine ideale Gesellschaft anderer Art, die er für 
realistischer hält. Das ist eine Gesellschaft, deren Mitglieder ein gemeinsames Ideal 
öffentlichen Vernunftgebrauches achten, das jedoch nicht an eine bestimmte ge-
meinsame Gerechtigkeitskonzeption gebunden ist. Dieses Ideal sieht vor, daß jeder 
Bürger nach bestem Wissen und Gewissen für eine bestimmte politische Gerechtig-
keitskonzeption entscheiden  die er natürlich auch nach bestem Wissen und Ge-
wissen revidieren kann  und sich dann in seinem politischen Verhalten zu Grund-
ordnungsfragen ausschließlich von dieser Konzeption leiten läßt (PL 226f., 241). 
Die Bürger orientieren sich zwar an verschiedenen Gerechtigkeitskonzeptionen, 
haben aber dennoch gute Aussichten, ihre die Grundordnung betreffenden Mein-
ungsverschiedenheiten durch zivilisiertes Argumentieren beizulegen. Allerdings 
geht es in ihren Diskussionen nicht mehr nur darum, wie eine bestimmte Gerecht-
igkeitskonzeption ein vorliegendes Entscheidungsproblem lösen würde, sondern 
auch darum, welche politische Gerechtigkeitskonzeption die plausibelste ist.”1065 
As made clear in my thorough discussion at the end of chapter 5, Rawls elaborates  
criteria for public reasoning. Let me recall the five aspects of the idea of public reason: 
 It is concerned with fundamental political issues. 
 It applies primarily to persons as officials and as candidates for public office. 
 Its content is given by a family of reasonable political conceptions of justice. 
 These conceptions are concerned with the settling of binding norms (and legitimate 
law) for democratic societies. 
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 T.W.Pogge, John Rawls (1994), pp.151-153. 
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 Principles set forward by citizens in the forum of public reason are to satisfy the 
reciprocity-criterion. 
Rawls‟ conception of public reason also incorporates a moral ideal, materialised in the 
duty of civility, as thoroughly discussed in chapter 6. When discussing the idea of public 
reason and the civic duty following from this idea, I have especially concentrated on the 
Rawlsian proviso and on the moral conflicts that might arise when Christians as citizens 
are challenged to comply with a duty of civility. I shall not now discuss these issues any 
further. What I want to stress, however, is that the Rawlsian idea of public reason, in-
cluding the ideal of a duty of civility, provides us with at least some essential ideas and 
ideals, which might in themselves be widely recognised as a shared basis for co-opera-
tive ventures and discourse in pluralist societies. 
What is to be endorsed then, is not really a fixed and specific liberal-political conception 
of justice, but rather some essential ideals of a coexistent society as implied by the very 
idea of public reasoning  with its accompanying ideal of a duty of civility  underpin-
ned by a family of reasonable (and liberal) conceptions of justice. It is in itself an im-
portant insight that there might be a family of such conceptions, which can provide us 
with guidelines required for handling shared political issues of vital significance for fair 
coexistence. This means that the third aspect of public reason focusing on its content or 
orientation  referred to in the third bullet-point above  is not any longer bound to one 
particular conception of justice. There is a family of conceptions that might serve as a 
proper orientation for our public reasoning with one another. Within this family, how-
ever, I think that Rawls‟ conception of justice as fairness might be considered one of the 
most impressing and most approvable conceptions of justice to go with the scheme of 
modern pluralist democratic societies. It is, however, important now to see that citizens 
 to a wider extent than was the case in Rawls‟ earlier writings  are expected to bring 
concerns stemming from their own conceptions of justice into the public forum, pro-
vided that these can be given a clearly political orientation and satisfy the Rawlsian 
proviso.  
The (reasonable) comprehensive doctrines, with their ideas of justice, may be assumed 
to have some internal guidelines for how to transform their ideas of justice to the level 
of common politics and shared efforts. Rawls himself emphasises that the difficult pro-
blem of how this “transformation” is to be done, and which restrictions and accommo-
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dations should be accepted, in the first place has to be resolved from within a citizens‟ 
own conception of justice.
1066
 
7.1.5. Who are the endorsing parties? 
Even if there might be some latitude concerning the political values and principles of 
justice to be endorsed, it seems quite clear that a Rawlsian “overlap” has to be strictly 
political. This immediately raises the question of who is expected to endorse a strictly 
political “overlap” from the Christian side? The church institution? Individual Christ-
ians? Or maybe should churches and Christians entirely abstain from this kind of 
support? 
The idea of establishing and maintaining a shared institutional framework through an 
overlapping consensus, thereby settling the conditions necessary for fair coexistence, 
public reasoning and the practice of civic duty seems to imply that individuals as well as 
groups and associations, Christians as well as Churches, have to be taken as the en-
dorsing and participating parties. From Rawls‟ perspective this seems obvious. The 
endorsing parties are not just supposed to be citizens taken strictly as individuals. All 
parties involved in social co-operation within society,  either individuals or associ-
ations, are addressed as endorsing parties. But there may obviously be different ways 
that the different parties could appropriately give their support. Thus two closely con-
nected questions are to be raised:  
 Who is entitled to endorse (or reject) an overlapping consensus about political values 
if this implies a recognition from within the Christian doctrine? 
 In what form should an endorsement eventually be given?  
Let me turn first to the question of the form in which support should be expressed.  
Churches often address an audience by preaching. This “kerygmatic” approach tran-
scends the domain of mere rational discourse, public reasoning and political delibe-
ration. When churches interfere with politics from the perspective of theological social 
ethics, they should therefore normally avoid using a “kerygmatic” form, due to the very 
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 This is clearly seen by Pogge, when he discusses the duty of civility in his book about Rawls. “Aller-
dings ist der Inhalt dieser Pflicht [the duty of civility] jetzt relativiert: Sie fordert nicht, daß jeder Bürger 
in seinem politischen Verhalten in der Öffentlichkeit, wo es um Grundordnungsfragen geht, seine persön-
lichen Werte und Interessen zugunsten dieser (etwa der Rawlsschen) Gerechtigkeitskonzeption, sondern 
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nature of politics, social ethics and the kerygma itself. And they have to take into 
account that in matters like this there is obviously widespread pluralism within the 
church itself, making unanimous, representative or categorical utterances nearly 
impossible.  
In this connection it might be useful to refer to the so called “Denkschriften”, elaborated 
in the German church. They are often worked out in broadly representative committees, 
and thereby the categorical form is usually to be systematically avoided. The most the 
authors hope for, I think, is that the church (by the means of such “Denkschriften”) can 
focus on problems, raise questions and maybe suggest or propose some solutions in a 
rather tentative form. And even when presented in this tentative form, political utter-
ances may lack clear and wholehearted backing from within the churches them-
selves.
1067
 If the church as such were really challenged to endorse a conception of 
political liberalism or a theory of justice as conceived of by Rawls, a tentative and 
hesitating endorsement might, one expects, be the most one could hope for. 
The question who is entitled to recognise or endorse political statements or doctrines of 
social ethics on behalf of the church raises difficult problems.
1068
 In a Lutheran church 
                                                                                                                                                                          
daß er sie zugunsten seiner Gerechtigkeitskonzeption beiseitesetzen soll.” Thomas W. Pogge, John Rawls, 
Beck'sche Reihe; 525; Denker, München 1994, p.153. 
1067
 Honecker even says:  “Die theologische Grundlage der Denkschriften ist bis heute unklar und strittig. 
Das teilen freilich Denkschriften mit der gegenwärtigen evangelischen Ethik weithin. Das sei im folg-
enden belegt und erläutert an der Selbstdeutung der Denkschriften, an der Denkschriften-Denkschrift: 
„Aufgaben und Grenzen kirchlicher Äußerungen zu gesellschaftlichen Fragen‟ (1970).” M. Honecker, 
“Sind Denkschriften „kirchlicher Lehre?”, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche (1984), p.247. And he 
continues: “Die Argumente sind wechselnd und inkonsistent. Es finden sich unterschiedliche Lieblings-
ideen, Leitvorstellungen und Belege aus bisherigen kirchlichen Erklärungen; in dieser Hinsicht ist diese 
Denkschrift ein Musterbeispiel für einen Gremientext, in den unterschiedliche Meinungen eingehen und 
aus dem man dann je nach Bedarf recht Unterschiedliches, ja Gegensätzliches herauslesen und zitieren 
kann. Das ist eine Crux vieler Denkschriften, daß Argumente und Wertungen nicht durchweg zueinander 
passen, ja sich sogar widersprechen können. Die Denkschrift summiert verschiedene theologische An-
sätze.” Ibid., p.249 
1068
 It would be beyond my scope to pursue in full extent the various aspects of this difficult problem 
here. Some of these issues are, however, discussed in: I. Asheim, Embetsplikt og lojalitet. Betenkning 
avgitt til Bispemøtet våren 1980 og Bispemøtets vedtak, Land og Kirke, Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, Oslo 
1980. Here Asheim raises the question: “Hvem bestemmer i kirken?” (p.44). And he makes it clear that; 
“Reformasjonen var uhyre vár overfor enhver tendens til å gi geistligheten og andre kirkelige instanser 
status som ville innebære umyndiggjørelse av menigheter og lekfolk.” Ibid., p.46. But it is also worth 
noticing that Asheim adds: “To forhold er det imidlertid viktig å være oppmerksom på i denne forbind-
else. For det første at Luthers lære om de troendes allmenne prestedømme ikke er individualistisk å forstå. 
Poenget er ikke individets selvstendighet overfor kirken, dets uavhengighet overfor alle formidlende in-
stanser, dets rett til selv å etablere seg som religiøst subjekt og på egne vegne eller sammen med likesin-
nede ivareta tradisjonelt kirkelige funksjoner på den måte og i den ustrekning som man måtte føle seg kalt 
til. Poenget er heller ikke en „demokratisk ordning‟ av forholdet prest  menighet i den forstand at grunn-
laget for prestetjenesten skulle være summen av de fullmakter som selvstendige personer skulle være 
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no member can claim to make binding proclamations in matters of politics, as Honecker 
makes clear with his decisive rejection of the view that “ein authentischer Interpret für 
Glaubens- und Lebensfragen vorgegeben ist.”1069 Accordingly, Lutheran churches have 
been very reserved about expressing direct support or recognition of specific political 
projects, philosophical conceptions and human enterprises. One might plausibly con-
clude that the church as such should be more cautious than individual Christian citizens 
in matters of political affairs, since there is no instance entitled to make statements on 
behalf of the church in strictly political matters, thereby threatening the freedom of the 
church members (and indeed undermining the very nature of the political). Honecker 
very appropriately criticises tendencies to church-authorisation of political programs, 
institutions, conceptions and principles. 
In correspondence with this view it should be added that even if bishops can usually be 
considered representative of the church, Lutheran churches have always had good 
reasons for underlining that they; 
“soll auch nicht in ein frembd Amt fallen; soll nicht Konige setzen und entsetzen, 
soll weltlich Gesetz und Gehorsam der Oberkeit nicht aufheben oder zurrutten, soll 
weltlicher Gewalt nicht Gesetze machen und stellen von weltlichen händeln, wie 
dann auch Christus selbs gesagt hat: „Mein Reich ist nicht von dieser Welt”; item: 
„Wer hat mich zu einem Richter zwischen euch gesetzt?‟”1070 
                                                                                                                                                                          
villig til å overdra til presten som sin talmann og representant. Når moderne politisk tenkesett og individ-
ualisme på denne måten blir inntolket i læren om det allmenne prestedømme, lander man langt på siden av 
reformatorenes og våre bekjennelsesskrifters kirkesyn. Uten tvil var menighetslemmenes myndiggjørelse 
en hovedsak for Luther. Derfor hans gjentatte understrekning av at „vi har alle samme rett‟. Men det er 
karakteristisk for reformatoren at han da samtidig fremholder at den rett det her er tale om, er en rett 
innenfor rammen av et fellesskap som ingen må bryte ut av.” Ibid., p.46f..  
1069
 “„Wer redet?‟ Es gibt bekanntlich kein Lehramt der evangelischen Kirche in Glaubensfragen, erst 
nicht ein Lehramt für ethische und politische Entscheidungen. Dies ist im römisch-katholischen Verständ-
nis prinzipiell anders, weil im Papstamt ein authentischer Intepret für Glaubens- und Lebensfragen vor-
gegeben ist. Nun darf man freilich nicht unterstellen, päpstliche Enzykliken seien unfehlbar. Ihre inhalt-
lichen Aussagen machen, wie sich an den Sozialenzykliken zeigen läßt, zudem im Lauf der Zeit nicht 
unerhebliche Wandlungen durch. Überdies ist die Grundlage der päpstlichen Soziallehre eine Sozial-
philosophie, für welche das Naturrecht steht. …Dennoch hat der Papst als Zeichen und Garant der Einheit 
der Kirche, hat das Papstamt als Institution iuris divini für die katholische Kirche eine andere geistliche 
Autorität als kirchenleitende Persönlichkeiten, Gremien, Organe  wie Synoden, Kirchenleitungen und 
Kammern  im evangelischen Verständnis. Die Lehrautorität evangelischer kirchenleitender Organe kann 
keine andere sein als die einer Sachautorität, die aus sich heraus überzeugt. … Nach evangelischem 
Selbstverständnis kann die Frage: Wer redet geistlich legitim? gar nicht losgelöst werden von der Frage, 
was die Kirche als Kirche theologisch verantwortbar sagen kann, erörtert werden. Diese Was-Frage wird 
in der Denkschrift aber Nahezu im Nebel und im Unklaren gelassen.” M. Honecker, “Sind Denkschriften 
„kirchlicher Lehre?”, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche (1984), p.248f. 
1070
 Confessio Augustana XXVIII,13. Die Bekenntnisschriften der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche 
(1967, 6.durchgesehene Auflage), p. 122f. 
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It might nevertheless be asked, shouldn‟t the Christian churches as churches support at 
least the most elementary Rawlsian principles of justice required for settling and main-
taining a fair institutional framework of coexistence? From a Rawlsian perspective 
churches are without doubt important associations within democratic societies,  some-
times going along with and sometimes competing with other associations.
1071
 And the 
vote of churches in matters of social ethics, human rights and political liberties is of 
considerable weight. And so one might expect that churches would endorse at least the 
most essential concerns of political liberalism,  as for instance the concerns covered by 
Rawls‟ first-principle  at least in the same way as Lutheran churches could also recog-
nise elementary declarations of human rights. There are certain liberties, rights and 
standards that may plausibly be taken to be very much in accordance with a Christian 
moral doctrine, even if these standards are not to be derived exclusively from that 
doctrine. Let it be inserted, however, that the most efficient way of recognising the 
Rawlsian “first-principle-concerns” is that one stands up for them when violated,  as 
churches have in fact not seldom done. This should at least be considered a way of 
practically endorsing the essential liberties and rights, exposed by Rawls.  
Even if Lutheran churches, in accordance with the doctrine of the two kingdoms, may 
appropriately emphasise that they “soll auch nicht in ein frembd Amt fallen”1072, it 
seems plausible to say that they should nevertheless be expected to support the “first 
principle-concerns” as concerns which are not “frembd”, but very much in accordance 
with central ground-assumption about man, freedom of faith and liberty of conscience as 
implied in the Christian (moral) doctrine itself. And the kind of (political) values and 
rights that Rawls aims at securing in the first principle, are to a wide extent the kind of 
elementary liberties and rights which churches themselves have sometimes felt inclined 
not just to make a concern of social ethics, but even to make a “casus confessionis”. 
And it might be rather easy to tell when elementary freedoms and rights of this kind are 
violated, which mean that these essentials could be unanimously defended for moral 
reasons. That may at least realistically be expected and hoped for.
1073
 Churches have 
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 Associations as such have liberties and rights (for instance a right of free speech), and citizens are 
supposed to be free to join them or leave them. That is part of an elementary fairness and justice, as 
guaranteed by the very liberal institutional scheme of society. 
1072
 Confessio Augustana XXVIII,13. Die Bekenntnisschriften der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche 
(1967, 6.durchgesehene Auflage), p. 122f. 
1073
 Cf. J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.230. Even if I shall not go in details in this concluding 
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good moral reasons for contributing to safeguarding the most elementary “principles of 
justice, specifying the equal basic rights and liberties.”1074 
However, the difficult problems in endorsing political principles, standards and values 
arise for the church when trying to take (the required) further steps: How can churches 
support, endorse or recognise principles for social politics, economic distribution and 
political arrangements, which in the end also depend on very complex deliberations?
1075
 
On the other hand, a church setting the questions of social ethics and justice on the 
agenda cannot ignore questions of basic justice when they turn complex. There can 
therefore be little doubt that churches are brought into dilemmas when faced with the 
kind of issues which are taken into account in Rawls‟ second principle of justice. It can 
therefore plausibly be argued by Honecker that a church, when interfering with complex 
socio-economic issues, runs the risk of legitimating certain political standpoints without 
a clear mandate from within the (moral) doctrine it takes as its own raison d‟être. It can 
therefore be taken as programmatic and typical of Honecker when he at the very outset 
of his Einführung in die theologische Ethik stresses that:  
“Zurückhaltend bin ich freilich gegenüber allen emphatischen Postulaten einer 
(absoluten) theologischen Begründung. Denn alle derartigen Begründungsansprüche 
                                                                                                                                                                          
chapter, it might nevertheless be appropriate to recall how T.W.Pogge comprises the Rawlsian “Grund-
rechtepacket”: “Rawls will nur die wichtigsten Rechte und Freiheiten aufnehmen, damit der  noch zu 
diskutierende  Vorrang des ersten Grundsats über den zweiten einerseits nicht verwässert wird und 
andererseits, auch im Urzustand, plausibel ist. Er argumentiert für die Wichtigkeit eines jeden Grund-
rechts im Rekurs auf die Wichtigkeit eines Gegenstandes vom Standpunkt der drei höherrangigen Inter-
essen. Jeder Mensch, der irgendwelche Interessen hat, braucht körperliche Unversehrtheit, Freizügigkeit, 
Rechtssicherkeit und persönliche Eigentumsrechte. Wer das erste Interesse hat muß insbesondere am 
politischen Leben seiner Gesellschaft teilnehmen und seine Meinung frei äußern können. Wer das zweite 
Interesse hat, muß vor allem seine Werte und Ziele  und deshalb auch Freunde, Laufbahn, Religion und 
Lebensstil  frei wählen und auch umwählen können, was auch Gewissensfreiheit, freien Zugang zur 
Kunst und Literatur seiner Gesellschaft sowie auch die Freiheit voraussetzt, mit anderen in gegenseitigem 
Einvernehmen nach Belieben zu interagieren. Und für jemanden, der eine bestimmte, aber unbekannte 
Zielsetzung erfolgreich verfolgen will, sind ebenfalls besonders Gewissensfreiheit und Schutz zu ver-
schiedener Weltanschauungen und Lebensweisen von Bedeutung. Zu diesen Argumenten, die die Wichtig-
keit eines Grundrechts für seinen Besitzer betonen, kommen noch weitere Argumente, die zeigen, wie es 
fur jeden, widerum vom Standpunkt seiner drei höherrangigen Interessen, ein großer Vorteil ist, in einer 
Gesellschaft zu leben, in der diese Grundrechte allen zustehen and als moralische Selbstverständlichkeit 
empfunden werden.” T.W. Pogge, John Rawls (1994), p.112f. 
1074
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.228. 
1075
 It seems as if different aspects, concerns and reasons have to be reasonably balanced when interfering 
with matters of distributive justice in social and economic affairs. By using the term “Konvergenzargu-
mentation”, a term that may seem rather loose, Honecker on his side seems at least to recognise the com-
plexity of such issues, simultaneously making it quite clear that the Christian revelation alone cannot pro-
vide us with the premises we need for handling them properly and in the most fair way. For the term 
“Konvergenzargumentation”, cf. “Das Problem des theologischen Konstruktivismus”, Zeitschrift für 
evangelische Ethik (1980), p.100. 
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können leicht zum Zweck ideologischer Sanktion und Legitimation mißbraucht 
werden.”1076 
Thus, there are solid historical grounds (churches have without doubt falsely “author-
ised” certain political authorities) as well as good theological reasons (in the doctrine of 
the two realms) why churches as such should better accept the more reserved approach 
proposed by Honecker in complicated matters of social and economic politics. Church-
endorsement in matters of politics has become problematic, and it can plausibly be 
claimed that Churches as such should enter the forum of public reason without “emphat-
ischen Postulaten einer (absoluten) theologischen Begründung.”1077 If bishops and 
church-officials interfere with political matters of basic justice  as they may freely do  
they in fact take on themselves an obligation to argue in terms of public reason, to con-
vince opponents by the means of good reasons, by referring to accessible moral values 
and by introducing sound political arguments. When churches (for instance through 
their officials) participate in public and political reasoning, they can normally be ex-
pected to go for reasonable arguments, valid within the strictly public forum, as required 
not least by the Rawlsian proviso.  
Accepting the more reserved approach of Honecker in complex matters of social ethics 
and politics,  thereby abstaining from “emphatischen Postulaten einer (absoluten) theo-
logischen Begründung”1078  does even not mean that complex matters of justice are to 
be ignored. There can for instance be little doubt that the difference principle, as intro-
duced by Rawls and discussed in all its complexity, raises crucial questions which 




However, in matters of complex socio-economic issues which “are nearly always open 
to wide differences of reasonable opinion […and] rest on complicated inferences and 
intuitive judgments that require us to assess complex social and economic information 
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 M. Honecker, Einführung in die Theologische Ethik, Grundlagen und Grundbegriffe (1990), p.vi.  
1077
 M. Honecker, Einführung in die Theologische Ethik, Grundlagen und Grundbegriffe (1990), p.vi. 
1078
 M. Honecker, Einführung in die Theologische Ethik, Grundlagen und Grundbegriffe (1990), p.vi. 
1079
 A church, taking “diaconia” as a central part of its mandate, can hardly avoid taking the more com-
plex questions implied in Rawls‟ second principle into account. There is, however, no agreement within 
the churches themselves about the political and socio-economical implications of “church-diaconia” (Let 
me define “diaconia”  not quite precisely  as “church-social-work”).  
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about topics poorly understood”1080, the opinions within churches as well as among 
citizens in general will obviously differ. The route from the principles and values given 
within the Christian (moral) doctrine, to the more complex matters of basic justice 
covered by Rawls‟ second principle, may be rather long and complicated to trace. But 
Christians, as citizens, as politicians, as judges, as participating in the public forum, 
should nevertheless be expected to seek for the most reasonable political principles of 
justice, to cohere with the comprehensive doctrine they honour.
1081
 
In fact both Rawls, from a political point of view, and Honecker, from a theological 
point of view, are faced with the question how to properly cope with the kind of pro-
blem actualised in the tension which is characteristic of a person, as simultaneously 
“Weltperson” and “Christperson”, or as both a citizen and a Christian.  
According to Honecker the ground-situation of man is characterised by his living both 
“coram deo” and “coram mundo”, and there may be a fundamental tension built into the 
very existence of the Christian, as being simultaneously “Christperson” and “Welt-
person”. This is a tension which cannot ultimately be escaped from or resolved by any 
political means accessible within the scheme of this world.
1082
 But, as simultaneously 
“Christperson” and “Weltperson”, a person can nevertheless be expected to strive to 
make his existence in both relations correspond.
1083
  
Rawls for his part is also  in a way  faced with the problem described as being simul-
taneously “Weltperson” and “Christperson”. As made clear Rawls does not treat this 
simultaneity as a theological problem, but as a political problem. For Rawls takes it for 
granted that citizens in modern pluralist societies are not just honouring a political 
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 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.229. 
1081
 If using Rawlsian terminology, the Christian doctrine should, however, only with some reservation be 
taken as a comprehensive moral doctrine, it should at the most be taken as partially comprehensive. And 
in a moral perspective it is open to different kinds of “substantialisation”. Let it, however, be noticed once 
more that “comprehensive” and “substantial” should better not be taken as synonymous. 
1082
 What Honecker characterised as “ein äonisches” approach to the doctrine of the two kingdoms is, as 
far as I can see, of importance for understanding the depth of this tension, built into the very ground-
situation of man in the world. But  as previously mentioned  the theological notion of the “world” , 
which is ambiguous in itself, should not unproblematically be introduced into a political context. 
1083
 Honecker all the way draws heavily upon the doctrine of the two realms. And it is important to stress 
that the two realms should be closely related in at least two respects. “Man darf freilich nicht übersehen, 
daß beide Reiche oder Regimente an zwei Stellen zusammentreffen, sich überschneiden: Einmal in Gott: 
beide Reiche sind Reiche Gottes, beide sind gleichermaßen vom Teufel bedroht, und sodann in der Person 
des Christen: er muß beide Reiche in seinem Gewissen vereinen können.”, M. Honecker, Das Recht des 
Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p. 157. This makes the “double-relation” of 
the Christian rather complex. 
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conception, but also have some higher-order interests, the first of which is a determinate 
conception of the good, as “interpreted in the light of some comprehensive religious, 
philosophical, or moral doctrine.”1084 It has to be taken into account that citizens are 
normally holding a political conception and simultaneously honouring a comprehensive 
(religious) doctrine. Therefore the question arises “How is it possible for citizens of 
faith to be wholehearted members of a democratic society?”1085 This question differs 
radically from the question I raised when asking who was entitled to endorse a Rawlsian 
conception on behalf of the church, and in which form. In a way one might say that the 
question, raised in the “Introduction to the Paperback Edition” of Political Liberalism 
(1996) is a more individualised one
1086
, indicating that the endorsing instance is fore-
most the citizen as member of society as a fair scheme of social co-operation.  
For an endorsement to be brought about, it is necessary that a Christian citizen can see 
his political reasoning (within the forum of public reason) as somehow coherent with 
the moral obligation he has as a Christian. This concern explains my thorough dis-
cussion of the issues of public reason and the duty of civility in the chapters 5 and 6. 
7.2. Theological social ethics  congruent with, or 
supportive of, or at least not in conflict with political 
liberalism, conceiving of an overlapping consensus? 
7.2.1. Comprehensive doctrines  relating themselves to a 
strictly political conception 
There are very different kinds of comprehensive doctrines, both philosophical, political, 
moral and religious. Rawls is therefore rather vague when choosing the terms that 
should most appropriately express the different ways comprehensive doctrines might 
expectedly be related to a strictly political ground-conception,  as for instance elabo-
rated in Political Liberalism. He is just stating; 
“… that there are many reasonable comprehensive doctrines that understand the 
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 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.74. 
1085
 J. Rawls, “Introduction to the Paperback Edition”, Political Liberalism (1996), p. xxxixf. 
1086
 The more individualistic perspective might at the first glance seem surprising since Rawls (and 
Honecker as well) is usually stressing the institutional perspective. But the two perspectives obviously 
complement one another. Of course social and political institutions should not be conceived of inde-
pendently of the persons affected by them. 
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wider realm of values to be congruent with, or supportive of , or else not in conflict 
with, political values as these are specified by a political conception of justice for a 
democratic regime.”1087.   
What is of interest here, is that Rawls allows for a strong and morally reflected way of 
relating comprehensives doctrines to a political (liberal) conception as well as a much 
weaker way of setting up a connection, apparently characterised by the mere absence of 
conflict.  
It also may be assumed that there are weaker and stronger ways that comprehensive 
doctrines might be supportive of a political view. One can for instance suppose that 
Rawlsian liberalism would have a much stronger support from within liberal theology, 
especially if influenced by Kantian philosophy, than from Barthian theology. On the 
other hand, one might expect that an overlap conceived of on Rawlsian liberal premises 
should receive very weak support, if not outright rejection by those tending towards 
religious fundamentalism. (In return Rawls may tend to label fundamentalism as un-
reasonable.) 
It is hard to say exactly what Rawls means with the terms he uses to propose ways in 
which reasonable comprehensive doctrines might relate to political liberalism,  saying 
for instance that a comprehensive doctrine may be “congruent” with a political concept-
ion.
1088
 But without doubt he starts with the stronger case, where doctrines and a politi-
cal conception are very closely connected, ending up with the weaker case, where one 
might hope only that they are not mutually exclusive. 
7.2.2. Three ways comprehensive doctrines might be expected 
to back up a political conception 
In lecture IV, § 8, of Political Liberalism Rawls raises the question; “Conceptions and 
Doctrines: How Related?” 1089 In relating conceptions and (comprehensive) doctrines he 
specifies different ways political liberal ideas of justice could possibly be supported 
from the side of comprehensive doctrines. Rawls presupposes that a supportive ap-
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 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.168f. 
1088
 In Webster‟s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language (1994 edition), 
„congruence‟ is just defined as “the quality or state of correspondence or agreeing.” (p.310). (Let it, 
however, be mentioned that being congruent with can for instance also be taken in a more precise 
meaning in geometry; as “coinciding on all points …”, p.310).  
1089
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), pp.168-172. 
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proach from the comprehensive doctrines might be given along different lines. He pre-
sents us with the following “approaches”: 
a) First there is what one should most appropriately characterise as a continuous way of 
connecting the comprehensive doctrine one might have to the political values.
1090
 The 
idea is that someone holding a comprehensive doctrine can consider the political con-
ception he holds as continuous with, or following directly from, the comprehensive doc-
trine one honours. Thereby the question of support can easily be handled. Rawls himself 
makes it for instance quite clear that the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, although in itself  
a comprehensive and controversial philosophical doctrine, could be taken as a “deduc-
tive basis of the political conception” formulated in political liberalism.1091 Rawls 
would most likely not establish such a close and continuous relation between a strictly 
political conception of liberalism and a theological doctrine. 
b) There might also be a relation between the comprehensive view and the political 
conception one holds that should best be characterised as a relation of approximation. 
This means that a (liberal) political conception can be considered “a satisfactory, per-
haps even the best workable approximation”1092 to central concerns within the particular 
moral doctrine one holds. Rawls takes the classical doctrine of utilitarianism (as elabo-
rated for instance by Bentham and Sidgwick) as a typical example of a doctrine that can 
be expected to endorse principles essential of political liberalism as principles that to a 
large extent can be approved of as the best workable approximation even when setting 
out from a criterion of maximising utility.
1093
 In a similar way one might think that the 
most one could hope for theologically, is that main concerns within a Rawlsian con-
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 Rawls can even characterise this way of relating doctrines and conceptions as “deductive”, although 
he immediately adds that it is not strictly deductive. Taking Kant as the most characteristic example Rawls 
is saying that; “Here the relation is deductive, even though the argument can hardly be set out very rigor-
ously. The point is that someone who affirms Kant‟s doctrine, or one similar to it, regards that view as the 
deductive basis of the political conception and in that way continuous with it.” J. Rawls, Political Liberal-
ism (1993), p.169. 
1091
 Cf. J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.169. For my part I would like to use the notion “continu-
ous” (that is also used by Rawls) instead of using the term “deductive”, which might easily be taken as too 
strong. 
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 Cf. J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.170. 
1093
 This is well worth noticing since Rawls in A Theory of Justice considers his own theory an alternative 
to Utilitarianism. “There are many forms of utilitarianism, and the development of the theory has con-
tinued in recent years. I shall not survey these forms here, nor take account of the numerous refinements 
found in contemporary discussions. My aim is to work out a theory of justice that represents an alternative 
to utilitarian thought generally and so all of these different versions of it.” J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice 
(1971), p.22.  
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ception of justice could be taken as the best approximation to central principles, which 
churches and most Christians hold to be in accordance with the Christian doctrine. 
c) To a wide extent I will especially take into account the two possibilities sketched 
above; seeing political values either as continuous with central values within the religi-
ous doctrine one holds, or as the best approximation. But I will bear in mind the fact 
that Rawls also allows for a third possibility; a political conception may simply be con-
sidered the best practical way of balancing different values and judgements that are 
characteristic of diverse “value-spheres”, which cannot be reconciled within one over-
arching and coherent comprehensive system. Thus life-reality is taken as consisting of 
different value-spheres and norm-codes, each with a high degree of autonomy and with 
an internal logic of its own.
1094
 However, the autonomy of each value-sphere cannot be 
taken as absolute. There are overlapping spheres of interest. Norms and values inherent 
in religion, science, economy, biology etc. might sometimes come into conflict, without 
any possibility of solving the conflict. A political conception, however, has to balance 
competing values and norm-codes in a fair way,  to make society function as a fair 
scheme of co-operation. A political conception which is successful in coping with this 
kind of pluralism by fairly balancing between competing values might be widely ap-
provable  all things considered. Such an approach can also be characterised by Rawls 
as a “pluralist” approach. 
Rawls summarises the three approaches sketched so far as follows: 
“True, each comprehensive view is related to the political conception in a different 
way. While they all endorse it, the first does so deductively supported and so con-
tinuous from within; the second as a satisfactory and possibly the best workable ap-
proximation given normal social conditions; and the last as resting on considered 
judgments balancing competing values, all things tallied up. No one accepts the pol-
itical conception driven by political compromise.”1095 
7.2.3. Political values rooted in the nature of faith itself? 
Even if there might be different ways comprehensive doctrines might be supportive of 
political values and rights, Rawls correctly assumes that there might be in the (reason-
able) religious doctrines themselves, as held by the churches and honoured by many 
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 This is a view that is also reflected in the idea of “Eigengesetzlichkeit”, which is sometimes closely 
connected to the doctrine of the two kingdoms.  
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citizens within modern societies, sufficient motives that can be expected to converge 
with and strengthen basic elements of a political conception worked out for a consti-
tutional democracy, securing elementary liberties and equal rights for the citizens.  
To demonstrate more concretely how this might be the case according to Rawls I shall 
take as an example the way he draws on John Locke‟s A Letter Concerning Toleration 
(1690) where the Christian background is obvious. Freedom of conscience as a political 
and religious liberty is taken to be one element where there can be supposed to be a kind 
of convergence between a political and a Christian perspective. The arguments that 
Locke uses for claiming this elementary kind of freedom in society are partly theological 
ones (for instance that “only faith and inward sincerity gain our salvation and acceptance 
with God” and that one “cannot be compelled by force to belief”) and partly more speci-
fic political ones (for instance that “excommunication does not affect civil relation-
ship”).1096 As far as I can see, Rawls, supported by Locke, thereby takes for granted that 
the very principle of toleration that is of crucial importance for fair coexistence in so-
ciety, can also be essentially rooted in the nature of faith itself. People might be sup-
posed to affirm “a principle of toleration and underwrite the fundamental liberties of a 
constitutional regime”1097 on the basis of central motives within the religious doctrine 
they hold. 
By his reference to the nature of free faith, Rawls (supported by Locke), deliberately 
connects  not to something peripheral within the Christian religion  but to something 
essential. Some vital (political) liberties, as for instance the freedom of conscience and 
the liberties which correspond with this basic freedom, can be supposed to follow from 
the very nature of faith. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
1095
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.171. 
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”This idea is illustrated by various of Locke‟s statements in A Letter Concerning Toleration (1690). 
He says such things as: 1) God has given no man authority over another (p.129);  2) no man can abandon 
the care of his own salvation to the care of another (pp. 129, 139, 154);  3) the understanding cannot be 
compelled by force to belief (p.129);  4) the care of men‟s soul is not given to the magistrate as that would 
determine faith by where we were born (p.130);  5) a church is a voluntary society and no man is bound to 
any particular church and he may leave it as freely as he enters (p.131);  6) excommunication does not 
affect civil relationships (p.134);  7) only faith and inward sincerity gain our salvation and acceptance 
with God (p.143).” .J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p.145, note 12. (Rawls‟ page references are to the 
edition of J.W.Gough, Two Treatises of Government with A Letter on Toleration, 1956). 
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 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), p.145. I cannot here enter into the full debate about toleration 
and Christian faith, but let me just refer to an instructive book on the issue, recently published: I. Broer 
and R. Schlüter (Hrsg.), Christentum und Toleranz (1996). 
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By using this central example, Rawls demonstrates that there might be good reason to 
believe that (the Christian) religion with its account of free faith  and on premises of its 
own  can underwrite some of the most fundamental liberties, rights and political 
values, taken by Rawls as the core for an overlapping consensus.
1098
 In this case the line 
from the comprehensive religious doctrine to central political values may even be taken 
as rather continuous. 
7.3. “Vermittlung” once more 
There is no reason to deny that one can plausibly postulate that there may be a continuity 
between the nature of Christian faith and the defence for freedom of conscience and 
principles of toleration. But I cannot conclude by just postulating some kind of contin-
uity, even if it might be important enough to find some convergent concerns in political 
liberalism and in the Christian doctrine. Let me instead conclude this chapter by em-
phasising some aspects that were of importance when I considered Martin Honecker‟s 
“model of transformation” characterised by the seeking for a “Vermittlung von Motiva-
tion und rationaler Evidenz” within the domain of social ethics.1099. 
I. Before considering the idea of “Vermittlung”, however, it is necessary to recall that 
Honecker all the way employs a theological fundamental distinction, which reflects the 
hermeneutic key-distinction between law and gospel, and most obviously gets manifest 
in the doctrine of the two realms. The doctrine of the two kingdoms  if really taking the 
worldly realm as a domain of political reason  would seem to go well with the idea of 
grounding an overlapping consensus which can be widely recognised as reasonable,  
since the idea of the political domain, as a commonplace for common reasoning and 
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 It might be of some interest now also to notice how W. Huber and H.E.Tödt consider the realisation 
of religious liberty,  citing from “die von der Ersten Vollversammlung des ÖRK in Amsterdam 1948 
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und politischen Gemeinschaft offen auszusprechen. 3. Jeder Mensch hat das Recht, sich mit anderen zu-
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religiöse Organisation, die entsprechend den Rechten der Einzelperson gebildet oder aufrechterhalten 
wird, hat das Recht, selbst ihre Grundsätze und ihre Praxis im Dienste der Ziele zu bestimmen für die sie 
sich selbst entschieden hat.” W. Huber and H. E. Tödt: Menschenrechte. Perspektiven einer menschlichen 
Welt (1977), p.211. Huber and Tödt can obviously ascribe to religious liberty some paradigmatic signifi-
cance for the whole field of liberties and rights. 
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 M. Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p. 155. 
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social co-operation is crucial within Honecker‟s social ethics, just as it is within Rawls‟ 
conception. According to Honecker theological social ethics should legitimately  and 
as far as possible  contribute to “die Bildung eines ethischen Konsensus durch ratio-
nale Diskussion…”1100 This seems to be Honecker‟s basis for entering into a dialogue 
with Rawls about a possible “overlap”. And Rawls for his part would certainly also 
avoid confusing a genuinely religious doctrine with a strictly political and reasonable 
conception. I think it is important to stress this approach, before adding that Honecker 
will also avoid advancing a model of separation (as made quite clear in chapter 5.4.2.1.: 
neither a “Trennungsmodell” nor an “Identitätsmodell” will do.) But this means that the 
theological “fundamental distinction” used by Honecker has to be taken into account in 
the moment one seeks “Vermittlung von Motivation und rationaler Evidenz”. 
The model of “Vermittlung” presented by Honecker establishes as far as I can see a 
certain continuity between the comprehensive (moral) doctrine one holds and the basic 
political and reasonable values one advances. Let me therefore once more briefly recall 
the stages of Honecker‟s three-levels-model of transformation (“Vermittlung”). Hon-
ecker holds that: 
 There is in the Christian doctrine a strong motivating force towards a moral commit-
ment. 
 Basic assumptions about man, including values and norms closely connected with 
these assumptions, are to be transformed into groundvalues, which can reasonably be 
shared by all human beings. 
 On the most concrete level, however, where groundvalues are to be realised, Hon-
ecker can open up even for a more pragmatic and situational approach, as I made 
clear in chapter 5. 
This means that the very idea of “Vermittlung” elaborated by Honecker implies a 
“transformation”, especially in the sense that vital assumptions about man, which are 
implied in the Christian belief, seek at a transformation into groundvalues, i.e. such 
values that are assumed to be widely recognisable in a society.
1101
 The “worldly realm” 
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 For this aim, let me once more refer to M. Honecker, Sozialethik zwischen Tradition und Vernunft 
(1977), p.200. 
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 I recall that according to Honecker should “Grundwerte … den fundamentalen Wertkonsensus einer 
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is taken as a domain where groundvalues, basic principles of justice and fundamental 
rights can and should properly be settled by political reason,  even if each citizen is 
simultaneously drawing on moral resources and ground-motives inherent in the par-
ticular doctrine he holds. This means that there is a driving force inherent in Christian 
belief itself towards a transformation into standards, norms, criteria and practices that 
can be reasonably argued for and rationally assessed through public reasoning. By using 
terms like “transformation” in this connection (instead of making Christian social ethics 
a matter of mere “derivation” from some dogmatic principles), Honecker is very much 
concerned about avoiding all tendencies to “politischen Programmatik”1102 from the side 
of theological social ethics.  
II. This may explain why Honecker so often stresses the role the reason should play 
within social ethics and politics. He is – as underlined – very much aware of the crisis of 
reason and of ethics, and he does in now way ignore the challenge of postmodern-
ism.
1103
 Even if this is so he sees no alternative, except for irrationalism and even vio-
lance, to taking reason, with its obvious limitations and iherent ambivalence as the 
shared means of establishing a system of social cooperation.
1104
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
Gesellschaft bezeichnen.” M. Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische Sozial-
ethik (1978), p.169. “Grundwerte” as conceived of by Honecker should in themselves be taken as an 
“overlapping” phenomenon, which can be discussed, assessed and recognised by all citizens, even if they 
hold diverse religious beliefs. The groundvalues for the political domain, which Honecker focuses, seem 
rather uncontroversial (as is for instance also the case for the list of primary goods proposed by Rawls). 
And he adds that “Grundwerte” can be converted into “Grundrechte”, setting elementary standards for all 
citizens. In his book about Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik (1978) 
Honecker makes a clear distinction between “Grundrechte” and “Grundwerte”. The former are the rights 
of citizens, guaranteed by the state according to the constitutional laws of a society. Honecker can there-
fore say that: “Grundrechte sind in der Verfassung eines States positivierte Menschenrechte”(Ibid., p.188) 
while “Grundwerte sind gesellschaftliche Maßstäbe. Sie sollen Orientierungspunkte allgemeinmensch-
lichen Handelns sein.”Ibid., p.185.  
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 M. Honecker, Sozialethik zwischen Tradition und Vernunft (1977), p.117. 
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 These aspects are very clearly stessed in his article on “Ethikkrise  Krisenethik: Die Hinterfragung 
der Vernunft im ethischen Urteil”, in: Das Ethos der Liberalität. Festschrift für HERMANN RINGELING 
zum fünfundsechzigen Geburtstag (1994), pp.81-94. 
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 “Die vorherigen Überlegungen haben die Ambivalenz, die inneren Widersprüchlichkeit im Verständ-
nis von Vernunft gezeigt. Ist es dann aber noch sinnvoll, sich überhaupt auf Vernunft zu berufen? Ist 
Rationalität nicht unvernünftig? Allein, was wäre die Alternative? Unvernunft, Übervernunft oder Gewalt? 
Die Aufforderung „Lasst uns miteinander vernünftig reden‟ ist ein Appell an Gewaltfreie Verständigung… 
Gibt es zur Vernunft eine Alternative  ausser der Unvernunft und blinden Gewalt? Wäre etwa die Autori-
tät der Offenbarung nicht ein finsterer Grund für eine Ethik als die fragile, unsichere Vernunft ihn anbiten 
kann? Der israelische Schriftsteller Amos Oz soll freilich einmal gesagt haben, aus dem Glauben sei 
Schlimmeres erwachsen als aus der Skepsis.” M.Honecker , “Ethikkrise  Krisenethik: Die Hinterfragung 
der Vernunft im ethischen Urteil”, in: Das Ethos der Liberalität. Festschrift für HERMANN RINGELING 
zum fünfundsechzigen Geburtstag (1994), p. 89f.  
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But it is important to see that it is the communicative aspect of reason which is to be 
stressed in this connection.
1105
 The Christian cannot introduce within the public field 
some kind of privileged political insight, but has nevertheless a moral commitment to 
enter into the role of “eines Dialogpartners im Orientierungsprozeß der Gesell-
schaft…”1106 Simultaneously, however, there is good reason  especially from a 
theological point of view  to be sceptical towards all “soteriological” ambitions 
inherent in ratio. Thus Honecker criticises tendencies within an age of modernity.  
“Der Vernunftanspruch der Aufklärung ging dahin, den Fortschritt und die Humani-
tät als Folge vernünftigen Handelns zu erwarten. Vernunft und logische Ansprüche 
konkurrierten miteinander, weil beide je für sich soteroiologische Ansprüche ver-
traten. Wenn Vernunft das Heil, die Rettung der Welt gewährleisten soll, wird sie 
soteriologisch. Eine soteriologisch verstandene Vernunft ist in der Tat theologisch 
zu hinterfragen; für dieses Hinterfragen findet sich dann bei Luther Anleitung. Nur 
eine Vernunft, die sich nicht als Erlösungsmacht und Glaubensautorität betätigt, 
kann zu einer pragmatischen Vernunftethik führen.
1107
 
This explains how Honecker can still find it possible to define the “worldly realm” as a 
domain of reason. And it also explains the pragmatic approach he takes within the field 
of politics and social ethics. But it is in my opinion also important to see that a situatio-
nal and pragmatic approach is to be framed. It should clearly be stressed “daß alle ge-
nannten Sachverhalte bezogen sind auf den einen Wert der Personwürde.”1108 Thus 
Honecker comes rather close to Rawls in one aspect: The reasonable is in the end to be 
morally qualified. Stressing the communicative aspect does even not mean that all sub-
stantive ideas are relativised or outweighed by mer procedural rules. Using Rawls‟ own 
words, one might say that the concern for basic liberties and rights, as advanced by pol-
itical liberalism, might be approved of as approximative to
1109
 or corresponding to 
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hensive doctrine and a view taking them as the result of a legitimate balancing of competing norms. 
Sometimes Honecker comes rather close to Rawls‟ third approach, stressing that theological ethics must 
“pluralistisch … ansetzen”. There are in society diverse fields of relative “Eigengesetzlichkeit” and there 
are competing norms that must be balanced. Theological ethics, seeking principles for coexistence, should 
take into account and legitimately balance existing norm-codes, values given in history and tradition, dif-
ferent kinds of experiences and hope, as well as specifically Christian insights. In the article on “Das Pro-
 427 
central assumptions about man implied in the Christian (moral) doctrine.  
III. I have already underlined that the recognition of an overlapping consensus might 
help strengthening the most fundamental standards covered by Rawls‟ first principle, 
allowing, however, for considerable flexibility in the more complex matters covered by 
the second principle. Churches as well as Christians must realise what Rawls has so 
clearly seen himself,  that “we can expect more agreement about whether the principles 
for the basic rights and liberties are realized than about whether the principles for social 
and economic justice are realised.”1110 I have even suggested that I  in accordance with 
Honecker  find it problematic, especially for the church(es) as such, to advance one 
particular political practice or philosophical conception, especially if it goes beyond the 
concern for the most elementary liberties, freedom of conscience and basic rights, as 
Rawls conception obviously also does. Primarily it is the Christian, as simultaneously 
“Christperson” and “Weltperson”, who is to provide for the “Vermittlung” in matters of 
social ethics and within the shared public domain. And he has to cope with uncertainty 
and conflicts, he will also have to comply with the disagreement of co-citizens as well 
as co-Christians, and I think that both Honecker and Rawls would agree that the tension 
there may be between one‟s existence as “Christperson” and as “Weltperson” first of all 
has to be handled out within the comprehensive view(s) persons hold. A Christian 
citizen will naturally strive to see his political obligation as continuous with or coherent 
with the moral commitment he has as a Christian person, without making the latter a 
derivative basis for the former, ending up with some kind of substantive and religiously 
grounded “politischen Programmatik”. 
IV. One can find a shared concern between Honecker and Rawls in the way the former 
establishes a model of “Vermittlung”, aiming at a transformation of Christian motives 
into (liberal) groundvalues, which can be widely shared, publicly discussed and reason-
ably assessed by (nearly) all human beings, and in the way the latter lets religious argu-
ments into the public forum, provided they can be transformed into publicly accessible 
reasons, thus satisfying the Rawlsian proviso. There are convergent concerns in their 
                                                                                                                                                                          
blem des theologischen Konstruktivismus” Honecker accordingly underlines that, “… dann kann auch 
theologische Ethik sich nicht allein auf Offenbarung berufen, sondern muß unterschiedlich, heute müßte 
man sagen: pluralistisch ansetzen”. Zeitschrift für evangelische Ethik (1980), p.100. I think that the very 
important phrase here is “nicht allein”.  
1110
 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), ..229. 
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respective conceptions, which goes deeper than to just being a fortunate coincidence.
1111
 
Both Rawls and Honecker provide for the required continuity between citizens‟ religi-
ous commitment and their political obligation. One should, however, be rather flexible 
when defining the different ways a continuity may take form. Honecker has made it 
clear that it would be the easier task to say how a continuity should not be defined. (He 
opposes the tendencies to “politischen Programmatik”). But Honecker for his part stres-
ses that the Christian doctrine provides support for the very reasonableness of politics,  
provided that the notion of the reasonable is morally qualified, as is the case in a Rawls-
ian reasonable “overlap”. Thus I think Honecker would support the consensual efforts of 
political liberalism in so far as they prove morally and politically reasonable. And I be-
lieve that Rawls should support Honecker, when claiming “daß alle genannten Sachver-
halte bezogen sind auf den einen Wert der Personwürde” [and that accordingly] sind 
Institutionen oder Sozialprinzipien lediglich auf diesen Wert bezogen”.1112  
                                                          
1111
 It may be of interest to see how such convergence or deeper interdependence between theological and 
political perspectives is outlined in a recently published Dictionary of Ethics, Theology and Society: 
“Some general relations between society in its widest sense, and ETHICS and THEOLOGY can be de-
termined. The first is one of interdependence; hitherto every society has presupposed a theology, every 
theology has presupposed a society and both presuppose and generate mores that when reflected on 
becomes ethics. In general terms an absolutist theology goes with an absolutist society, together with its 
associational mores and practices. A closed theology goes with a closed society with its closed mores, 
practices and ethical reflections; an open theology goes with an open society, while a diverse theology 
goes with a diverse society. Any attempt to modify this linkage is fraught with difficulty. To take one 
example, an absolutist and closed theology will not sit well with an open society or an open ethical out-
look.” P. B. Clarke in: Dictionary of Ethics, Theology and Society (1996, Article on SOCIETY), p.775. 
To some extent the correspondence between Rawls and Honecker may in many respects be taken as a 
result of their shared concern for some of the human values, rights and liberties traditionally promoted by 
liberalism. 
1112
 M. Honecker, Das Recht des Menschen. Einführung in die evangelische Sozialethik (1978), p.169. 
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